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ABSTRACT	  
 
This thesis analyses financialisation in developing countries.  Financialisation is first 
theoretically located within the distinctive characteristics of the contemporary world 
market, namely the internationalisation of the circuits of capital and the use of the 
dollar as world money.  This context presents novel sources of funding and 
investment opportunities and places new demands on enterprises, banks and 
households. 
 
As a consequence, characteristic sectoral transformations – the tendencies of 
financialisation – can be identified across advanced and emerging economies.  I find 
that enterprises use retained earnings and market-based finance to engage in financial 
investment; banks exploit global pools of liquidity and draw profits from investment 
banking and household loans; and households have become reliant on financial 
intermediation, increasing indebtedness and assuming market risk.  Significantly, 
these tendencies are not homogeneous; their particular form reflects their institutional 
context. 
 
The form taken in the periphery is theorised to be subordinate, shaped by imperial 
relations between states.  Subordinate financialisation involves the subjugation of 
domestic monetary policies to the imperatives of international capital; the turn of 
domestic corporations to global markets requiring engagement in derivatives, the 
assumption of market risk and the surrender of profits to foreign investors; and debt-
financed consumption by an elite who seek to hold their wealth in world money. 
 
The foundations of subordinate financialisation in Mexico lay in the state’s response 
to crises, and the failure to establish developmental finance.  Financial statement 
analysis reveals that listed enterprises have turned away from banks and towards 
bond financing; fixed investment has fallen while investment in liquid financial 
assets has grown, reflecting involvement in the carry trade.  Econometric evidence 
corroborates the financialisation postulate that the availability of different forms of 
financing influences firms’ financialised investment behaviour.  Foreign investors 
have participated in the financialisation of the Mexican enterprise, while the Mexican 
state’s defence of their interests and those of the firms they invest in has ominous 
implications for development.  
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Chapter	  1	  	  
Introduction	  
 
 
According to the Bank of Mexico, the external debt of private companies 
operating in Mexico reached 92 billion dollars by the end of 2012, a 15.4 
per cent increase over the record level achieved in 2011.  
(Zúñiga, 2013, author’s translation) 
 
The group of financial institutions, a majority of which are controlled by 
foreign firms, earned net profits last year of 87,126 million pesos, 20.6 
per cent more than those of 2011 and growing at a rate five times that of 
the expected rate of economic growth for the same period, according to a 
report from the National Commission on Banking and Securities. 
(Amador, 2013a, author’s translation) 
 
The payday loans of nearly half a million workers that have borrowed 
from commercial banks are non-performing, representing 10.21 per cent 
of such loans outstanding, said the National Commission for the Defence 
of Financial Services Users. 
(V. Cardoso, 2013a, author’s translation)  
 
Industrial firms’ integration into international financial markets, record profits of 
banks emanating from investment banking activities and lending to individuals, and 
rising levels of household indebtedness: In this thesis I will argue that these are not a 
series of unconnected stylised facts, but systemic characteristics reflecting a 
structural transformation in the relations between enterprises, banks and workers.  
This transformation, representing the financialisation of the process of capital 
accumulation, has unfolded amongst the advanced internationalisation of the world 
market.  As such, the tendencies of financialisation are global, while the form in 
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which they are experienced in any one time or space is contingent on an array of 
institutional factors.  In emerging capitalist economies, such as Mexico, the 
particular form taken, as shaped by imperial relations, is a subordinate one.  This has 
critical implications for investment, employment, growth and stability. 
 In the following section, I outline my motivation and objectives in carrying 
out this research and the original contributions of this thesis to academic 
understanding of the issues which it addresses.  This demands first a brief discussion 
of the understanding of ‘finance’ and its role in capital accumulation which I will 
draw upon.  In the second section, I present the research questions posed, hypotheses 
advanced and methodologies employed in each of the three major parts of this work. 
 
1.1	  MOTIVATION,	  OBJECTIVES	  AND	  CONTRIBUTION	  
 
The motivation for this thesis came from my personal experience with and academic 
interest in finance1 as a pivotal issue for development. I lived in Thailand during the 
Asian crisis of 1997-8, Argentina during the collapse which began in 2001, and the 
UK when the bankruptcy of Northern Rock ushered in what is now referred to as the 
‘Great Recession’.  In each instance, finance lay at the heart of both boom and bust, 
with severe consequences for people’s livelihoods.  For a long time economists of 
disparate political orientations have agreed that finance plays a decisive role in the 
process of capital accumulation and its vicissitudes (for example Marx, 2004[1867]; 
Schumpeter, 1912; Keynes, 1930; Sayers, 1960), though this judgment has not been 
without its dissenting voices (for example Walras, 1954[1874]; Arrow & Debreu, 
1954; Fama, 1980; Rochon, 1999).  These differences of opinion over finance 
emanate from different analyses of the origins of finance and the role it is assumed to 
play.  
                                                
1 Throughout this work, the term ‘finance’ (or ‘financial system’) is used as a highly abstract term 
encompassing financial institutions and financial capital.  ‘Financial institutions’ are understood as 
those agents whose primary interest lies in the circulation of financial capital, including, but not 
limited to, the central monetary authority, commercial banks, investment banks and non-bank 
financial intermediaries.  ‘Financial capital’ is employed here heuristically to refer to forms of capital 
apart from commodity capital and productive capital.  This includes money-dealing capital, interest-
bearing capital, loanable money capital and fictitious capital (more on these in footnote four); these 
forms of capital should be understood as distinct from the agents which deal in them.  Finally, 
‘financial capital’ must be distinguished from the term ‘finance capital’, a historically-specific term 
developed by Rudolf Hilferding (1981) to describe the amalgam of banking and industrial capital. 
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Finance pre-dates capitalism but, in parallel with the emergence of the 
multiple conditions necessary for the capitalist mode of production2, it assumes an 
expressly capitalist form. Emerging spontaneously from the circuit of capital, finance 
initially takes the form of merchants’ credit granted to one another, and the 
accumulation of hordes by capitalist producers themselves3.  Banks develop as 
specialised money-dealing institutions that sit outside the circuit and yet are integral 
to it.  They perform multiple functions including, but not limited to: centralising 
social capital through the aggregation of idle and interest-bearing capitals 4 ; 
accelerating the turnover of the circuit through the specialised provision of credit; 
and allocating loanable money capital between capitalist producers, thereby 
supporting the equalisation of the rate of profit across sectors of the economy.  As 
capitalism matures, a market is established between banks to allow them to carry out 
their functions on a national and eventually international scale.  The central bank 
emerges at the apex of this system, regulating the money market, standing at the 
confluence of capital and the state, and intervening on behalf of the interests of 
national capital in the development of the world market.   
From these various functions emerges the influence of the financial system 
over the pace and direction of capital accumulation, and hence its attraction to 
governments as a lever of power.  At the same time, from the outset there exists a 
tension between finance and industry.  Finance earns a share of the total surplus 
value generated by industrial capital in the sphere of production.  While the 
malleability of financial capital gives to it its power to expand the process of 
                                                
2 These include, but are not limited to, the alienation of the working class from the means of 
production, the subsumption of labour to capital, the development of the forces of production, and the 
presence of money.  
3 This understanding of the emergence and development of finance draws heavily upon the work of 
Lapavitsas (1999; 2003, 2013).   
4 Within a Marxian framework, I draw upon the work of Lapavitsas (1999; 1997, 2000, 2013) in my 
understanding of the various forms of financial capital.  Money-dealing capital, which develops into 
banking capital, performs integral services for the sphere of circulation, such as account-keeping, 
holding deposits, transferring funds, etc..  For this it receives the average rate of profit obtained by 
commercial and industrial capital.  Interest-bearing, or loanable money capital, both gathers idle funds 
outside the circuit of capital and creates new liabilities endogenously within the credit system.  These 
it directs towards productive and non-productive activities and consumption.  It earns a share of total 
surplus value, but, unlike money-dealing or banking capital, it earns interest rather than the average 
rate of profit.  Fictitious capital refers to the advance of money capital in anticipation of future surplus 
value production rather than representing already realised surplus value; it is remunerated by a 
discounted stream of future revenues. 
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accumulation and accelerate the turnover of capital, thereby indirectly contributing to 
the generation and realisation of surplus value, it may also give rise to speculative 
bubbles in economic activity and even outright ‘predation, fraud and thievery’ 
(Harvey, 2003, p. 147).  This pro-cyclical and predatory behavior can damage the 
prospects for surplus value creation. 
According to this understanding of finance, the critical question for 
development is not how to deepen financial markets per se, but rather what is the 
appropriate form and size that finance should take, and what are the appropriate 
functions that it should serve?  I want to pose these questions not only because of 
their importance for accumulation and economic growth, but also because of their 
influence over a range of real outcomes including wages, employment, levels of 
inequality and environmental sustainability. 
  Finance is therefore a critical issue for development.  This is how I 
approached the phenomenon of financialisation, or, as it is broadly characterised, the 
“… increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and 
financial institutions in the operation of the domestic and the international 
economies.” (Epstein, 2005, p. 3)  From this perspective, the extant scholarship on 
financialisation exhibits three major weaknesses.  First, the literature limits its focus 
to a handful of advanced capitalist economies, and either explicitly or implicitly 
places financialisation within the pro-crustean container of the nation-state.  Second, 
the literature dichotomises the interests of predatory finance against those of the 
‘real’ economy, and focuses on flows of capital from the latter to the former.  Third, 
the rise of finance is ascribed to policy errors, or a bureaucracy which has been 
captured by a financial elite, often described as a rentier class.  
 In contrast to this, my objective is to assess whether and how financialisation 
is occurring in the periphery 5 .  This demands, first, a global theory of 
                                                
5 In an international context, the ‘core’ is normally used to indicate the advanced capitalist economies 
of Western Europe, the United States, Canada and Japan.  These economies are traditionally 
associated with higher-profit, higher-technology, higher-wage, and more diversified production.  The 
remaining countries form the ‘periphery’, trapped in lower-profit, lower-technology, lower-wage and 
less diversified production.  Some authors (Marini, 1972; Wallerstein, 1976) have argued that 
hegemons in each region, such as Mexico, Brazil and South Africa form a semi-periphery, having 
characteristics of both core and peripheral economies.  Within the core itself, regions such as Southern 
and Eastern Europe are often said to form a periphery (Lapavitsas et al., 2012).  For the purposes here, 
these terms are to be understood as indicators of countries’ relative place in relation to global 
production chains and financial markets, and not as teleologically-derived or static categories. 
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financialisation; second, an understanding of the impact of core-periphery relations 
on that theory; and, third, rigorous investigation of the empirical purchase of this 
theoretical framework in emerging capitalist economies.  In support of the 
formulation of such theory, I employ an understanding of finance which, while in 
tension with industry, sees it as integral to capital accumulation and, far from serving 
as a residual pool of capital, possesses its own distinctive and coherent institutions 
and imperatives.  Finally, while I acknowledge a critical role for policy, I want to 
explore the structural dynamics of financialisation.       
 In this thesis, I make three original contributions to the field.  First, I develop 
a global theory of financialisation which locates the phenomenon within the 
contemporary characteristics of the world market.  This will allow the elaboration of 
the essential tendencies of financialisation, to be distinguished from the varying 
forms it may take reflecting specific institutional configurations.  Second, I argue that 
as a global phenomenon, financialisation must reproduce the hierarchies of imperial 
relations, resulting in a distinctive form of financialisation in the periphery, which I 
have called subordinate financialisation.  While incorporating the essential 
tendencies of financialisation as witnessed in the core, financialisation in the 
periphery will exhibit distinctive characteristics.  Third, in support of these 
arguments, I provide original empirical evidence of the tendencies and forms of 
financialisation across both advanced and emerging capitalist economies.  The 
highlight of this is a detailed study of the financialisation of the non-financial 
corporation in Mexico using financial statement analysis and innovative econometric 
techniques.  
 
1.2	  RESEARCH	  QUESTIONS,	  HYPOTHESES	  AND	  METHODOLOGY	  
 
This thesis is organised in three parts.  Before the first part begins, chapter two is 
devoted to an elaboration of both the broader methodology and the specific methods 
adopted.  I will argue that the problems which this thesis addresses demand the use 
of critical political economy; within this methodological framework, empirical 
investigation of the specific research questions addressed has required the analysis of 
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national accounts, historical analysis of class relationships, and the application of 
econometric techniques to firms’ financial statement data.   
In the first part of the thesis, comprising chapters three and four, I assess the 
literature and set out a general theory of financialisation in a capitalist world market; 
this theory is supported by original empirical analysis of financialisation in advanced 
capitalist economies (ACEs)6.  In the second part, chapters five and six, I turn to the 
development of a theory of financialisation in the periphery, or subordinate 
financialisation, and assess empirical evidence from a survey of emerging capitalist 
economies (ECEs), with a focus on Mexico.  The third part, covering chapters seven 
to nine, descends from the higher level of abstraction of the previous chapters to 
account for the institutional specificities of financialisation in Mexico, with a focus 
on the non-financial corporation.  Each of these parts addresses a particular set of 
research questions, advances distinctive hypotheses and employs a variety of 
methods.  I turn to these now. 
 
1.2.1	  	  Financialisation	  in	  a	  capitalist	  world	  market	  
 
The extant literature, examined in chapter three, fails to address financialisation as a 
global phenomenon.  Instead financialisation has been investigated as if it emerged 
out of the conditions of the nation-state, predominantly in the countries of the core.  
This emergence is linked causally either to policy decisions taken under the influence 
of a rentier class, or to inadequately specified structural forces.  In contrast, my 
hypothesis is that financialisation is a global phenomenon reflecting an epochal 
transformation in the relations between the agents of capitalism and located within 
the contemporary characteristics of the world market7.  Therefore, I expect to see the 
essential tendencies of financialisation reproduced across a range of countries, but 
taking on distinctive forms related to specific institutional configurations. 
                                                
6 I use the terms ‘advanced capitalist economies’, or ACEs, and ‘core countries’ interchangeably.  
Similarly, ‘emerging capitalist economies’, or ECEs, and ‘peripheral countries’ are intended to refer 
to the same group of countries.  This avoids the increasingly anachronistic term ‘industrialised 
economies’ and the problematic differentiation of countries according to income levels (‘high-
income’, ‘medium-income’, etc.).  See footnote five. 
7 The concept of the world market is discussed in detail in chapter three. 
Chapter	  1	  	  Introduction	  
 
17 
 
The stagnation of accumulation and falling profitability experienced in the 
economies of the core in the 1970s provided the conditions from which these states 
and their constituent capitalist classes were able to advance a neo-liberal agenda, 
marked by the liberalisation of trade and financial flows, and the repression of 
labour.  The ensuing period of development of the world market has been 
characterised by the deepening of the internationalisation of the circuits of 
commodity and money capital, the unprecedented internationalisation of the circuit 
of productive capital, and the role of the US dollar as world money8.  It is important 
to note that these characteristics of the world market are distinct from those which 
prevailed during previous periods of financial expansion9.  
The work of Lapavitsas and the RMF School10 (for example 2009a, 2011, 
2013) has revealed how transnational corporations have exploited these conditions to 
access a growing global pool of liquidity that has itself been fed by pension 
privatisation and financial deregulation.  As a result, enterprises have replaced 
external financing from commercial banks with the issuance of market-based 
securities, and acquired the capacity to engage in both hedging and speculative 
financial investment.  Banks have become increasingly active in international capital 
markets, and have compensated for the decline in their traditional commercial loan 
portfolio with an increased role in investment banking activities and the 
intermediation of household reproduction. In combination with wage repression, this 
has led to increasing household indebtedness in an attempt to maintain living 
standards.   
From this theoretical framework, in chapter four I construct innovative 
sectoral indicators – using national accounts, banking and industrial data – that 
capture the presence of the tendencies of financialisation.  What emerges from the 
application of this analysis to a selection of advanced capitalist economies11 is, first, 
                                                
8 The concept of world money is discussed in detail in chapter three. 
9 Commonly mentioned among such periods of financial expansion are: the Dutch ‘tulipmania’ of the 
1630s; the South Sea and Mississipi bubbles of the 1720s; the expansion of imperial finance of the 
1870s; and the US stock bubble of the late 1920s (Kindleberger, 2011).  In Marxist scholarship, the 
imperial period, for example, is linked with the rise of monopoly capital during the 
internationalisation of the circuit of money capital (Fine & Harris, 1979). 
10 Research on Money and Finance (RMF), based out of the Department of Economics, SOAS, 
University of London. 
11 France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States 
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that firms across the sample are turning away from finance through relationship 
lending and towards retained earnings and market-based finance, and re-orienting 
their business to hold a greater share of financial relative to fixed assets. These trends 
are particularly pronounced in large enterprises.  Second, banks have moved to a 
smaller loan share of assets, shifting from income on long-term interest spreads to 
short-term spreads on repo markets and fees on investment banking activities.  
Within the loan portfolio, there has been a pronounced shift to lending to households 
and for real estate.  The banks’ source of finance has moved from traditional deposits 
to short-term borrowing from the money market, especially from other financial 
institutions.  Within this overall story of convergence, Japanese and German banks 
retain a distinctive character, though evidence is provided of the financialised path 
taken by large German banks.  Third, in the household sector, Japan and Germany 
stand apart from the general trend towards falling deposits and increased holdings of 
market-based securities.  Housing loans account for three quarters of liabilities in the 
US, the UK and France; while in Germany and Japan, though the trend is rising, 
housing loans still only represent half of household liabilities.  These differences 
reflect variations in industrial policies, pension and housing provision and the 
organisation of finance in these countries. 
 
1.2.2	  	  Subordinate	  financialisation	  in	  the	  periphery	  
 
The literature has only begun to investigate financialisation in the emerging capitalist 
economies.  As far as I am aware, there is as yet no theory which coherently accounts 
for the distinctive nature of financialisation in the periphery.  Drawing upon the 
theoretical foundations that are established in chapter three, I argue in chapter five 
that as financialisation is a global phenomenon located in the contemporary 
characteristics of the world market, and since the world market is itself moulded by 
imperial relations, I expect financialisation to take a subordinate form in countries of 
the periphery. 
At the macroeconomic level, subordinate financialisation will not be 
reducible to the quantity or direction of capital flows at any one time, but discernible 
by the volatility of these flows and the subjection of domestic monetary policy to the 
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imperatives of international capital markets.  The characteristic turn of large non-
financial corporations towards market-based finance in advanced capitalist 
economies will see firms of the periphery turn disproportionately to foreign capital, 
allowing the extraction of a share of the domestically-generated surplus.  Globally-
integrated firms, operating from open economies which do not issue world money, 
must participate in derivatives markets and will come under increasing competitive 
pressure to assume speculative positions in a range of financial assets.  As in 
advanced capitalist economies, banks’ tendency will be towards greater reliance on 
international money markets, and a turn towards lending to households.  They are 
subject to increased price risk, while the macroeconomic impact of lending to 
households will be limited by the distinctive class structure of ECEs.  The turn of 
corporations, both financial and non-financial, to international capital markets may 
hold back the development of the domestic financial sector, dependent on state-
capital relations.  Finally, as in advanced capitalist economies, it is expected that 
financialisation in ECEs will be marked by households’ increasing indebtedness 
accompanied by rising holdings of financial assets.  This will be distinguished by the 
markedly different class structure in ECEs, and the desire of wealthy households to 
hold a greater share of their assets denominated in world money.   
 In chapter six, I deploy similar techniques to those used in chapter four, in 
constructing indicators of financialisation for a sample of emerging capitalist 
countries, including Brazil, South Korea, South Africa, Thailand and Turkey12.  
National accounts, banking and industrial data are drawn upon; a range of additional 
data sources 13  are accessed to provide further insight into the particular 
transformations of the Mexican economy.   
At the macroeconomic level, the footprint of the financial sector as a share of 
economic activity and profits is rising across the sample, with the exception of 
Thailand in the wake of the 1997 financial crisis.  While similar in trend, the 
                                                
12 The choice of countries is meant to be indicative of trends in emerging capitalist countries, and not 
a statistically representative survey.  It encompasses two countries from Latin America, two from East 
Asia, one from Africa and one from Central Asia.  By income, four of the countries are classified as 
upper middle income, while Thailand is considered lower middle income and Korea high income.   
13 These include: IMF balance of payments data; the Orbis database of listed firms’ financial 
statements; Bank for International Settlements’ tables on cross-border banking claims; data from the 
Banco de México (Banxico) and the banking regulator, the Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores 
(CNBV); and the Mexican national statistical office (INEGI) household survey results. 
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financial sector in Mexico has the smallest footprint in terms of its level.  A number 
of indicators are presented which support the hypothesis of subordinate 
financialisation in Mexico.  These include the volatility of real net capital flows and 
the increase in deposits held abroad since 2000.   
Establishing the tendencies of financialisation in the non-financial corporate 
sector is made difficult by the absence of national accounts data in levels in virtually 
all emerging capitalist economies.  Looking specifically at Mexico, preliminary 
evidence is provided to suggest that loans are falling in relative importance as a share 
of external funding, while financial investment is increasing in importance relative to 
fixed investment.  The subordinate nature of the financialisation of the Mexican non-
financial corporation is indicated by the increasing reliance on foreign capital.   
Data is more readily available for the banking sector in ECEs, where the 
tendencies of financialisation in advanced capitalist economies are echoed.  There 
has been a modest decline in the share of deposits in total liabilities since 2000; in 
Mexico there has been increasing reliance on foreign funds.  On the asset side, with 
the exception of Turkey, banks across the sample have witnessed commercial 
lending levels stagnate or fall.  In Mexico, a fall in lending to central government has 
been compensated by an increase in consumer loans.  The share of total interest 
income derived from this consumer lending has risen from insignificance to over 
fifty per cent in the last decade.  Like their non-financial counterparts, Mexican 
banks have become heavily engaged with derivatives markets, and submit a 
significant portion of their profits to non-resident shareholders.   
Finally, in the household sector, the tendency of increasing household 
indebtedness as a share of income is repeated across the sample after 2000.  Mexico 
follows the trend but from the lowest level.  Increasing indebtedness in Mexico has 
been accompanied by a falling wage share and the assumption of greater market risk 
with increasing flows into market-based pensions.  I provide evidence that while 
Mexico is undergoing a particular form of financialisation, it is nonetheless under-
financed by orthodox measures.  However this should not be seen as a paradox, but 
characteristic of subordinate financialisation. 
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1.2.3	  	  Financialisation	  in	  Mexico	  	  
 
Research into financialisation in Mexico is in its infancy.  Initial examples have 
emphasised linkages with deficiencies in the productive sector (Correa, Vidal, & 
Marshall, 2012), the nature of the integration of the Mexican economy into the world 
economy (Levy-Orlik, 2012), and the fusion of domestic and foreign capital in the 
interests and actions of the Mexican state (Marois, 2012).  In chapters seven to nine, 
I contribute to this literature by pursuing the hypothesis that what is unfolding in 
Mexico is in fact a form of subordinate financialisation.  In order to understand why 
financialisation has taken the form that it has in the Mexican context requires 
recourse to the analysis of inter- and intra-capitalist relations.  In chapter seven, 
particular attention is paid to the historical transformations of bank-firm relations, the 
relation of Mexico’s capitalist classes with the state, and their place in relation to the 
world market.  
Through periods of bank nationalisation, re-privatisation and eventually 
‘extranjerización’, bank-firm relations in Mexico have been dysfunctional for 
national development.  As a result, the characteristic turn of large non-financial 
corporations to international and market-based finance in the contemporary period 
has been done from a position of weakness.  Smaller firms remain reliant on retained 
earnings and the internal capital market.  This has created a bifurcated funding 
structure which limits the growth potential of the endogenous credit cycle, distributes 
rather than expands existing domestic wealth, and surrenders a portion of the 
domestic surplus to foreign financial capital.  This structure has facilitated financial 
profits through the accumulation of both public and private fictitious capital, but has 
failed to stimulate fixed investment and employment. 
The Mexican state has facilitated these behaviours through its management of 
crises in the 1980s and 1990s, by enabling reliance on non-productive accumulation, 
and pushing aggressive financial and trade liberalisation measures.  Macroeconomic 
policies designed to attract foreign capital, requiring high interest rates and an over-
valued exchange rate, undermined the dynamism of the domestic market.  The 
structural subordination to foreign capital allied with a domestic elite, has left the 
economy vulnerable to volatile portfolio flows and burdened with trade deficits 
owing to its place in production chains led by US corporations.  The transfer of the 
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ownership of the banking system has allowed foreign shareholders to claim an 
increasing share of domestically-generated surplus. 
In chapters eight and nine, I investigate the hypothesis that the 
financialisation of the Mexican non-financial corporation will share the tendencies 
exhibited in advanced capitalist economies, but with distinctive features owing to the 
subordinate nature of financialisation in the periphery.  My focus is on the non-
financial corporation for two reasons.  First, Marxian theory places emphasis on the 
sphere of production as the locus of the creation of surplus value, and therefore the 
driver of capital accumulation in the first instance.  Large corporations are the 
institutional embodiment of industrial capital in the contemporary era of monopoly 
capital.  Second, as the analysis in chapters six and seven reveals, the financial sector 
in Mexico is under-developed and has had a dysfunctional relationship with 
industrial capital.  This suggests that study of the non-financial sector be prioritised.  
To this end, in chapter eight, I carry out an original, exhaustively detailed 
examination of the financial statement data of listed non-financial firms.  I find that 
in the 2000s, listed non-financial corporations have satisfied external financing 
requirements through long-term bond issuance rather than bank borrowing.  On the 
asset side, fixed investment has fallen, while holdings of highly liquid financial 
assets, derivatives and intangibles have increased substantially.  Evidence is provided 
that the holdings of liquid assets indicate participation in the carry trade, refuting the 
assertion that access to deeper financial markets will necessarily result in more 
efficient capital allocation.  Dependency on foreign capital inflows has committed 
the Mexican state to a strong peso policy and low inflation anchored by the domestic 
interest rate.  On the back of these commitments, large corporations have adopted 
profitable strategies to exploit the availability of cheap international funding and 
invested these funds in domestic financial instruments.  The participation of foreign 
investors in this behaviour marks it out as a symptom of subordinate financialisation; 
the increase in Mexican non-financial corporations’ investment in financial assets 
between 2000 and 2011 coincides with a dramatic rise in the purchases of Mexican 
securities by US residents. 
Finally, in chapter nine, I deploy innovative econometric techniques of panel 
time series analysis to address the question of whether access to cheaper funding 
from international investors on bond markets is inducing Mexican firms’ investment 
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in liquid assets.  This is a key assertion of the theory of financialisation presented in 
this thesis, namely that transformations in firms’ funding opportunities have altered 
their investment behaviour.  On balance, the findings suggest that an increase in the 
ratio of financing received from long-term bonds is more influential on the cash 
holdings ratio than the availability of internal funds.  It appears that the change in the 
availability of funding opportunities has permitted firms to increasingly act as 
balance sheet managers.  The distinctively subordinate nature of this behavior is 
down to its reliance on and surrender of tribute to, international financial capital, and 
its vulnerability to changes in the relative value of the domestic currency vis-á-vis 
world money.   
 While I have not set as one of my objectives the delineation of the 
consequences of financialisation for real economic variables, the final chapter draws 
out a number of inferences which flow from the analysis.  These suggest that 
financialisation in the periphery threatens both fixed investment and the 
establishment of a developmental system of finance.  State policies designed to 
defend strategies of financial accumulation are both costly to maintain and ultimately 
detrimental to growth and stability.  The Mexican economy is characterised by low 
levels of investment and growth and high levels of underemployment and inequality.  
For these reasons, there is an urgent need to re-consider the accepted wisdom of 
‘financial deepening’ which has guided the development of finance for the past forty 
years.  New thinking is needed about how to harness finance for equitable and 
sustainable development.  
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2.1	  	  INTRODUCTION	  
 
While methods can be understood as particular tools or techniques, methodology 
refers to “… a combination of techniques, the practices we conform to when we 
apply them, and our interpretation of what we are doing when we do so.” (Olsen & 
Morgan, 2005, p. 257)  Methodologies have embedded assumptions about the nature 
of reality and human behaviour (ontology) and the way that social reality can be 
understood and truth claims made about it (epistemology).  Significant debate exists, 
both across the physical and social sciences, and more narrowly within the 
economics discipline, over whether particular methods presuppose particular 
methodological assumptions (for example Lawson, 2003).   
This thesis is based on the premise that specific methods of analysis are not 
ineluctably linked to a particular methodology.  This allows for the possibility that 
different methods, through the transformation of their practice and interpretation, can 
be combined in analysis (Downward & Mearman, 2007).  Andrew Sayer (2000) has 
argued that with such a mixed method approach the key issue is to match the chosen 
methods with an appropriate level of abstraction and with the material under 
investigation; that is the challenge confronted in this work. 
In this thesis I make original contributions to both the theoretical and the 
empirical understandings of financialisation.  I develop a global theory of the 
tendencies of financialisation which embeds them within the contemporary 
characteristics of the world market, and outline the specifically subordinate form that 
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financialisation may take in the periphery.  I attempt to capture empirically the 
tendencies and forms of financialisation across advanced and emerging capitalist 
economies, and document the phenomenon as it is manifest in Mexico, with 
particular attention paid to the financialisation of the non-financial corporation.  The 
formulation of a middle-range theory of subordinate financialisation requires a 
theorisation of the agents of capitalism, and their changing relationship with each 
other, the state and the world market.  Immanent in this is an understanding of power 
and its exercise across space and time. The empirical investigation and specification 
of the concrete manifestations of subordinate financialisation in the Mexican setting 
demand the exploitation of a variety of data sources and analytical tools that are 
available at the international, national and sub-national levels, and the integration of 
different sectoral vantage points.  For these tasks, a mixed method approach, unified 
within a framework of critical political economy, is most appropriate. 
This chapter will begin by contrasting the central methodological tenets of 
critical political economy against its classical and neoclassical variants, showing how 
the former is what is required to address the problematic posed by this research.  In 
the subsequent section of the chapter, I will describe the specific methods which 
have been adopted in this thesis and their relationship to the broader methodological 
framework of critical political economy.  This will involve a discussion of:  the 
political economy of national accounts and the nation-state; the use of historical class 
analysis; and econometric analysis as applied to the financial statement data of the 
firm.   
 
2.2	  	  THE	  METHODOLOGIES	  OF	  POLITICAL	  ECONOMY	  
 
Different strands of political economy have adopted a variety of methodologies, 
sometimes in agreement and other times at odds with one another.  In the works of 
seminal authors such as Adam Smith (1910[1776]) and David Ricardo (1971[1817]), 
classical political economy constituted the study of production and exchange, their 
relationship with the state, and the distribution of wealth.  While methodological 
assumptions were rarely made explicit (Blaug, 1980, p. 56), the classical political 
economists presented their work as objectively materialist.  They believed, first, that 
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an objective understanding of the reality of the human condition was possible, and, 
second, that it could only be gained through an analysis of the material conditions of 
the world around them.  However, contradicting these beliefs was a certain 
ontological essentialism in the form of a postulated eternal human nature existing 
outside of particular material conditions.  Human society was seen as a mirror of the 
natural world, obeying its own metaphysical laws.  Famously, this is reflected in 
Smith’s caricature of man’s inherent ‘propensity to truck, barter and exchange’ (1910 
[1776]).  
In terms of epistemology, the classical political economists associated 
themselves with the empiricists.  Following in the tradition established by John 
Locke (1998[1690]), and as contemporaries respectively of David Hume 
(2003[1739]) and John Stuart Mill (1859), Smith and Ricardo believed that truth 
claims arise out of sensory experience.  However, it can be argued that this 
perception too was in tension with that part of their work which followed a deductive 
method, starting from general propositions about human nature and moving towards 
concrete hypotheses about specific behaviour.  This tension would be resolved in the 
neo-classical school through the articulation of empiricism in the method of 
hypothetico-deductivism. 
In their support for a labour theory of value, the classical political economists 
showed themselves to be epistemological essentialists; that is, they looked for inner 
essences of social relations, the elucidation of which could not be grasped by the 
mere examination of surface phenomena. They practiced a form of linear and logical 
abstraction from the concrete to the conceptual.  This would be abandoned by neo-
classical economists in favour of nominalism, or the acceptance of the accidental or 
contingent as explanatory ends in themselves. 
As with the classical political economists, so too Karl Marx devoted little 
time to the exposition of his method (Sayer, 1987, p. 1; Schmitt, 1988, p. 441).  
However, from a broad reading of his work it becomes apparent that Marx’s critique 
of classical political economy marked a break from some of its methodological 
underpinnings, while remaining consistent with others.  With the classical political 
economists, Marx shared an objective materialist ontology.  Marx’s worldview was 
premised on the notion that the fundamental human motivation lies in social 
reproduction, to which labour is the defining component: “… men must be in a 
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position to live in order to be able to ‘make history’ … the production of material life 
itself… ” is “… a fundamental condition of all history” (Marx & Engels, 1968, p. 
39)1.  With his emphasis on social reproduction, Marx suggests that the forces and 
relations of a particular mode of production have primacy in explaining social 
systems (Callinicos, 2004, p. 40).  This is not to deny in any way human agency, for 
famously according to Marx, “Men make their own history, but they do not make it 
as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under 
circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past.” (2009, p. 9) 
Unlike his classical predecessors, Marx was not an ontological essentialist.  
True to his materialist grounding, Marx’s analysis was rooted in the historical 
specificity of the object of his analysis, namely the capitalist mode of production.  
Capitalism is a class-stratified social system marked by the exploitation of the 
labourer by the owner of the means of production.  Central to historical materialism 
is the appreciation that analysis of the relations between capitalists and labour, and 
between different fractions of the capitalist class, provides indispensable insight into 
complex social phenomena.  This is reflected in this thesis both in the use of the case 
study method more generally, and in the deployment of both qualitative and 
quantitative analysis of changing class relations more specifically. 
While Marx was assiduously empirical, as can be observed in his meticulous 
examinations of trade flows, input-output tables and the like, he was decidedly not 
empiricist (Paolucci, 2011, p. 47).  His essentialist epistemology (not to be confused 
with his non-essentialist ontology) was marked by a search for the essence of 
phenomena.  In contrast to the classical political economists’ belief in linear logic, 
Marx believed that this essence could only be discovered through a combination of 
inductive and deductive method, abstraction, and the dialectical process2.  This thesis 
will use a variety of techniques in its attempt to distinguish the essential tendencies 
of financialisation from both counter-tendencies and differences related to 
institutionally-specific forms.   
Importantly, Marx’s epistemology demands that the social world be 
understood in its dynamic totality.  Abstraction may be employed to focus in on a 
                                                
1 Critics of Marx view this assertion itself as a form of metaphysics (Carlson, 2000).   
2 Whether or not Marx’s method is able to overcome the problems which plague either purely 
deductive or purely inductive method is a point of some contention (Carlson, 2000). 
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particular aspect of this totality from a certain vantage point, but this abstraction 
must always be understood in its relation to the larger whole.  In contemporary 
terms, this places Marx within the ‘open system’ perspective, one shared with other 
strands of what might be termed ‘critical’ political economy.  Open systems 
methodologies reject the central positivist thesis that causal relations can be directly 
drawn between variables in complex social systems.  In Marx’s work, the notion of 
causality itself is replaced with that of tendencies and counter-tendencies, the essence 
of which may be obscured by contingent phenomena.   
Marx shared some of the methodological underpinnings of classical political 
economy and shed others.  However, Marx’s work anticipated a much wider break 
with subsequent methodological developments in the discipline of neoclassical 
economics, as first developed in the foundational work of Carl Menger (1950[1871]), 
Léon Walras (1954[1874]), William Jevons (1875), and Alfred Marshall (1890) and 
culminating in the work of Kenneth Arrow and Gérard Debreu (1954).  This is not to 
suggest that Marxian political economy rejects outright all aspects of neoclassicism’s 
underlying methodological positivism.  As argued cogently by Paul Paolucci (2003), 
while Marx was against positivist tenets such as universal laws, predictive theory, a 
priori conceptualisation, and individualistic reductionism, he supported the use of 
abstraction, controlled comparison and quantitative and deductive analysis where 
appropriate.  
Unlike classical political economists, neoclassical economists have attempted 
to break from the other social sciences through claims to superior scientific 
methodological rigour, and then, more recently, colonise these same disciplines with 
the methods developed since the marginalist revolution (Fine & Milonakis, 2009). 
The methodological foundations of neoclassical economics are ill-suited to the 
problematic of this thesis.  Neoclassical economics stakes a claim to ontological 
realism, as against either idealism or subjectivism.  However this claim is 
undermined by its ultimate recourse to the ‘black box’ of subjective utility functions 
as the prime determinant of economic interaction.  From classical political economy, 
neoclassicism adopts its essentialist view of human nature as eternal; in its extreme 
form, all structural constraints on human behavior are abandoned in favour of a 
purely atomistic and instrumentally rational portrayal of human agency.   
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This ontology is the basis for a ‘closed systems’ epistemology.  The method 
of hypothetico-deduction sees the formulation of predictive hypotheses from 
universal laws regarding human nature and social interaction.  Complex social 
phenomena are understood as aggregations of their constituent, independent parts.  
Manifestations of these variables are believed to be directly observable through their 
phenomenal appearances.  Therefore, the hypotheses can be tested, and the general 
propositions they support either verified or falsified, reflecting a crude version of the 
positivism of Karl Popper (1959)3.  This epistemological foundation has enabled the 
application of increasing mathematical formalism rooted in the assumption that 
social phenomena always and everywhere tend towards a general equilibrium.  In 
sum, neoclassical ontology and epistemology are anathema to the aims of this thesis, 
which seeks to distinguish between tendencies and counter-tendencies, and locates 
the complex phenomenon of financialisation within the social relations of a 
particular historical epoch and spatial hierarchy. 
 
2.2.1	  	  A	  short	  note	  on	  dialectics	  and	  abstraction	  
 
While there is general agreement that Marx’s dialectical method emerged from his 
study and critique of Georg Wilhelm Hegel’s dialectical idealism (1964 [1807]) via 
Ludwig Feuerbach’s materialism (Feuerbach, 1972 [1839]), there is great debate as 
to its precise content and import.  Since this is not a thesis in philosophy, in what 
follows I rely considerably upon the understanding of Marx’s use of dialectics and 
abstraction as presented by Bertell Ollman (2003).   
Dialectical thinking replaces the study of ‘things-in-themselves’ with that of 
things which are inherently understood to also be part of both processes and 
relations.  A process contains both its past and its future; relations contain within 
themselves their ties to other relations.  This is important for the present study for a 
number of reasons.  First, financial capital is not understood in this thesis as a mass 
of wealth, or increased profits held in the form of financial assets by a bank.  Rather 
                                                
3 It is important to note that this neglects subsequent attempts even within the positivist tradition itself 
to nuance Popperian falsification in the wake of the Duhem-Quine problem (Lakatos, 1970), which 
states that no hypothesis can be definitively falsified since it must be tested in conjunction with 
auxiliary conditions.  This is aside from developments outside of the positivist tradition (Kuhn, 1962).  
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it is seen as process and relation simultaneously.  It is both an integral part of the 
ceaseless process of accumulation, its form in constant flux following the 
requirements of continued accumulation, and an expression of the constantly 
evolving relationship both between fractions of the capitalist class and between 
capital and labour more generally.  In this understanding, financial capital can not be 
located within simple dichotomies between productive and unproductive, or between 
industrialists and rentiers. 
As both a method of inquiry and exposition, dialectics does not seek to go 
back to ‘first causes’ for the purposes of predictive power.  Much of the critical 
scholarship on financialisation seeks to root the increasing profitability of the 
financial sector in such policy-induced changes as increased shareholder value 
orientation (Lazonick & O’Sullivan, 2000) or the impacts of pension privatisation 
(Toporowski, 2000).  While valuing such efforts, a dialectical approach recommends 
that ‘causes’ should be understood in the specific context from which they emerged 
(often that of the United States in this case), and might themselves have been 
immanent in the conditions which preceded their emergence.  Where complex social 
systems are the subject matter of inquiry it is more powerful to consider numerous 
factors and relationships that may determine (or over-determine) the phenomena of 
interest.  Description of these factors and clarification of their inter-relationships 
provides significant insight without artificially introducing simple causality. 
Against those who would argue that financialisation can only be a temporary 
cyclical phenomenon, dialectics offers the possibility that the quantitative change 
which characterises cyclical phenomenon can, at a certain point, result in qualitative 
systemic transformation.  Michael Williams argues that supercession is latent in 
cyclical development, pointing to the “… imperative to investigate the conditions 
under which systemic transformation might occur” (2001, p. 567).  This points to the 
need to examine the underlying changes in social relations which have emerged from 
a succession of liberalisation measures to examine at what point a systemic 
transformation in capitalism might occur.  This transformation is discussed at a more 
general level in relation to advanced capitalist economies in chapters three and four, 
and in more detail in the Mexican case in chapters six and seven. 
Dialectical thought emphasises that the interconnections between different 
relations of the capitalist system must be understood in their interdependence with all 
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other relations.  This interdependence is the ‘whole’ or the ‘totality’ in which the 
relations must be conceptualised.  The totality itself is, of course, not knowable, but 
it expresses itself through its constituent relations.  Applied to the present analysis, 
this suggests that transformation in financial capital in one context must be placed 
within an understanding of changes in the broader capitalist system.  This commends 
a theorisation of financialisation in the context of the world market, which will be 
discussed subsequently.  Importantly, awareness of the whole does not imply that 
there is homogeneity in relations and processes; in unity there is distinction.  While 
this study posits an underlying essence of financialisation, it acknowledges 
differences in its manifestations, since they are reflected and refracted through 
different institutional contexts. 
It is in this spirit that the case study country, Mexico, is analysed in relation 
to the broader unfolding of financialisation.  This approach enriches the 
understanding of what is happening in Mexico, but equally an understanding of what 
is happening in Mexico deepens the understanding of the broader process.  Philip 
McMichael describes this method as ‘incorporated comparison', "… in which inter-
related instances are integral to, and define, the general historical process ... the 
particulars directly realise the general..." (1990, p. 389)  If financialisation is 
understood as a process emerging out of the productive and financial integration of 
emerging capitalist societies and successive and ever more deeply penetrating rounds 
of the liberalisation of capital, then the Mexican experience should be seen as a 
'moment' of this process, as the particular with the power to reveal the general. 
Abstraction, as defined by Ollman (2003), is both a verb for the mental 
activity of sub-dividing the world in to manageable parts in order to better 
understand it, and a noun representing the results of this process of sub-division.  
Marx’s method starts from the ‘imagined concrete’, that is the given world of 
phenomenal forms, and proceeds through abstraction to capture the essential 
relations which explain these forms, ending back at the ‘thought concrete’, that is 
how the whole is understood in the mind.  The process of abstraction, of setting the 
boundaries of investigation, is critical in determining which relations will be 
emphasised and how they will be understood. 
As dialectics require that social phenomena be understood as dynamic, that 
change is a part of what things are, abstraction serves to isolate particular temporally-
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isolated moments or spatially-isolated forms.  This is in stark contradiction to the 
understanding in neoclassical economics that social phenomena always and 
everywhere tend towards an equilibrium.   
Ollman describes three modes of abstraction: -­‐ Extension – abstracting boundaries in space and time; -­‐ Generality – abstracting from most specific (the person) to the most general 
characteristics (natural world); and -­‐ Vantage point – abstracting to the viewpoint of different places within a 
relation. 
 
In this work, spatial abstraction will by necessity shift from nation-states to the world 
market and then back to a chosen nation-state within that world market, its analysis 
reflecting what was learned at the global boundary.  The contemporary Mexican 
experience is understood as a moment of the global unfolding of financialisation.  
The temporal boundary of primary interest is the last decade in emerging-capitalist 
countries, but to understand this period, it will be necessary to extend the analysis to 
the period of post-war capitalism.  Abstraction in the level of generality will be 
limited primarily to Ollman’s level two, that is “… what is general to people, their 
activities, and products because they exist and function within modern capitalism.” 
(2003, p. 88)  Some space, particularly in chapter seven, is devoted to level one, the 
influence of particular individuals on the relations of interest.  Abstraction to the 
differing vantage points of non-financial corporations, financial firms and 
households will be a central theme of this work. 
 
2.3	  	  SPECIFIC	  METHODS	  EMPLOYED	  
 
While critical political economy should reject empiricism’s mystification of 
phenomenal essences in outward appearances, it must nonetheless employ rigorous 
empirical methods of investigation.  Concrete data are critical for understanding 
processes and relations, selecting the appropriate mode of abstraction, and specifying 
the move from the imagined concrete to the thought concrete.  For present purposes, 
empirical analysis is required in order to grasp and specify the contingent from the 
determinant in the phenomenon of financialisation, and to avoid falling into the trap 
of purely deductive supposition. 
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In this thesis, three different methods of empirical analysis are employed. 
First, national accounts data are analysed in chapters four and six in order to evaluate 
the theory of financialisation as outlined in chapter three and its subordinate form 
developed and elaborated in chapter five.  Second, inter- and intra-class relations will 
be examined in chapter seven to provide an understanding of why the phenomenon 
appears in the form that it does in the Mexican context.  Finally, chapters eight and 
nine are concerned with specifying the transformation of the behaviour of the 
financialised large Mexican firm.  This demands careful analysis of financial 
statement data, including the use of econometric techniques.  While only the second 
method is by definition a method of critical political economy, I will show in what 
follows that the other two methods, often mistakenly associated with Keynesian and 
neoclassical political economy respectively, can be interpreted in ways consistent 
with the broader methodological framework of critical political economy. 
 
2.3.1	  	  The	  political	  economy	  of	  national	  accounts	  and	  the	  question	  of	  the	  nation-­‐
state	  
The	  System	  of	  National	  Accounts	  
 
Chapters four and six employ sectoral analysis based largely on data from the 
System of National Accounts (SNA).  The SNA is divided into a set of current 
accounts which detail flows in the current period, and the accumulation accounts 
which identify investments in real and financial assets whose lifespan extends across 
periods.  The difference between net savings in the current period and investment in 
real assets must be financed by changes in financial assets (incurring liabilities), with 
the latter enumerated in the financial accounts4.   
The accounts are divided into four domestic sectors (households, financial 
corporations, non-financial corporations and government) and a sector representing 
the rest of the world.  By construction negative balances for the domestic economy 
                                                
4While the financial accounts show changes in assets and liabilities by sector, so-called flow-of-funds 
tables, where sufficient data is available, go one step further to identify for each instrument which 
sector is the creditor and which the debtor (European Commission, IMF, OECD, United Nations, & 
World Bank, 2009). 
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must be offset by positive balances for the rest of the world account (and vice-versa).  
Similarly by construction, the sum of the sectoral domestic balances must equal that 
for the domestic economy as a whole.  Each of the four major domestic sectors is 
further disaggregated into sub-sectors5.  
The current account matches, on the one hand, revenues generated by the 
production of goods and services and, on the other hand, the income received for this 
production in the form of wages, interest, rent, and profits (and how this income is 
re-distributed in the form of taxes, transfers, etc.).  From this figure for total 
output/income, final consumption is subtracted to arrive at a figure for net savings.  
The capital account next calculates total capital formation as fixed capital investment 
in construction, machinery and equipment, less consumption of fixed capital 
(depreciation), variation in inventories, and the acquisition/disposition of assets.  The 
difference between net savings and capital formation gives net borrowing.  The 
financial account describes changes to financial assets, divided into eight categories6; 
changes in these assets cover both the gap between investment and savings in the 
current period, as well as additional investment in financial assets as an end in 
themselves.   
The SNA was developed during wartime Britain to provide a basis for the 
formulation of war budgets (Hartwig, 2006).  It took shape at a time when the 
Keynesian view that output is determined by aggregate demand was dominant.  
Hugo Radice (1984) argues that national accounting also in part reflects John 
Maynard Keynes’ view of the importance of the self-sufficiency of the sovereign 
state7 – an empirically justifiable view for the period from 1930 to 1950 when trade 
retreated as a share of output – and therefore its appropriateness as a unit of analysis.  
Use of the SNA spread as post-war economic growth unfolded, and has become 
                                                
5The household sector is divided into households and non-profit institutions serving households; 
Government is divided into central, state and local government; financial corporations are divided into 
nine sub-categories including the central bank and depository institutions; non-financial corporations 
are divided into private and public corporations. 
6Gold, deposits and legal tender, securities, loans, equities, insurance and pension funds, derivatives 
and other accounts payable. 
7 Radice quotes from Keynes’ paper National Self-sufficiency: “… economic internationalism 
embracing the free movement of capital and of loanable funds as well as of traded goods may 
condemn my own country for a generation to come to a much lower degree of material prosperity than 
could be attained under a different system.” (Keynes 1933, 762-3) 
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entrenched through the efforts of a number of UN agencies and a series of revisions 
over the subsequent decades. 
The SNA offers a number of significant analytical insights.  It provides the 
analyst a view of the whole economy, the internal interactions of its constituent 
sectors, and its relationship with the rest of the world.  By design it draws attention to 
both stocks and flows, and both assets and liabilities.  This contrasts markedly with 
neoclassical models which often neglect the impact of financial wealth (or debt) or 
heterodox theories on the rise of finance which neglect the two-sided nature of the 
balance sheet.  Accounting identities, by definition, provide data which is free from 
causal inference. 
Nonetheless, the SNA is subject to a number of limitations, some of which lie 
within an orthodox understanding, while others are only revealed by political 
economy analysis.  Dealing first with limitations of the SNA on its own terms, there 
are important capacity issues which impact upon the availability and quality of the 
data.  This has been aggravated by the fact that different generations of the SNA 
have required burdensome revisions.  Mexico, like many emerging capitalist 
economies, does not provide the financial account (or for that matter the flow-of-
funds) in terms of stocks (levels).   
Changes in SNA classification have also introduced concerns over temporal 
consistency.  Generations of the SNA prior to SNA93, for example, witnessed 
fundamental – and some would argue ideological – revisions to the accounting for 
the contribution of the financial sector to national output (Christophers, 2011).  The 
analysis herein therefore uses data from approximately 1980 for high-income 
countries which have had the opportunity to reconcile previous editions of the SNA; 
detailed analysis of Mexican data in chapter seven focuses on data from a period for 
which SNA93 was applied consistently (1993-2009). 
There are also issues of consistency and harmonisation in construction across 
countries, introducing concerns over spatial equivalence.  As the level of detail of 
presentation has increased in each subsequent generation of SNA standards, this has 
run up against real differences in the way that different economies are organised, and 
therefore differences in the way that data are consolidated, classified and compiled 
(Research and Statistics Department, 2000).  In this research, these differences will 
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be highlighted where possible, but it has also led to less emphasis on the importance 
of comparative levels between countries than on the identification of common trends.     
Finally, there are technical difficulties, the solutions to which pose additional 
challenges for temporal and spatial consistency.  Large statistical discrepancies in the 
calculation of the underlying data often result in significant revisions for several 
years after initial SNA accounts are published.  Research has also shown how 
differences in the choice of deflator (Hartwig, 2006) and methods of capital 
valuation (Kennedy, 1988; Murinde & Green, 2003) can have significant influences 
upon the SNA.  This can be particularly important in emerging capitalist countries 
which have suffered from high inflation rates.  According to International 
Accounting Standard 29 on ‘Hyperinflationary Economies’, the last 
hyperinflationary period for the Mexican peso was in 1998.  This recommends 
caution in the interpretation of trends in the early 1990s in the lead-up to and 
immediately following the peso crisis. 
 
The	  political	  economy	  of	  national	  accounts	  and	  the	  nation-­‐state	  
 
In terms of consistency with the broader methodological framework, first, it must be 
readily conceded that the SNA and similar data sources use orthodox economic 
categories, which are conceptually distinct from Marxian categories8.  This means, 
for example, that categories such as output, wages, fixed capital and profits include 
what, in Marxian terms, would be considered non-capitalist production, such as 
peasant agriculture, as well as the unproductive functions of supervision, circulation 
and distribution, and social maintenance.  However, the conception of distinct 
Marxian categories remains an issue of much debate within Marxist scholarship itself 
(for example Moseley, 1992; Shaikh & Tonak, 1994), and poses significant 
challenges in terms of estimation, particularly in the context of emerging capitalist 
countries such as Mexico (Mariña-Flores & Moseley, 2000).  Therefore, 
                                                
8 Thanks to Professor Jan Toporowski for pointing out that the understanding of the economy as a 
circular flow originates in François Quesnay’s ‘tableau économique’ (economic table) (1972 [1758]), 
and travels via Marx’s reproduction schema (1992[1885]) and Kalecki’s ‘Essays in the theory of 
economic fluctuations’ (1939), before informing the work of Keynes and the creation of the System of 
National Accounts.  
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conventional categories are analysed for the trends which they reveal over time, 
keeping in mind their conceptual basis in epistemological nominalism. 
Second, use of the SNA poses a challenge in terms of the level of 
disaggregation.  Important dynamics within sectors may be obscured from view.  
Distribution within the household sector between different classes, or even between a 
proxy for class in the form of income groups, is unavailable.  For non-financial 
corporations, the SNA does not allow the analyst to draw out differences between 
firms of varying structural characteristics.  For these reasons, SNA analysis is 
complemented in this thesis with survey data, wage data and industrial data where 
available and appropriate.  Teasing out these important differences in the non-
financial corporate sector has demanded recourse to the analysis of firm-level data 
(see discussion below).  This requirement to change the level and vantage point of 
abstraction is illustrative of how an investigation can lead to its own logic of 
analysis.   
Finally, the use of the SNA raises a more profound theoretical debate about 
the acceptability of the definition, measurement and analysis of macroeconomic 
aggregates over a given geographical-political space.  As earlier alluded to, it was 
only in the inter-war period that this practice became broadly accepted.  Radice 
(1984, p. 122) points out that subsequently economists could make, “… theoretical 
propositions about economies defined empirically in geopolitical terms – which have 
the same theoretical status, the same measurability, the same behavioural 
foundations, and the same methods of testing and proof, as the more conventional 
theoretical propositions about markets.”  That is, the characteristics of a national 
economy may be understood through its internal dynamics, and the influence of 
‘external’ factors on those internal dynamics. 
The positivist tradition embodied in neoclassical analysis has unquestioningly 
taken the nation-state as a self-evident unit of analysis.   This neglects the fact that 
neoclassicism’s analytical premises are rooted in markets, not states.  Markets which, 
in neoclassical terms, clear supply and demand functions which are themselves 
aggregations of the maximising behaviour of individual firms and consumers; firms 
and consumers which increasingly operate across borders.  Since the end of the era 
of relative national self-sufficiency, the world market has undergone rapid 
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internationalisation in terms of not only commodity exchange and capital flows, but 
also in the ownership of assets and the organisation of production. 
This poses a challenge not so much to the national accounts data themselves, 
but to the inferences that are drawn from them.  Charles Gore has argued that the key 
defining feature of what he terms methodological nationalism is that “… it isolates 
and separates the influence of internal factors from external factors.” (1996, p. 81) 
More sophisticated explanations, he suggests, interrelate the ‘internal’ and the 
‘external’ to such an extent that these terms become virtually meaningless. 
Dialectics provides precisely this kind of penetrating insight into the complex 
relationship between the national and the global, without resorting to a complete 
dissolution of the distinction.  Marx argued in the Grundrisse (1993, p. 408) that “… 
the tendency to create the world market is directly given in the concept of capital 
itself.  Every limit appears as a barrier to be overcome.”  The question of the relation 
between the nation-state and the world market was a preoccupation of the first 
generation of Marxist theorists of imperialism (Bukharin, 1966; Hilferding, 1981; 
Kautsky, 1970; Lenin, 2010).  While divisions remained on the question of whether 
the world market or the nation-state was the proper unit of analysis, the particular 
form of the world market was understood not as a teleological corollary of the 
workings of capitalism, but as a hard-fought creation of the capitalist classes of the 
imperial nation-states. 
More recently, as part of the German state derivation debate, von Braunmühl 
argued that capitalist relations of production emerge on the basis of a world economy 
“… within which statehood arises and consolidates itself”(1978, p. 167).  Only after 
Great Britain’s development of industrial capitalism and imperial expansion, does 
the tendency of nationalisation emerge predominant.  That is, the world market 
shapes the formation of capitalist nation-states, only then to have the actions of those 
nation-states become constituitive of the world market.  The important corollary of 
von Braunmühl’s argument is that the historical development of class relations and 
the state apparatus within the nation-state "… bear in a specific manner the imprint 
of that country's position on the world market." (1978, p. 171)  
This dialectical understanding of the relationship between the nation-state 
and the world market is essential to: the theory of subordinate financialisation 
elaborated in chapter five; the empirical case for subordinate financialisation in 
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Mexico in chapter six, where foreign capital has played a key role; and to the 
historical examination of class relations in Mexico in chapter seven.  The argument 
has a number of key implications.  National data must be seen in the context of the 
international processes out of which they emerge.  This is accomplished by moving 
the vantage point of abstraction from countries in the core to those in the periphery, 
and then moving back to an understanding of global processes unfolding through the 
specificities of the nation-state.  At the national level, it demands a sophisticated 
understanding of the evolution of both the qualitative and quantitative interaction of 
Mexican capital with ‘foreign’ capital, and stresses the importance of seeking out 
data sources which capture this interaction9.   
 
2.3.2	  	  Class	  analysis	  and	  finance	  
 
This thesis concerns itself with the increasing role of finance and what it means both 
as a process and relation emerging globally, particularly as manifest in emerging 
capitalist countries.  My interest is in what this reflects in terms of the changing 
relationship between workers and capitalists, that between different forms of capital, 
and the articulation of those interests in the actions of the state.  Neoclassical 
analysis is blind to these lines of investigation, seeing only the results of the 
decisions of optimising agents in the sphere of exchange amidst a vast array of 
institutional transaction costs.   
Examining these relationships demands recourse to class analysis.  Marx’s 
pioneering work in, for example, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (2009 
[1852]), illustrates the method of an historical analysis of Bonapartism through the 
tensions that lie both between classes, and between fractions of the capitalist class.  It 
was in this tradition that Rudolf Hilferding (1981 [1910]) analysed the increasing 
dependence of industry on the banks in late 19th century Germany.  Due to the 
increasing volumes of capital which investment in large-scale industry required and 
the complexities of cash flow management in such operations, industrialists were 
                                                
9 For example, in chapter eight, data from the US Treasury International Capital Reporting System is 
used to afford analysis of the linkages between Mexican firm behaviour and a proxy for gross foreign 
portfolio inflows.  
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forced both to channel their existing capital and to acquire additional capital via the 
banks.  In return, the banks were investing a larger part of their capital in industry.  
Due to the endogenous nature of loanable capital (and hence the money supply), 
banks were able to insert themselves into the accumulation processes of industrial 
capital.  Hilferding coined the term ‘finance capital’ to describe that “… bank capital 
… which is actually transformed … into industrial capital.” (1981, p. 225) 
It is important to point out that Hilferding did not portray finance capital as 
necessarily in conflict with industrial capital, as is the wont of much contemporary 
work that sees finance only as a rentier layer.  Instead, he viewed the two fractions of 
capital as an amalgam, with industrial capital having a direct interest in the 
profitability of financial operations.  Hilferding was unable to anticipate the precise 
form of the relationship between banks and firms as it would manifest itself a century 
later, but his work points out that is only through analysis of this relationship that a 
full understanding of the circuit of capital and the generation of (financial) profits 
can be gained.  The analysis of this relationship is a key theme of this thesis. 
Class itself is, of course, an elusive concept (Wright, 1997).  Proper 
elucidation of the debates over its meaning and import is beyond the scope of this 
chapter, but sufficient for the present purposes here, is the position of Nicos 
Poulantzas that “… social class is defined by its place in the social division of labour 
as a whole.  This includes political and ideological relations.”(1974, p. 14)  Within 
these classes can be distinguished fractions, such as industrial and financial 
capitalists, and social categories including the state bureaucracy and intellectuals.  
These sub-groups do not exist separate from class; their members are drawn from 
social classes which may have taken up different class positions.  Poulantzas argues 
that whether a social class, a fraction or a category forms part of an alliance of 
dominant classes “… will depend on the social formation, its stages, phases and 
conjunctures.” (1974, p. 24) 
This insight gives a framework within which to understand the changing 
alliances of the bourgeoisie and the bureaucracy in contemporary Mexican society, 
as analysed in chapter seven.  Depending on the social formation and requirements of 
accumulation, fractions of the capitalist class may variously oppose, ally with or 
merge into one another.  The boundaries of a ‘fraction’ may change spatially or 
become porous as different institutional forms engage with different forms of capital.  
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All of these inter-relationships are reflected in the form and actions of the state, the 
primary location for the reproduction of social relations, remembering that the 
apparatus of the nation-state bears the imprint of its historical relationship to the 
world market. 
While the struggle between the capitalist classes and the working class occurs 
primarily in the sphere of production, exploitation of different layers of the working 
class may occur in the sphere of circulation.  This is critical for an understanding of 
the role of the financial sector in the current period of financialisation.  Drawing on 
Marx’s concept of ‘profits by deduction’ (1991, p. 1001), Paul Baran (2012) argued 
that when wages rose to a level significantly higher than the socially necessary 
minimum and when the bulk of output is sold at monopolistic prices, as is the case in 
many advanced capitalist countries in the contemporary period, price policy can be 
used to extract surplus value in the sphere of circulation.  Costas Lapavitsas (2009b) 
uses the term ‘expropriation’ to describe the actions of financial institutions to 
capture profits from workers in the sphere of circulation.  These profits do not 
originate in the creation of additional surplus value.  Instead they may emanate either 
from the capture and re-distribution of existing surplus value (or rents), or in the 
expansion of the circuits of loanable money capital. Exploitation in the sphere of 
circulation may mark an attempt by capital to lessen direct confrontation in the 
sphere of production in a way deemed more socially acceptable or at least less 
visible. 
In sum, this class analytical approach differs fundamentally from the 
methodological individualism of neoclassical economics, but also from other 
heterodox traditions such as post-Keynesianism.  For neoclassicals there is no class 
interest, only the aggregated outcomes of the profit-maximising behaviour of 
individuals and firms.  The state apparatus is seen as somehow external to this 
activity, though since it is composed itself of utility-maximising individuals, the state 
bureaucracy attempts to capture rents.  This rent-seeking behavior is to the detriment 
of what would otherwise be Pareto-optimising market outcomes.   
Post-Keynesian analysis draws inspiration from the class analysis of Marx, 
particularly work in the Kaleckian tradition (1971).  However, for the most part, it 
has set up a dichotomy between industrial and financial capitalists, the latter taking 
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the form of a rentier class which undermines the productivity of the former10.  
Problematically, post-Keynesianism lacks an explicit theory of the state and its 
relation to class structure.  This results in an emphasis on policy fixes to capitalist 
crises, with the state implicitly posited as a neutral arbiter of conflicting interests.   
 
2.3.3	  	  Firm	  financial	  statement	  data	  and	  econometric	  analysis	  
 
This thesis focuses on the actions of the large non-financial corporation as critical to 
understanding the dynamics of financialisation, both advanced and subordinate.  This 
focus is consistent with the central role attributed to the productive sphere in 
Marxian theory, and also emerges from the empirical analysis of bank-firm relations 
in Mexico in chapters six and seven.  This poses the challenge of specifying changes 
in the behavior of these enterprises, and examining the relationship between these 
changes and broader societal transformation.  As touched upon in the section above 
on national accounts, the SNA does not offer sufficient disaggregation or detail for 
this task.  For this reason, additional insight has been sought in chapters eight and 
nine from the examination of the firm-level financial statement data of those entities 
listed on the Mexican stock exchange11. 
Financial statement analysis has been conducted in order to provide an initial 
indication about the behavioural changes of interest, broken down along the lines of 
firm size and sector12.  Corporate financial statements are, of course, not unbiased 
presentations of reality.  While only annual statements are fully audited, quarterly 
data have been used in order to maximise the ability to capture the potentially more 
volatile flows of financial assets.  Even in the case of audited statements, individual 
firms may employ transfer-pricing techniques in order to minimise tax payments.  In 
consideration of this likelihood, and to avoid double-counting, consolidated financial 
statements have been used.  Additional accounting techniques involving the 
manipulation of, for example, depreciation methods and accruals, may allow 
                                                
10 This literature is discussed in detail in chapter three. 
11 The data come from the financial statements of publicly-listed non-financial firms, as aggregated in 
the Economatica database.   
12 Data limitations made it impossible to examine compositional effects related to ownership 
structures and degree of export orientation. 
Chapter	  2	  	  Methodology	  
 
43 
 
enterprises to present their year-end results in a more favourable light, understating 
cash and overstating fixed investment for example.  However, through the use of a 
longer time series and the analysis of sectoral and aggregate transformations, such 
firm-specific effects should be mitigated.  Aggregate irregularities over time, such as 
changes in accounting standards, have been noted in the analysis.  Finally, as was the 
case with national accounts data, so too the use of line items from corporate financial 
statements is at odds with Marxian categories, only this time on a micro level.  
However, an assessment of changing sources and uses of funding, as compared to an 
assessment of, for example, output and profitability, does not suffer unduly from this 
fact.  
The first-cut analysis in chapter eight highlights secular changes in large non-
financial corporations’ management of highly-liquid assets and in their capital 
structure.  However, at the level of aggregated data, compositional effects may be 
obscuring any relationship (or suggesting a relationship at the aggregate level when 
one does not exist at the individual firm level).  In order to attempt to unravel the 
potential relationship between capital structure and investment behaviour, panel time 
series econometrics is employed in chapter nine.   
Classical econometrics was designed to seek confirmation of stable, usually 
linear, causality in the equilibrium relationship between independent and dependent 
variables.  This reflects both an essentialist and atomistic ontology of agents’ 
behaviour, and a closed-system epistemology of causality.  For these reasons, 
economists from a number of schools of thought, from Keynesians (Keynes, 1939; P. 
Davidson, 1996) to Austrians (Hayek, 1948) and more recently critical realists 
(Lawson, 1997), have been skeptical if not altogether dismissive of the practice.  The 
abuse of econometrics, particularly cross-country macroeconomic testing, has led to 
the charge from within the econometrics profession itself that the ‘arm-waving’ of 
rhetorical economic debate based on deductive assertion, “… has been replaced by t 
coefficient waving.”  (Mayer, 1980, p. 166). 
However, more recent methods, such as the mean group panel time series 
analysis employed in chapter nine, have loosened the restrictions on linearity and 
parameter stability.  This allows for both agent and temporal heterogeneity and is 
more consistent with a materialist ontology, that is, it allows relationships to change 
following changes in material conditions.  As a result, statistical relationships may be 
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interpreted as either manifestations of spatially and temporally transient causality, or 
replace causality altogether with a more complex understanding of tendency and 
counter-tendency.   
The issue of ontological essentialism may be addressed by adopting a critical 
attitude towards the interpretation of results, rather than accepting statistical 
relationships prima facie.  Indeed, combined with analysis from multiple vantage 
points of abstraction, econometrics can deepen an understanding of the real 
mechanisms and structures shaping agents’ actions.  Results should be understood as 
a description limited to the spatial and temporal context out of which they emerged, 
rather than as the purely instrumental basis upon which to conduct formal modeling 
and statistical inference (often over fundamentally different contexts).  The rejection 
of predictive econometrics in favour of qualitative characterisations of patterns in 
data is shared by a number of schools of thought, including institutionalists (Wible & 
Sedgley, 1999).  By limiting the use of this technique to the microeconomic level, 
and testing for structural composition effects between firms in the sample, the 
specificity of agents’ actions can be even more firmly rooted to their material 
context.  Finally, caution must be shown in imputing motivation to the interpretation 
of firm financial statement data; between intention and outcome lies dynamic change 
and fundamental uncertainty. 
 
2.4	  	  CONCLUSION	  
 
This chapter first sought to lay out the political economy methodology motivated by 
the requirements of this research project.  The ontological argument was made that 
an attempt to grasp the complex relations between finance and broader social 
reproduction must root its analysis in historically-specific material conditions.  This 
has compelled the usage of a country case study to delve more deeply into dynamics 
revealed by empirical work with national statistics.  Dialectics, reflecting both an 
ontological understanding and an epistemological approach, permit an appreciation 
of finance simultaneously as both a dynamic process and a relation between fractions 
of capital and between social classes.  The approach adopted herein, which places the 
changing nature of finance within the context of transformations in the world market 
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is evoked by the interdependence of the particular to the totality which characterises 
dialectical thought. The technique of incorporated comparison seeks to illuminate the 
general phenomenon of financialisation from the particular reality of subordinate 
financialisation in the case study context.  Abstraction of level, generality and 
vantage point will be conducted in order to provide a rich and varied understanding 
of the dynamics under study.   
Against those who argue that methods are indelibly marked with the 
methodological premises from which they emerged, I have argued that with the 
appropriate qualification and through careful interpretation, mixed methods may be 
successfully employed in a way which is consistent with the broader methodological 
framework of critical political economy.  This thesis employs three primary methods 
of analysis: national accounts statistical analysis, historical class analysis, and the 
econometric analysis of firms’ financial statement data. 
First, the use of national accounts requires consideration not only of their 
technical limitations, but also an appreciation of the epistemological nominalism 
which they reflect.  Rejecting causal inferences which take the nation-state as a self-
evident unit of analysis, I have argued for a consideration of the data in the context 
of a dialectical relationship between the nation-state and the world market.   
Second, to understand the particular manifestation of subordinate 
financialisation in the Mexican context would be impossible without careful 
historical class analysis.  Drawing upon the tradition of Marx and Hilferding, I have 
argued that it is only through analysis of the relationship between different fractions 
of capital that a full understanding of the circuit of capital and the generation of 
profits can be gained. This insight provides the framework within which to 
understand the changing alliances of the bourgeoisie and the bureaucracy in 
contemporary Mexican society. 
Finally, as macroeconomic data are unable to provide sufficient 
disaggregation, panel time series econometrics has been conducted on the financial 
statement data of listed Mexican firms.  This was compelled by the need to more 
accurately specify changes in the behaviour of these enterprises, and to examine the 
relationship between these changes and broader societal dynamics.  Agent and 
temporal heterogeneity afforded by the chosen panel time series method allows for 
greater consistency with the broader onto-epistemological approach.  Caution in 
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interpretation implies the characterisation of patterns, rooted in a specific temporal 
and spatial contexts, where the relationship between intention and outcome is 
understood to pass through multiple mediations. 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter	  3	  	  	  
Financialisation	  in	  a	  capitalist	  world	  market	  
 
 
3.1	  	  INTRODUCTION	  
 
The driving interest of this thesis is the question of whether and how financialisation 
is occurring in emerging capitalist economies.  One possible hypothesis is that 
financialisation is a phenomenon unique to the Anglo-Saxon states to which it is 
most closely associated.  However the empirical evidence, as pointed to in the 
opening chapter and as will be developed in more detail in subsequent chapters, does 
not support the ‘financialisation in isolation’ hypothesis, nor does it support 
financialisation as a ‘zero-sum game’1.  The presence of what might be crudely 
described as the ‘symptoms’ of financialisation in a range of countries suggests that a 
theory of financialisation must be able to account for both the common tendencies of 
the phenomenon as well as the divergent forms that it takes across a range of 
institutional contexts2. 
This chapter serves two purposes.  I will review the financialisation literature, 
making an original contribution by examining whether, and if so how, the literature 
relates financialisation to transformations in the capitalist world market.  To do this, I 
will first outline the concept of the world market as it has emerged from Marxist 
scholarship, and then reconsider the concept in light of the new material realities 
which characterise the contemporary global economy.  The second purpose of the 
                                                
1 Christophers (2012, 2013) has suggested that financialised economies are capturing the financial 
activities of the non-financialised economies. 
2 Within the financialisation literature there are increasing calls for just such a global theorisation of 
financialisation (for example Montgomerie, 2008; Christophers, 2012). 
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chapter is to build upon these foundations and elaborate the theory of financialisation 
which will guide this thesis.   
 The literature on financialisation will be broken down into five currents.  The 
first is the predominantly Marxist work which relates financialisation to a crisis in 
productive accumulation.  This category incorporates four sub-currents which 
variously link the rise of finance to problems of surplus absorption, falling profit 
rates, a new regime of accumulation, and cyclical historical shifts in hegemonic 
power.  The second current in the literature emphasises the role of global financial 
liberalisation. Policy changes assume causal importance in post-Keynesian work, 
whereas they are treated as proximate factors in Marxian analysis.  Two seminal 
elements of the broader liberalisation agenda, namely capital account liberalisation 
and banking liberalisation, are highlighted.  The third current includes those themes 
which are decidedly post-Keynesian in orientation: corporate governance and 
shareholder value orientation, the rise of a rentier class, and the role of inequality 
and global imbalances.  The fourth distinctive current in the literature is that which 
argues that financialisation signals an epochal change in capitalism. This is attributed 
to the emergence of a ‘knowledge-based economy’3, or more convincingly in the 
work of Costas Lapavitsas and the RMF School4, it is located in fundamental changes 
in the relationship between firms, banks and workers.  The fifth, and final, current in 
the literature is represented here by a selective synthesis of work from critical strands 
in sociology, geography and political science.  These document how social 
institutions such as pensions, housing, and government interact with financialisation.  
The review reveals that, while the literature on financialisation contains numerous 
attempts to link the phenomenon with observed changes in the international 
economy, none of it locates financialisation within a theoretical framework of the 
development of the world market.   
In the final section of the chapter, I elaborate a theory of financialisation 
building upon the work of the RMF School.  An epochal transformation in the 
relations between firms, banks and workers is understood to pivot on the turn of the 
                                                
3 This term is used as a catch-all for literature which talks about ‘cognitive capitalism’, ‘bio-
capitalism’, ‘knowledge-based regimes of accumulation’, etc.. 
4 Research on Money and Finance (RMF), based out of the Department of Economics, SOAS, 
University of London. 
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non-financial corporation toward international capital markets, and the banks’ turn 
towards households and expropriation from workers’ wages.  My theoretical 
contribution is to argue that these transformations in the behaviour of the 
fundamental agents of capitalism should be located within the development of the 
world market.  The contemporary world market is uniquely characterised, first, by 
the deepening of the internationalisation of the circuits of commodity and money 
capital; second, by the unprecedented internationalisation of production; and, third, 
by the pivotal role assumed by the US dollar as quasi-world money.  These 
historically-specific features of the world market provide the essential context in 
which the changed behaviour of the agents of capitalism can be situated. 
 
3.2	  	  THE	  DEVELOPMENT	  OF	  THE	  WORLD	  MARKET	  	  
 
The concept of the world market adopted here has its origins within Marxian 
scholarship.  While Marx’s planned volume on the world market was never 
completed (Rosdolsky, 1980), he provided the starting point for this line of inquiry in 
the Grundrisse (1993, p. 408) where he argued that “… the tendency to create the 
world market is directly given in the concept of capital itself.  Every limit appears as 
a barrier to be overcome.”  Marx argued that the drive towards expanded 
accumulation of surplus value is immanent in the capitalist mode of production and 
shapes social relations both within and between states.  It is experienced by the 
capitalist as a ceaseless competition for profits across time and space.  The use of the 
term world market, suggesting an emphasis on the sphere of exchange, reflected the 
specificities of 19th century capitalism.  High tariff barriers between imperial powers 
limited the internationalisation process to the circuit of commodity capital, and to a 
lesser extent the circuit of money capital, with the global restructuring of production 
and ownership which is now so familiar only coming much later.  
The question of the relation between the nation-state and the world market 
was a preoccupation of the first generation of Marxist theorists of imperialism5.  
Rudolf Hilferding believed that ‘finance capital’ (1981[1910]), an amalgam of the 
                                                
5 Theories of imperialism and the role attributed to finance therein will be examined in greater detail 
in chapter five. 
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interests of industrial and bank capital, sought to counter the tendency of the rate of 
profit to fall in the domestic market by exporting capital to foreign countries, and 
then called upon the state to protect its investments.  Nikolai Bukharin (1966[1918]) 
subsequently argued that these blocs of finance capital took on a national character 
because the 'labour aristocracy' in the imperial country gained.  Building on 
Hilferding, Bukharin envisioned the merger of finance capital and the state to form 
‘state capital trusts’.  Hilferding, Bukharin and Vladimir Lenin all believed that 
military and political rivalry over control of the world market would develop 
between these states.  This was pointedly in opposition to Karl Kautsky’s theory of 
‘ultra-imperialism’, which envisioned a division of the world market between 
powerful states without violent conflict, the “… joint exploitation of the world by 
internationally combined finance capital” (1970[1914] in Lenin (2010, 117)).  What 
is clear in all of these formulations is that the world market was understood not as a 
teleological corollary of the workings of capitalism, but as a hard-fought creation of 
the capitalist classes of the imperial nation-states6. 
Several decades later, in response to the ravages of the Great Depression and 
the Second World War, came a period of regulated national capitalism under the 
international auspices of the Bretton Woods system and the gold dollar standard.  
This served to insulate the nation-state for a time from the global movement of 
capital7.  GDP and productivity growth were strong, while labour in the core 
countries gained in terms of an increasing wage share (Marglin & Schor, 1990).  
Corporations of the core continued to expand operations to overseas markets, though 
trade and financial barriers remained high8.  However, by the late 1960s and into the 
early 1970s, the economies of the core were entering into crisis.  The increasing 
strength of labour had put pressure on profits.  Unemployment and inflation were 
rising in concert.  Barriers to trade, capital flows and asset ownership limited the 
                                                
6 Though divisions remained on the question of whether the world market or the nation-state was the 
proper unit of analysis for the purposes of historical materialism (Howard & King, 1992, p. 214). 
7 Claudia von Braunmühl has argued that the organisation of capitalist relations on the basis of a 
world economy was, in fact, the norm from which the period of national autarchy was a deviation. 
Capitalist relations of production first emerged on the basis of a world economy “… within which 
statehood arises and consolidates itself” (1978, p. 167).  Only after Great Britain’s development of 
industrial capitalism and imperial expansion, did the tendency of nationalisation emerge predominant.    
8 Indeed, Keynesian analysis, grounded in the notion of a largely self-sufficient sovereign state, had 
been an empirically justifiable view for the period from 1930 to 1950 when trade had retreated as a 
share of output (Radice, 1984). 
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breadth of capital accumulation.  Rising monopoly protected by a ‘big state’ checked 
Schumpeterian processes of creative destruction.  The result was falling profitability 
and an end to the post-war productivity ‘miracle’ (Armstrong, Glyn, & Harrison, 
1991; Brenner, 2003). 
The breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, and the model of accumulation 
of which it was emblematic, set the stage for a period of rapid liberalisation of trade 
and financial flows, inaugurating a new period in the development of, and academic 
inquiry into, the nature of the world market.   In an impressively prescient piece, 
Stephen Hymer described the evolving interlocking system of world capital and 
world labour into an integrated worldwide structure as one which “…completely 
changes the system of national economies that has characterised world capitalism for 
the past three hundred years.” (1972, p. 92)  Hymer assigned a key role in the 
transformation of the world market to the expansion of multinational corporations, 
both pulled by opportunities for expanded markets and the prospects of cheaper 
labour, and pushed by oligopolistic competition.   The financing needs of these large 
enterprises fed the expansion of international banking and the development of 
international capital markets, helping to “… forge an identity of interests between 
competing national capitals.” (1972, p. 99)  Underplayed in Hymer’s account is the 
key role played by technological advances, particularly in communications and 
transportation, which I can only mention here but whose complex relationship with 
the development of the world market requires extensive study of its own (see for 
example Pérez, 2003). 
As a result of these changes, it was increasingly the case that the passage of 
capital through its various forms – from money capital to productive capital to 
commodity capital, and back again – could not be realised within a single capitalist 
social formation, or nation-state.  As argued by Christian Palloix (1975, 1977, p. 20), 
“… the commodity can only be conceptualised, produced and realised at the level of 
the world market.”  Whereas the process of the internationalisation of capital had 
previously been limited to the circuits of commodity capital and money capital, it 
now for the first time included the internationalisation of production9.   
                                                
9 The periodisation of the development of the world market into the internationalisation of the 
commodity, money and productive circuits of capital, was similarly laid out by Fine and Harris 
(1979). In the understanding employed in this thesis, I will consciously avoid the implication that the 
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Palloix argued that there are two aspects to the internationalisation of capital: 
a functional one and a structural one.  The functional character of internationalisation 
includes those dynamics described by Hymer: the purchase of cheap labour and 
means of production from around the globe and the realisation of profits on a world 
level by the multinational firm.  But Palloix cautions that the multinational firm is 
only the form that the internationalisation of capital assumes.  The structural 
character of the internationalisation of capital relates to the fact that that these 
dynamics tend towards both an equalisation of the conditions of production and 
exchange, but at the same time to a differentiation of these same conditions in 
relation to the aim of the production process, the extraction of surplus value.  This 
differentiation reflects Leon Trotsky’s law of uneven and combined development 
(1969).  An important implication of this differentiation is that international value is 
chaotic, constantly negated and reborn.  From this arises the difficulty in 
standardising international rates of profit, giving “… free rein to the international 
differentiation of rates of profit among the more or less hegemonic strata of capital 
and to their engagement-disengagement in different industrial and financial 
branches.” (1977, p. 24)  This possibility for the differentiation of rates of profit will 
be seen to play an important role in financialisation. 
Palloix is adamant that the state, far from withering away under trans-
historical processes of internationalisation whose agency is unspecified10, has been 
the spearhead of this latest transformation in the world market.  With the 
interpenetration of productive processes, the nation-state’s effectiveness now lies in 
establishing, at the national level, “…a monetary standard which conforms to the 
internationalisation of capital and to the fractions of capital with which it is allied.” 
(1977, p. 13)  This points to the new importance assumed by the management of the 
exchange rate by the central monetary authority, and the role played by world 
money.  
In Marxian monetary theory, money initially emerges as the commodity 
which assumes the monopoly over the prerogative to buy, rooted in and affording to 
                                                                                                                                     
development of the world market follows a linear trajectory through a series of distinct, ordered 
phases. 
10 The hypothesis of a withering state is embodied in world systems theory (Wallerstein, 2004), and 
has echoes in more recent theorisations of a transnational capitalist class (Robinson, 2001; Sklair, 
2000; van der Pijl, 1998). 
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its holder economic and social power (Lapavitsas 2003).  This is contrasted with, 
though not set in opposition to, credit money which represents trust, based on 
domestic customs and practices, that is socialised on a capitalist basis.  Since 
customs and practices underpinning trust relations vary between countries, for credit 
money this can give rise to “… conflicts of probity and reliability, as well as of 
means and methods of payment. … the use of particular monies in the world market 
is subject to political and military interaction among states.” (Lapavitsas, 2006, p. 
135)  The money which emerges from this interaction as world money is that which 
“… serves as the universal means of purchasing, and as the universally recognised 
embodiment of all wealth.” (Marx, 2004, 3c. 240)  
While the self-expansion of capital creates the world market, it does not 
create a world state (Nachtwey & ten Brink, 2008, p. 46).  One of the most important 
implications of this asymmetry is the resolution of the contradiction between the 
function of money as universal means of purchasing and its function as a store of 
value, not in the money of a world state, but in the use of the money of the world 
hegemon, a form of quasi-world money.  The use of quasi-world money offers 
differentiated opportunities and challenges for capitalists across the hierarchy of 
states to exploit the malleability of the relationship of the circuit of money capital to 
the commodity and productive forms.  This fact will be crucial to the theory of 
subordinate financialisation developed in chapter five. 
In sum, this discussion highlights two aspects of the contemporary features of 
the world market which I will argue are critical to a theorisation of financialisation.  
First, the period since the end of the Bretton Woods system has seen the 
consolidation of the internationalisation of the money circuit of capital, and for the 
first time the internationalisation of the productive circuit of capital.  These processes 
have been shaped by, and at once transformative of, the nation-state.  Since the early 
work of authors such as Hymer and Palloix, these processes have been deepened 
through the increasing interpenetration and new forms of private ownership of 
capitals.  This has created new opportunities for the differentiation of profits and the 
extraction of surplus value across borders.  Second, this unprecedented 
internationalisation of capital has resulted in exchange rate management becoming 
the pivot of the nation-state’s insertion into the world market, and placed increased 
importance on the role of world money.   
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3.3	  	  THE	  LITERATURE	  OF	  FINANCIALISATION	  AND	  THE	  WORLD	  MARKET	  
 
As the literature on financialisation matures, what becomes clear is the multi-
dimensionality of the phenomenon.  Within the literature, there is both contradiction 
but also complementarity between accounts drawn from different disciplines and 
sub-disciplines.  The typology adopted herein therefore necessarily involves a 
subjective assessment of the relative emphasis given by different authors in their 
accounts of the origins and manifestations of financialisation.  This emphasis reflects 
the level of abstraction from which the phenomenon is viewed, which, rather than 
representing an explicit choice, may be a corollary of disciplinary methodology.  
Much of the literature on financialisation from within radical currents in sociology 
and geography, for example, provides detailed and insightful portrayals of the 
mechanisms and impact of financialisation on a range of social institutions and 
relationships.  Implicit in this is a methodological rejection of the meta-narrative.  In 
contrast, within political economy, where meta-narrative is more readily acceptable, 
there is an important distinction between Marxist accounts of financialisation which 
tend to emphasise its material roots, and Keynesian scholarship which places more 
emphasis on the power of ideas as evinced through policy change.  As such, there is 
often overlap in the agreed elements of financialisation, but disagreement over 
causality and emphasis. 
Four currents mark out the literature which attempts to explain the providence 
of financialisation:  stagnation of production; global financial liberalisation; the rise 
of the rentier, shareholder value orientation, inequality and global imbalances; and 
epochal changes in capitalism.  A fifth current, that of critical sociology, geography 
and political science, seeks to elucidate the appearances of financialisation, but, as 
argued above, tends to steer away from questions of the origin of the phenomenon.  
In what follows, I will look briefly at the understanding of financialisation central to 
each current, and ask where the changes in the world market enter each account.   
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3.3.1	  	  Stagnation	  of	  production	  
 
Within this first current are four different sub-currents of analysis, with the common 
thread being that the emphasis is placed on the slowdown in productive 
accumulation.  Many of these accounts were originally theories of capitalist crisis 
which have been adapted to accommodate financialisation.  Emphasis in all of these 
accounts is on the material drivers of financialisation, reflecting their predominantly 
Marxist foundations.  These authors generally see financialisation as either a 
medium- or long-term cyclical phenomenon.  
First, the important contribution made by Harry Magdoff, Paul Baran and 
Paul Sweezy and the Monthly Review School to contemporary understandings of 
financialisation should be recognised.  Famously in Monopoly Capital (1968), Baran 
and Sweezy argued that rising monopolisation results in an increasing flow of 
profits, but falling demand for additional investment in ever more tightly controlled 
markets.  The resulting surplus must be absorbed in unproductive consumption.  One 
such method of surplus absorption is for profits to be diverted into financial activities 
rather than fixed capital formation11 (Baran & Sweezy, 1968; Sweezy & Magdoff, 
1987; Sweezy, 1997).  In parallel with this financialisation of the behaviour of non-
financial firms, Sweezy drew from the work of Hilferding (1981) in an earlier period 
of financial sector growth to argue that investment banks are allowed to keep 
extraordinary profits because they play a vital role in facilitating the monopolistic 
positions of non-financial firms12.  
Certainly the focus in Baran and Sweezy’s work was on the performance of 
the US economy.  However, there have been attempts more recently within the 
Monthly Review School to place their theory of financialisation within the context of 
the internationalisation of accumulation.  John Bellamy-Foster has initiated work to 
document the rise of international oligopoly in the form of the transnational 
corporation (2009; 2011a; 2010a, 2010b).  Following a consistent logic to the earlier 
work of Baran and Sweezy, growth of this form of monopoly has given rise to 
                                                
11 Initially, in the post-war era of restrained finance, Sweezy relegated finance to a means “… on an 
equal footing with the sales effort” by which a capitalist economy absorbs surplus (Baran & Sweezy, 
1968, p. 143). 
12 This was a correction of an earlier dismissal of investment banks’ power due to the ability of 
monopoly capital to self-finance, and the growth of institutional investment (Sweezy, 1953). 
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financialisation, "… as the giant firms, unable to find sufficient investment outlets 
for their enormous economic surpluses within production, increasingly turn to 
speculation within the global financial sphere." (2011a, p. 20) This speculative 
activity of monopoly-finance capital has been propped up by rents extracted from 
‘the South’ through the integration into capitalist production of a global reserve 
army, resulting from de-peasantisation of the periphery and the integration of the 
erstwhile socialist countries (2011b, p. 6).   
The role of monopoly in a number of the theories of financialisation, both 
within and outside Marxist scholarship, owes a debt to Baran and Sweezy’s work13.  
There are echoes of it in David Harvey’s influential characterisation of capitalist 
crises as ‘blockages’ to accumulation (2005, 2006a, 2006b, 2011).  These blockages 
are overcome through spatial, temporal and financial ‘fixes’.  Harvey’s keen 
awareness of capitalism’s spatial nature ensures that these ‘fixes’ are not constrained 
to the unit of the nation-state. 
The second major strand within analysis which emphasises productive 
stagnation is that work which links rising financialisation with overaccumulation and 
Marx’s tendency of the rate of profit to fall (TRPF).  Under this heading come a 
number of different accounts of what causes the profit rate to fall and conflicting 
evidence of its empirical purchase.  Examples include:   
 
Robert Brenner (2003, 2004, 2006a), reflecting a form of Smithian Marxism, argues 
that increased international competition has resulted in overproduction and lowered 
profit rates since the 1970s.  Firm exit, and with it a restoration of profit rates, has 
been prevented by the interventions of the modern state.  Avoiding use of the term 
financialisation, Brenner sees the flight of capital into the sphere of finance as a 
natural response to declining profitability in production.   
 
Anwar Shaikh (2011) links declining profitability in the post-war period to the rising 
organic composition of capital.  This trend was halted by the attack on labour in the 
1980s which resulted in over three decades of wage stagnation.  Together with a fall 
in interest rates this led to a surge in debt and borrowing.  Fred Moseley (2010) 
offers a similar explanation, however placing emphasis on the rising costs of 
unproductive labour in the 1960s.  This was counteracted by increased labour 
exploitation and increased credit flows to both firms and households. 
 
                                                
13 See, for example, Crotty’s use of ‘co-respective competition’ (2003, 2008). 
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Gérard Duménil and Dominique Lévy (2005) stress that a rise in real interest rates in 
the US from the 1980s onwards led to increasing profitability in the financial sector 
and the migration of non-financial corporate capital into the development of financial 
activities.  They document the rising share of the top one per cent of households, 
drawing a distinction between France, where the distance between the managerial 
and capitalist classes remains considerable, and the US, where a “… big capital-top 
management ‘love story’” has emerged (2006, p. 18).  Less emphasis is placed on 
falling profitability in this account than in changing relative rates of profit linked to 
changing class configurations.  
 
Data restrictions mean that work on the TRPF has tended to focus on the US 
economy, or at best advanced capitalist economies, assuming that from there the rest 
of the world takes its cue.  There is less attention paid to the profit dynamics in the 
periphery, or the impact of the changing relationship between peripheral states and 
the world market on the profit rate in the periphery14.   
 The third strand within the literature which emphasises stagnation in 
production is that of the French regulationist school.  Régulation theory examines 
how the institutions which are embodiments of social relations stabilise a particular 
accumulation regime, how they enter into crisis, and how they renew themselves 
(Boyer & Saillard, 2002).  François Chesnais (2001) asks whether a new ‘finance-
dominated’ regime is emerging following the decline in productive accumulation and 
the demise of the capital-labour compromise purportedly embodied in the Fordist 
growth regime.  Michel Aglietta (1998) has suggested that the formation in the 
United States of a growth regime based on finance prefigures the ‘capitalism of 
tomorrow’ in advanced capitalist countries.  Robert Boyer’s (2000) model of an 
‘equity-based regime’ combines finance-based growth, wage flexibility, a shift from 
manufacturing to services, the rise of shareholder power and a diffusion of 
information technologies15.   
 While typically accumulation regimes have been seen as anchored in the 
institutions of the nation-state, Aglietta (2008) has noted the need to think about 
global accumulation regimes.  This is not a new idea and, indeed, understanding the 
                                                
14 Bellamy-Foster (2010b) does however relate financialisation in the core with rising industrialisation 
in the periphery and its impact on the profitability of industry in the core.   
15 Despite criticisms which suggest otherwise, Boyer questions the viability of the model even in the 
United States itself, and cautions other governments against mimicking American institutions. He has 
argued that the sub-prime crisis was “… probably the end of an epoch both for financialisation and for 
sources of growth in the United States”(2009, p. 23). 
Chapter	  3	  	  Financialisation	  in	  a	  capitalist	  world	  market	  
 
58 
 
world market as the ultimate horizon of accumulation has been a central 
preoccupation of both the Grenoble and Amsterdam schools of Regulationist thought 
for many years (Jessop & Sum, 2006).  Becker and Jäger (2010) take up the 
challenge, outlining a number of dichotomies of accumulation.  They distinguish 
productive vs. financialised accumulation based on the primary sector of investment; 
extensive vs. intensive accumulation based on whether increases in surplus value 
emerge from increased work intensity or relative surplus value from cheapened 
consumption goods; and introverted vs. extroverted accumulation determined by the 
relative emphasis of production for domestic against international markets.  In a 
further piece, Becker et al. (2010), drawing on case studies from Brazil, Chile, Serbia 
and Slovakia, draw two further dichotomies of financialisation.  They distinguish 
between financialisation based on fictitious capital in the core, and that based on 
interest-bearing capital, and therefore high interest rates, in the periphery; similarly, 
they make a distinction between the ‘popular’ financialisation of the middle classes 
of the advanced countries, from the ‘elite’ financialisation in the emerging capitalist 
economies.  
The spread of regulation theory to Brazil has led a number of authors there to 
formulate theories of financialisation in regulationist terms (Araujo, Bruno, & 
Pimentel, 2012; Paulani, 2010; Prates & Paulani, 2007).  According to these 
accounts, Brazilian policy makers have introduced institutional changes allowing the 
valorisation of fictitious capital as part of Brazil’s insertion into a global regime of 
financial accumulation.  This has resulted in de-industrialisation, an explosion in the 
trade in fictitious financial instruments, and subordination of the wage-labour nexus.    
 The final strand of analysis emphasising the role of productive stagnation is 
drawn from the output of the Annales School, and its influence on World Systems 
theorists.  Leader of the Annales School Fernand Braudel (1981) claimed that 
structural cycles of the ‘longue durée’ mark the rise and fall of leading powers16.  
The phase of decline, which Braudel termed the ‘autumn’, is associated with an 
expansion in financial activity.  Braudel’s thesis has been influentially adopted by 
Giovanni Arrighi (1994, 2007).  Arrighi has argued that the cyclical financial 
                                                
16 Braudel described this process for Venice and Genoa in the 13th to 15th centuries, Antwerp in the 
16th century, Amsterdam in the 16th to 18th centuries, and London in the 18th and 19th centuries. 
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expansion allows the transformation of capital from its fixed form into more liquid 
ones, such as money and credit.  This facilitates its escape from confinement in 
increasingly less productive activity of the declining hegemon, and allows it to flow 
into new regions and channels of surplus value creation17.  While the historical 
sweep of Arrighi’s work is impressive, its thesis is at odds with current realities.  
First, the current period of the rise of finance in the leading power, the United States, 
has been accompanied not with an outflow of capital to new, rising centres of 
power18, but an inflow to the US from the rest of the world.  Despite such problems, 
Arrighi’s work has been influential on the groundbreaking empirical work of Greta 
Krippner (2005, 2011), tracing the rise of financial profits in both the financial and 
non-financial sectors in the United States.  
The association of financialisation with the declining hegemonic power in the 
work of Arrighi, provides an opportunity to contrast the literature which comes to the 
opposite conclusion, namely that the current hegemon, the United States, uses 
financial expansion precisely as a tool to project its imperial power.  Indeed Leo 
Panitch and Sam Gindin (2004) argue that Arrighi confuses Asian ownership of US 
treasury bills with a genuine shift in the distribution of power.  They counterargue 
that liberalised finance was key to the United States’ ability to overcome the profit 
squeeze of the 1970s caused by rising wage and commodity prices, and spiraling 
military expenditure.  As such, the American state has played the lead role in 
reproducing global capitalism; not only creating the conditions for the expansion of 
multinational corporations and the internationalisation of production, but in the 
liberalisation and expansion of finance by acting as the dominant regulatory 
innovator in the governance of global finance (Panitch & Gindin, 2012). 
In a similar fashion, Peter Gowan (1999, 2003, 2009, 2010) advances a 
theory of the ‘Dollar-Wall-Street regime’ as a response to an overproduction crisis in 
the leading capitalist nations.  This regime allows the United States to maintain low 
interest rates, benefit from seignorage from the use of the US dollar as world money, 
and use international institutions to both set institutional norms worldwide and to bail 
                                                
17 Original credit for this concept should be given to Rosa Luxemburg (2003 [1913]). 
18 Arrighi has struggled with the question of who should be the successor to the United States as the 
hegemonic power of the next cycle, first arguing that it could be Japan (1994), and later examining the 
possibility of China (2007). 
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out US financial institutions during crisis periods.  These institutional reforms have 
ensured that industrial companies worldwide have become dependent on 
international securities markets and that foreign takeovers have been permitted.  In 
times of crisis, this has meant that not only governments and banks, but also 
industrial companies would require American finance to tide them over, “… giving 
American finance capitalism ever widening circles of control over international 
capitalism.” (2003, p. 41)  
Prabhat Patnaik (2003, 2005, 2009) has argued that the leading capitalist 
economy necessarily plays a role in diffusing capitalism, but as rivals catch up, the 
imperion’s current account surplus turns to deficit.  This is a particular problem for 
the US, since unlike previous eras of imperial control, it can not directly expropriate 
from its colonies.  Instead, continued confidence in the US dollar as world money in 
the face of growing deficits is maintained through its control over both the capitalist 
hinterland of developing economies and global energy reserves.   
All of the arguments in this sub-strand consciously address issues of global as 
opposed to purely national accumulation.  Missing however are finer grain analyses 
of the transformations in the relations between the agents of capitalism both within 
and across borders, and their specification within a changing world market.  As such 
the arguments struggle to account for the specificities of the rise of finance in the 
periphery.  
 
3.3.2	  	  Global	  financial	  liberalisation	  	  
 
The second strand in the literature on financialisation, focusing on the role of global 
financial liberalisation, is one which threads its way through accounts from a wide 
variety of disciplinary perspectives and levels of abstraction.  In post-Keynesian 
work, the liberalisation is itself the causal factor leading to the financialisation of the 
economy, driven by the rise of a rentier class and accompanying inequality.  In 
Marxian accounts, liberalisation is a proximate factor, leaving open the possibility 
that liberalisation is itself reflective of deeper structural transformations in 
capitalism.  In the literature which stresses the role of financial liberalisation, there is 
a broad acceptance that financialisation is a secular phenomenon (or, if cyclical, of a 
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long-term duration), if disagreement over whether its course can be halted and a lid 
put back on Pandora’s box.  This is a large literature, so I have chosen to limit the 
exposition to exemplary references of two seminal elements of broader financial 
liberalisation: capital market liberalisation, and foreign bank entry. 
Capital market liberalisation involves the removal of constraints on both 
incoming and outgoing monetary flows, be they direct investment, portfolio flows, or 
cross-border lending.  Advocates argue that the consequent deepening of financial 
markets improves both access to capital and the price discovery process, resulting in 
the more efficient allocation of funds (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973; Fry, 1997).  In 
economies of the periphery, capital market liberalisation has been variously 
undertaken at a country’s own behest, as an urgent necessity during times of crisis, or 
as a contractual requirement; the latter stipulated by loan conditionalities, or bi-
/multi-lateral investment and trade agreements.   
Against orthodox accounts, the literature on financialisation finds that, by 
enlarging domestic capital markets and allowing access to international capital 
markets, capital market liberalisation has facilitated increased investment in financial 
assets by non-financial corporations, with negative implications for levels of 
productive investment.  This has occurred in countries as diverse as the United States 
(Orhangazi, 2007, 2008, 2011), India (Sen, 2008), South Africa (Mohamed, 2009), 
Mexico (Vidal, Marshall, & Correa, 2011), Argentina, Mexico and Turkey (Demir, 
2009a), and Hong Kong, Singapore, Indonesia, Korea and Malaysia (Yan, 2010).  
Declining productive investment may either be the result of improved relative 
profitability in finance following capital market liberalisation, or simply from the 
ensuing volatility discouraging real investment (Demir, 2009a; Stockhammer & 
Grafl, 2010).  Financial investors have taken advantage of capital market 
liberalisation to ‘hollow out’ productive firms through the leveraged purchase and 
subsequent break-up and sale of firm assets in countries such as Mexico (Correa, 
Marshall, & Vidal, 2010).  Governments have had to adopt monetary and exchange 
rate policies which protect the financial gains of investors at the expense of domestic 
fixed investment and employment, as documented in Mexico (Levy-Orlik, 2008), 
Brazil and Korea (Kaltenbrunner, 2010; Painceira, 2010). 
 A second central tenet of financial reforms over the last three decades has 
been the opening up of domestic banking markets to foreign competition.  The 
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arguments advanced in favour of foreign bank entry (Claessens, Demirgüc-Kunt, & 
Huizinga, 2001; Claessens & van Horen, 2010; Levine, 1996) can only be 
summarised in general terms here.   First, benefits are said to be derived from 
increased competition.  Larger foreign banks are able to access more diversified 
funding sources, and invest in a more diversified range of assets.  This allows them 
to lower funding costs, and achieve higher returns through better risk diversification.  
Customers then stand to benefit from a decreased interest rate spread, resulting in 
more efficient allocation of resources.  A second set of benefits is related to positive 
spill-over effects.  Along with greater size and reach, foreign banks introduce best-
practice policies and procedures, more experienced staff and cutting-edge 
technologies.  It is hoped that competitive pressures will force domestic banks to 
adopt such features.   This leads to both greater efficiency and stability.  Third are 
governance benefits.  Foreign banks reputedly demand improved systems of 
regulation and supervision from regulatory authorities, and reduce the influence of 
the government on financial sector allocation decisions.  They may also serve to 
weaken cronyism in lending between units affiliated to family-based conglomerates. 
 In contrast to this ruddy prognosis, there is increasing evidence that the 
claims in the orthodox literature are overstated.  A similarly large body of literature 
finds evidence that foreign bank entry may lead to decreased competition (Beck & 
Martinez Peria, 2010; Kim & Lee, 2004; Lensink & Hermes, 2004; Levy-Yeyati & 
Micco, 2007; Schulz, 2006; Tregenna, 2009), a fall in access to credit for certain 
sectors (Berger, Klapper, & Udell, 2001; Gormley, 2010; Mian, 2006), and 
weakened governance (dos Santos, 2007).  However, what is of greater interest to the 
present discussion is the literature which looks at the relationship between foreign 
bank entry and the financialisation of accumulation.  Foreign banks may face an 
environment in which large firms are self-financing, but lack the local relationships 
and monitoring skills to profitably exploit SME markets.  This fact, combined with 
the technical expertise developed in advanced economies for the securitisation of 
household lending for housing and consumption, induces a turn of the banks towards 
the household (dos Santos, 2009a; Gorton, 2009; Kregel, 2010).  In developing 
country contexts, this change may be accompanied by banks’ reliance on investments 
in government securities.  These critical changes in bank behaviour have been 
claimed in, for example, Eastern Europe (Raviv, 2008), the Balkans (Ćetković, 
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2011), Korea (Crotty & Lee, 2005), Turkey (Karacimen, 2013), India 
(Chandrasekhar, 2007) and  Mexico (Levy-Orlik, 2009).  
 By construction, literature focusing on the import of global financial 
liberalisation for financialisation integrates analysis of the changes on the countries 
of the periphery.  As such, it provides significant empirical insight into the 
commonalities and the divergences between how these processes are experienced in 
different institutional settings.  Without specifically linking these processes to 
transformations in the world market, it suggests that financialisation is related to the 
nature of a state’s insertion into the global economy.  
 
3.3.3	  	  The	  rentier,	  shareholder	  value,	  inequality	  and	  imbalances	  	  
 
Under the third heading, I have included a number of factors linked with 
financialisation which are often discussed together, particularly though not 
exclusively in the post-Keynesian literature, namely, the rise of the rentier, 
shareholder value orientation, inequality and global imbalances.  This literature also 
frequently highlights the role played by global financial liberalisation as previously 
outlined.  Much of the empirical purchase of this work is accepted by scholars of 
other traditions, however for Marxists, these factors are understood to be 
symptomatic of underlying material realities, such as the stagnation of production 
(discussed above), or epochal transformations in the relations of capitalism 
(discussed below). 
Ground-breaking to the post-Keynesian understanding of the role of finance 
in contemporary capitalism was the work of Hyman Minsky.  A number of post-
Keynesian writers have argued that Minsky’s well-known financial instability 
hypothesis (FIH) can be adapted to explain a secular (or, at least, medium-term) rise 
in the weight of finance in the economy.  As originally argued, the FIH explained the 
rising indebtedness of firms over the business cycle (Minsky, 2008).  Firms’ 
willingness to assume debt in order to fund investment is conditioned by both future 
profit expectations and financing costs.  At the peak of the business cycle, interest 
rates rise and growth slows, leading firms’ whose income-to-debt relation was 
originally classified as hedge (meaning that both principal and interest can be repaid 
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from profits), to first become speculative and eventually ponzi (where new loans are 
required to meet interest payments on existing debt).  Avoiding mass bankruptcy 
requires the injection of liquidity by the central bank in its role as lender of last 
resort, and/or big government19.   
 In his later writings, Minsky (1992; 1996; 1996) introduced the concept of 
‘money manager capitalism’ (MMC), a fifth financial stage of American 
capitalism20, in which he saw an increasing proportion of financing taking place 
through markets rather than through intermediaries.   MMC was a consequence of 
the privatisation of the American pension system which led to the dominance of 
institutional funds and shareholder value orientation in the financial structure.  
Randall Wray (2011) argues that Minsky’s MMC can be interpreted to foretell a 
number of key transitions in the US economy, including the rise of financial 
innovation and shadow banking, pressure for deregulation and desupervision, and 
increasing household debt.  Thomas Palley (2011) believes that the work on MMC 
suggests a ‘super-cycle’ involving the twin developments of regulatory relaxation 
and increased risk-taking, leading an economy over the medium-term to move from 
systemic stability to systemic exuberance and finally to systemic vulnerability.  As is 
the case with Minsky’s original FIH, the MMC theory of a ‘super-cycle’ rise in 
finance is centred upon policy changes in the United States, offering scant direct 
insight into financialisation in the economies of the periphery. 
According to much of the post-Keynesian literature which has been produced 
since Minsky’s path-breaking work, lying at the root of the changes which 
characterise financialisation is the rise of a rentier layer, whose interests lie in the 
perpetuation of financial profits at the expense of productive investment and broader 
welfare21.  The rise of such a layer is linked with a series of policy initiatives 
                                                
19 Maria Ivanova (2013) has summarised the criticisms of the FIH, including its failure to go beyond 
‘animal spirits’ in its explanation of the boom, its purely microeconomic basis, and its empirically-
unfounded contention that leverage increases during periods of economic expansion.  Gary Dymski 
(2010) has  succinctly summarised the problems that Minsky’s FIH encounters in trying to account for 
the dynamics of the crisis which began in 2007-8. 
20 Minksy’s five financial stages of American capitalism are:  commercial capitalism, industrial 
capitalism and wild-cat financing, financial capitalism and state financing, paternalistic, managerial 
and welfare state capitalism, and money manager capitalism (1996). 
21 Epstein and Jayadev define the rentier share as “… the sum of profits of the financial sector plus 
interest income of the non-financial sector and households” (2005, p. 50).  However, defined in this 
way, the agency of such a diverse grouping is unclear. 
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undertaken particularly in the United States (Dore, 2008; Duenhaupt, 2012; Epstein, 
2005; Lazonick & O’Sullivan, 2000; Lazonick, 2008, 2010, 2013; Pollin, 2007), 
though accounts of the rising rentier share have been produced for other countries 
such as Germany (Duenhaupt, 2012), OECD economies more generally (Epstein & 
Jayadev, 2005) , Mexico (Babb, 2005), Turkey (Akyüz & Boratav, 2005), Brazil 
(Barbosa-Filho, 2005) and Korea (Crotty & Lee, 2005).  While this work is 
commendably global in its outlook, the interconnections between the rise of the 
rentier layer in such a diverse range of institutional contexts are under-explored.  
 One of the key consequences of the increasing power of the rentier are 
changes to corporate governance, captured by the term shareholder value orientation 
(SVO).  The post-Keynesian theory of the firm distinguishes workers, management 
and rentiers (Lavoie, 1992).  In the age of ‘managerial capitalism’ in the United 
States, it was commonly understood that managers’ preference was for growth, while 
shareholders’ was for profits (Chandler, 1977).  The alignment of managers’ 
preferences with those of shareholders, and resolution of what was problematised as 
a principal-agent conflict (M.C. Jensen & Meckling, 1976), was achieved through 
two key institutional changes: the use of performance-related pay and stock options 
in managerial compensation, and the growth in mergers and acquisitions. William 
Lazonick’s work (Lazonick & O’Sullivan, 2000; Lazonick, 2008, 2010, 2013) has 
been instrumental to understanding the impacts of a range of measures including 
executive stock options, share buybacks and increased mergers and acquisition 
activity, as firms move from an outlook of ‘retain and invest’ to one of ‘downsize 
and distribute’.   
Innovative contributions for the purposes here look at the impact of SVO on 
the financialisation of the firm.  Engelbert Stockhammer (2004) finds evidence in 
France, the US and the UK, that the share of income paid out in dividends and 
interest is negatively associated with real investment.  Özgür Orhangazi (2007), 
using US firm level data, finds that increased financial profit opportunities may have 
crowded out real investment by changing the incentives of firm managers, shortening 
planning horizons and increasing uncertainty.  James Crotty (2003) and Eckhard 
Hein (2009) find that in the US since the 1980s, pressures to increase dividend 
payments and/or share prices (through share buybacks) have led to the substitution of 
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own capital with borrowed capital.  This has driven up the debt-capital stock ratio, 
forcing firms to cut labour costs and investment or else face rising indebtedness. 
Emphasising a different aspect of firm behaviour under financialisation, 
Claude Serfati (2008, 2011) posits the transnational corporation (TNC) as a locus of 
the valorisation of capital, where productive and financial valorisation are 
intertwined.  A key aspect of financial valorisation has been the growth in intangible 
assets22 due to their positive impact on shareholder value. Similarly within a view to 
the role of intangible assets, Hugh Willmott (2010) looks at brand value, arguing that 
capital invested in brands yields a higher return in terms of market capitalisation than 
investment in production.   
William Milberg (2008; Milberg & Winkler, 2010a, 2010b) has argued that 
SVO has driven the re-structuring of production across borders.  Lead firms in global 
value chains are able to exert oligopsony power to drive down input costs, allowing 
them to maintain profits even in the context of slower economic growth.  This, he 
says, has helped to sustain financialisation by easing managerial opposition to the 
use of profits in dividend payouts, share buybacks and mergers and acquisitions.  
Perhaps surprisingly, this is one of the few contributions in the financialisation 
literature which explicitly addresses the impact of the global re-structuring of 
production on the relation between financial and industrial capitals23.  However, 
Milberg’s suggestion that global re-structuring has eased the tension between 
shareholders’ and managers’ interests sits at odds with Lazonick’s managers whose 
incentives lie precisely in executive stock options, share buybacks and mergers and 
acquisitions.  What is critical however, is the observation that financial and industrial 
capitals are now integrated within the form of the TNC, opening new spaces for 
surplus value extraction and re-distribution. 
 Within much of the post-Keynesian stream, the reasons for the rise of a 
rentier layer (or equally why the policies which have emboldened this layer have 
occurred when they did) are inadequately specified.  Stronger material grounding is 
given in Jan Toporowski’s theory of ‘capital market inflation’ (2000, 2009, 2010a, 
                                                
22 Serfati uses ‘intangible assets’ to refer to patents, copyrights, licences and trademarks. 
23 Baud and Durand (2012) take a sociological lens to the analysis of retailers’ use of overseas 
expansion, increased pressure on labour inputs and working capital management, and the resultant 
financialisation of assets. 
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2010b, 2010c, 2011).  The post-war baby boom and strong economic growth in the 
United States created a middle class demand for higher-yielding assets for savings 
purposes.  Pension fund privatisation allowed this demand to be channeled into 
corporate securities.  Since share prices, unlike bonds, have no 'par' value, their 
prices rise disproportionately with increased inflows to stock markets.  This capital 
gain is paid not by the company that issued the share, but by the next buyer in the 
stock market.  In contemporary finance, this ‘next buyer’ is an institutional investor 
who is more interested in capital gains (‘flipping’ shares) than in long-term 
sustainable profits.   
In this environment, corporations are tempted to issue excess capital and 
increase their borrowing.  This results in interest and dividend obligations rising 
faster than their cash-generating capacity is expanding.  For such ‘over-capitalised’ 
companies, it is safer to hold financial assets against liabilities, rather than tie up 
funds in plant and equipment whose yields are subject to the caprice of the business 
cycle.  As a result, rather than investing in production, corporations buy financial 
assets, and engage in mergers and acquisitions and/or balance sheet restructuring.  In 
a financially developed economy, Toporowski (2008) argues that all sectors manage 
their liquidity with excess capital. Households, for example, hold increasing bank 
debt against real estate and financial assets, with the middle classes increasingly 
relying on housing inflation rather than income for consumption.   
Toporowski’s arguments provide a powerful analytical basis for 
understanding the financialisation of the US economy, without recourse to a 
mysterious rentier layer.  However, it should be noted that in Toporowski’s 
formulation, financialisation (a term which he avoids) is decidedly cyclical.  He has 
gone so far as to argue that “… financialised capitalism is over” (2009, p. 146).  
Furthermore, the impact of capital market inflation in the advanced economies on 
emerging capitalist countries awaits further elucidation, though presumably capital 
market spillovers and the changing investment patterns of transnational firms would 
figure prominently. 
A further theme common to much of the literature on financialisation is the 
interdependence of the phenomenon with rising inequality.  In the post-Keynesian 
literature this rising inequality is linked to a neoliberal policy agenda which has 
empowered a small minority whose wealth emanates from financial profit.  Seminal 
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examples which describe the class and race implications of this growing divide, 
particularly in the United States, include the work of Gary Dymski (2005) and 
Gabriel Palma (2009).  Within a Marxist framework, Photis Lysandrou (2011a, 
2011b) has argued that the effects of increased exploitation have resulted in an 
excess demand for the financial securities which act as ‘wealth containers’.  The 
argument is extended globally, observing that this excess demand is exacerbated by 
growing inequality and wealth in emerging market economies which has not been 
matched by growth in their domestic capital markets. 
 A large body of post-Keynesian macroeconomic research has focused on the 
implications for growth of the growing inequality linked to financialisation (Hein & 
Van Treeck, 2010; Hein, 2010; Lavoie, 2008; Onaran, Stockhammer, & Grafl, 2009; 
Skott & Ryoo, 2007; Stockhammer, 2010; Zalewski & Whalen, 2010).  While a 
detailed examination of these papers is impossible here, all of these models critically 
pivot on assumptions made about the labour market, and the specification of 
investment and consumption functions.  Accordingly, a 'finance-dominated' regime 
can lead to an expansionary (though unstable) outcome, but can equally lead to 
'profits without investment' or 'contractionary' outcomes24. 
 Stockhammer (2012a, 2012b; Stockhammer & Onaran, 2012) has extended 
this analysis to the global level, where he argues that financial deregulation has 
allowed certain countries to run protracted current account deficits.  In reaction to 
stagnant domestic demand in both deficit and surplus countries, two growth models 
have emerged, respectively debt-led and export-led.  In the former countries, 
households maintain consumption levels in the face of stagnant or falling wages 
through increased borrowing.  In the latter countries, wage repression supports 
export competitiveness, with profits recycled as capital account outflows to the 
deficit countries25.   
Summing up this section, a number of important contributions can be 
highlighted.  Changes in corporate governance associated with financial imperatives 
                                                
24 Paulo dos Santos (2013), while agreeing with the policy objectives of the post-Keynesian work on 
wage-led growth, argues from a Marxist framework that, rather than being an exogenous variable 
which can be related to output, the distribution between wages and profits is endogenous to the 
relationship between the decision to produce and the decision to consume, and therefore holds no 
causal power. 
25 Examples of research into the relationship between global imbalances and financialisation from a 
Marxist perspective include Guttmann and Plihon (2010) and Lucarelli (2012). 
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in policy-making have influenced relative levels of investment in fixed, intangible 
and financial assets.  The interpenetration of industrial and financial capital in the 
form of the transnational corporation has opened up new opportunities for surplus 
value extraction and redistribution.  At the domestic level, financialisation and 
inequality appear to be mutually reinforcing in a number of countries, while at the 
international level, a pattern has emerged of complementary debt and export-led 
growth models.   
 
3.3.4	  	  Epochal	  transformation	  in	  capitalism	  
 
Underlying much of the literature which has been reviewed to this point is an 
understanding, whether made explicit or not, that financialisation is a cyclical 
phenomenon of varying durations.  The rise of finance can or will be checked, either 
by the perspicacious actions of concerned policymakers, or by the counterveiling 
tendencies of the operation of the capitalist economy.  In this section, I examine two 
currents within the literature which emphasise the secular nature of financialisation, 
that is, the argument that financialisation signifies an epochal transformation in 
capitalism. 
The first example of this current is that which, broadly put, places emphasis 
on the impact of the emergence of a new knowledge-based economy.  From within a 
post-Keynesian framework, Bernard Paulré (2010) suggests that the uncertainty and 
instability associated with the knowledge economy make finance and its ability to 
control and limit risk more important.  This, of course, assumes that finance does 
these things.  From within a Marxist framework comes the work of Carlo Vercellone 
(2007, 2008) on the development of ‘cognitive capitalism’.  This he defines as a new 
phase of capitalism, where labour organises itself autonomously, primitive 
accumulation is based on financial logic, and the extraction of rents dominates.  A 
similar argument is developed by Teixeira and Rotta (2012) that the 'new enclosures' 
of intellectual property rights allow the transformation of knowledge into a 
monopolised commodity, the revenue from which should be understood as a form of 
rent.  Related to the notion of ‘cognitive capitalism’ is Christian Marazzi’s 
‘biocapitalism’ (Marazzi, 2010), where investment in apparatuses of producing and 
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capturing value outside of directly productive processes permeate human lives, 
resulting in a lengthening and intensification of the working day from which 
financial profits may be drawn.  This literature on ‘cognitive capitalism’ and 
‘biocapitalism’ is refreshing in its outlook, but lacks a well-defined international 
perspective; as such, the relationship between the rise of the knowledge economy in 
certain regions and the global re-structuring of production is not sufficiently 
explored.  
The second example which I will focus on is that of the body of work 
developed by Lapavitsas (2008; 2009a, 2009b, 2010, 2011, 2013) and the RMF 
School, which builds upon Baran and Sweezy’s (1968) argument that the existence 
of increasingly large monopolistic enterprises in the contemporary period is the 
result of the immanent capitalist tendencies to centralisation and concentration.  The 
stagnation of productive accumulation26 in the countries of the capitalist core has 
added impetus to these large monopolistic enterprises’ push for reforms which 
facilitate their expansion.  This has resulted in trade and capital account 
liberalisation, but also the weakening of that domestic regulation which constrains 
foreign ownership, profit-making and the reach of the private sphere.  With the 
substantive achievement of these policy objectives by the neoliberal state, and aided 
by technological developments in communications and information technology, large 
firms have become increasingly self-financing.   Where external funds are required 
(and/or part of a profitable investment strategy), the firms draw upon market-based 
securities rather than loans, thereby empowering investment banks relative to 
commercial banks.   
 The increased ability of corporations to self-finance constitutes the push 
factor behind a transformation in commercial banking.  Pull factors include: first, the 
aforementioned changes in regulation combined with developments in information 
technology which have led to liquidity-enhancing financial innovation, namely credit 
scoring and securitisation (dos Santos, 2009a); and second, the privatisation of social 
services, which has introduced financial intermediation into a growing share of 
household reproduction.  As a result of these factors, commercial banks have turned 
                                                
26 The declining rate of growth in labour productivity in the US, UK, Germany and Japan is 
documented by Lapavitsas (2013). 
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to the individual as a source of revenue, and act more like investment banks, turning 
over the balance sheet to satisfy demands for increased profitability. This turn has 
resulted in profits from expropriation27 from workers' wages.  Where workers' wages 
have been stagnant, this expropriation has only been possible due to the expansion of 
consumer indebtedness.  These profits originate, not thanks to the creation of 
additional surplus value, or even in the capture and re-distribution of existing surplus 
value28, but in the expansion of the circuits of loanable money capital.  It is important 
to point out that this fact is what ensures that such expropriation is in the broader 
interest of capital (at least in the short-term), and not simply in the predatory interests 
of bank capital as against industrial capital.  For this reason, Lapavitsas (2013) 
argues that loanable capital, not fictitious capital, lies at the root of financialisation. 
Taken together, these transformations in the behaviour and inter-relationships of 
non-financial enterprises, banks and households constitute an epochal change in 
capitalism. 
 The RMF School has taken a lead role in attempts to both theorise the links 
between financialisation in developed and developing countries (Lapavitsas, 2009c, 
2013) 29 , and to document the phenomenon in emerging capitalist economies 
(Ergunes, 2009; Kaltenbrunner, 2010, 2011; Karacimen, 2013; Painceira, 2009, 
2010, 2011).  Their argument centres around the impact of capital account 
liberalisation and developing countries’ ensuing obligation to hoard reserves of US 
dollars in their function as quasi-world money in order to participate in these flows.  
This has resulted in net capital flows from developing to developed countries, and 
imposed significant opportunity costs in the form of reserve accumulation.  With 
developing countries’ exchange rates functioning as an asset class for international 
investors, and central banks’ commitment to inflation-targeting regimes, foreign 
capital inflows have had to be sterilised, encouraging the growth of domestic bond 
                                                
27 The concept of expropriation bears similarities to Marx’s concept of ‘profits by deduction’ (1991, 
p. 1001), as surplus value extracted in the sphere of circulation resulting from pricing policies 
characteristic of an environment where wages are higher than the socially necessary minimum and the 
bulk of output is sold at monopolistic prices.  Marx believed that the opportunity to earn such profits 
would be fleeting, but, as argued by Baran (2012), the requisite conditions are characteristic of many 
advanced capitalist countries in the contemporary period. 
28 Baragar and Chernomas (2012) argue that increased working-class debt in the United States and 
Canada has allowed value created in the non-financial sector to be transferred to the financial sector. 
29 Lapavitsas (2013) draws upon the concept of ‘subordinate financialisation’ first developed in this 
thesis. 
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markets and the financial institutions which service them.  A key role has also been 
assigned to foreign bank entry in introducing new techniques for securitised lending 
to individuals for mortgages and consumption.    
 
3.3.5	  	  The	  financialisation	  of	  everyday	  life	  
 
Finally, from within radical currents in sociology, geography and political science, 
come perceptive readings of how financialisation has interacted with a variety of 
social institutions.  This is a large and growing literature rendering an exhaustive 
review impractical; what follows is therefore a highly selective synthesis. 
The influential cultural economy approach30 places central importance on the 
‘wall of money’ which entered Western financial markets post-deregulation.  The 
creation of this flow is attributed to a range of material and psychological conditions, 
including low interest rates, middle-class saving and ‘irrational exuberance’.  The 
capital market is understood as a social construct, standing between households and 
firms and the securities they invest in, acting not just as an intermediary but shaping 
the behaviour of the agents themselves31.  Julie Froud et al. (2002) have coined the 
term ‘coupon pool capitalism’ to describe these changing relations.  This approach 
draws upon shareholder value theory, but injects a healthy dose of skepticism 
concerning its limitations as an explanatory factor.  There is a gap, they point out, 
between saying and doing, and while shareholder value may “… set management on 
a utopian quest for growth and higher capital returns”, the actual consequences of 
this “social rhetoric” are uncertain (2006, p. 65). 
Pension systems are a critical element in a number of accounts of 
financialisation (Blackburn, 2006; Dixon & Sorsa, 2009; Engelen, 2003; Langley, 
2004; Macheda, 2012).  Robin Blackburn has coined the term 'grey capitalism' to 
describe an economy in which the relations of ownership and responsibility become 
blurred, as citizens place their future income security in the hands of institutional 
                                                
30 Associated with the Centre for Research in Socio-Cultural Change (CRESC) at the University of 
Manchester, much of whose work is summarised in Engelen et al. (2011). 
31 This notion of the ‘performativity’ of markets can trace its intellectual origins through Donald 
MacKenzie (2008a, 2008b) to Michel Callon (1998). 
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investors.  The cancellation of pension promises – what he calls 'exploitation over 
time' – is crucial in attempts to prolong the current regime of accumulation.   
A number of authors point to the importance of cultural attitudes towards 
home ownership and the role of the state in housing provision in the rise of 
financialisation (Aalbers, 2008; Leyshon & Thrift, 2007; Schwartz & Seabrooke, 
2009; Watson, 2008).  Matthew Watson has argued that the political consequence of 
the combination of privatised pension provision and liberal housing regimes, is a 
populace which punishes political parties which do not protect asset wealth, locking 
in processes of financialisation. 
 One of the few authors to approach the question of what financialisation 
means applied to the government sector is political scientist Iain Hardie (2011, 
2012).  Hardie defines financialisation simply as the trading of risk.  Comparing the 
bond markets of Lebanon, Turkey and Brazil, Hardie argues that the dominant 
presence of foreign investors in Brazil’s highly liquid bond market has encouraged 
the shorting of government bonds.  This has undermined debt sustainability by 
pushing up borrowing costs, and increased the severity of crises.  In contrast, the 
Lebanese bond market is dominated by a handful of domestic commercial banks, 
whose interest is in holding government bonds as an investment, helping to calm 
bond markets at times of political upheaval.    
As this selective review illustrates, while this current within the 
financialisation literature does not provide a theoretical account of the emergence of 
financialisation across the world market, it does provide a rich diversity of case 
studies of the impact of financialisation on all aspects of life in a variety of 
institutional settings.   
 
 
3.4	  	  A	  THEORY	  OF	  FINANCIALISATION:	  AN	  EPOCHAL	  TRANSFORMATION	  IN	  
CAPITALIST	  RELATIONS	  AND	  THE	  CAPITALIST	  WORLD	  MARKET	  
 
What this review suggests is that financialisation has an enormous reach and 
diversity of appearances, and that its emergence is both multi-faceted and mediated 
in complex ways.  In this thesis, I have chosen to base my theorisation of 
financialisation on the analysis of the RMF School.  However, I will argue that the 
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epochal transformation of the relations between the fundamental agents of capitalism 
must be located within the development of the world market.  Not as a trans-
historical abstract logic of a capitalist world system, but as a process driven by and 
contingent upon the specific actions of states and their capitalist classes.  The 
contemporary distinguishing attributes of the world market are, first, the deepening 
of the internationalisation of the circuits of commodity and money capital, including 
the interpenetration of capital ownership; second, the unprecedented 
internationalisation of production; and, third, the pivotal role assumed by the US 
dollar as quasi-world money in a flexible exchange rate system.  
In seeking to explain the origins of financialisation, a central role is played by 
the stagnation of productive accumulation and falling profitability in the advanced 
capitalist economies which led to the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system.  
Rather than drawing a direct causal link from this stagnation to financialisation, as in 
those accounts which depict a flight of capital into finance, the impact of the 
slowdown arrives via the liberalisation in trade, capital flows and asset ownership, 
and the repression of the wage share, which it fostered32.   
The ensuing expansion of the world market was characterised by both the 
deepening of the internationalisation of the circuit of money capital, and, for the first 
time, the internationalisation of the circuit of productive capital.  With the 
internationalisation of these two circuits came an acceleration in the interpenetration 
of capital across nation-states.  The central agent in these changes is the transnational 
corporation, supported by the actions of the state, overcoming crisis through the 
restructuring of the relations of production and the exploitation of new productive 
technologies, especially those in communications, information technology and 
transportation33.  Integrating the stagnation of production in this way, as a mediated 
factor catalysing the development of the world market, allows for financialisation in 
contexts where productivity and/or profitability is rising, such as those of the 
emerging capitalist economies.     
                                                
32 Whether these changes resulted in a recovery in the rate of profit is a contested empirical issue, 
which I need not resolve here.   
33 The importance and specific role of technological change deserves far more attention than I am able 
to give it in this work. 
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 As they have re-structured their productive activities across the globe, 
corporations have extracted surplus value under circumstances where revenues and 
expenses are drawn from different social formations reflecting chaotic standards of 
value.  The rise of intangible assets, irregularities in transfer pricing, and increased 
tax arbitrage all trace their origins to these transformations in the behaviour of the 
corporation.  In this environment, the non-financial corporation has become 
increasingly able to finance itself out of retained earnings (Lapavitsas, 2013). 
Where external financing has been required, capitalist enterprises have 
exploited capital account liberalisation to access a global pool of liquidity, the latter 
spurred on by pension privatisation and financial deregulation.  This has had three 
key corollaries.  First, enterprises have replaced commercial bank borrowing with the 
issuance of market-based securities.  Second, in the context of a global system of 
floating exchange rates, this has necessitated engagement in interest rate and 
exchange rate derivatives.  Third, corporations have acquired the capacity to engage 
in financial investment.  This increase in hedging and speculative activity reflects 
both the increased opportunities for surplus value extraction opened up by global 
productive re-structuring and the unfolding of the world market in the absence of a 
world state which might regulate the predatory tendencies of finance; both reflect 
capital’s quest to escape the constraints of productive valorisation.   
These processes have driven financial innovation and empowered investment 
banks relative to commercial banks.  The ensuing growth in fictitious capital is 
certainly characteristic of financialisation, but it is viewed here as symptomatic 
rather than causal.  Similarly, the importance of shareholder value orientation, rising 
inequality and global imbalances are all accepted in this account, however these 
behavioural and distributional aspects have been embedded within the context of 
deeper structural transformations in capitalism. 
 Commercial banks have witnessed a decline in their loan portfolio with the 
largest enterprises.  In parallel, financial liberalisation has led to a rising demand 
amongst the upper classes for wealth instruments driving financial innovation, while 
privatisation has introduced financial intermediation into increasing areas of 
household reproduction.  Particularly in those countries where the repression of 
wages has been successful, this has resulted in increasing recourse to indebtedness in 
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order to maintain living standards34.  Taken together, this has allowed commercial 
banks, employing new technologies in support of innovative financial products, to 
make profits from expropriation from workers’ wages.  
 In conclusion, the development of the world market under particular 
historical conditions has provided the context for a fundamental restructuring of the 
relations between enterprises, financial intermediaries and workers.  However, this 
restructuring will be uneven, taking different forms across the nation states which are 
constitutive of the world market, as it is mediated by domestic institutional 
formations and the hierarchical nature of each state’s insertion into global processes 
of accumulation.  In the periphery, for example, capitalist enterprises’ access to 
international pools of liquidity has proven a mixed blessing in the context of flexible 
exchange rate regimes held together by the US dollar acting as a form of quasi-
world-money.  Governments in the periphery, furthermore, have adopted monetary 
policies to attract capital flows, with sterilisation efforts driving the growth of 
domestic bond markets.  A theorisation of the distinctive process of financialisation 
as it unfolds in the periphery, characterised as subordinate financialisation, will be 
developed in chapter five.  However, before this, in the next chapter, I set out 
original empirical evidence of the tendencies of financialisation as they manifest 
themselves across a range of advanced capitalist economies. 
 
                                                
34 The connection between the wage share and indebtedness is mediated by changing prices of the 
worker’s consumption basket owing to the global re-structuring of production, as well as by 
government policies towards pensions, housing, healthcare, education, etc.. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter	  4	  	  	  
Financialisation	  varied:	  
Financialisation	  in	  advanced	  capitalist	  economies1	  
 
 
4.1	  	  INTRODUCTION	  
 
Most macroeconomic research into the phenomenon of financialisation has focused 
on the United States (for example Krippner, 2005; Orhangazi, 2008; Evans, 2009).  
This is both since it is assumed, correctly or not, to be the ideal type of a 
financialised economy, and for more practical reasons of data availability2.  There 
have been forays into the phenomenon as it manifests itself in the UK 
(Stockhammer, 2004), France (Chesnais, 2001; Duménil & Lévy, 2005), Germany 
(Duenhaupt, 2012) and a number of other single countries, but little truly 
comparative work (with notable contributions from Epstein & Jayadev, 2005; 
Lapavitsas, 2013).  The present chapter attempts exactly this, in order to come to 
better grips with the empirical realities of financialisation in advanced capitalist 
economies. 
In the previous chapter I developed a theory of financialisation based upon 
Lapavitsas’ work on epochal changes in the behaviour of and relations between the 
                                                
1 Significant portions of this chapter have been incorporated into a joint paper with Professor Costas 
Lapavitsas (2013) which has been accepted for publication in the Cambridge Journal of Regions, 
Economies and Societies. 
2 Any cross-country survey of the peculiarities of financialisation presents numerous statistical 
difficulties.  Beyond basic data availability, there are maddening problems with the use of varying and 
opaque categories in national accounts, and with differing methods and degrees of aggregation and 
consolidation.  In some cases, these difficulties simply reflect the very different nature of the way that 
different economies function.  Added to this is the fact that, no matter how much effort is put in to 
reconciling these issues, a central development within financialisation has been the skyrocketing 
growth of off-balance sheet activity. 
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key institutions of contemporary capitalism – banks, enterprises and households.  I 
located these transformations within the historically-specific characteristics of the 
world market.  This theorisation provides a testable hypothesis that the tendencies of 
financialisation should be observable as a global phenomenon, rather than something 
which is limited to archetypal financialised states.  I want to emphasise that this is 
not an argument that financialisation will be experienced in a homogenous fashion 
across countries.  Instead the essential tendencies of financialisation are expected to 
manifest themselves unevenly across the nation states which are constitutive of the 
world market, mediated by domestic institutional formations and the hierarchical 
nature of each state’s insertion into global processes of accumulation.   
An implication of this argument for divergence within convergence, which 
will mark a sub-thesis of this chapter, is that it runs against the thrust of the 
comparative capitalisms literature.  The chapter will re-visit the bank-based versus 
market-based typology (BBMB) which is so central to the comparative capitalisms 
work.  Does the bank-based versus market-based typology still hold, and if so, how 
has it been transformed in an era of financialisation?  What emerges is that while key 
BBMB differences remain, these differences have come under heavy pressure from 
and been transformed by processes of financialisation.   
In the advanced capitalist economies, firms are turning away from finance 
through relationship lending and towards retained earnings and market-based finance, 
and re-orienting their business to hold a greater share of financial relative to fixed 
assets.  Preliminary evidence suggests these trends are particularly pronounced in 
large enterprises.  However, the turn away from relationship lending has been less 
pronounced in Germany, France and Japan.  While French firms’ holdings of 
financial assets appear to mark them as financialisers par excellence, historical 
analysis links this to a wave of corporate re-structuring in the 1990s coming in 
response to the very particular way in which French cross-shareholdings have been 
unwound.  After binging on financial assets during the 1980s bubble, Japanese 
corporations have in some sense de-financialised, perhaps offering a glimpse of the 
future for firms in countries such as the UK.   
Banks have moved to a smaller loan share of assets, shifting from income on 
long-term interest spreads to short-term spreads on repo markets and fees on 
investment banking activities.  Within the loan portfolio, there has been a 
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pronounced shift to lending to households and for real estate.  The banks’ source of 
finance has moved from traditional deposits to short-term borrowing from the money 
market, especially from other financial institutions.  Within this overall story of 
convergence, Japanese and German banks retain a distinctive character.  While the 
trends are the same, the levels of lending to corporations versus households still 
cleaves to the bank-based typology.  Once again, there is evidence of a distinct 
financialised path of large international banks, which emphasises the importance of 
institutional specificities and policy environments in the evolution of bank-based and 
market-based systems. 
In the household sector, Japan and Germany again stand apart.  French 
households have moved rapidly towards the US/UK model, with deposits falling 
sharply and increased holdings of equities and pension funds invested in private 
marketable securities.  Japanese households keep their pension and insurance 
reserves in government bonds, while the Germans come out somewhere between the 
Japanese and the rest.  On the liability side, housing loans account for three quarters 
of liabilities in the US, the UK and France; while in Germany and Japan though the 
trend is rising, housing loans still only represent half of household liabilities.  These 
differences reflect variances in housing and pension policies and the organisation of 
finance in these countries. 
The chapter is structured as follows. The next section highlights relevant 
aspects of the comparative capitalisms literature, both to draw out lessons for the 
analysis and to distinguish the analytical approach employed in this chapter.  The 
third section provides empirical evidence of the transformations at the macro-
economic level, as well as that of non-financial enterprises, banks and households.  
The investigation deploys national account, flow of funds as well as non-financial 
and banking data for the USA, the UK, France, Germany and Japan.  The final 
section concludes. 
 
4.2	  	  BANK-­‐BASED	  VS.	  MARKET-­‐BASED	  IN	  AN	  ERA	  OF	  FINANCIALISATION	  
 
For over three decades, a vibrant literature on what Jackson and Deeg (2008) term 
‘comparative capitalisms’ has evolved.  These comparative studies, which take the 
nation-state as their point of departure, have been wide-ranging in their institutional 
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approach.  They have variously focused on labour, industrial organisation, 
production regimes, financial systems, corporate governance, legal systems, welfare 
regimes, systems of innovation, and more.  In their survey, Jackson and Deeg draw 
out three common principles that unite this enormous literature.  The first is the 
grounding of the economic in the institutional settings of the social.  Second is an 
understanding of the various institutions within an economy as complementary, and 
therefore as a potential source of comparative advantage.  Finally, and critically for 
the argument here, there is a presumed institutional path dependence which prevents 
system convergence. 
A strand within this broader literature is the bank-based vs. market-based 
framework (BBMB).  The typology was originally set out by John Zysman (1983) 
who examined the changing relationship between governments and markets in 
bringing about industrial change.  The distinction also plays a decisive role in Michel 
Albert’s (1991, 1993) influential depictions of Rhineland vs. Anglo-Saxon capitalism.  
Any financial system, regardless of its institutional specificities, has to fulfil a 
number of basic functions.  These include, but may not be limited to, capital 
allocation, risk sharing and corporate control.  According to conventional 
understandings, in a bank-based system, as typically represented by Germany or 
Japan, commercial banks act as ‘delegated monitors’ (Diamond, 1984), collecting 
information about borrowers and channelling depositors’ savings to investment 
opportunities.  In so doing, banks provide both intergenerational risk-sharing and 
smoothing to their creditors (Allen & Gale, 2000), and have a stake in monitoring 
borrowers’ behaviour (Stiglitz, 1985).  In contrast, in a market-based system, typified 
by the US and the UK, price revelation through debt and equities markets plays the 
lead role in capital allocation3.  Risk-sharing is accomplished through each individual 
investor’s portfolio diversification, and corporate control is exercised through arms-
length financial market discipline, chiefly through takeovers (M.C. Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Lazonick & O’Sullivan, 2000).  There are substantial literatures 
which debate both these conventional understandings themselves and the relative 
merits of bank-based vs. market-based systems for growth and development, an 
examination of which is not germane for present purposes.  Common to all of this 
                                                
3 Note that this may involve a considerable, perhaps increased role for investment banks, but 
diminishes the importance of retail commercial banking. 
Chapter	  4	  	  Financialisation	  varied	  
 
81 
 
literature however is a tacit assumption that finance plays a central if not the central 
role in determining the nature of a capitalist system.   
It is in this sense that another strand of the comparative capitalisms literature 
can be clearly distinguished.  What has become known as the ‘varieties of capitalism’ 
approach (VoC), after the pivotal book by Hall and Soskice (2001) of the same name, 
places the firm, not finance, at the centre of its analysis of capitalist divergence.  
Following VoC analysis, four institutional domains define firms’ incentives and 
constraints: financial systems and corporate governance, industrial relations, 
education and training systems, and the inter-company system (Deeg & Jackson, 
2007).  Asserted strong complementarities between these four domains mean that 
any coherent system can confer on its firms an institutional comparative advantage.  
From their analysis of these institutional domains across a range of national settings, 
Hall and Soskice draw out two ideal types:  that of the liberal market economies 
(LMEs), represented by the US and the UK, marked by short-term capital, 
deregulated labour markets, general education and inter-firm competition; and that of 
coordinated market economies (CMEs), represented by Germany, characterised by 
long-term capital, regulated labour markets, vocational training and inter-firm 
coordination. In terms of the financial system domain, the VoC approach maintains a 
similar dichotomy as the BBMB method. 
A number of critiques have been levelled at the VoC approach, of which only 
a few will be highlighted here.  Foremost is the charge that due to the assumption of 
strong institutional complementarity and path dependence, the approach is relatively 
static.  There is no theory of when and how capitalist systems change from one 
configuration to another (Crouch, 2005; Hancké, Rhodes, & Thatcher, 2007).  There 
is in fact much evidence of institutional incoherence (Crouch, Hall, Streeck, Boyer, 
& Amable, 2005), and that both incoherence and complementarity can either 
facilitate or hinder institutional change (Amable, 2003; Aoki, 2001).  Second, the 
firm, according to some critics, should be given more agency and not simply viewed 
as an ‘institution-taker’ (Hancké et al., 2007).  Power and politics must be brought 
into consideration to understand how firms attempt to build and link coalitions with 
political processes and institutions.  Third, a number of authors caution against over-
emphasising national boundaries, suggesting that there is a much wider scope for 
hybridisation of different institutional configurations that change the 
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complementarities and linkages within national boundaries, between different sectors 
and layers of the economy (Aoki & Jackson, 2008; Deeg, 2009).   
For the purposes of this chapter, both the innovations of VoC analysis and a 
number of criticisms of the same can usefully be considered in relation to a re-
visiting of the BBMB analysis in an era of financialisation.  First, the understanding 
in what follows is not that capitalist accumulation is either finance or firm driven.  
Rather, the interaction between the two and with households and the state will be 
examined.  Second, the meso-level insights of the more recent dynamic VoC 
literature will be drawn upon to better understand how material reality and policy 
have interacted resulting in institutional and system change.  Third, the analysis will 
look at the dimension of firm (and bank) size to offer some initial indication of the 
presence and degree of intra-national institutional hybridisation.   
Most importantly, against the central tenet of the comparative capitalisms 
literature that institutional path dependence will prevent convergence, the chapter 
will present empirical evidence of convergence across countries despite their 
historical, political and institutional specificities.  Within the theoretical framework 
of this thesis, this is to be expected; the transformations in the behaviour and 
relations between enterprises, banks and households elaborated in chapter three have 
emerged within the historical and political context of financial liberalisation, labour 
market deregulation and ideological domination of free markets since the 1970s. The 
epochal features of financialisation are historically and institutionally specific, 
reflecting the shifting balance of class forces between capital and labour. Hence, 
financialisation has varied at different times and in different countries.  
 
4.3	  	  FINANCIALISATION	  VARIED:	  THE	  EMPIRICAL	  EVIDENCE	  IN	  ACEs	  
 
Using national flow of funds data, this section analyses the degree and trajectory of 
financialisation at the level of the macroeconomy, and then in, respectively, the non-
financial corporate, the bank and the household sectors of the USA, the UK, Japan, 
Germany and France. The procedure allows for a comparative study of 
financialisation across advanced countries, while remaining aware of institutional 
and political specificities in each country.  Three empirical questions arise from the 
approach to financialisation proposed above and serve as testing ground for its 
Chapter	  4	  	  Financialisation	  varied	  
 
83 
 
validity. First, for enterprises, is there a turn away from bank loans in favour of 
borrowing from open financial markets, and has there been accumulation of financial 
relative to other assets? Second, for banks, is there an increase in the relative weight 
of lending to finance, insurance and real estate as well as to households? Third, for 
households, has there been increasing acquisition of financial liabilities relative to 
the ability to pay, and have financial assets shifted away from deposits? These 
questions are examined in the following sections by constructing appropriate 
empirical indicators. 
 
4.3.1	  	  The	  macroeconomic	  picture	  
 
One simple way to capture the increasing role of finance is to look at total financial 
sector assets as a share of GDP (see figure 4.01; for source notes, except where 
otherwise noted, see Appendix A).  A caveat is first required that too much emphasis 
should not be placed in the interpretation of cross-country differences in levels, due 
to the many difficulties in constructing comparable data sets as enumerated above.  
Having said this, through the 1990s, the UK, France, the US and Germany all show 
parallel growth trends starting from different levels.  In the 2000s, financial sectors 
in the UK and France rise rapidly while their US and German counterparts continue 
on their earlier growth path.  The exception to this story is Japan.  After explosive 
growth during its bubble period in the 1980s, and then slower growth in the 1990s, 
the financial sector has shrunk as a share of GDP in the last decade.   
 Comparing figure 4.01 with the growth of bank assets as a share of GDP 
(figure 4.02) counsels against making any simple macroeconomic distinctions 
between those economies which are traditionally thought to be bank-based and those 
which are not.  The growth in the financial sector in Japan in the 1980s is due to the 
growth in bank balance sheets, but since that time, any growth relative to GDP has 
come in the non-bank financial sector.  For the UK and France, most of the growth in 
the financial sector in the last two decades is accounted for in the growth of banks; 
however, in the US and Germany, the opposite is true.  Grasping the bank-based 
market-based typology and the transformation of banks in an era of financialisation 
clearly requires nuanced investigation. 
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Figure 4.01: Financial sector total financial assets as a share of GDP 
 
 
 
Figure 4.02: Banks’ total financial assets as a share of GDP 
 
 
Typically the relative importance of market-based finance is gauged by 
looking at stock and bond market development (Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt, & Levine, 
2009; Demirgüc-Kunt & Levine, 2001).  Figure 4.03 shows stock market 
capitalisation as a share of GDP, while figure 4.04 shows private bond market 
capitalisation as a share of GDP.  Stock markets have grown in size relative to GDP 
across the sample in the last two decades, however, clearly they are more central to 
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the market-based economies of the US and UK.  Private bond market capitalisation 
defies easy classification.  It is at similar levels and shows no growth for all countries, 
except for the US where it is at both a much higher level and increasing in relative 
size.   
 
 
Figure 4.03: Stock market capitalisation as a share of GDP 
Source: WB financial structure dataset, from Standard &Poor’s emerging market 
database 
 
 
 
Figure 4.04: Private bond market capitalisation as a share of GDP 
Source: WB financial structure dataset, from BIS Quarterly Review 
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A number of other measures have been used to show the increasing ‘footprint’ 
of the financial sector.  These include the increasing share of the Finance, Insurance 
and Real Estate sectors (FIRE) in GDP4, while its share in employment has remained 
stagnant5.  US data on wages from the FIRE industries shows that after two decades 
at a stable 15 per cent, the FIRE share of domestic private income rises to over 20 
per cent in the 1980s, where it has stayed for the last two decades6.  A number of 
attempts have been made to unravel the complexities of accounting for financial 
profits as a share of total profits.  The first work on the US economy was done by 
Krippner (2005), while that on France by Duménil and Lévy (2004a).  Lapavitsas 
(2013) confirms Krippner’s finding that financial profit as a share of total corporate 
profit in the United States has been rising from approximately ten per cent in the 
1940s and 1950s to reach nearly 35 per cent before the crisis of 2007-8; to this he 
adds the findings that the pre-tax profits of financial corporations as a share of total 
pre-tax profits have risen in the UK from below ten per cent before 2000 to above 35 
per cent before the crisis, and have risen in Japan from approximately ten per cent in 
the early 1980s to 20 per cent in recent years.  
But while such measures illustrate the undeniable growth in the size, share 
and reach of finance, they do not provide a deeper understanding of the structural 
transformations going on within and between key sectors of the economy, and how 
and why those transformations differ across countries.  It is these processes of the 
penetration of financial motives into the operations of and relations between firms, 
financial intermediaries and households which characterises financialisation. 
 
 
                                                
4  Tracing such a ratio using data from OECD.stat shows the FIRE sector growing in all countries of 
the sample from approximately 15 per cent of GDP in 1970 to 30 per cent in 2008, with the exception 
of Japan which grows from approximately 10 per cent in 1970 to 17 per cent recently.  The direct 
contribution of finance is masked in such calculations by the inclusion of real estate.  However, data 
for the finance sector alone are both less reliable due to differences in categorisation and available for 
a much shorter time period.  Efforts by Lapavitsas (2013) to reconcile individual national accounts 
data estimate the growth of the finance sector from approximately five per cent in the early 1980s to 
between seven and eight per cent more recently, with the exception of Germany, the ratio for which 
moves around five per cent since data become available in 1991. 
5 Using data from OECD.stat shows employment in financial intermediation at approximately 4.5 per 
cent in the US and UK, 3.5 per cent in Germany and France, and 2.5 per cent in Japan.   
6 Source is US National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) tables 6.1 and 6.2. 
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4.3.2	  	  Non-­‐financial	  corporations	  
 
According to the theory of financialisation adopted here, it is expected that non-
financial corporations (hereafter just corporations) will, first, turn away from bank 
loans towards open financial markets and, second, accumulate a greater proportion of 
financial relative to other assets.  The bank-based versus market-based distinction 
has historically pivoted on the degree to which corporations seek financing from 
‘patient’ relationship-based bank lending as against ‘impatient’ open market capital.  
Examining loans as a share of liabilities (figure 4.05) suggests that overall there has 
been a secular decline in the use of loans as corporations turn to self-finance.  
However, two distinct levels persist.  Germany and Japan on the one hand, and the 
US and UK on the other, with France moving from the former towards the latter.   
 
Figure 4.05: Non-financial corporations’ loans as a share of total liabilities (and 
linear trend) 
 
 
Some care should be taken in drawing any firm conclusions about the 
magnitude of the move away from bank borrowing.  The classification of what is a 
loan is critical.   As an example, the line given in figure 4.05 above shows loans from 
only UK MFIs (monetary financial institutions) as a share of liabilities.  If total loans 
is used instead, the UK appears to join the bank-based group.  But total loans masks 
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both increased borrowing from foreign monetary financial institutions (MFIs), and 
more importantly from increased ‘direct investment loans’.  The latter represent 
cross-border borrowing and repurchases between affiliated enterprises, where an 
MFI does not participate as a lender or borrower.  In effect, a form of short-term 
internal credit which masks the fall in bank borrowing. 
The impact of financialisation comes out more starkly with examination of 
the uses side of the balance sheet (figure 4.06).  For France, the US and the UK, 
there is a marked secular rise in the ratio of financial assets to fixed assets, reflecting 
the shift in corporate holdings of financial versus ‘productive’ assets7.  Once again, 
Japan and Germany appear to be marching to a different tune, in trend if not in the 
level of this ratio.  All five countries exhibit cyclical fluctuation, however finer 
analysis would be required to disentangle asset price inflation from net acquisition of 
financial assets.  
A number of interesting stories suggest themselves here.  First of all is that of 
Japan.  The ratio rises spectacularly during the bubble decade of the 1980s, reaching 
240 per cent.  This then falls back to hover around 150 per cent for the next two 
decades, with a second smaller period of inflation between 2002 and 2006.  This 
flattening out of the trend post-1990 suggests that Japanese corporations, due to their 
earlier experience, have become reluctant to or are unable to re-engage in 
financialisation. 
 
                                                
7 It would have been desirable to only include what might be termed ‘tradeable’ or ‘portfolio’ assets in 
the numerator, however, at the national flow of funds level, differences between countries’ 
categorisation makes interpretation of such a ratio difficult.  By using ‘total financial assets’, I can be 
sure that I am not missing part of the story due to different classification systems.  Fixed assets was 
used to avoid volatility in land prices (included in tangible assets) and cyclical inventory stocks 
(included in produced assets). 
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Figure 4.06: Non-financial corporations’ total financial assets as a share of fixed 
assets 
 
 
The second interesting story is that of France.   From 1982 to 2000, the ratio 
explodes from about 70 to 270 per cent, far exceeding the levels of both the Anglo-
American economies and Japan.  This is particularly notable in that it occurred 
during a period of the “unravelling” of the French system of cross-shareholding 
(Morin, 2000).  In the first round of privatisations of state-owned enterprises in the 
1980s, French businesses were sold to five categories of investors only: a core of 
stable shareholders (‘noyau dur’), the workforce, public, French and foreign 
institutional investors.  Thus, according to Bob Hancké (2001, p. 320): “… an 
ownership structure of loyal investor cores emerged, which consisted of groups of 
banks, insurance companies, and industrial companies that acted as long-term 
institutional investors and were supposed to help govern the company and protect it 
from takeovers.” This explains the relatively high level of corporate holdings of 
financial assets from the outset of figure 4.06.  Then in 1993, the French government 
resumed those privatisations which had been earlier postponed and allowed sales of 
the core shareholdings which had been meant to protect the newly privatised 
companies.  In late 1996, one of the two major cross-shareholding structures 
collapsed.  This led to a wave of merger activity, with the amount of equity raised by 
French corporations increasing by 38 per cent (Culpepper, Hall, & Palier, 2006).  
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French companies during this period also looked abroad for acquisitions and joint 
ventures.   
The third question which arises from figure 4.06 is the contrasting movement 
of US and UK corporations during the most recent decade.  Decomposition of the 
ratio shows that for the US, both financial and fixed assets continue to grow but at an 
equal (nearly exponential) rate.  While in the UK, the stock of financial assets 
continues to grow post-2001 on a near-exponential trend, but growth in fixed assets 
is clearly linear.  This suggests that the difference in behaviour is down to the 
relatively slower growth of UK corporations’ fixed investment.  This view is 
partially explained by higher rates of gross fixed capital formation in the US over the 
past two decades, though the difference here does not seem to fully justify the trend 
in the ratio of financial to fixed assets.   
 
German	  and	  Japanese	  corporations	  apart	  
 
Further insight can be gleaned through the examination of the historical changes of 
corporations’ balance sheets8.  On the asset side, levels of corporate deposits decline 
in the US, France and Germany, coinciding with the rise of the use of money market 
instruments.  This has eaten into the liability side role of banks in these countries.  
The exceptions are Japan and the UK.  However, if deposits with foreign MFIs are 
subtracted from UK corporate balance sheets, the UK joins the ranks of the former 
group.   
Trade credit is squeezed in the eager financialisers much more so than in 
Japan and Germany.  This follows the financialisation story: corporations are pushed 
towards the use of factoring to turn over their trade receivables as quickly as possible.  
Japan stands out for its persistently high level of trade credit.  This reflects both the 
more export-intensive and manufacturing-based nature of its economy, as well as the 
history and customs of the physical payments system.  Germany shows an increase in 
trade receivables (though not payables) over the last decade.  This might reflect 
                                                
8 The analysis here reflects the author’s analysis of national accounts data, plotting the change in the 
portfolio composition of the balance sheets of non-financial corporations over the period in question.   
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growing German strength (both absolutely and relatively) in export markets where 
credit terms may be longer than for domestic production.  
Equity holding trends increase universally with cyclical fluctuations.  Levels 
reflect national institutional histories.  France stands out for the reasons explained 
above.  In Japan, corporations’ holdings of shares and equity increase dramatically, 
first during the infamous bubble period in the 1980s, but then again more recently 
between 2002 and 2006.  However, what is interesting to note is that in the earlier 
boom, a doubling of bond issuance and a 50 per cent increase in loans (in absolute 
terms, on the asset side) suggests that corporations were ‘in on the party’.  Industrial 
firms reduce their own borrowings, and begin lending their surpluses to others, 
leading to a rise in financial assets to liabilities and an increase in financial profits 
(Calder, 1997).   Financial manipulations, known as zaitech (‘financial technology’) 
become a key source of profitability.  In contrast, during the 2002 to 2006 period, 
there was a modest decline in absolute holdings of securities and loans, pointing to a 
more conservative corporate response.   
On the liability side of the balance sheet, there is both an increasing share of 
equity, and within credit market instruments, a shift towards securities and away 
from loans and mortgages.  However, German corporate liabilities are distinctive 
both for their composition and the stability of that composition.  Securities make up a 
much smaller share of liabilities than in other countries.  Loans make up both a 
higher share of liabilities throughout the period and are consistently of a longer-term 
nature, made up of 70 per cent ‘longer-term loans’9.   
A number of attempts have been made to move German corporations towards 
the Anglo-American model of shareholder value orientation.  This includes, for 
example, the 1998 Law for Control and Transparency in Large Companies which 
authorised the use of stock options for managers and share buy-back programmes 
(Vitols, 2001) and measures to allow greater foreign equity ownership and introduce 
hostile takeovers.  All have been met with a lukewarm reaction from German 
business.  According to Beyer and Hopner (2004), most firms still fund from retained 
earnings and bank finance, and cross-shareholdings have shifted but not enough to 
                                                
9 According to 1993 System of National Accounts (SNA) guidelines, long-term loans must be greater 
than one year, but may be greater than two years to accommodate national variation.  Loans may 
include repo where it is not included in the broad money definition. 
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end firm protection from hostile takeovers.  Unlike France, growth of foreign 
ownership has been stable at 23 per cent during the 1990s (Gourevitch & Shinn, 
2005) and what entry there has been has happened through lower-turnover pension 
funds rather than hedge and mutual funds (Goyer, 2007). 
The picture of French corporations’ financial liabilities is broadly similar to 
those of UK corporations.  There is an increasing holding of securities, made up of 
negotiable debt securities (over 50 per cent) and derivatives (over 10 per cent) rather 
than bonds, which have shrunk from 100 to 30 per cent.  The breakdown of loans has 
edged slightly more towards short-term loans.  This reflects both the liberalisation of 
the system of industrial credit starting in 1984, and increased access to money 
markets granted large enterprises starting in 1985 (Loriaux, 1997). 
 
Corporate	  size	  matters	  
 
Other things being equal, large non-financial corporations, corresponding to 
the ‘monopolistic’ capitals of Marxist analysis, are expected to be more financialised 
than their smaller counterparts.  They have the easiest access to open financial 
markets, facilitating acquisition of financial skills and extraction of financial profit.  
The European Commission’s Bank for the Accounts of Companies Harmonised 
(BACH) database provides a unique way to test this hypothesis.  BACH contains the 
harmonised annual accounts of non-financial enterprises for 11 European countries 
(not including the UK), Japan and the United States.  Importantly, BACH provides 
aggregated accounts of non-financial enterprises divided by size10. 
Despite heroic attempts to harmonise diverse national accounting standards, 
the creators of the BACH database emphasise that while trend comparisons can be 
made, comparisons in terms of level should be done with considerable caution (DG 
ECFIN, 2006).  A preliminary investigation was conducted using the data for France, 
where the growth in the ratio of financial to fixed assets has been most pronounced.  
The French data gives a flavour of the internal variation of corporate behaviour 
according to firm size.  Figure 4.07 provides support for the hypothesis that large 
                                                
10 Small enterprises are those with turnover less than 10 million euros; medium enterprises between 10 
and 50 million euros; and large enterprises those with turnovers exceeding 50 million euros.   
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corporations are leading the turn away from bank-based finance, though corporations 
of all sizes appear to be returning to bank loans in the two years before the current 
crisis.  Figure 4.08 shows large corporations leading a general trend towards 
increased reliance on financial relative to productive income.  Figures 4.09 and 4.10 
show the ratio of fixed financial assets11 to tangible fixed assets12 (respectively flows 
and stocks).  In both cases, the upward trend is clear across the three size categories.  
The lower-than-expected level in the ratio of stocks of financial assets relative to 
tangible fixed assets for large enterprises could reflect differences in sectoral 
composition or business model, but would require further investigation.  Pending 
further analysis, these data provide qualified support for Deeg’s (2009) theory of 
internal capitalist diversity, which highlights the differentiation between ‘traditional’ 
SMEs versus highly-financialised international firms. 
 
 
Figure 4.07: French non-financial corporations’ loans (short and long-term) to total 
liabilities (stocks) 
 
 
                                                
11 ‘Fixed financial assets’ includes holdings of stocks and bonds, but does not include ‘current 
financial assets’ of trade credit and cash in hand.  The latter are included in ‘total financial assets’. 
12 ‘Tangible fixed assets’ refers to land and buildings, plant and machinery, other fixtures, and assets 
in construction. 
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Figure 4.08:  French non-financial corporations’ financial to total income (flows) 
 
 
 
Figure 4.09:  French non-financial corporations’ acquisition of fixed financial assets 
to tangible fixed assets (flows) 
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Figure 4.10:  French non-financial corporations’ fixed financial assets to tangible 
fixed assets (stocks) 
 
 
To recap, corporations across this survey of advanced capitalist economies 
are financialising, as they are moving away from relation-based lending and 
acquiring more significant portfolios of financial assets.  However, resistance to both 
trends is more marked in Japan and Germany.  French firms appear to have rapidly 
financialised, though finer historical analysis suggests that this is related to a very 
particular institutional development.  There is some preliminary evidence to suggest 
that financialisation is more pronounced among large corporations.  All of this 
suggests that while the bank-based vs. market-based typology still holds, it is being 
eroded by the process of financialisation.   
 
4.3.3	  	  Banks	  
 
For banks, financialisation can be expected in the form an increased reliance on 
market-based funding, and a rising trend in the relative weight of lending to finance, 
insurance and real estate as well as to households.  This would relate to the decline of 
traditional intermediation activities with large corporations, and towards liquidity 
management, fee-based services and lending to workers and households.  According 
to conventional understanding, in a bank-based system commercial banks 
intermediate between household depositors and corporate borrowers.  Banks manage 
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the ensuing maturity mismatch, and both risk and profitability hinge on the banks’ 
abilities to construct interest-earning loan portfolios.  In a market-based system, 
companies seek short-term financing from money markets, and longer-term funds 
from debt and equity issuance.  Investment banks play the role of underwriter, 
market maker and trader, and collect fees for these services.   
Analysis in this section is based on the aggregate bank balance sheet of the 
five countries. Examining first the liability side, the deposit-to-liabilities ratio shows 
little difference between them (figure 4.11).  Moreover, the ratio does not conform to 
the expectation that banks should hold relatively less more expensive deposits during 
upswings (and vice-versa).  In fact, what more detailed balance sheet analysis 
illustrates is that ‘deposits’ as a category has been transformed.  Increasingly, it is 
capturing overnight and short-term repurchase agreements (‘repos’), and may include 
holdings of short-term certificates of deposit.  Banks have substituted these market-
based deposits both as their needs for sourcing funds have risen and as traditional 
depositors have moved increasingly into money market funds.  In the US, for 
example, while money market mutual funds first appeared in 1971, it was not until 
1983 that legislation was passed ensuring that the underlying net asset value of a 
fund’s assets would support the guarantee of one-dollar-per-share value that allowed 
it to compete with bank deposits (Kregel, 2010).  Without being able to disentangle 
this shift towards short-term and market-based deposits, the ratio reveals little about 
structural changes in the banking sector.  Even so, it appears that banks are holding 
less deposits as a share of liabilities, with the notable exception of Japan after the 
collapse of the bubble of the 1980s.  
On the uses side of the balance sheet, examination of the ratio of non-FIRE 
corporate lending to total financial assets in figure 4.12 below provides more telling 
results13.  Overall, there is a clear secular decline in the ratio.  Japanese banks start 
from a radically higher level, reflecting the integrated position of banks within 
                                                
13 This is meant to capture the change in banks’ attitudes towards holding productive loans as against 
lending to finance and real estate.  This has the advantage of being the only item that is ‘clean’ in 
terms of being solely for productive purposes, and is less likely to have been securitised (though even 
here increasingly these loans are sold, see footnote 14 for US) and taken off the balance sheet.  
Attempting to capture ‘portfolio’ assets inevitably introduces definitional confusion and issues of data 
availability.  Once again, some care should be taken with cross-country comparisons.  The category of 
commercial banks was used for the United States, the UK and Japan, however data limitations forced 
the usage of the broader ‘monetary financial institutions’ in the case of France and Germany.  Despite 
the above concerns, the universal trend emerges clearly. 
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industrial keiretsu.  However, the ratio falls from 60 to below 30 per cent during the 
1980s bubble, recovers to 40 per cent by 1993, and then plummets to much more 
similar levels as the other advanced capitalist economies in recent years.  Germany 
also starts from a much higher level, but falls steadily to reach similar levels as 
France and the US14. 
 
Figure 4.11: Banks’ deposits as a share of total liabilities 
 
 
 
Figure 4.12: Banks’ non-FIRE loans as a share of total financial assets 
                                                
14 On-balance sheet figures underestimate the extent of commercial and industrial loan origination due 
to securitisation, though perhaps less than would be the case in household lending.  Gary Gorton 
(2009) provides data which suggests that in the US the ratio of secondary market loan sales to 
commercial and industrial loans outstanding reached an estimated 25 per cent in 2007. 
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The banks’ non-FIRE loans to assets ratio is in some ways the mirror image 
of the loans to liabilities ratio constructed for non-financial corporations in the 
section 4.3.2 (see figure 4.05).  Comparison between the two ratios is instructive.  In 
the 1980s, the banks are following the corporations, that is both ratios are declining 
in Japan, both are flat in the US.  In the early 1990s recession, they continue to run in 
parallel, rising in Japan and the UK and flat in the US.  For the most part this carries 
on with growth in the 1990s (except in France where loan share falls for corporations 
but rises for banks), but then the parallel movement falls apart after the crash of the 
dot-com bubble in 2000-1.  Across the five countries, corporations’ loan share rises 
after the bubble bursts, falls during the subsequent four-year expansion, and then 
rises with the onset of the current crisis.  However, on the bank side, non-FIRE loan 
share falls throughout.  This suggests that in the last decade, rises in finance, real 
estate and household lending have replaced corporate lending as the driving factor in 
banks’ loan portfolio.  This will be reinforced by more detailed examination of 
household balance sheets in section 4.3.4. 
 
Lending	  to	  finance,	  real	  estate	  and	  households	  
 
Looking at the historical evolution of the composition of bank balance sheets15 yields 
a number of insights.  Most importantly on the asset side, a finer picture emerges in 
the shifting nature of banks’ loan portfolios.  While the data does not provide 
comparable sectoral disaggregation across all countries, the flavour of the results is 
clear.  Over the past three decades, there have been significant increases in the share 
of lending to real estate (for example, in the US from 14 to 35 per cent); to financial 
intermediaries (for example, in Germany from 15 to 40 per cent); and to individuals, 
especially for housing (for example, in Japan from 10 to 23 per cent).  Figure 4.13 
captures an approximation of bank lending to households.  US securitisation of 
household loans is hidden until 2004 when the category ‘closed-end residential loans’ 
is introduced.   
                                                
15 The analysis here reflects the author’s analysis of national accounts data, plotting the change in the 
portfolio composition of the balance sheets of commercial banks over the period in question. 
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It is important however not to overstate the uniformity of the changes.  While 
the trends are similar across the sample, German banks have decreased their lending 
to individuals.  Bank holdings of both securities and equity are increasing across the 
sample.  In France, rising securities holdings are increasingly made up of derivatives; 
in the US mortgage-backed securities; and in Japan Treasury bills.  French banks 
hold the largest share of equity.  
 
Figure 4.13: Banks’ loans to households as a share of total loans 
 
On both the asset and liability side, analysis of compositional changes is 
complicated by the rising importance of repurchase agreements.  Some countries do 
not even make available disaggregated information about repo levels.  Such data is 
available in the UK, where from 12 per cent in 1997, reverse repos reached over 25 
per cent of assets by 2005, at which level they stayed until the crisis (figure 4.14).  
The big growth here was in repurchase agreements with UK banks and non-resident 
agents, especially those denominated in foreign currency.  Such stock figures 
underestimate the true importance of the turnover of the repo market to bank 
financing.  While there are no official statistics about the size of the overall repo 
market, unofficial estimates put the US market at around $10 trillion, equalling total 
assets of the regulated US banking sector (Gorton, 2009). 
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Figure 4.14: UK banks’ sterling and foreign currency reverse repos, sterling millions 
 
 
On the liability side of the balance sheet, there is some evidence that even 
taking into consideration the transformation of what is considered a deposit, that they 
are falling as a share of liabilities.  Once again, however, Japan is an outlier.  There 
appears to be two distinct periods.  The first period ends in 1986, during which time 
deposits decline from 68 per cent to 54 per cent of liabilities, with a corresponding 
increase in banks’ holding of shares and other equities.  This period includes the 
introduction of both certificates of deposit in 1979, and money market certificates in 
1985 (Calder, 1997).  During the second period from 1987 until 2008, deposits 
recover their share of liabilities, while securities, equities and accounts payable all 
shrivel.  This structural break is reflected in the composition of deposits themselves.  
Transferable deposits fall from 35 per cent to below 20 per cent of deposits between 
1979 and 1989, with a corresponding growth in foreign currency deposits.  This is 
then reversed, as transferable deposits rise to over 50 per cent of deposits, and both 
foreign currency and time and savings deposits fall back.  This is the opposite of 
what has been witnessed in other countries as households switch from transferable 
into savings accounts, and the repo market expands time deposits. The difference is 
the zero interest rate policy of the Bank of Japan which led to indifferent yields 
between transferable and savings accounts. 
Where loans are increasing, for example in the US, this is increasingly 
borrowing from non-bank entities on money markets.  Securities are rising in all 
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countries but Japan where their level is stable.  Equity financing has risen drastically 
in France from 5 to 25 per cent, while it has been stable in Germany, and followed 
cyclical fluctuation in Japan.   
 
What	  role	  big	  banks?	  The	  German	  case	  
 
Given the theoretical framework employed here, it would be expected once again 
that the financialisation of banking would be more pronounced amongst larger 
multinational banks.  Investigation of this question also sheds light on the question of 
intra-national hybridity highlighted in the critique of the varieties of capitalism 
literature.  The availability of Bundesbank data disaggregated by bank type allows 
for preliminary investigation of the question in the German case.  This is particularly 
interesting due to the historic role of banks in German capitalist development. 
There is a lively debate about whether the German economy is truly bank-
based or not (Corbett & Jenkinson, 1997; Hackethal, Schmidt, & Tyrell, 2005; 
Hackethal & Schmidt, 2004).  Michel Goyer (2007) argues that the bank-based 
system of German corporate finance has crumbled due to deregulation and capital 
account liberalisation which has allowed the entry of foreign investors and the rise of 
shareholder value.  According to Richard Deeg (2005), this process was facilitated 
by a domestic reform coalition of big banks allied with external investors.  The 
German government responded to this pressure with the Second and Third Laws for 
the Promotion of Financial Markets in the 1990s (Vitols, 2004).  In 1999, the capital 
gains tax was abolished on the sale of inter-corporate shareholdings to allow large 
German banks to reduce their involvement in the management of domestic 
enterprises in order to focus on global markets (Hall, 2007).   
While acknowledging the far-reaching impact of these changes, Vitols (2004, 
p. 1) responds that the bank-based nature of the German financial system is driven by 
“… complementarities and continuities in household savings and investment 
behaviour and in patterns of company sector demand for finance.” Change could 
occur if income inequality were to increase and pensions reform were to allow more 
private retirement savings.  Also key is the publicly-owned municipal savings bank 
sector (Sparkassen) which lends to the vast Mittlestand (SMEs) and accounts for 
more than half of all banking system assets in Germany (Vitols, 2001).  
Chapter	  4	  	  Financialisation	  varied	  
 
102 
 
However, in the last decade, market share has shifted towards the big banks.  
Savings banks’ assets as a share of total MFI assets have fallen from 17 to 13 per 
cent, while big banks’ assets have risen from 15 to nearly 20 per cent (while 
Landesbanken have stayed fairly consistent at 20 per cent).  Indicative is the 
changing behaviour of these banks.  Figure 4.15 shows the change in the levels of 
non-bank loans (a proxy for ‘productive’ loans given data limitations) as a share of 
total assets by bank type.  While savings banks consistently hold about 65 per cent of 
their assets in the form of non-bank loans, both the big banks and Landesbanken 
(state-owned regional banks) have seen a marked decline in the ratio.   
 
 
 
Figure 4.15: Non-bank loans as a share of total assets by bank type, Germany 
Source:  Bundesbank 
 
 
As shown in figure 4.15 above, like other countries Germany has seen a 
decline in bank lending to non-FIRE corporations, and a marked rise in lending to 
other banks, foreign enterprises and households.  The flipside has been the growth in 
bank holdings of securities and equity.  As Vitols argues, “… although not as 
extensive as the Japanese keiretsu, the core shareholders of the large German banks 
include other banks (through cross-shareholdings) as well as insurance companies.” 
(2001, p. 355).  For all MFIs (including big banks), lending to other financial 
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institutions peaks at just under 40 per cent in 2008.  For big banks alone, this figure 
reaches 44 per cent16.   
Providing evidence against any simplistic assertion that it is only Germany’s 
big banks which are financialising, Hardie and Howarth (2009) find a sharp increase 
in German (and French) banks’ holding of ‘trading assets’ relative to total assets for 
both flag-carrying German banks such as Deutsche, Dresdner and Commerzbank, but 
also for the smaller Landesbank.  On the liability side, from the late 1960s non-bank 
deposits fall from 53 per cent to under 40 per cent.  For big banks, non-bank deposits 
falls from over 70 per cent of total liabilities in the 1960s to drop below 30 per cent 
in early 2001.   
To sum up the argument for the banks, deposits have fallen as a share of 
banks’ liabilities and the nature of deposits themselves has become more short-term 
and market-oriented.  Japan is the exception to the rule.  Across the sample, lending 
to non-FIRE corporations is falling, though once again Japan stands out for the 
continued relatively high level of such loans.  There has been an increase in lending 
to finance, real estate and households, though the shift is less marked for both 
Japanese and German banks.  Preliminary evidence in the German case suggests that 
these trends are more accentuated in the big banks, though the behaviour of the 
Landesbanken in the recent crisis 17  suggests that this is not an unambiguous 
separation. 
 
4.3.4	  	  The	  household	  sector	  
 
Perhaps the most simple and telling measure of the financialisation of the 
household18 is the level of household total financial liabilities as a share of gross 
national disposable income (figure 4.16).  This ratio illustrates the increasing 
assumption of financial liabilities relative to the ability to pay. 
 
                                                
16 Source: Bundesbank MFI lending to MFIs (OU0081) and big bank lending to MFIs (OU0828). 
17 Landesbanken accumulated upwards of $80 billion of US sub-prime mortgages in the run-up to the 
crisis of 2007-8 (Reuters, 2008). 
18 For statistical purposes, this refers to households and private non-profit institutions’ serving 
households. Unlike the non-financial corporate and financial sectors, intra-sectoral consolidation is 
not a significant issue here. 
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Figure 4.16: Household financial liabilities to gross disposable income 
 
 
Clearly, the data indicate two distinct trends.  US household indebtedness 
rises steadily from 1955 until 1991, but then accelerates markedly from the late 
1990s until 200719.  UK household indebtedness rises rapidly from 1997, accelerates 
through the housing price bubble, and crests at 175 per cent of disposable income in 
2007.  French household indebtedness has historically been quite low, however in the 
last ten years it has started to grow at Anglo-Saxon rates, surpassing indebtedness 
levels of German households.   
The other pattern is that of the Japanese and Germans.  Japanese levels rise 
during the 1980s, flatten out in the 1990s, and then start to fall in the 2000s.  Levels 
never exceed 90 per cent of disposable income, half the level reached by the UK.  
The levels of liabilities of German households grow from 1991 to 2001.  Like Japan, 
these liabilities have fallen off as a share of disposable income in the past decade.  It 
is interesting to note that the counter-movement in German and French levels 
coincides with the introduction of the euro. 
 
                                                
19 Note that these figures underestimate US household indebtedness relative to the other countries, due 
to the US custom of excluding sole proprietorships from the household category.  Inclusion of non-
farm non-corporate data in the calculation, which takes US indebtedness above that of the UK, would 
equally overestimate the level. 
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Critical	  roles	  for	  pension	  reform	  and	  housing	  finance	  
 
On the asset side there are two distinct patterns at work through the 1980s and 
1990s20.  Households in the US and the UK hold relatively lower levels of deposits 
and higher holdings of market-based assets (either direct holdings of shares and other 
equities, or life insurance and pension fund reserves invested in the securities 
markets).  Even within deposits, this is increasingly made up of money market 
mutual fund share holdings.  In both the US and the UK, securities holdings shift 
away from government securities and towards corporate and foreign bonds, though 
from a lower level in the UK.   
The others hold higher deposits and lower market-based assets.  Japan is 
unique in several respects.  In terms of deposits, Japanese households have been 
increasing their share of assets held in deposits while households in all the other 
countries have moved in the opposite direction.  In terms of securities, they have 
been increasing the share of government securities.  In the equities category, 
Japanese households hold more in insurance than pension reserves (though falling 
from 80 to 55 per cent of the combined total).  In the 1980s, private Japanese 
insurance and pension funds held a roughly equal portion of loans, securities and 
equities, while public pension funds held over 70 per cent of their assets in deposits 
with the government-sponsored Fiscal Loan Fund.  Through the 1990s, private 
insurance and pension fund holdings of loans and equities fell, while holdings of 
securities rose (mostly government bonds).  In public pension funds, the decline of 
holdings with the Fiscal Loan Fund to near zero starting in 2000 is mirrored by a rise 
in holdings of government-sponsored securities.   
However, from the crash of the dot-com bubble in 2000-1, household balance 
sheets in all countries start to move in unison: an increasing share of deposits in the 
wake of the crash, then falling in the subsequent mini-boom, then rising once again 
entering the current crisis.  There is now an interesting change in levels.  From 
‘Anglo-saxons and the rest’ at the start of the 1990s, there now appears to be the 
Americans at one extreme, the Japanese at the other, and a convergence of the 
Europeans in the middle. 
                                                
20 The analysis here reflects the author’s analysis of national accounts data, plotting the change in the 
portfolio composition of the balance sheets of households over the period in question. 
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One of the most dramatic transformations revealed by this research is that 
experienced by French households.  Deposits have fallen by half.  Holdings of shares 
and equities grew significantly in the 1980s after reforms which made investing in 
stocks more appealing to households21.  Most dramatic however has been the growth 
in life insurance and pension fund premiums, claims and reserves from seven per 
cent in the late 1970s to 40 per cent last year.  These funds went from 30 to 50 per 
cent invested in equities during the 1990s, with the rest in securities22.  A back of the 
envelope calculation suggests that within a generation French households have 
moved from a situation where only approximately five per cent of their financial 
assets were subject to capital risk to one where 20 to 25 per cent are so subjected 
today23. 
On the liability side, one important trend jumps out.  Across the five 
countries mortgages make up an increasing share of household liabilities.  However, 
there are two distinct levels.  On the one hand the US, UK and France; on the other, 
Japan and Germany  (US – 65 to 75; UK – 65 to 80; FRA – 62 to 75; JPN – 30 to 47; 
DEU – 30 to 52).  Contrary to what might be considered ‘common knowledge’, there 
is no clear trend in levels of consumer credit. 
The overall picture of household financialisation is reinforced by a partial 
view of the household income statement.  In the US, dividends as a share of total 
income rise from ten per cent in the early 1980s to over 15 per cent more recently.  
Duménil and Lévy (2006) calculate total financial incomes as the aforementioned 
plus a measure of capital gains corrected for inflation.  As a share of total income it 
                                                
21 Up until 1996, this growth was in mutual fund shares and money market mutual fund shares.  After 
1996, the share of mutual funds falls back, and the growth is in unquoted shares.  Quoted shares make 
up about 15 per cent throughout. 
22 Insurance and pension fund holdings of securities has moved from being almost entirely in fixed 
coupon longer-term bonds to 30 per cent short and medium-term negotiable securities since 2003.  
Equities holdings have moved from less than 50 per cent mutual funds in the early 1990s to nearly 70 
per cent more recently.  Eighty per cent of mutual fund holdings are in general investment funds.  
Direct holdings of shares and other equities has seen a growth in unquoted shares from less than 50 to 
over 70 per cent.   
23 In 1980, ten per cent of household assets were in shares and equity, of which about a third were in 
quoted shares and general investment mutual funds. Less than ten per cent was in pension funds, of 
which 25 per cent was in equities, about half of which was subject to capital risk.  In 2008, 25 per cent 
of household assets were in shares and equity, of which about 40 per cent were subject to capital risk.  
A further 40 per cent of assets were in pension funds, of which about 40 per cent were in equities, 
over 60 per cent of which are invested in either quoted shares or general investment mutual fund 
shares.  Note that Charlemagne, in The Economist (2010) says: “… three-quarters of all French 
household financial assets are free from capital risk” – while this is true, the change in risk profile 
over time is nonetheless significant. 
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oscillates around ten per cent through the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, before beginning 
an ascent to 40 per cent before the collapse of the dot-com bubble.  Their data show a 
similar trend for France.  On the expenditure side, US household outlay on financial 
services and insurance rises from four per cent in the early 1960s to nearly ten per 
cent recently24.   Meanwhile, the US household debt service ratio has crept up from 
11 per cent in 1980 to 14 per cent in 200825.  
In a nutshell, the household sector is clearly divided between the ‘eager 
financialisers’ and the ‘reluctant financialisers’.  The division replicates the 
traditional market-based versus bank-based divide, though this is not to suggest 
simple causation from changes in finance to changes in the household balance sheet.  
France is moving from the latter in to the former.  For the former, economic growth 
over the last decade or more is being driven by rising household indebtedness.  For 
the latter, growth (if there is any) has to be found elsewhere.  The composition of 
pensions is critical in judging the degree of household financialisation, as is the issue 
of the financing of home ownership.  On both counts, Japan and Germany stand apart. 
 
4.4	  	  CONCLUSION	  
 
This chapter has, first, provided empirical evidence in relation to the theoretical 
framework established in chapter three; this framework understands financialisation 
as a global phenomenon representing a structural transformation of relations among 
non-financial corporations, banks and households, located within the contemporary 
characteristics of the world market.  Second, within this analysis, I have argued that 
the ‘diversity within convergence’ which is suggested by this thesis, marks a 
refutation of the divergence hypothesis common to much of the comparative 
capitalisms literature.  Specifically, I expected that while bank-based vs. market-
based differences would still have purchase, these differences would be 
systematically eroded by the process of financialisation.  
What has emerged is that corporations are indeed moving away from bank-
based borrowing and are, at the same time, acquiring portfolios with an increasing 
weight given to financial assets.  However, resistance to both trends is more marked 
                                                
24 Source is NIPA table 2.3.4 personal consumption expenditures. 
25 Source is Federal Reserve household debt service ratio. 
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in the traditionally bank-based countries of Japan and Germany.  French firms appear 
to have joined the eager financialisers.  For banks, deposits have fallen and have 
themselves become more market-based, and lending to corporations is falling.  Once 
again Japan stands out for both the resilience of its traditional deposit base and the 
continued relatively high level of corporate lending.  There has been an increase in 
lending to finance, real estate and households, though the shift is less marked for 
both Japanese and German banks.  
This picture is one of a complex of inter-related processes which are 
variously facilitated, restrained or blocked by regulatory, cultural and technological 
change.  The corporate turn to self-finance is universal.  But should this imply a 
universal turn to investment in financial assets?  Not necessarily so.  But if, at the 
same time, household assets are shifted out of deposits and into market-based 
pensions or direct equities, there is pressure on the corporate sector for higher, short-
term returns (exemplified by the twin movement of French household and corporate 
assets).  This move away from holding assets in deposit form – facilitated by policy 
change – in turn also puts pressure on the liability side of the bank balance sheet.  
Banks replace these funds with those raised via the repo-securitisation complex.  On 
the uses side, banks shift away from long-term relationship lending to corporations 
and towards lending to individuals, real estate and other financial institutions.  Not 
surprisingly, though certainly not unavoidably, this leads to increased household 
indebtedness. 
This inter-related web of transformations can of course be altered or broken.  
Policy and culture in Japan mean household assets have stayed within bank deposits 
or with pension funds which invest in state bonds.  This puts less pressure on the 
liability side of the banking sector balance sheet, at the same time as it may reduce 
the pressure for non-financial corporations to invest in financial as opposed to fixed 
assets.  Similarly, cultural norms and institutional history in Germany and Japan 
mitigate against households assuming high levels of mortgage debt, meaning overall 
indebtedness is more manageable.  However, it would be disingenuous to suggest 
that German and Japanese corporations do not feel the pressures of financialisation 
via international market competition.  Indeed, large banks and firms must either play 
the game, or find other ways to squeeze costs and force profits up. 
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Having empirically established the presence of the tendencies of 
financialisation across a range of institutional formations, in the next chapter I will 
develop a theoretical framework to account for the distinctive form of 
financialisation in emerging capitalist economies, or what will be termed subordinate 
financialisation.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter	  5	  	  	  
Imperialism,	  dependency	  and	  finance	  in	  the	  periphery:	  	  
Towards	  a	  theory	  of	  subordinate	  financialisation	  	  
 
 
5.1	  	  INTRODUCTION	  
 
In chapter three, after an examination of the literature on financialisation, I argued in 
favour of a theory of financialisation centred around an epochal transformation in the 
behaviour of and relations between firms, banks and households (Lapavitsas, 2011, 
2013).  My original contribution was to locate these transformations within the 
contemporary characteristics of the world market (Hymer, 1972; Palloix, 1975; Fine 
& Harris, 1979), namely:  the deepening of the international circuits of commodity 
and money capital, extending to the interpenetration of capital ownership; the 
internationalisation of production; and the pivotal role assumed by the US dollar as 
quasi-world money.  My hypothesis, validated empirically in chapter four, was that 
the tendencies of financialisation, reflecting its global character, would be observable 
across a range of advanced capitalist economies, while its particular form in any one 
country would reflect institutional specificities. 
In the current chapter I turn to the question of whether and how the 
behavioural transformations characteristic of financialisation will be experienced in 
emerging capitalist economies (ECEs).  The focus in the financialisation literature 
has been on its emergence and proliferation in advanced economies.  In what ways 
might financialisation in ECEs be similar, in terms of causation, nature and impact, 
and in what ways distinct?  How is financialisation in the one set of countries related 
to the other?  If there is a distinctive essence to financialisation in ECEs, how should 
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this be theorised?  These questions have only begun to be addressed (see for example 
Lapavitsas, 2009c, 2013; Becker et al., 2010; Painceira, 2010; Kaltenbrunner, 2010; 
Marois, 2012), and are far from satisfactorily understood.   
I contend that the experience of financialisation in ECEs must be indelibly 
marked by contemporary imperialism, that is to say it will be shaped by the exercise 
of international power manifested through productive and financial, as well as 
political (and military) means.  In order to elaborate the implications of this 
contention, in the next section I will critically examine the literature on imperialism 
and dependency1, with a focus on its treatment of finance2, especially in the 
periphery3.  There have been three generations of imperialist scholarship, which in 
my estimation have been rooted in the specific material conditions of the periods out 
of which they arose: the colonial, post-colonial and neoliberal periods, respectively4.  
For the periphery, each of these periods is distinguished by characteristic 
transformations in the capitalist world market relating to: the global organisation of 
capitalist production; the degree of trade and financial openness; the nature and 
extent of state autonomy; and, a key factor which is often overlooked, the form of 
world money. 
In the third section, I will draw out a number of insights from this review of 
the literature of imperialism which should inform a theorisation of financialisation 
for countries of the periphery.  These relate to the drivers of imperialism, the nature 
of the state, the relationship between finance and industry, and the form of world 
money.  These insights are put to use in the fourth section of the chapter, in 
formulating a number of hypotheses about the form that financialisation is expected 
                                                
1 The term ‘dependency’ is used here as an ill-fitting shorthand for an amalgam of overlapping yet 
sometimes contradictory writing under the headings of the ‘development of underdevelopment’, 
‘world systems analysis’, and ‘autonomous development’. 
2 On the use of ‘finance’, ‘financial capital’ and ‘finance capital’, see chapter one, footnote one. 
3 On the use of ‘core’ and ‘periphery’, see chapter one, footnote five.  
4 Both the precise meaning and temporal boundaries of these three periods are heavily contested.  For 
the purposes of this chapter, the following definitions are followed.  The colonial period refers to the 
period of direct colonial rule of European powers (dating as far back as the sixteenth century, though 
the discussion here will begin from the nineteenth century) coming to a close, for the most part, at the 
end of the second world war.  The post-colonial period refers to a proliferation of independence 
struggles which took place in Asia, Africa and the Middle East from the end of the second world war 
until the early 1970s; economically, it is a period associated with Keynesianism.  The neoliberal 
period, marked by an often contradictory amalgam of liberal ideology and mercantilist praxis resulting 
in an increasing share of wealth accruing to capital as against labour, can be dated from the early 
1970s until present (Saad-Filho & Johnston, 2005).  
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to take in ECEs.  While sharing the characteristic tendencies of financialisation in 
advanced economies, I will argue that financialisation in ECEs will exhibit 
distinctive forms which I characterise as subordinate financialisation.  The final 
section will conclude. 
 
5.2	  	  THEORIES	  OF	  IMPERIALISM	  AND	  FINANCE	  IN	  THE	  PERIPHERY	  
 
This section will review the literature of imperialism and dependency, highlighting 
the analysis of the role of finance therein.  I will look at the evolution in the 
understanding of the drivers of imperialism, the relationship between finance and 
industry in the imperial project, and the extent of state autonomy.  Additionally, I 
will assess to what extent the form of world money has been considered.  I will argue 
that the understandings of these matters have emerged out of the particular material 
conditions of the colonial, post-colonial and neo-liberal periods, each distinguished 
by characteristic conditions in the development of the world market. 
 
5.2.1	  	  Colonialism	  and	  classical	  theories	  of	  imperialism	  
 
Finance plays a key role in Karl Marx’s description of capitalist expansion.  In the 
shadow of the rise of large corporations, Marx (2004[1867]) described the credit 
system as constituting "… a new and terrible weapon in the battle of competition and 
is ... transformed into an enormous social mechanism for the centralisation of 
capitals." (2004, pp. 625–6)  Through the creation of debt, the credit system acts as a 
"… means of transferring surplus capital from declining to rising centres of capitalist 
accumulation." (2004, pp. 755–6)  Giovanni Arrighi (2007, p. 85) has argued that, in 
this understanding of the role played by finance, Marx "… does not refer only to 
capitalists operating within a given political jurisdiction but also to capitalists 
operating across jurisdictions."  That is to say that finance may play an important – if 
inadequately defined – role in imperialist expansion.   
The colonial period of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century was 
marked by relatively high trade tariffs generally, and especially by barriers between 
spheres of imperial influence (Coatsworth & Williamson, 2002).  Capital flowed 
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freely through these channels, but less easily across them, and monetary policies of 
the periphery were determined by imperial powers.  Colonial state structures were 
clearly under the command of their respective metropolises. 
John Hobson (1902), writing in the midst of the ‘scramble for Africa’, 
reasoned that rising cartelisation and monopolisation, as well as unequal income 
distribution caused excessive saving by capitalists.  This created crises in capitalism, 
reflecting a dual problem of over-accumulation and under-consumption.   Imperial 
projects, he argued, provided a convenient channel both for the investment of surplus 
capital and for the development of new markets.  Hobson’s view of financiers, 
tainted by his anti-semitic beliefs5, was that they were central in building a 'pro-
imperialist' coalition.  Finance was able to profit from bankrolling foreign nations 
“… where it is a chief instrument or pretext for encroachment” (1902, pp. I:VII, 36), 
but just as importantly it would finance the large domestic debt which the imperial 
project entailed, winning important political influence at home.  Convinced that 
imperialism was of dubious benefit to British manufacturing, Hobson argued that “… 
the modern foreign policy of Great Britain is primarily a struggle for profitable 
markets of investment. To a larger extent every year Great Britain is becoming a 
nation living upon tribute from abroad…” (1902, I:IV, 27). 
The introduction of a central role for finance in the theory of imperialism was 
seized upon by Austrian social democrat Otto Bauer.  Bauer (2000[1907]) was 
witnessing the rise of industrial cartels and the concentration of capital in banks in 
the Austro-Hungarian empire.  He argued that tariff barriers acted as protection for 
cartels and their banks, creating ‘spheres of investment for domestic capital’ and 
ensuring profitable returns on their investments.  Imperialism is accelerated as the 
military is placed at the service of these cartels and their desire to open up new 
spheres of investment.  In contrast to Hobson’s emphasis on the parasitic interests of 
finance, Bauer underlined the role of financial institutions in coordinating the 
imperial project.  Banks, he asserted, "… are able to plan and direct the emigration of 
capital into subjugated regions" (2000, p. 378).   
                                                
5 “United by the strongest bonds of organisation, always in closest and quickest touch with one 
another, situated in the very heart of the business capital of every State, controlled, so far as Europe is 
concerned, chiefly by men of a single and peculiar race, who have behind them many centuries of 
financial experience, they are in a unique position to control the policy of nations.” (1902, I:IV, 34) 
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Rudolf Hilferding (1981[1910]), the Austrian-born economist who would go 
on to be the minister of finance in the Weimar republic, first put forward a detailed 
explanation of the rise of ‘finance capital’ and its relationship with imperialism.  
Bank credit, Hilferding said, was increasingly needed in mature capitalism as 
investment requirements rose and turnover times lengthened.  This made industrial 
capital increasingly reliant on the banks.  But equally, with such large sums of capital 
locked up in these investments, the banks took an ever-greater interest in industrial 
management.   This fusion of the interests of industrial and bank capital he termed 
‘finance capital’.   
Following Marx, Hilferding believed that along with the rising concentration 
of capital, there would be an increase in the organic composition of capital and 
therefore a tendency for the rate of profit to fall.  Finance capital could use its 
influence in a number of ways to counteract this tendency, but for present purposes 
one of the most important factors stressed by Hilferding was the export of capital to 
foreign countries, where it would enjoy a lower organic composition of capital and 
higher rate of profit.  This obviated the need for imperialism to be driven by an 
accumulation of surplus capital. 
Having invested in new territories, the capitalists call for the imperial state to 
protect their interests: “… thus the export of capital encourages an imperialist 
policy” (1981, p. 322).  Through conditions attached to loan capital, the capital 
exporting country can then perpetuate its dominant position in the provision of 
industrial goods.  For this reason, the struggle for markets for goods “… becomes a 
conflict among national banking groups over spheres of investment for loan capital” 
(1981, p. 324).  Hilferding supposed that ‘advanced’ finance capital countries such as 
Germany and the United States, where industrial and bank capital were closely 
interlinked, would export capital by direct investment; while less advanced finance 
capital countries such as the UK would do so by portfolio investment.  Through these 
channels, the drive for colonial expansion, he argued, would generate increasing 
conflict among powerful states.   
Both Vladimir Lenin (2010[1916]) and Nikolai Bukharin (1966[1918]) would 
side with Hilferding in the debate over the relationship between imperial expansion 
and conflict.  As summarised by Anthony Brewer (1980), Bukharin believed that 
blocs of finance capital took on a national character because the 'labour aristocracy' 
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in the imperial country gained.  Building on Hilferding, Bukharin envisioned the 
merger of finance capital and the state to form ‘state capital trusts’.  Like Hilferding, 
and against Hobson, Bukharin did not believe that imperialist expansion was 
predicated on the accumulation of surplus capital.  This assumption was unnecessary 
he believed, when, returning to an analysis that borrows from Marx, “the expansion 
of capital is conditioned by the movement of profit, its amount and rate…” 
(Luxemburg & Bukharin, 1972, p. 255)  This view was reinforced by Lenin’s 
evidence of the predominance of capital flows between imperial countries rather than 
between the same and their colonies (2010 [1916]). 
Lenin asserted that, by allowing for the payment of wages higher than would 
otherwise be possible, imperialism "… creates the economic possibility of corrupting 
the upper strata of the proletariat, and thereby fosters, gives form to, and strengthens 
opportunism." (2010, p. 131)  Military and political rivalry then develops between 
national blocs.  The theories of both Lenin and Bukharin, developed in a climate of 
growing inter-imperial animosity, both served as pointed rejections of Kautsky’s 
theory of ‘ultra-imperialism’, which had envisioned a division of world markets 
between powerful states without violent conflict, the “… joint exploitation of the 
world by internationally combined finance capital” (1970 [1914] in Lenin (2010, 
117)).  Lenin criticised Kautsky for envisioning inter-state relations as that between 
isolated units.  In his discussion of the ‘division of the world among the great 
powers’, Lenin offers that relations between ‘big and little states’, marked by 
political independence together with varying degrees of financial and economic 
dependence, become a general system in the epoch of capitalist imperialism, and “… 
become links in the chain of operations of finance capital.” (2010, p. 106) 
Lenin adopted an extreme position in the agency he granted to banks as 
ephors, or overseers: "They can ascertain exactly the position of the various 
capitalists, then control them, influence them by restricting or enlarging, facilitating 
or hindering their credits, and finally they can entirely determine their fate, determine 
their income, deprive them of capital..." (2010, p. 38).  In relation to imperialism, 
banks played this ephor role by founding branches in the colonies to direct the spread 
of finance capital.   
Controversially, Lenin considered that this exploitation of the colonies could 
lead to a slowdown of capitalist development in the imperialist countries, as 
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entrepreneurs seek profits from ‘clipping coupons’, that is investing in financial 
assets rather than in production.  At the same time, he observed that imperialist 
capitalism was growing more rapidly than it had before, but with the growth 
becoming increasingly uneven and the decay of countries which were richest in 
capital.  This question of the relation between the rise of finance and capitalism’s 
functionality presages part of the contemporary debate over financialisation6. 
In his analysis of the slowness of capitalist development in Russia (1956 
[1899]), Lenin highlights three factors: the survival of traditional structures of 
society, competition from Western Europe, and the weakness of the Russian 
bourgeoisie.  As discussed by Gabriel Palma (1978, p. 892), the latter weakness is 
linked by Lenin to the ambiguous role played by foreign, particularly financial, 
capital; on the one hand accelerating the process of industrialisation, while on the 
other creating a weak and dependent bourgeoisie.  The linkage between foreign 
capital and the inability of a domestic bourgeoisie to lead a process of autonomous 
development resurfaced a half-century later in the writings of the dependency school. 
Finally, any discussion of finance in classical theories of imperialism should 
give space to the ideas of Rosa Luxemburg (1972[1921]; 2003[1913]).  Luxemburg’s 
economic basis for imperialism has been widely criticised7.  Despite this, her 
contribution is important for at least two reasons.  First, against the dominant view of 
imperialism as a ‘stage’ of capitalism, she attempted to understand it as a 
phenomenon deeply rooted in the process of capital accumulation itself:   
 
“… capitalist accumulation as a whole, as an actual historical process, 
has two different aspects. One concerns the commodity market and the 
place where surplus value is produced … [the other] concerns the 
relations between capitalism and the non-capitalist modes of production 
                                                
6 As discussed in chapter three, in its regulationist / post-Keynesian guise, this debate centres on the 
possibility for finance-led accumulation.  In Marxian debates, the debate focuses on the functionality 
of financialisation for profit levels. 
7 See, for example, Panitch and Gindin (2003, p. 5); Milios & Sotiropoulos (2009, p. 101)  cite the 
critique of Tugan-Baranowsky (2000 [1969]).  Unlike other theorists of imperialism who had 
emphasised the central role of monopolies, Luxemburg insisted that all capitalists are required to sell 
to buyers outside of the capitalist system in order to valorise the circuit of capital, condemning 
capitalism to collapse before it would be able to become a universal form of production.  The mistake 
was in not appreciating the role of hoarding and dishoarding in perpetuating realisation (Marx 2004 
[1867], vol. 1, ch. 3, section 3b), and both the credit system and crisis as means of restoring dynamic 
equilibrium. The same conclusion can be arrived at from Marx’s analysis of the ‘Reproduction and 
circulation of aggregate social capital’ in Volume II of Capital (1992[1885]).  
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which start making their appearance on the international stage. Its 
predominant methods are colonial policy, an international loan system – 
a policy of spheres of interest – and war.” (2003[III:31]) 
 
Second, in opposition to Bukharin’s assertion that capital export would accelerate 
development in underdeveloped areas, Luxemburg defended a more nuanced 
posture.  Through a detailed analysis of British and German loans to Egypt and 
Turkey respectively, she contrasted the role of international loans in the 
‘emancipation’ of emerging capitalist states but also as “… the surest ties by which 
the old capitalist states maintain their influence, exercise financial control and exert 
pressure on the customs, foreign and commercial policy of the young capitalist 
states.” (2003[III:30])  
In summary, in classical theories of imperialism, finance was seen to play a 
coordination role, if an ambiguous one from the perspective of the colonised.  The 
increased alignment of industrial and bank capital of the capitalist core was 
necessitated by both industrial catch-up and the challenge of overcoming tariff 
barriers between imperial ‘spheres of influence’.  The partial exception to this view 
of finance came from Hobson and Lenin, who drew attention to a parasitical role, 
first pointing out the potential dangers of the rising influence of a ‘rentier layer’. 
Inter-state relations are treated in an instrumental fashion in these theories.  
The capitalist classes of the colonial states in the periphery act as agents of the 
interests of the capitalist classes of the core.  Lenin highlighted the critical role of 
finance capital in acting as the link in the imperial chain between the capitalist 
classes of core and periphery.   
The role of world money is notably absent from this first generation of 
theorists of imperialism.  This is not because it was not a significant factor in 
imperial relations, but because the relative stability of sterling as world money had 
caused it to fade from view.  Until the first world war, sterling had enjoyed a near 
half-century of unquestioned supremacy supported by British imperial leadership.  
Vasudevan (2009) describes how Great Britain had been able to finance its deficits 
with the United States and the other European imperial powers through the surpluses 
of empire, especially those drawn from the Indian sub-continent.  The colonies 
adopted some form of the gold exchange standard, holding sterling reserves as a 
form of defence against a currency crisis.  On the back of this ‘willingness’ to hold 
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sterling deposits in London, British banks were able to extend greater quantities of 
credit, acting as a global lender of last resort.  World money had begun to take on the 
form of credit money of the imperial power.  This conferred numerous benefits on 
the issuer, including seigniorage, investment gains and avoidance of adjustment 
costs: "While on one hand Britain recycled liquidity to the periphery through capital 
outflows, it could, by sharply curtailing investments and lending, redistribute the real 
burden of adjustment to the periphery during times of crises." (Vasudevan, 2009, p. 
482)  With its status as financial centre of the British empire, Britain could attract 
inflows of gold simply by raising the central bank interest rate.   
However, this situation was not to last.  As argued by Itoh and Lapavitsas, 
with the collapse of convertibility of credit money into gold following the first world 
war, the defence of the core capitalists’ participation in world markets “… acquired a 
more complex meaning.” (1999, p. 163)  With confidence in the value of world 
money shaken, new arrangements would have to be put in place to secure capitalist 
profit-making in the world market. 
 
5.2.2	  	  Post-­‐colonialism	  and	  the	  dependency	  school	  
 
Palma (1978, p. 895) argues that the Sixth International of the Communist 
International in 1928 marked a turning point in Marxist analysis of imperialism.  
From this point forwards, the ability of capitalism to develop the social forces of 
production was understood to be limited by an alliance between imperial powers and 
traditional elites (land-owning, merchant and money-lending bourgeoisies).  The 
possibilities of development therefore depended on the capacities of national 
bourgeoisies to overthrow the ‘feudal-imperial alliance’ to begin the process of 
industrialisation and autonomous development.  This ‘simple analysis’, according to 
Palma, dominated Latin American left-wing thinking until the 1960s.   
Independence struggles and social revolutions across the periphery saw the 
burgeoning of post-colonial analysis8, and provided the political context for a 
                                                
8 This wave of independence struggles began with the ending of the second world war, gathering pace 
through the 1950s and 1960s:  in Asia, independence was won in countries including India (1947), 
Indonesia (1949), Indochina (1954), and Malaya (1957); in the Middle East and North Africa, it was 
gained in Libya (1951), Tunisia, Morocco and Sudan (1956), Iraq (1958), and nominally-independent 
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growing split over the possibilities of development in the periphery.  On one extreme 
were those dependency theorists, such as Andre Gunder Frank (1967), who saw 
development in the periphery as inimical to the interests of the core, and therefore 
only possible after a socialist revolution; at the other end of the spectrum were 
structuralists, such as Raul Prebisch (1963), who sought to apply more Keynesian 
and nationalist analysis in pursuit of autonomous development.  Both currents were 
grappling with the implications of core corporations’ establishment of plants in the 
periphery, created to exploit domestic markets behind tariff barriers.  
Two, often overlooked, points will be highlighted here.  First, the view taken 
by the different schools reflected their understanding of the role to be played by 
financial capital: dependency theorists focused on its role serving the interests of 
core capitalists, variously extracting or absorbing surplus capital; conversely, 
structuralists entertained the possibility that finance could be managed9, offering the 
national bourgeoisie the opportunity to undertake autonomous development. This 
understanding would, in turn, be profoundly shaped by their analysis of the state in 
the political space opened up by, first, the transition between declining British and 
rising American imperial hegemony, and subsequently the Cold War.  The changing 
status of world money is important in this regard.       
 
Development	  of	  underdevelopment	  
 
Paul Baran’s work provides the central building block for subsequent theories of the 
development of underdevelopment.  In his seminal work with Paul Sweezy, 
Monopoly Capital (1968), Baran elaborates the implications of the expansion of an 
era of giant firms with oligopoly powers.  Baran and Sweezy argue that monopolies 
invest less than competitive firms, and restrict their output to defend their profits.  
This leads to a dual crisis of overaccumulation and underconsumption10.  From this 
                                                                                                                                     
Egypt fought a battle over the Suez Canal (1954-6); and in sub-Saharan Africa, numerous countries 
gained their independence, including Ghana (1957), Congo (1960), Nigeria (1960), Uganda (1961) 
and Kenya (1962). 
9  Only later would this management of finance come to be pejoratively labeled as ‘financial 
repression’ (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973). 
10 Brewer (1980) has argued that Baran and Sweezy failed to give Hobson, and his analysis of 
cartelisation, due credit for laying the groundwork for their theory of monopoly capital. 
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viewpoint, imperialism serves to open up new channels for the investment of 
accumulated surplus11.  However, since successful foreign investment serves to 
transfer surplus from abroad to the investing country, it “… aggravates rather than 
helps to solve the surplus absorption problem.” (1968, pp. 107–8)  
Within the Monthly Review school, Harry Magdoff accepted the linkage 
between rising monopoly and overaccumulation, but not that between surplus capital 
and capital export (2003 [1968]).  In Magdoff’s analysis, capital exports were 
associated with the classical age of imperialism due to a number of factors including: 
the proliferation of states seeking to challenge British imperial supremacy; efforts to 
jump over protective tariff walls; the growth of industries requiring vast quantities of 
fixed investment; the growth of joint stock companies; and the expansion of financial 
markets which more efficiently mobilised capital.  The ability and desire of giant 
corporations to control markets provides “… another major incentive for the 
expansion of capital abroad”. (2003, p. 95) 
Baran’s earlier work had a major influence on the initial output of the 
dependency school.  In his ‘On the political economy of backwardness’ (1952), 
which was immediately translated into Spanish, Baran argued that while it is possible 
for developing country states to overcome backwardness through a series of 
measures including fiscal policy, land reform and price, import and capital controls, 
it is implausible.  This, he says, is because the alliance of property-owning classes 
can not be expected to implement a set of measures which runs counter to “… each 
and all of their immediate vested interests.” (1952, p. 80)  He framed the choice of 
the capitalist middle-classes in so-called backward countries as that between 
overcoming their myopia, or facing a socialist revolution.   
Frank’s theory of the ‘development of underdevelopment’, builds on Baran’s 
foundation of the rise of monopoly corporations (1967).  Frank argues that after the 
Korean War, US monopoly investment finance sought to take over Latin American 
manufacturing and service industries, seeking high profits behind tariff walls, and 
creating a putting-out system to service raw material exports and the consumption of 
                                                
11 In relation to both domestic and international means to absorb surplus, Baran and Sweezy came to 
view the financial sector as a critical outlet (1987; 1997).  However, in earlier writings during the 
post-war era of restrained finance, finance was relegated to a means “… on an equal footing with the 
sales effort” by which a capitalist economy absorbs surplus (1968, p. 143). 
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the domestic elite in the periphery.  Unlike the earlier Marxist theorists of 
imperialism who believed that post-colonial states could begin the process of late 
industrialisation, Frank argued that the new international division of labour, 
demanded by changing conditions in the core, required industrial development in the 
periphery.  However, he insisted that import substitution strategies could not create 
an internal market since they depend on the export of raw materials and consumer 
manufactures. 
On the role of financial institutions, Frank was critical of American banks 
which lent Latin American deposits to American corporations.  He attempted to 
document the outflow of foreign exchange earnings through profit remittances, 
capital transfers and foreign debt servicing.  Frank believed that this extraction of 
additional surplus forced local capitalists to exploit workers ‘ever more’ (1967, p. 
314).  This ensured that the domestic bourgeoisie would be unable to secure their 
political support.  He also argued that this additional exploitation interfered with 
domestic savings for investment, obliging domestic capitalists to seek still further 
foreign finance.  Frank’s analysis was politically in keeping with Baran’s 
implausibility thesis, but whereas Baran had recognised a tension between surplus 
moving to and from countries in the periphery, in Frank’s work imperialism had 
become primarily a channel of surplus value extraction.  The only remedy against the 
causes of underdevelopment according to Frank was “… the revolutionary 
destruction of bourgeois capitalism and its replacement by socialist development” 
(1972, p. 136).  
 
World-­‐systems	  analysis	  
 
World-systems analysis attempted to move beyond the analysis of capitalism in a 
single nation-state or in that relationship between nation-states, to that of the 
international division of labour in a ‘world-system’.  Cross-disciplinary in his 
approach, sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein (1974, 2007[1980], 1989, 2004)	  argues 
that through the centuries-long history of colonialism, the Western imperial powers 
have been able to render the periphery dependent on the core.  Imperialist powers 
have used economic, military, political and cultural systems to control and benefit 
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from an expanding sphere of influence.  They have imposed a system of unequal 
exchange which has resulted in unequal development.  In the contemporary period, 
Wallerstein introduces the notion of the semi-periphery as a zone which mixes core 
and peripheral production processes, and where therefore industrialisation is deemed 
possible.  His work focuses on the organisation of industrial production, with 
relatively little attention given over to financial institutions. 
Egyptian-born economist Samir Amin brings the role of finance into the 
centre of his analysis of a global system of accumulation.  Historically, he writes, 
core states exported capital to peripheral ones, reinvesting profits during the 
prosperous periods of colonial development, and then subsequently repatriating them 
(1976, p. 250).  This created a growing financial dependency.  In the next stage, the 
monopolistic industrial enterprises of the core states penetrated underdeveloped 
countries with financing secured from either commercial banks in their home 
country, or local branches of the same. 
Amin continues that the 'monetary problem' of underdevelopment lies in the 
working of the banking system in the periphery:  "... it exists in order to facilitate the 
growth of a capitalism ultimately based on the external market, which is the essential 
element in underdevelopment." (1976, p. 484)  The constitution of the network of 
commercial banks is critical; that is whether it serves what Amin calls ‘extraverted’ 
or ‘autocentric’ activities.  In autocentric economies, financial institutions transform 
savings into long-term investment, while in underdeveloped countries these are used 
either for short-term financing of the economy or for financing state expenditure.  
However, it is unclear in Amin’s writing what factors determine whether the banking 
network will be developed in one way or the other.    
In his discussion of social formations in Latin America, Amin argues that 
after the Great Depression and through the Second World War, a new industrial 
bourgeoisie attempted to challenge the power of the landowners and traders.  This 
represented a movement beyond Frank’s implausibility thesis to the analysis of the 
concrete conditions of social struggle which autocentric development required.  The 
new industrial bourgeoisie gave support to populist regimes, such as that of President 
Lázaro Cárdenas in 1930s Mexico.  But this was soon replaced with what Amin 
describes as the technocratic ideology of desarollismo (‘developmentalism’) and 
compromise with foreign capital.  The new bourgeoisie, often from the same families 
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of the great landowners and traders, allied itself with foreign capital in order to 
defend its hegemonic position.  
Giovanni Arrighi (1994),	   following in the tradition of Ferdinand Braudel 
(1981), examines the rise and fall of hegemonic countries over the longue durée.  In 
opposition to both the classical thesis of finance capital as the highest stage of 
capitalism and earlier world-systems writing which posited Western finance as the 
apex of colonial exploitation, Braudel had characterised finance as a sunset industry 
of imperialist powers.  Within the world systems school, this understanding has come 
to predominate12.   
In Arrighi’s final book, Adam Smith in Beijing, he argues that the capitalist 
developmental path of Europe has been a “… sequence of endless accumulation of 
capital and power” (2007, p. 93)13.  This has been achieved through the synergy of 
militarism, industrialism and capitalism, and sustained by ceaseless overseas 
expansion.  Each time that accumulation stagnated in one centre of power, the 
financial system facilitated the migration of capital to a ‘larger container’ where 
expansion could resume on a greater scale14.  Long periods of financial expansion 
which accompanied over-accumulation crises “… provided the means of payments 
necessary to force the economic system into new channels." (2007, p. 93)  This rise 
and fall of finance implies that Lenin’s theory of inter-imperialist rivalry and 
Kautsky’s ‘ultra-imperialism’ may not have been mutually contradictory, but rather 
different cycles in capitalist development.  Periods of imperial dominance may be 
marked by coordination, followed by increasing emphasis on finance in the ‘autumn’ 
of the hegemon, which, in turn, may be followed by increasing belligerence during 
the transition to a new imperial configuration.  From this vantage point, the ‘decay’ 
of capitalism in one container may reflect the rude health of the system as a whole. 
In his understanding of how imperial powers attempt to maintain their 
dominant position, Arrighi argues against a narrow focus on profitability in 
manufacturing, stressing the monetary foundations of the world capitalist order.  
                                                
12 In his later work, for example, Wallerstein (2004, p. 86) argues that falling profits in production, 
linked to the post-1968 decline of western capitalism, led capitalists to seek profits in finance. 
13 Arrighi’s distinction between European capitalism and Asian ‘market society’ has come in for 
heavy criticism.   See, for example, Leo Panitch (2010) and the special issue of Historical 
Materialism in which his article19 appears.  
14 Original credit for this concept should be given to Rosa Luxemburg (2003 [1913]). 
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Following a brief period in the 1970s of what he describes as ‘world monetary 
disorder’, the US used the Volcker interest rate shock of 1979 to 1982 in order to 
compete aggressively for global capital inflows.  Arrighi argues that the dollar has 
not enjoyed the same privileges as sterling did during the British imperial epoch 
since the US lacks a territorial empire from which to extract tribute, or what he calls 
‘hegemony without hegemoney’.   
 
Autonomous	  development	  
 
Though they developed their ideas independently, Argentine economist Raul 
Prebisch (1950, 1963) and German economist Hans Singer (1969), are best known 
for the Singer-Prebisch theory, or the theory of unequal exchange.  Both were 
influenced by the Keynesian response to the Great Depression and its impact on 
underdeveloped economies.  They believed that, due to the higher income elasticity 
of primary as compared to manufactured goods, countries in the periphery faced 
declining terms of trade relative to those of the core.  Prebisch advocated state 
intervention to advance industrialisation in the periphery, accompanied by tariff 
protection to shelter the development of domestic industry.  In the interim before 
achieving industrialisation, protection of the prices of raw materials would also be 
needed.  These ideas became the foundations of the work of the UN Economic 
Commission for Latin America (ECLA) and were influential on Latin American 
policymakers through the 1970s.      
For Prebisch, and for many who would follow and extend the ECLA 
analysis15, emphasis was placed on production and particularly trade, with less 
attention given over to the role of finance.  Placed in the context of a managed 
international currency system and widespread financial restraint, such a focus seems 
understandable.  The central problems of unequal exchange were eventually seen to 
be aggravated by financial arrangements that brought with them increased volatility, 
particularly after the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system (see Chilcote, 1984, p. 
26). 
                                                
15 Important amongst these is Arghiri Emmanuel (1972). 
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Chilean economist Osvaldo Sunkel (1970, 1973a, 1973b) drew attention to 
the critical role of the multinational corporation.  By introducing capital-intensive 
production techniques and promoting forms of conspicuous consumption which 
could only be accessible to the elites, multinationals would co-opt the domestic 
bourgeoisie, preventing autonomous development.  Brazilian Celso Furtado shared 
much of the analysis of his sometimes co-author Sunkel (1976).  His examination of 
the role of financial flows in external dependency focused on the penetration of 
American multinationals into Latin American manufacturing and service sectors.  
Echoing the analysis of Frank, he found that some four-fifths of the expansion of US 
subsidiaries in Latin America in the 1960s was funded by local resources, and a 
similar percentage of profits were subsequently remitted to parent companies (1976, 
pp. 199–201).  Examining the social structures of Brazil, Furtado concluded that the 
absence of a clearly formulated working-class ideology left national development 
plans to the conflict between intra-elite interest groups.  This resulted in a form of 
imitative capitalism unable to innovate and dependent on external intervention, both 
economic and political.  Overcoming this required central planning to promote 
autonomous development.   
Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, in their classic Dependency 
and Development in Latin America (1979), share Furtado’s emphasis on examining 
the social structures of concrete situations of dependency.  They argue that external 
forces, such as multinationals and international finance, may appear as internal 
forces where their interests coincide with those of local groups.  Therefore, 
industrialisation in the periphery provides products not for mass consumption, as in 
the centre, but for consumption by the bourgeoisie.  Distinct from Prebisch, Cardoso 
argued that what was possible in the periphery was only a form of ‘associated 
dependent development’, where industrial firms, owned by domestic or foreign 
capital, respond to markets, investment and decisions outside the country.  Unlike 
Furtado, Cardoso insisted that dependent states are subject to national class struggle 
and hegemonic crisis just as dominant states. 
One of the few authors from this tradition who has focused on the role of the 
financial sector is Brazilian economist Maria da Conceição Tavares (1985).  Her 
work, dating from after the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system and the 
beginnings of financial liberalisation, foreshadows the discussion in the next section. 
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Her argument points to the inability of peripheral countries to borrow in their own 
currency, or as it is known in the economics mainstream, ‘original sin’ (Eichengreen, 
Hausmann, & Panizza, 2003).  The lack of finance, in particular foreign finance, and 
the limits imposed by the balance of payments constraint, lead to low growth rates.  
This interpretation of dependency puts “… international money – and not technical 
progress – as the expression of financial capital domination over the periphery in the 
last 150 years.” (Tavares, 2000, pp. 131–2) 
In summary, the dependency school, understood in its broadest terms, shifted 
attention from economic processes in the core, the focus of classical theories of 
imperialism, to social formations and impacts in the periphery.  This reflects the 
shifting historical context from colonialism to post-colonialism, marked by the rise 
of Southern-based intellectuals.  Within this framework, and as argued by Vernengo 
(2006), Marxist-inspired dependency theory emphasised the agency of external 
actors and the implausibility of development, while structuralists stressed internal 
agency and the possibility of autonomous development.   
Differences in the understandings of the factors feeding imperial expansion 
are reflected in the various analyses of the role of finance.  While classical theories 
of imperialism concentrated on the role of core banks as the ephor of finance capital, 
dependency theory began to examine the role of banks in the periphery, first 
investigating the role of the branches of core banks, and then that of the peripheral 
banks themselves.  In Amin’s arguments, the constitution of commercial banks is 
central to the question of whether or not autocentric development is possible.   
It is not surprising that the earlier work in this tradition paid little attention to 
the role of world money.  In the inter-war years, when the periphery did not play the 
role of a buffer absorbing adjustment costs, there were more crises in the core 
countries (Eichengreen & Bordo, 2002).  During the post-war period of recovery 
under the gold-dollar standard, the periphery enjoyed a period of growth and relative 
stability.  As a result, attention in the 1960s focused on the unequal terms in the 
growing economic activity driven by the multinational corporations of the north 
drawing in an exploited labour force in the south.  However, the institutional and 
conjunctural specificity of world money as manageable policy construct was soon 
laid bare.  After the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, the manipulation of the 
dollar as de facto world money, and the proliferation of crises in Latin America and 
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Asia, is rightly regarded in the later writings of authors such as Arrighi and Tavares 
as a central element to understanding imperialism under the neoliberal conjuncture.  
 
5.2.3	  	  Neoliberalism	  and	  the	  ‘new	  imperialism’	  	  
 
The neoliberal period is marked by the extension of global production chains, and 
catalysed by trade and financial liberalisation, including the liberalisation of 
exchange rates.   In an attempt to understand the impact of these changes for inter-
state relations, a third wave of imperialist scholarship takes as its starting point the 
fall of the Berlin Wall, America’s new status as sole global superpower, and 
crucially for my purposes, the explosion in finance following two decades of 
liberalisation in the wake of the collapse of the Bretton Woods system.   
 Contemporary scholars in the Monthly Review tradition re-visit the question 
of the relation between monopoly capital and imperialism (Foster et al., 2011b; 
Foster & McChesney, 2009; Foster, 2007, 2008, 2010a, 2010b).  John Bellamy 
Foster draws on Rosa Luxemburg to argue that Marx’s analysis of the reserve army 
of labour needs to be extended in a global context in order to understand 
contemporary imperialism. The formation of a global reserve army of labour, driven 
by the de-peasantisation of the periphery and the integration of the erstwhile 
communist countries, allows multinational corporations to extract an 'imperialist rent' 
“… through the integration of low-wage, highly exploited workers into capitalist 
production." (2011b, p. 6)  
Financialisation in the core, driven in the first instance in Foster’s analysis by 
the deepening tendency to overaccumulation16, is exacerbated by these inflows of 
imperial rent which can nowhere be profitably absorbed within production17.  At the 
same time Foster notes a rise of financialisation in the periphery itself, citing real 
estate bubbles in Asia (2010b, p. 10), though it is not clear why this should be the 
case.  He approvingly quotes Amin (2009) who argues that the “… dominant force in 
                                                
16 This is linked to the lack of price competition in monopolistic industries together with continually 
rising productivity. 
17 Foster’s description of multinational corporations’ extraction of ‘imperial rent’ echoes William 
Milberg and Deborah Winkler’s (2010b) analysis of global commodity chains.  However, the latter 
relate the investment of these additional profits in financial rather than ‘productive’ channels, not to 
overaccumulation, but to diminished shareholder imperatives for re-investment in fixed capital. 
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today’s financialised globalisation is the imperialist ‘capitalism of oligopolies’, of 
which financial oligopolies now constitute the 'headquarters', backed up by the 
power of the states of the triad” and the international financial institutions (2010b, p. 
11).   
Following in a line of analysis extending from Hobson through Baran and 
Sweezy, Marxist geographer David Harvey agrees that in the era of classic 
imperialism, rising monopolisation led to the accumulation of surplus capital, which, 
when unable to find profitable employment at home, generated pressure for 
imperialist practices (2003, p. 107).  However, in describing the contemporary era of 
US imperialism, Harvey foregoes the use of surplus accumulation as his key 
variable, emphasising instead a ‘profit squeeze’ resulting from a combination of 
wage pressure, fiscal tightening related to increases in military expenditure and 
falling international competitiveness.  Transcending static depictions of imperial 
powers and subjugated states, Harvey suggests the replacement of an understanding 
of a singular imperialism with a “… series of different imperialist practices dispersed 
through the uneven geography of capital surplus distribution." (2007, p. 70) This 
allows for a more fluid interpretation of the actors, motives and processes which 
characterise imperialism.   
In Harvey’s writing, financial institutions act as agents of ‘accumulation by 
dispossession’ (2003, p. 145), a controversial re-interpretation of Marx’s notion of 
primitive accumulation18.  Financial capital, in its various forms, plays a central role 
in privatising environmental commons, cultural forms and other formerly public 
assets.  He highlights an orchestrating role for international financial institutions in 
imposing limited crises which serve to devalue assets so that they can then be put to 
profitable use under the command of dominant class alliances in imperial states.    
But Harvey also makes the case that finance maintains aspects of ‘predation, 
fraud and thievery’ (2003, p. 147).  Financialisation, he says, has been characterised 
by speculative and predatory practices such as asset-stripping, debt peonage, and 
corporate fraud.   These features ensure that capitalism is both ‘contingent and 
haphazard’.  This suggests a fluidity and ambiguity in the role of finance which is 
                                                
18 For a critique of Harvey’s ‘accumulation by dispossession’, see Ben Fine (2006) and Robert 
Brenner (2006b). 
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missing in some of the earlier theorists of imperialism.  While Luxemburg had 
argued that finance played an ambiguous role in relation to development in the 
periphery, she had still believed that the role of finance was functional as viewed 
through the lens of the capitalist classes of the imperialist countries.  
In contrast to both Harvey and the Monthly Review School, Leo Panitch and 
Sam Gindin (2003), authors in what might be termed the York School of Marxist 
political scientists, insist that imperialism is not, and was never, driven either by the 
pressure of an overaccumulation of capital resulting from rising monopoly, or by 
declining rates of profit in the core countries.   They appear to be in agreement with 
Harvey however that the current phase of US-led imperialism comes instead as a 
predictable response to competitive pressures and opportunities in a capitalist world 
economy.  Though even here, Albo (2003) argues that Harvey’s ‘spatial fix’ 
unnecessarily recalls classical imperialism’s focus on outlets for surplus capital.  He 
argues that contemporary imperialism should be viewed as an "… expression of the 
expansionist tendencies of capital to internationalise and constitute a world market 
for its valorisation." (2003, p. 90) 
According to this group, Lenin, symptomatic of classical theorists and their 
contemporary adherents, wrongly translated particular conjunctural conditions into 
historic inevitability.  This led him to depict the emergence of cartels in an era of 
inter-imperial belligerence as the defining characteristics of capitalist expansion in 
the monopoly stage, the highest stage of capitalism. Most damaging for the classical 
theorists according to Panitch and Gindin is their economic reductionism and 
instrumental treatment of the state.  Capitalist imperialism "… needs to be 
understood through an extension of the theory of the capitalist state, rather than 
derived directly from the theory of economic stages or crises."  (2003, p. 7)   
For their understanding of the state, Panitch and Gindin draw heavily on 
Nicos Poulantzas (1974), who viewed the internationalisation of capital in terms of 
“… the internalised transformations of the state itself” (Poulantzas, 1974, p. 81, 
quoted in Albo 2003, 94).  According to this understanding, the export of capital is 
not in itself an imperialist practice.  What is pivotal is the way that foreign 
investment affects class structures and state formations.  American direct investment 
which spread capitalist production across core states in the post-war era led to the 
creation of tensions and alliances within domestic capitalist classes:  "Domestic 
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capital tended to be 'dis-articulated' and no longer represented by a coherent and 
independent national bourgeoisie." (Panitch & Gindin, 2003, p. 19) In the third 
world, "… globalisation internationalises domestic capitalist classes, shifting their 
orientation towards global accumulation… ", this "… undermines the base for 
domestic bourgeoisies to create the national economic coherence fundamental to 
capitalist development." (2003, p. 34) 
 Panitch and Gindin share the analysis of Tavares discussed in the previous 
section, that the imperial basis of financialisation lies in the acceptance of the 
dollar’s role as the fulcrum of the international financial system, allowing the 
American economy to attract global savings (2004, pp. 65–69).  They place finance 
at the heart of the contemporary accumulation process, reaping speculative gains but 
equally keeping profits higher than they would otherwise have been.  The rise of 
finance, they conclude, has been functional for global accumulation and US empire, 
but "… this certainly does not mean that it is not attended by contradictions, let alone 
grotesque inequalities and injustices." (2004, p. 69) 
This examination of the role of finance resonates with the work of Marxist 
scholar of international relations Peter Gowan, whose analysis of imperialism centres 
on what he has termed the ‘Dollar-Wall Street Regime’ (1999, 2003, 2009, 2010).  
This term refers to the measures adopted by the US government to ensure the 
centrality of the dollar as both an international exchange medium and store of wealth, 
such that most states must hold their reserves in dollars placed within the financial 
system controlled by Wall Street.  Gowan asserts that the US broke the Bretton 
Woods System in order to be able to “… unilaterally subordinate international 
monetary conditions to the perceived requirements of American capitalism." (2003, 
p. 39)  The new flexible exchange rate system, based around the dollar as world 
money, has provided Washington with multiple benefits: seigniorage, a source of 
credit-creating power, and freedom from the payments disciplines applying to other 
states. 
Contra Arrighi, Gowan rejects the idea that the expansion of US financial 
capital necessarily represents a hegemonic crisis (2010, p. 160).  Part of the 
establishment of an ‘imperial economic framework’ has involved pressing for 
institutional reforms which have ensured that industrial companies worldwide have 
become dependent on securities markets and that foreign takeovers have been 
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permitted.  In times of crisis, this has meant that not only governments and banks, 
but also industrial companies would require American finance to tide them over, “… 
giving American finance capitalism ever widening circles of control over 
international capitalism.” (2003, p. 41) International monetary instability serves to 
enhance this control.  Gowan makes the point that despite what might be otherwise 
expected, the capitalist classes of dominated states have supported these 
measures:  “For they can take advantage of the free movement of capital enforced by 
the US and its allies to transfer their assets into metropolitan financial centres and 
live as rentiers rather than risking their wealth in hazardous development strategies 
locally." (2010, p. 161) 
 Finally, two more recent contributions directly addressing the relationship 
between imperialism and financialisation merit discussion.  Milios and Sotiropoulos 
(2009) call for a ‘re-thinking of imperialism’.  They cast off both classical and 
dependency accounts of the drivers of imperialism, namely monopoly and surplus 
absorption on the one hand, and unequal exchange and surplus extraction on the 
other.  Instead they support the notion of an inherent capitalist drive to expanded 
accumulation, driven on by class struggle.  In relation to the role of the state, 
depictions of both an instrumental state, found in various dependency theories, and 
of capital dis-articulated from the state taking on autonomous characteristics, as 
advocated by some theorists of the new imperialism, are rejected; instead they 
defend the national character of the capitalist state reproduced through internal 
struggle, but also insist that no social formation exists in isolation, but “… occupies a 
specific position (necessarily one of inequality) in the global imperialist chain” 
(2009, p. 195).  On the question of the role of finance, the pair set themselves firmly 
against both post-Keynesian and Marxist theories of financialisation which 
emphasise the detrimental impact of finance on capitalist accumulation.  Instead they 
argue that the explosion of financial markets has “… provided sites for the 
monitoring of the effectiveness of individual capitals.” (2009, p. 179) That is to say 
that finance plays a disciplining role in the process of capital accumulation, driving 
exploitation and maintaining profits. 
 The work of Bichler and Nitzan (2010) is a provocative appeal to abandon 
the ‘nexus’ between imperialism and financialisation altogether.  Their argument is 
primarily framed as a rejection of the hegemonic transition thesis, most cogently put 
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forward by Arrighi; namely, that having once been weakened, the hegemon will seek 
to maintain its position by promoting a process of financialisation.  At the first 
critical step in their argument, they provide data showing the declining profit share of 
US corporations relative to those in the rest of the world, from which they find that 
“… ‘financialisation’ has not worked for the hegemonic power” (2010, p. 20); a 
conclusion which, they point out, is not at odds with the theory of hegemonic 
transition.  This evidence however, is problematic for empirical reasons which are 
for the most part enumerated, though glossed over, by the authors themselves19.  The 
second, more important step in their argument is built on the assertion that, if 
financialisation is to be understood as a survival strategy of a declining hegemon, 
then US financialisation must precede and be bigger than financialisation in the rest 
of the world.  Using data on the profit shares of listed finance, insurance and real 
estate corporations (FIRE), they find that it did not, and it is not.   Beyond the 
numerous empirical problems related to this data set20, it is not clear why the authors 
should:  a/ not conclude that the initial difference in the level of the profit shares of 
listed FIRE companies is related to historically-specific structural differences in 
bank-firm relations in countries going through industrial catch-up; or b/ not conclude 
that the more rapid increase in profit shares of US listed FIRE corporations after 
1980 (and concomitant expansion of Anglo-Saxon finance worldwide) drives the 
increase in the rest of the world. 
Despite the fact that their argument is problematic at both critical stages in its 
elaboration, what underlies it is an appeal to confront financialisation as a secular 
trend which must be accounted for in its own right, rather than a mechanistic 
outcome of a historically-recurring process.  They perhaps go too far however, in 
demanding that the connection between imperialism and financialisation be severed 
altogether.  Consistent with their underlying appeal is the idea advanced here that the 
                                                
19 Potential problems mentioned by the authors include: the limitation of the data set to publicly listed 
firms, creating problems due to the explosion of listed firms in Europe and emerging markets from the 
1980s (acknowledged), difficulties matching the location of listing with the location of operations 
(acknowledged), but also potentially reflecting the fact that industrial firms are less likely to be 
publicly listed in non-US countries relative to financial firms (unacknowledged); difficulties in 
determining a firm’s ultimate ownership (acknowledged), as well as the likelihood that US investors 
would receive greater profits from capital invested in minority stakes in foreign firms 
(unacknowledged). 
20 This is the focus of Michael Hudson’s comments, which led Bichler and Nitzan to revise the paper 
in 2010 which had been originally published in 2009. 
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phenomenon of financialisation, and how it is experienced in different social 
formations, is itself shaped by, rather than driven by imperial relations.  The 
transformation in the relations of the fundamental agents of capitalism described in 
chapter three, and documented in chapter four, marks a new epoch, but an epoch in 
which imperial relations are nonetheless present. 
In summary, shaped by the material conditions of the neoliberal era, theorists 
of the ‘new imperialism’ have sought to break away from some of the shibboleths of 
both classical theories of imperialism and dependency theory.  In terms of the drivers 
of imperialism, all question previous accounts centred either upon the rise of 
monopoly and over-accumulation, or the imposition of unequal terms of exchange 
and surplus extraction.  Instead, there is increasing agreement that, in the words of 
Milios and Sotiropoulos, "… there is an immanent imperialist tendency for territorial 
expansion inside every capitalist state" (2009, p. 108) driven by the capitalist 
imperative of accumulation through competition.  Against this, Foster and the 
Monthly Review School hold fast to theories of monopoly capital and over-
accumulation, to which they have added the impact of ‘imperial rents’ extracted 
through the exploitation of a global reserve army of labour. 
 Panitch and Gindin provide a convincing argument that what is pivotal in the 
imperial relationship is not the flow of capital but the way that foreign investment 
affects class structures and state formations, shifting the orientation of domestic 
capitalists.  While Milios and Sotiropoulos might disagree if this were understood to 
imply a logic of capital dis-articulated from national struggles, there is in fact 
considerable alignment between the two groups.  This can be seen in the argument of 
the latter that the historical form that imperialism will take "… depends on the way 
in which the 'external' situation (that is to say the international correlation of forces) 
not only overdetermines but also constrains the practices that emerge out of the 
evolution of the internal class correlations." (2009, p. 197)  Their notion of the global 
imperialist chain, drawing upon Lenin, is a way of conceptualising the “… complex 
economic, political and ideological interconnections that develop between different 
social formations.” (2009, p. 215) 
 Financial liberalisation and the subsequent growth of finance have left an 
indelible mark on contemporary theories of imperialism.  For both Harvey, and 
Panitch and Gindin, finance plays an ambiguous role in relation to capitalist 
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expansion, at times functional for imperial-led accumulation while at other times 
prone to ‘predation, fraud and thievery’.  Milios and Sotiropoulos question any 
association of the rise of finance with theories of capitalist decay, arguing forcefully 
that finance plays a key role in disciplining capital and accelerating exploitation.  
Both Panitch and Gindin and Gowan incorporate an understanding of world money 
into their work on imperialism.  The manipulation of the dollar has played a key role 
in US ascendancy.  However, Gowan rejects Arrighi’s argument that the rise of Wall 
Street necessarily denotes hegemonic decline.  Bichler and Nitzan reinforce this 
position that mechanistic understandings of the relationship between imperialism and 
financialisation should be subject to severe scrutiny. 
 
5.2.4	  	  A	  reconsideration	  of	  imperialism	  and	  finance	  	  
 
During the colonial era, the classical theorists of imperialism documented the pivotal 
role of the rise of monopoly firms in generating expansionist pressures.  According 
to Hobson, the rise of monopoly capitalism drives a process of overaccumulation, 
with the resulting surplus relieved through the imperial project.  While for others, 
such as Hilferding and Bukharin, monopoly generates only the structures to allow 
expansionist tendencies in response to profit opportunities to move across borders, 
without the need for this expansion to be driven by surplus capital.  Trade barriers 
between the various ‘spheres of influence’ demanded the cooperation of banking and 
industrial capital in order to exploit new profit opportunities through the 
establishment of overseas operations.  
The prevalent theory of the state was that it served as an instrument in the 
hands of dominant ruling classes.  Banking capital was placed in a lead role in an 
alliance with both industrial capital and the state; Bukharin’s notion of the ‘state-
capital trust’ takes this analysis to its logical extreme.  These blocs lay at the root of 
what these theorists saw as inevitable inter-imperial rivalry.  Inter-state relations 
were portrayed by Lenin as a ‘global imperialist chain’, where the social formations 
of various states occupy necessarily unequal positions in a global hierarchy.  Within 
this imperial chain, finance capital and its institutional manifestations act variously 
as coordinator and parasite.  Lenin saw that the rise of finance in the imperial states 
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risked diverting capital from productive to speculative activity, a form of decay from 
within.  In the periphery, according to both Luxemburg and Lenin, capital imports 
threatened to create perpetual servitude through a weakening of the domestic 
bourgeoisie.  Perhaps understandably, theorists of classical imperialism took as given 
that the role of world money was immutable; as such, it faded from view.  However, 
with hindsight it is clear that the imperial powers, but especially Great Britain, were 
able to defend their positions in part through the formal exploitation of their status as 
issuers of world money. 
Disagreement over the role of surplus capital in relation to imperialist 
expansion carried over into the post-colonial period of scholarship.  Dependency 
school analyses credited the imperial project with powers to variously absorb surplus 
capital in the core or extract it from the periphery.  Much stress was placed on the 
role of colonial history in cementing unequal exchange in trading relationships.  
World-systems analysis attempted to move beyond this dichotomy in its description 
of a new international division of labour, wherein the direction of the flow of capital 
at any one time became less important than the hierarchical relationship which it 
reflected and enforced.    
Theories of the state during this period grappled with the impact of domestic 
social formations in the periphery itself.  Theorists of underdevelopment such as 
Frank suggested that dependent states are instruments of the ruling classes of core 
states in alliance with a comprador bourgeoisie.  Contra to this, authors such as 
Prebisch and Cardoso, maintained the ultimate importance of domestic class 
struggles in the states of the periphery, suggesting the possibility for autonomous 
development or, at least, a form of autonomous development.   
The view of the role played by finance was important in this respect.  Frank 
pursued the analysis of the deleterious effects of capital imports on the domestic 
bourgeoisie, seeing branches of imperial banks as coordinators and conduits for the 
extraction of surplus value.  Amin’s more nuanced analysis submits that both 
international and national banks may serve either autocentric or extraverted 
objectives.  However, for much of the dependency school, unlike the classical 
theorists, finance was not in the lead role, and emphasis was placed instead on 
industrial capital and trade relationships.  Again, this corresponds to the material 
context in which these theories evolved.  Under the post-war Bretton Woods system, 
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finance was managed at both the international and domestic levels, meaning that the 
periphery enjoyed temporary relief from its role as global buffer against adjustment.  
Meanwhile, despite the maintenance of trade barriers, US corporations were 
aggressively expanding their operations across Latin America.   
During the contemporary neoliberal period, there appears to be a growing 
acknowledgement that none of the more purely economic factors which dominated 
earlier generations of theory – the rise of monopoly, levels of capital accumulation, 
trends in profit rates, international division of labour – can on their own be 
determinant in imperial expansion (or dependency).  The exertion of social, cultural 
and political power, reflecting the agency of historically-specific social formations 
must be brought into the analysis.  This demands a well-developed theory of the 
capitalist state and inter-state relations.  Milios and Sotiropoulos defend the primacy 
of the social formation of the state.  They invoke an interpretation of Lenin’s 
imperialist chain, wherein external practices are seen both to overdetermine and 
constrain what emerges out of internal class struggles.  Authors of the York School 
have argued that capital exports from core states penetrate and influence the 
domestic social formation, undermining national economic coherence.   
Following in the wake of the demise of the Bretton Woods system and 
financial liberalisation, contemporary theories of imperialism have returned to a 
focus on finance, with many of the same tensions and ambiguities that were present 
in earlier eras.  For Harvey, finance is both at the core of accumulation by 
dispossession and at once ‘contingent and haphazard’.  Finance has moved to the 
heart of accumulation and the maintenance of higher profit levels across the globe, 
according to the York School, and yet is attended by contradictions and injustices.   
With the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, the introduction of 
liberalised exchange rates, and the implementation of broad-based financial 
liberalisation, imperialist theories have been forced to confront the implications of 
the hegemony of the US dollar as world money.  From Tavares, Gowan, and Panitch 
and Gindin, a central element of US imperial strategy is seen as its ability to set 
international monetary conditions according to the needs of the American economy.   
This provides not only seigniorage benefits, cheap savings and credit, and freedom 
from payments disciplines, but it has allowed the prising open of the markets of 
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competitor states through the exploitation of crisis and the outward growth of US 
corporations through acquisition. 
 
5.3	  	  INSIGHTS	  TOWARDS	  A	  THEORY	  OF	  SUBORDINATE	  FINANCIALISATION	  
 
Following the hypothesis that the form of financialisation in ECEs will be shaped by 
contemporary imperial relations, the insights obtained in the previous section 
through a survey of the literature of imperialism should inform a theorisation of 
financialisation for countries of the periphery.  These insights relate to the drivers of 
imperialism, the nature of the state, the relationship between finance and industry, 
and the form of world money.   
 
5.3.1	  	  Drivers	  of	  imperialism	  
 
Imperialism eludes any simple causal explanations, be it the absorption or extraction 
of surplus found in classical theories of imperialism, the differential marginal gains 
from exchange which typify dependency theory, or movements in relative profit rates 
found in some of the theories of the new imperialism.  As was documented in chapter 
three, many of these hypothesised drivers of imperialism have echoes in 
contemporary theories of the emergence of financialisation.  Problems of 
overaccumulation form the basis of a number of such theories, invoking the 
properties of finance to variously absorb (Foster, 2010a) or extract surplus value 
(Gowan, 2010; Panitch & Gindin, 2004).  Similarly, profitability, be it the tendency 
of the rate of profit to fall (Brenner, 2003) or changes in relative profit rates 
(Duménil & Lévy, 2004b), figures prominently.  Unequal terms of exchange are 
internalised within the multinational corporation in the work of William Milberg 
(2008; Milberg & Winkler, 2010b), reducing pressure on managers to maintain fixed 
investment levels. 
Wary of essentialism, I maintain that in a world market marked by deep and 
complex trade, finance and production linkages, an understanding of imperialism 
must be sought in the multi-faceted way that the forces and relations of production in 
the periphery respond to the imperatives of the capitalist classes of powerful nations 
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in the core.  Therefore, in order to construct theory for the periphery, I will need to 
consider how these imperial relations will shape the tendencies of financialisation. 
 
5.3.2	  	  Financial	  capital	  and	  the	  state	  
 
In classical theories of imperialism, the state was seen implicitly as a thing, 
functional to the needs of the capitalist classes.  However, this requires political unity 
of the fractions of the capitalist classes pre-existing outside of the state.  Finance 
capital was assigned the role of ephor of imperialist capitalist expansion in the 
project of the state-capital trust.  The antithesis of this understanding found 
expression in those dependency theorists who advanced the theory of the state as 
subject, instrumental variously to a parasitic comprador class (in alliance with the 
capitalist classes of the imperial power) or to the developmental interests of a 
domestic bourgeoisie.  The orientation of finance was critical in this regard.  But this 
required the state to be external to class struggle with its own will.   
Rather than as a thing or a subject, the state needs to be seen as a 
relationship; as Poulantzas (2000) described it, ‘a material condensation of the class 
relationship of forces’, both that between fractions of the capitalist class and that 
between dominant and dominated classes.  Viewing the state as a relationship allows 
for its character to change as capitalism develops (McMichael, 1987).  To play its 
constituitive role, the state must enjoy relative autonomy of particular interests.  This 
does not mean that state autonomy is set against the fractions of the capitalist class, 
Poulantzas tells us, but that autonomy is the result of what takes place within the 
state.  This understanding allows us to simultaneously consider both a state project 
and an internally contradictory state. 
Capitalism reproduces territorial divisions with the goal of mobilising 
nationalism in the pursuit of competitive accumulation.  This provides for the 
possibility that “… cross-class coalitions will come into being with the goal of 
securing shared competitive advantages in the world market” (Hirsch & 
Kannankulam, 2011, p. 21).  However, it is by no means certain that this will result 
in the formation of a coalition which functions in the interests of the advancement of 
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a national bourgeoisie.  Poulantzas argued that the history of the bourgeoisie was 
that of oscillation between identification with and betrayal of the nation. 
Theorists of the transnational capitalist class (Robinson, 2001; Sklair, 2000; 
van der Pijl, 1998) argue that the capitalist state is being re-organised according to 
the demands of an alliance of the ruling classes that operates across borders, 
deracinated or denationalised.  While provocative, this goes perhaps too far.  Clearly, 
within a dynamic global hierarchy, states occupy differentiated positions.  The 
possibility for movement within this hierarchy is affected by the inter-relationship 
between the state, its constituent social relations, and external forces.  This recalls 
Poulantzas’ (1974) notion of the ‘internal’ (or ‘interior’) bourgeoisie, with its 
complex interdependency with foreign capital, yet retaining its own base of capital 
accumulation.  In assessing this notion in the contemporary era, Jens Wissel (2011, 
p. 224) argues that “… there is really no such thing as external factors on the one 
hand, acting purely from 'outside', and opposed to internal factors 'isolated' in their 
own 'space'”.  In this understanding, domestic social struggle should be seen neither 
as isolated from cross-border influence, nor determined by the same.  The room for 
and direction of movement, may change across particular conjunctures, as 
international configurations of power shift and especially during periods of transition 
or crisis.  All of this suggests that the form of financialisation in any particular 
conjuncture can not be universalised; it must emerge from a careful historical 
analysis of state-class relations. 
 
5.3.3	  	  The	  changing	  relationship	  of	  industrial	  and	  financial	  capital	  
 
While financial capital first emerges from the circuit of capital, its potential to 
reproduce and expand in relation to the material confines of production, means that it 
enjoys a unique malleability.  It is precisely the exploitation of this malleability 
which explains the ability of financial capital to re-shape social formations.  It is this 
characteristic which has made financial capital such an appealing lever of power 
throughout history.   
In Volume III of Capital, Marx (1991 [1894]) describes the challenge of the 
financing of capitalist production as that of achieving balance in the proportions of 
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money and commodities.  In expanded reproduction, accumulation requires the 
hoarding of surplus value by capitalist producers, which is then placed under the 
control of bankers as representatives of social capital.  The financing challenge 
involves the correct adjustment of hoarding and dishoarding, thereby introducing 
uncertainty and with it complex psychological dynamics.  In an advanced capitalist 
economy, this passage of money capital into and out of the circuit of production, 
becomes irretrievably intertwined with the extension of interest-bearing capital by 
banks. The balance of forces between lenders and borrowers in a particular social 
formation determines the division between interest and entrepreneurial profit out of 
total profit.  As Marx says, it is “… only the division of capitalists into money 
capitalists and industrial capitalists that transforms a part of the profit into interest 
and creates the category of interest at all.” (1991, p. 493) 
It is crucial to note that the object of Marx’s analysis was a closed economy.  
However, in a world market where transnational corporations organise production 
across liberalised borders, the financing of capitalist production has undergone 
important transformations.  The hoarding of surplus value can now be effected by 
transfers within the same corporate unit across territories, preventing the 
socialisation of the investment process according to the constrictions of the nation-
state.  In the periphery, large transnationals acting as balance sheet managers, access 
finance in international markets and channel it to borrowers both within and outside 
of their corporate networks.   
Perhaps surprisingly, there is very little in the financialisation literature which 
attempts to link the phenomenon with these broader changes in the structure of 
global production.  Milberg & Winkler (2010b; 2008) stand out for their examination 
of how the creation of global value chains has impacted shareholder value orientation 
of the corporations of the core.  But what is missing for the focus here is an 
examination of how changes in the financing of capitalist production which have 
accompanied these transformations have affected the role of financial capital in the 
periphery.   
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With peripheral interest rates driven by the role of the exchange rate as an 
asset class in a small open economy (Kaltenbrunner, 2010)21, corporations able to 
access international markets enjoy a substantial advantage over those confined to 
domestic funds22.  This bifurcation of capital structures has decisive impacts upon 
investment allocation and broader national development trajectories, particularly in 
economies where SMEs play a predominant role in terms of employment and fixed 
capital investment (Toporowski, 2010c, p. 922).  The participation of corporations in 
supra-national financial circuits has the further corollary that it may limit the 
capacity of domestic banks to centralise money capital and act as ‘representatives of 
social capital’.   This may result in domestic financial under-development.  The 
flipside of this is the ability of foreign capital to participate in a profit rate which is 
determined by the social formations predominant in the periphery (importantly 
reflecting low labour costs).  Where the result of these changes in financing is 
stagnation in productive investment, this may have the unintended consequence of 
driving policy changes which attempt to catalyse growth through the expansion of 
household debt-fuelled consumption. 
 
5.3.4	  	  US	  dollar	  as	  world	  money	  and	  flexible	  exchange	  rates	  in	  the	  periphery	  
 
As previously elaborated in chapter three, the money which emerges from the 
spontaneous economic, political and military interactions of states “… serves as the 
universal means of purchasing, and as the universally recognised embodiment of all 
wealth.” (Marx, 2004, pp. 240–4)  Suzanne de Brunhoff (1978) has argued that the 
reproduction of money as general equivalent requires the interplay of three levels; 
that is bank-created credit money, national currency and world money.  Constantly 
evolving according to the changing needs of accumulation, this interplay between the 
three levels of money will be experienced differently in countries occupying distinct 
positions in the international hierarchy of states. In the world money-issuing country 
(or countries), there is little or no difference between national currency and world 
                                                
21 Note that Marx foresaw this, arguing that the world market “… exerts a direct influence on the 
establishment of the interest rate”. (1991, p. 490) 
22 Not only do these firms not have to borrow at these higher interest rates, but they may borrow 
abroad at lower rates and invest in government securities, exploiting the difference. 
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money, conferring a range of benefits, as pointed to by a number of authors 
previously discussed.  However, in peripheral countries, there is a sharp distinction 
between national and world money.  For the state, the central bank must navigate the 
interaction between these two spheres.  Costas Lapavitsas and Makoto Itoh argue 
that the “… possession of a hoard of international money is a pre-condition for the 
defence of national bourgeois interests in the world market” (1999, p. 160).  Whether 
by choice or by necessity, central banks are driven by the requirements of inflation 
targeting and international competitiveness in an open economy to sterilise foreign 
capital inflows.  Juan Pablo Painceira (2009, 2010) has shown how this creates a 
linkage between reserve accumulation and domestic public debt in middle-income 
countries.  The proliferation of domestic public debt instruments may create an 
incentive for domestic capitalists (both financial and non-financial) to invest in 
financial assets over productive activity.   
For capitalists in the periphery, the compulsion to transact in and hold world 
money may prove irresistible.  Tony Smith (2005, p. 230) enumerates the reasons 
why this may be so, including: funding cross-border production chains, joint 
ventures, and mergers and acquisitions; responding to overcapacity difficulties in 
home markets by either entering foreign markets or shifting accumulated surplus 
value into the financial sector.  
To reiterate, world money is in increasing demand to facilitate production and 
circulation carried out as part of increasingly global networks.  This is rooted in the 
relative price and liquidity of US markets, themselves characteristics derived from 
the status of the US as ‘banker to the world’.  World money is also sought after in its 
function as primary means of payment and store of value.  This latter point poses a 
number of risks for the periphery.  First, firms accessing world money encounter 
exchange rate risk and incur fees and intermediary costs which are a deadweight loss 
to the domestic economy23.  Second, the increasing recourse to world money 
threatens to perpetually stunt the development of domestic financial markets.  
 
                                                
23 This is leaving aside the potential for domestically-based branches of international corporations, 
both financial and non-financial, to transfer profits abroad in the form of dividends (Ortiz, 2012). 
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5.4	  	  SUBORDINATE	  FINANCIALISATION	  
 
Consistent with the methodology employed thus far, understanding the role of 
finance in the periphery today requires an updated assessment of the characteristics 
of the world market in the current historical conjuncture:   
 -­‐ The liberalisation of trade has continued, facilitating the continual re-
organisation of production chains and trade channels driven by profit 
imperatives.  This re-organisation is carried out by corporations, both of the 
core and increasingly of the periphery, constantly re-shaped by incessant 
pressures of centralisation and concentration.  Importantly, these units are 
more and more able to access cross-border market-based sources of finance 
and circulate these funds through their production networks.  
 -­‐ Industrialisation certainly can and has occurred in the periphery, and is not 
constricted, as envisioned by dependency theorists, to goods either for export 
or for elite consumption.  However equally, de-industrialisation can take 
place where local conditions no longer fulfill the requirements of capitalist 
production.   The outcome in any particular context rests on a host of factors 
which impact upon the profitability of the firm, including technological 
innovation, temporal and spatial re-organisation, and the strength of working 
class organisation. 
 -­‐ Finance, both financial institutions and financial capital, has risen in 
importance across the globe, in both creditor and debtor nations, and in both 
core and periphery.  This has been supported by and given support to 
financial liberalisation.  The growth in capital flows has become increasingly 
de-linked from the growth in trade flows; the direction and nature of these 
flows eludes explanations based on such simple notions as the marginal 
productivity of capital. 
 -­‐ While questions are being raised about the future of its role as world money, 
the US dollar continues to enjoy an unrivalled status.  The dollar is dominant 
in its share of international trade (Goldberg & Tille, 2008); liquid liabilities 
and risky assets24, including derivatives25; and official reserves26. 
 -­‐ Finally, as illustrated by the rise of sovereign wealth funds and state-owned 
enterprise control of commodities, the state is by no means withering away.  
Indeed, through the crisis which began in 2007-8, there has been a revival in 
                                                
24 The US share of liquid liabilities (debt, trade credit and bank loans) has gone down only slightly 
from 70 per cent in 1973 to around 60 per cent in 2004, while its share of risky assets has risen 
dramatically from near zero post-war to almost 60 per cent in 2004 (Gourinchas & Rey, 2005). 
25 In the foreign exchange market in April 2007, the US dollar stood as the leading currency with 89 
per cent of all contracts having, at least, one “leg” denominated in that currency (BIS, 2007, p. 15).  
26 Share of claims in USD in the allocated reserves portion of the total official foreign exchange 
reserves peaked at 71.5 per cent in 2001 and decreased to 62 per cent in 2008 (IMF, 2010).  
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more explicit forms of state-led interventions in the interests of capitalist 
development. 
 
My hypothesis is that peripheral economies will experience the tendencies of 
financialisation, but in a distinctive form which has been shaped by imperial 
relations in the current world market conjuncture.  The impact of such needs to be 
apprehended in relation both to posited changes at the macroeconomic level, as well 
as to the sectoral transformations characteristic of financialisation.  Taken together, I 
have called the distinctive form of financialisation in the periphery subordinate 
financialisation. 
At the macroeconomic level, subordinate financialisation will not be 
reducible to the quantity or direction of capital flows at any one time.  Foreign 
portfolio flows, driven by yield dynamics in the core, variously inflate and then exit 
from government debt, private securities and real estate markets in the periphery.  
Under flexible exchange rates, costly central bank efforts to sterilise these flows 
and/or foreign exchange earnings increase government indebtedness and threaten to 
crowd out domestic lending by commercial banks and fixed investment by private 
firms.  Monetary and exchange rate policy become driven by the profit-making 
strategies of both foreign capital and large domestic capital.  All of this appears 
explicitly as a result of the subordinate status of peripheral states in international 
capital markets and the subordinate status of the domestic currency.   
The turn of large non-financial corporations towards market-based finance 
will lead them disproportionately either to foreign markets, or to foreign investors in 
domestic markets.  Additionally, those firms which are part of global production 
chains may finance themselves with trade credit from corporate headquarters, 
themselves becoming pivots in the development of internal capital markets.  In the 
short-term, this sees the extraction by foreign capital of a share of domestically-
generated profit in the form of interest, fees and commissions, pitted against the 
benefits of greater liquidity and a reduced cost of financing.  The long-term risk is 
that this mode of financing perpetuates shallow and/or volatile domestic financial 
markets.  In a world market marked by the internationalisation of production, 
hedging exchange rate and interest rate risk in small, open economies which are 
subordinate to world money, requires globally-integrated firms to participate in 
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derivatives markets.  The further temptation may arise for firms under increasing 
pressure to generate higher yields to assume speculative positions in a range of 
financial assets, which may have the corollary of reduced investment in fixed assets. 
The role of domestic banks in the periphery is expected ex-ante to be 
ambiguous.  However, the tendency will be towards greater reliance on international 
money markets, and a turn towards lending to households.  As is the case with non-
financial corporations, financial corporations of the periphery entering into 
international capital markets are subject to increased risks owing to the exchange 
rate, interest rate and macroeconomic risks they assume.  While lending to 
households may prove a profitable strategy for the banks, its macroeconomic impact 
via the wealth effect will be limited by the distinctive class structure in the periphery.  
In any one institutional setting the transformation of bank behaviour will pivot on its 
relationship with industrial capital and the state, overdetermined by that with foreign 
capital.  Depending on these relationships, and owing to the tendencies of non-
financial corporations and banks alike to turn to international capital pools, it is 
conceivable that economies in the periphery may be at the same time both under-
financed and financialised.   
Finally, as in advanced capitalist economies, it is expected that 
financialisation in ECEs will be marked by households’ increasing indebtedness 
accompanied by rising holdings of financial assets.  This will be distinguished by the 
markedly different class structure in ECEs.  The size of the middle class will affect 
the potential of finance-led accumulation, especially in the relative importance of 
mortgage as against consumer lending.  Securitisation is likely to be limited by 
institutional quality.  A further distinguishing characteristic will be the desire of 
households, in the face of greater domestic volatility, to hold a greater share of 
foreign assets denominated in world money.  The transformation of the household 
will be influenced by class struggle as it is reflected in the policy directives of the 
state around critical issues such as housing, pensions and consumer finance.   
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5.5	  	  CONCLUSION	  
 
This chapter began with a review of the literature on imperialism and dependency, 
highlighting whether and how finance figured in the analysis.  I illustrated how each 
successive generation of imperialist theory was rooted in the particular material 
conditions of the colonial, post-colonial and neoliberal periods, each of which 
exhibited distinguishing world market characteristics: 
  -­‐ During the classical period of colonial production and restrictions on trade, 
the predominant analysis was that imperialism relieved pressures of over-
accumulation driven by the formation of monopolies in the core.  Banking 
capital was seen to take a lead role in collaboration with industrial capital in 
order to overcome trade barriers.  The peripheral state served the needs of its 
masters in the capitalist classes of the core.  The role of a seemingly 
immutable gold-sterling standard was not yet a prominent feature of analysis, 
though it was critical to maintaining British imperial dominance.  
 -­‐ In the post-colonial period, while trade and financial barriers remained, the 
question of ownership over the means of production and thereby the 
orientation of the domestic bourgeoisie, rose to the fore.  Emphasis was 
placed on the unequal terms of exchange, with a split opening up between 
those who expected dependent states to act as instruments of the ruling 
classes of the core, and those who anticipated the possibility for autonomous 
development.  How finance was understood, and what role it should play, 
pivoted on this interpretation.  Little attention was given to the role of world 
money during the period of stability that was facilitated, for a time, by the 
gold-dollar standard. 
 -­‐ After the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, the institutional specificity 
of world money began to be recognised as a key element in the imperial 
relationship.  In reaction to the crisis of the post-war model of accumulation, 
neoliberal reforms deepened trade and financial liberalisation, facilitating the 
internationalisation of production.  In this context, rather than being seen to 
relieve pressures of overaccumulation, or being centred around unequal 
exchange, imperialism has been related to the way that foreign investment 
affects class structures and state formations in the periphery.  In this, finance 
plays an ambiguous role, in tension with industry, variously productive and 
parasitic, capable of either empowering or enfeebling. 
 
From this review, a number of critical insights were gained which have 
informed my theorisation of financialisation in the periphery.  First, imperialism can 
not be explained by recourse to any single nationally-based dynamic relating to the 
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absorption/extraction of surplus, marginal gains from exchange or movements in 
relative profit rates.  In a world market marked by deep and complex trade, financial 
and production linkages, a contemporary understanding of imperialism must be 
sought in the multi-faceted way that the forces and relations of production in the 
periphery respond to the imperatives of the capitalist classes of powerful nations in 
the core.  Financialisation should be seen in this light.  Second, the role of finance 
has been an ambiguous but influential one in imperial relations.  The malleability of 
the circuit of financial capital creates a constant tension with industrial capital, and 
opens up possibilities to variously, and sometimes simultaneously, coordinate, erode 
or subvert power structures.  In the current setting of unprecedented financial 
liberalisation, these tensions and possibilities are magnified, giving institutional 
forms an important role to play.  Third, overlooked in much of the literature is the 
importance of world money to the exercise of imperial power.  Today, the nature and 
impact of financialisation pivots on the status of the US dollar as world money.  
Finally, grasping imperialism has required advancements in analysis of the state. 
Instrumental descriptions of the peripheral state must be abandoned in favour of a 
view of the state as a condensation of intra- and inter-class struggles, constrained and 
overdetermined by its place in an uneven global hierarchy.  Ultimately, these 
struggles are what give the sectoral transformations which characterise 
financialisation their particular form. 
 In view of these insights, a number of hypotheses were advanced about the 
sectoral transformations which are expected to characterise financialisation in the 
periphery.  At the macro level, subordinate financialisation can not be reduced to the 
quantity or direction of capital flows at any one time.  In ECEs, the difference will be 
a qualitative one, in that capital flows in a financialised economy may be expected to 
be more volatile, and their movement driven by external imperatives.  The turn of the 
non-financial corporation to market-based finance and investment in financial assets 
will be distinguished by both the nature of the risks undertaken and by the recipients 
of the financial profits thus generated.  The tendency of banks will be towards 
greater reliance on international pools of capital and a turn towards household 
lending.  The turn of corporations, both financial and non-financial, to international 
capital markets may hold back the development of the domestic financial sector, 
dependent on state-capital relations.  Finally, it is expected that financialisation in 
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ECEs will see increasing household indebtedness, with different impacts owing to 
distinct class structures, accompanied by rising holdings of financial assets, impacted 
by the desire to hold them in world money.  Taken together, I have called the 
distinctive form of financialisation in the periphery subordinate financialisation.  
In the next chapter, drawing upon this theorisation of subordinate 
financialisation, I will examine macroeconomic and sectoral transformations across a 
range of ECEs with a focus on my case study country Mexico.  Following this, 
chapter seven provides a contemporary political economy of Mexico; its changing 
place in the world market reflecting the re-configuration of domestic capitalist 
classes and their relationship with foreign, particulary US, capital.  The focus will be 
on bank-firm relations which are deemed critical to the form that financialisation has 
taken in the country.  Finally, in chapters eight and nine, I will look in detail at the 
transformation of the financing and investment behaviour of large Mexican firms.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter	  6	  	  	  
Financialisation	  in	  emerging	  capitalist	  economies:	  
Accounting	  for	  the	  Mexican	  paradox1	  
 
 
6.1	  	  INTRODUCTION	  
 
In 1969, Raymond Goldsmith was commissioned by the OECD to study Mexico’s 
financial development.  Goldsmith was impressed by Mexico’s post-war economic 
progress.  It was achieved, he noted, despite only 'limited' reliance on capital imports 
and virtually without foreign aid.  He highlighted a number of characteristics to 
which he credited the success.  Of the characteristics particular to Mexico, he cited 
the important role of government development banks, the rapid development of 
financieras (NBFIs), the role of economic groups, and an increase in the financial 
intermediation ratio (FIR) 2  "… well above the level prevalent in many 
underdeveloped countries". (1969a, p. 55) 
Some forty-five years later, if it can be questioned whether Mexico’s 
economic development has lived up to its promise, it can be stated with certainty that 
its financial development has not.  Of the characteristics highlighted by Goldsmith, 
public development banks have faded to insignificance (Girón, Correa, & Rodríguez, 
2010), and, as will be subsequently discussed, domestic market-based finance 
remains stunted.  At the same time, Mexico is experiencing firms’ turn to market-
                                                
1 Earlier drafts of parts of this chapter and chapter seven have been published in Spanish as a chapter 
in a edited volume (Powell, 2013). 
2 Goldsmith calculated the financial intermediation ratio as the assets of financial institutions relative 
to the total of all domestic and foreign financial assets in the economy.  FIR is today typically 
calculated as liabilities of financial corporations (S12) divided by the total liabilities of other sectors 
(S11 + S13 + S14 + S2).  
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based funds and investment in financial assets, and banks’ turn to household lending; 
tendencies which were theoretically linked to financialisation in advanced capitalist 
economies in chapter three, and empirically established in chapter four.  What 
explains this apparent paradox – a country which is under-financed and 
financialising?   
This chapter will first establish that, according to conventional measures of 
financial depth and relative to its peer group, Mexico is under-financed.  Measures of 
financial depth will be reviewed for a survey of emerging capitalist countries:  
Brazil, Korea, South Africa, Thailand and Turkey3.  In the subsequent section, the 
question of whether and, if so, how Mexico is financialising will be addressed.  This 
will be done using the sectoral indicators developed in relation to advanced capitalist 
economies in chapter three, and by examining additional measures building upon the 
understanding of subordinate financialisation suggested by the theoretical analysis in 
chapter five.   
At the macroeconomic level, relative to advanced capitalist economies as 
well as some of the emerging capitalist economies surveyed, Mexico does not appear 
financialised.  However, it will be shown that the nature and volatility of foreign 
capital flows are indicative of Mexico’s subordinate position in the hierarchy of 
global finance.  At the sectoral level, data limitations restrict cross-country 
comparisons of firm behaviour; however, Mexican firms are increasingly reliant on 
market-based and foreign funding, and are investing in financial assets.  It will be 
argued that the drivers of these transformations and the failure of firms to translate 
this strategy into increased financial incomes may be symptomatic of subordinate 
financialisation.  In the financial sector, central bank data allows a comparison of the 
financialising behaviour of ECE banks.  Mexican banks are increasingly dependent 
on short-term and foreign funding, with lending and profit-making shifting towards 
households.  For both firms and banks, reliance on foreign funds has brought with it 
an increasing engagement with derivatives required for hedging the volatility that is 
intrinsic to Mexico’s subordinate status and position relative to world money.  
                                                
3 The choice of countries is meant to be indicative of trends in emerging capitalist countries, and not a 
statistically representative survey.  It encompasses two countries from Latin America, two from East 
Asia, one from Africa and one from Central Asia.  By income, four of the countries are classified as 
upper middle income, while Thailand is considered lower middle income and Korea high income.  
Note that data is not available for some countries for certain figures, as indicated. 
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Finally, a measure of household financialisation will be assessed, suggesting that 
Mexican household financialisation is distinct from that in advanced economies; 
Mexican households are increasing their borrowing, particularly of a short-term 
nature, and their investment in market-based assets, however the level of 
financialisation from a macroeconomic perspective is still relatively low.  
Based on this evidence, it will be argued that Mexico represents a case of 
subordinate financialisation, that is, an uneven combination of the transformations 
which characterise inter-sectoral relations in a new epoch of capitalism, but whose 
distinctive characteristics emerge from Mexico’s subordinate status in the hierarchy 
of global finance.  Mexico is simultaneously under-financed and financialising.  
However this is not a paradox, but characteristic of a process of subordinate 
financialisation.  Understanding why financialisation has taken the particular form it 
has in Mexico requires finer analysis of inter- and intra-class relations; this will be 
the subject of the next chapter. 
 
6.2	  	  UNDER-­‐FINANCED	  …	  
 
This section will first establish that, by standard measures, and relative to its overall 
level of economic development, Mexico is under-financed.  Countries at lower levels 
of income per capita can be expected to have, ceteris paribus, lower levels of 
financial system development4.  Goldsmith (1969b) believed that the ratio of 
financial sector assets to GDP would steadily increase as a country became richer, 
flattening out at about three to four times GDP.  However Mexico exhibits financial 
under-development even when compared to countries at similar or lower levels of 
income per capita, both in terms of overall monetary aggregates as well as the size of 
the banking industry and the capitalisation of securities markets.   
Typically in the mainstream literature, overall ‘financial depth’ is measured 
by using various measures of the money supply as a share of GDP (Goldsmith, 
1969b; King & Levine, 1993; Levine, 2004).   One such measure accessible for 
                                                
4 Though the exact level of financial development of any particular country reflects its historical and 
institutional specificities. 
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emerging capitalist countries is the IMF’s ‘broad money’ to GDP5.  Figure 6.01 
shows that by this measure Mexico’s ‘financial depth’ is considerably less than a 
number of other countries, including those at lower levels of per capita GDP.  The 
difference is made more emphatic by the fact that Mexico includes deposits of 
residents in banks abroad in its monetary aggregates, while most other countries do 
not (Lim & Sriram, 2003).   
 
 
Figure 6.01: Broad money to GDP   
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics 
 
 
In terms of bank-based finance, Mexican deposit money banks’ claims on the 
domestic non-financial sector peaked at 47 per cent of GDP in 1969 (figure 6.02)6.  It 
is important to note that this ratio excludes claims on the financial sector and 
international claims, by definition limiting itself to what is generally considered 
‘productive’ lending.  Since 1969, with the exception of the immediate period after 
                                                
5 The use of the IMF’s ‘broad money’ category is not unproblematic.  The IMF’s Monetary and 
Financial Statistics Manual does not prescribe a specific definition of broad money.  But as presented 
here, the data will be understood as indicative.  Data is only available from 2001 forward.  Data for 
the US and UK is included for comparative purposes; note that the measure used for the UK is M4 
(M2 is unavailable).  Germany and France do not make M2 data available; the ratio for Japan is above 
two times GDP so its inclusion would have obscured the differences between other countries. 
6 This ratio measures deposit money banks’ total assets to GDP.  Time series begin from when data is 
available.  The same dataset makes available private credit by deposit money banks to GDP, however 
no additional insight into either relative levels or the trends in the size of the banking sector is 
provided.  
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bank re-privatisation, these claims have hovered around 30 per cent of GDP.  This is 
considerably lower than the levels of Korea, Thailand, South Africa and Brazil.  In 
the last decade, the relative size of the Mexican banking sector, as indicated by this 
particular metric, has also been surpassed by the other laggard of the group, Turkey.  
 
 
Figure 6.02:  Deposit money banks’ claims on domestic non-financial sector to GDP 
Source: World Bank financial structure dataset 
 
 
In terms of market-based finance, with the exception of the pre-NAFTA 
surge in the years 1990-3, stock market capitalisation as a share of GDP in Mexico 
has been below that of all countries except for Turkey (figure 6.03)7.  Private bond 
market capitalisation is gradually increasing from a low level, tracing a similar path 
to that of Brazil, South Africa and Thailand, but decidedly less important as a source 
of financing than in Korea (figure 6.04)8.  From a situation in the early 1990s where 
Mexico had one of the most significant public bond markets (smaller only than South 
Africa), a decade of fiscal austerity resulted in the smallest public bond market by 
the end of the 1990s (figure 6.05)9.  Despite steady growth since that time, it remains 
the smallest public bond market in relative terms throughout the 2000s. 
                                                
7 Time series begin from when data is initially available. 
8 The time series data for Turkey are incomplete, and the level is below one per cent of GDP.  Data for 
other countries is only available from 1990. 
9 Data is only available from 1990. 
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Figure 6.03: Stock market capitalisation to GDP 
Source: World Bank financial structure dataset 
 
 
 
Figure 6.04: Private bond market capitalisation to GDP 
Source:  World Bank financial structure dataset 
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Figure 6.05: Public bond market capitalisation to GDP 
Source: World Bank financial structure dataset 
 
 
Having established that Mexico is relatively under-financed by traditional 
measures, can it also be argued that it is, at the same time, financialising?  To address 
this apparent paradox, the macroeconomic picture will be first examined, followed 
by a consideration of each of the non-financial corporate, banking and household 
sectors.  Within each category, the indicators of financialisation developed in relation 
to advanced capitalist economies in chapter three will be assessed, as well as 
additional measures capturing the subordinate nature of financialisation theorised in 
chapter five.  
 
6.3	  	  …	  YET	  FINANCIALISING?	  
6.3.1	  	  The	  macroeconomic	  picture	  
 
Starting at the macroeconomic level, one of the empirical transformations which is 
typically associated with financialisation in advanced capitalist economies is a surge 
in the size of the financial sector relative to that of the economy as a whole.  The 
increase in the assets of both bank and non-bank financial institutions as a share of 
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GDP gives an indication of the financial sector ‘footprint’ (figure 6.06)10.  Note that 
this is similar to one of the measures of financial depth discussed above (figure 6.02), 
though this measure includes claims of both the bank and non-bank financial 
institutions on the financial as well as the non-financial sector, and also includes 
international claims.  This more exhaustive picture is important for capturing 
financialisation. 
For those countries considered as archetypes of financialisation, the increase 
in this ratio has been dramatic (see figure 4.01, chapter four).  The US has seen 
financial sector assets rise from less than two times GDP in 1980 to over four times 
GDP by 2010; in the UK in recent years the figure has risen to nine times GDP.  
Such growth is by no means confined to the archetypical financialisers, as the ratio 
shows a similar trend, if distinct levels, in the other advanced capitalist economies 
examined.  However, by this measure, Mexico is neither already financialised nor 
does it appear to be financialising; the ratio of financial sector total assets to GDP is 
lower than all the other countries of the sample.  Korea and South Africa, conversely, 
have reached similar levels to those attained by the advanced capitalist economies.  
Thailand was on a similar trajectory until the Asian financial crisis of 1997-8. 
 
 
Figure 6.06: Financial sector assets to GDP 
 
                                                
10 Unless otherwise indicated (as with the previous figures), source notes can be found in appendix B.  
Note that comparable data for Brazil are unavailable. 
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In her seminal piece charting financialisation in the United States, Greta 
Krippner (2005) documents the increasing weight of the finance, insurance and real 
estate industries (FIRE) in the US share of output.  In the post-war era, FIRE has 
grown from 10 per cent of output to nearly 25 per cent in the early 2000s11.  The 
change in the FIRE share of US employment during the same period, in contrast, has 
been minimal - from 5 to 7 per cent.  Comparable data for Mexico and the emerging 
capitalist economies tell a different story (figure 6.07).  The Mexican share of FIRE 
in GDP fell following bank nationalisation, rose rapidly in the period of bank re-
privatisation and the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement, or 
NAFTA12, and has since fallen back to hover at 20 per cent.  This is the level reached 
by the more consistent rise in the FIRE share in the Korean and South African 
economies.  Turkey ends at approximately the same level, following the end of a 
bubble in the late 1990s and early 2000s.  The share of FIRE collapses in Thailand 
after the Asian financial crisis of 1997-8, though the data appear to underestimate the 
actual level. Like the United States and the advanced capitalist economies, the 
corresponding gain in employment in the Mexican FIRE sector has been small – 
from 3 to 6 per cent, with most of the growth coming in the real estate sector in 
recent years13. 
 
                                                
11 FIRE share of GDP has risen from approximately 15 per cent in 1970 to approximately 30 per cent 
in 2008 in France, Germany, Great Britain and the USA.  In Japan, during the same period, it has risen 
from 10 per cent to 17 per cent (Source: OECD.stat). 
12 These events and their implications will be discussed in detail in chapter seven. 
13 Source for these summary comments on employment in the FIRE sectors is ILOstat. 
Chapter	  6	  	  Financialisation	  in	  emerging	  capitalist	  economies	  
 
158 
 
 
Figure 6.07: FIRE share of GDP 
 
 
Exploiting the detailed data available in the United States, Krippner (2005) 
documents the rise in the share of the FIRE sector in profits, rising from just ten per 
cent post-war to 40 per cent in 200314.  Data restrictions make it difficult to estimate 
profitability by sector in ECEs.  However, national accounts data do allow a crude 
comparison of profitability in the financial as against the non-financial sectors to be 
made.  Figure 6.08 shows that Mexican financial corporations accounted for over 12 
per cent of gross operating surplus15 (GOS) in the immediate period after bank re-
privatisation in the early 1990s, falling to nearly two per cent in the late 1990s in the 
wake of the peso crisis and the collapse of the banking system, then rising from the 
period of foreign bank entry in 2001 to reach nearly seven per cent recently.  
Financial corporations in Brazil, Korea and South Africa capture approximately ten 
per cent of GOS in the early 1990s, rising to roughly 14 per cent recently.    
 
                                                
14 Lapavitsas (2013) documents the rise of pre-tax profits of financial corporations as a share of total 
pre-tax profits for the UK (from below ten per cent in 2000 to 35 per cent in 2008) and Japan (from 
ten per cent in 1981 to peak at 20 per cent in 1995, hovering between 15 and 20 per cent since). 
15  Gross operating surplus is equal to gross value added less employee compensation and 
taxes/subsidies on production.  Comparable data are unavailable for Thailand and Turkey. 
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Figure 6.08: Financial corporations’ share of GOS of both financial and non-
financial corporations 
Source: UNdata national accounts data, tables 4.3 and 4.4 
 
 
Comparison of these levels with those of financial corporations’ share of 
national gross disposable income16 (GDI) is informative (figure 6.09).  Mexican 
financial corporations secured over 40 per cent of GDI in the immediate period after 
bank re-privatisation, falling to zero in the period 1996-2001, but then rising rapidly 
to surpass 20 per cent in recent years.  Korean financial corporations have seen their 
share of GDI rise from approximately 10 per cent in the 1980s to 20 per cent in the 
1990s and 2000s; Brazilian financial corporations’ share has risen sharply from 
below 10 per cent in the mid 1990s to between 20 and 30 per cent in the last decade; 
and South African financial corporations have taken approximately 40 per cent of 
GDI from the mid 1990s until the recent crisis.   
 
                                                
16 Gross disposable income is equal to gross operating surplus adjusted for property income, FISIM 
(Financial Intermediation Services Indirectly Measured), social transfers and taxes on income, wealth, 
etc..  Comparable data are unavailable for Thailand and Turkey. 
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Figure 6.09: Financial corporations’ share of GDI of both financial and non-
financial corporations 
Source: UNdata national accounts data, table 4.3 and 4.4 
 
 
Thus far, by measures typically used to illustrate financialisation in high-
income countries, Mexico is not clearly financialised, though the trend in the 
profitability of the financial sector echoes developments in advanced capitalist 
economies.  Hypotheses will now be examined concerning the mechanisms of 
subordinate financialisation, first at the macroeconomic level.  In the previous 
chapter a key role for the nature, term and volatility of capital flows was postulated.     
A large theoretical literature exists on the various transmission mechanisms 
through which capital flows affect real variables such as consumption, investment 
and output.  It is clear that the composition of capital flows matters, with a general 
presumption in favour of FDI but more skepticism about the benefits of portfolio 
flows and foreign bank lending (Kose, Prasad, Rogoff, & Wei, 2006).  Where 
portfolio inflows or bank lending lead to currency appreciation under a floating 
exchange rate regime, this can lead to a bias against tradable goods; at the same time 
this appreciation reduces the costs of imports and the repayment of foreign debt.  The 
impact of inflows on stock market prices can distort investment allocation, but 
equally may provide cheaper financing for domestic firms and spur, at least 
temporarily, wealth effects on consumption.  The change in interest rates will depend 
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on inflationary effects, and ultimately the actions of the central bank in choosing 
whether to sterilise inflows.  In sum, the overall impact of these flows will hinge 
upon which of these many complex and interacting factors dominate in a particular 
context.    
 A number of empirical studies have examined the impact of increasing 
financial integration on the volatility of real variables, with little overall agreement.  
Early econometric work across 138 countries by Razin and Rose (1994) found no 
empirical link between openness and macroeconomic volatility; conversely Gavin 
and Hausmann (1996) found significant association between volatility of capital 
flows and output volatility in developing countries.  While Aghion, Bannerjee and 
Piketty (1999) link low financial sector development and high output volatility in the 
face of ‘sudden stops’, Arellano and Mendoza (2002) conclude that ‘sudden stops’ 
do not induce ‘sizeable’ changes in the volatility of output and consumption in small, 
open economies.  Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2003) find that output volatility 
declined through the 1990s, however financial openness has been associated with an 
increase in the ratio of consumption volatility, running counter to the neoclassical 
assertion that financial openness will reduce consumption volatility by allowing 
greater consumption smoothing through access to finance.  Faia (2011) has more 
recently confirmed this linkage between capital account liberalisation and 
consumption volatility.  Attempting to reconcile these different findings, Mody and 
Murshid (2011) provide evidence to support their argument that the ability to 
productively use capital inflows is related to structural features of the economy.     
What is clear is that where capital inflows do lead to price and asset market 
volatility, they can increase uncertainty, undermining productive investment and 
encouraging speculative behaviour.  In view of this, it is surprising that there is 
relatively little work on the impact of capital flow volatility on real variables in the 
Mexican context.  Demir attempts to fill this gap, finding that the average coefficient 
of variation of real short-term capital flows17 in Mexico doubled between the periods 
1982–1989 and 1990–2005 (2009b, p. 677).  This has important ramifications when 
his econometric testing suggests that a ten per cent increase in capital flow volatility 
                                                
17 Real short-term capital flows are defined by Demir as annual portfolio investment liabilities (equity 
plus debt securities) plus other investment banks’ liabilities plus other sector liabilities from the 
International Financial Statistics of the IMF. 
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reduces fixed investment spending in the range of 2.3 to 15.1 per cent (2009b, p. 
683).  Earlier work by Ibarra (2004) concluded that, while the volatility of non-FDI 
capital flows is a significant factor behind consumption behaviour, its impact on 
investment has tended to disappear since Mexico’s transition to a floating exchange 
rate regime. 
 
 
Figure 6.10: Real net capital flows (mns USD) 
Source: IMF Balance of Payments Statistics (BOPS) table 2, author’s calculation 
 
 
While caution is merited in interpreting balance of payments data18, figure 
6.10 tracing real net capital flows (the sum of net investment income and net 
investment19), argues against any simplistic assertions that Mexico has suffered net 
capital outflows.  The 1980s, after the debt crisis in 1982, are a decade of net 
outflows.  The early 1990s, after financial liberalisation, are a period of rapid growth 
                                                
18 The most significant deficiency of balance of payments data in capturing the true nature of cross-
border financial flows, particularly in an economy with a large export sector which is integrated into 
multinational firm production chains, is the issue of transfer pricing (Shaxson, 2011).  Beyond this, 
Mexican balance of payments data lack any information on derivatives, and fail to provide detail in a 
number of categories. 
19 Net capital flows is the sum of net investment income from the current account and net investment 
from the capital account.  From the current account, net investment income is the sum of net direct 
investment income (dividends and interest payments, with reinvested earnings stripped out since they 
do not represent an outflow), net portfolio investment income (income on equity, bonds and money 
market instruments) and net other investment income.  From the capital account, net investment is the 
sum of net direct investment, net portfolio investment and net other investment.  These figures in USD 
have been deflated by the US GDP deflator to approximate real net capital flows. 
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in inflows, dominated by portfolio flows.  After the peso crisis end-1994, while FDI 
remains resilient, portfolio flows become erratic and bank lending dries up.  The 
most recent decade sees strong net inflows with the exception of the pre-crisis year 
of 2006 as US FDI, portfolio investment and lending all turned downwards in 
unison.  Over the 30-year period from 1980 to 2010, $305 billion leave the economy 
in the form of dividends and interest payments, and $100 billion exits via deposits 
made abroad.  This $405 billion outflow is countered by $480 billion inflow of direct 
investment, portfolio investment and bank lending.   
Examining some of the components of the balance of payments reveals a 
number of trends of interest.  First, the theory of subordinate financialisation 
suggests that domestic firms will spend greater amounts on commissions and fees 
paid to foreign banks.  In need of foreign currency-denominated loans and in search 
of lower funding costs, firms might be forced to pay foreign banks increasing 
commissions and fees related to brokerage, placements of issues, underwritings, 
redemptions, arrangements of derivatives, etc..  However, as illustrated in figure 
6.11, this does not appear to be the case20.  The entry of foreign-owned banks from 
2000 may be mitigating such a trend by orchestrating Mexican firms’ access to 
foreign funds via syndicated loans.  Second, an increasing trend in the outflow of 
dividends and distributed profits, illustrated in figure 6.12, on its own is neither an 
indication of subordinate status or of financialisation21.  The growth of reinvested 
earnings is, in fact, outstripping that of repatriated profits.  This issue will arise again 
in the sectoral analysis.  Third, a possible indicator of a subordinate relationship 
shows up in the sharply increasing trend in deposits held abroad in the past decade 
(figure 6.13). 
 
                                                
20 According to the IMF BOPS manual, the category ‘financial services’ “… covers financial 
intermediary and auxiliary services (except those of insurance enterprises and pension funds) 
conducted between residents and nonresidents. Included are intermediary service fees, such as those 
associated with letters of credit, bankers’ acceptances, lines of credit, financial leasing, and foreign 
exchange transactions. … Also included are commissions and other fees related to transactions in 
securities—brokerage, placements of issues, underwritings, redemptions, and arrangements of swaps, 
options, and other hedging instruments; commissions of commodity futures traders; and services 
related to asset management, financial market operational and regulatory services, security custody 
services, etc.”  Insurance is included for comparative purposes, illustrating the increasing 
internationalisation of Mexican firms and their need to insure internationally. 
21 This ambiguity is compounded by the inability to capture the impact of transfer pricing practices on 
the true nature of profit remittances, as previously observed. 
Chapter	  6	  	  Financialisation	  in	  emerging	  capitalist	  economies	  
 
164 
 
 
Figure 6.11: Current account, services, debit (mns USD) 
Source: IMF BOPS, table 2 
 
 
 
Figure 6.12: Current account, income, debit (mns USD) 
Source: IMF BOPS, table 2 
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Figure 6.13: Currency and deposits held abroad (mns USD) 
Source: IMF BOPS, table 2  
 
 
In sum, the evidence of financialisation, either advanced or subordinate, at 
the macroeconomic level is mixed.  Consistent with the previous conclusion that 
Mexico is relatively under-financed, analysis here indicates a relatively small 
financial sector, the profit share of which is increasing in the last decade.  Capital 
flows, particularly portfolio flows have been marked by volatility, denoting a 
subordinate relationship with international finance.  In aggregate terms over the past 
thirty years capital inflows have outweighed outflows and profit remittances. For 
corporations, there is no evidence of increased spending on commissions and fees to 
foreign financial intermediaries, and while profit remittances have grown 
significantly, so have reinvested earnings.  Finally, there is some evidence that 
households are moving deposits abroad in the last decade.  I now turn to examine the 
sectoral behavior of Mexican firms, banks and households in more detail. 
 
6.3.2	  	  The	  non-­‐financial	  corporate	  sector	  
 
To further probe the question of Mexico’s financialisation, it is necessary to devote 
attention to the sectoral level.  This reflects the theoretical understanding established 
in chapter three, and the empirical evidence in advanced capitalist economies 
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captured in chapter four, which understands financialisation as a transformation in 
the relations between the fundamental agents of capitalism, in the context of a 
particular stage in the development of the world market.  This will be combined with 
sectoral measures which build upon the understanding of subordinate financialisation 
developed in chapter five. 
Looking first at firms, their financialisation is indicated by a rising share of 
financial relative to non-financial assets.  Due to data limitations22 it is impossible to 
examine stock figures for non-financial corporations (NFC) as a sector.  However, 
figure 6.14 makes use of the flows data which is available, plotting the net 
acquisition of financial assets to gross fixed capital formation23.  Interpretation of 
this trend should be done with caution; increasing (decreasing) flows might, for 
example, be a corrective to historically low (high) stocks of financial assets, or 
constitute a purely cyclical phenomenon.  The ratio for Mexican non-financial 
corporations’ rises markedly between 2000 and 2009, outpacing that of the other 
countries in the sample.  Firms in Thailand and Korea appear to be increasing their 
relative acquisition of financial assets once again, following a decline in the period 
after the Asian financial crisis of 1997-8.  South African firms appear to be acquiring 
less financial assets relative to fixed assets over the period for which data are 
available. 
 
                                                
22 With the exception of Korea, none of the sample of emerging capitalist economies makes sectoral 
national accounts data available in stocks. In discussions with the author, officials of INEGI, the 
Mexican statistical office, revealed that plans were under way to do so, perhaps allowing such 
analysis at a future date.  Within the Mexican literature, Loría and de Jesús (2007) have estimated 
aggregate capital stocks.  In discussions with the author, they revealed that they had updated this 
series to 2009, but had not disaggregated, either between the public and private sector, or between 
sectors of the economy. 
23 Flows data is only available for Brazil from 2005 to 2009, and is unavailable for Turkey.  For 
detailed source notes see appendix B. 
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Figure 6.14:  NFC net acquisition of financial assets to gross fixed capital formation 
 
 
Figure 6.15 disaggregates the picture of Mexican NFC financial asset flows.  
In the 1990s, flows of firms’ financial assets were dominated by ‘other’ assets (loans, 
commercial advances and other accounts receivable), in other words trade credit, and 
deposits.  This lending to other firms (and micro-enterprises, captured in the 
household data) reflects the second stage of the development of the intra-firm capital 
market in the wake of the banking collapse of 199424.  In contrast, from 2001 to 2006 
there was growth in purchases of securities; from 2004 until present, marked 
increases have been seen in purchases of equities and derivatives25.  Deposits have 
been declining in importance throughout. 
 
                                                
24 This issue will be examined in more detail in chapter seven. 
25 Data on derivatives is only available from 2005. 
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Figure 6.15:  Mexican NFC disaggregated assets flows, as a share of GDP26 
Source: INEGI SNA 
 
 
While data on stocks of financial assets is unavailable at the sectoral level, it 
is available for publicly listed firms27.  A note of prudence is warranted in the 
interpretation of listed firm data.  There are only approximately 130 firms which are 
listed on the Mexican stock exchange28.  Despite this, in a highly concentrated 
economy, these firms make up a significant portion of economic activity29.   With 
this caveat, figure 6.16 shows that listed NFC financial assets as a share of net 
property, plant and equipment30 have risen from below 20 per cent to over 40 per 
                                                
26 Disaggregated information on derivatives is only available from 2005 SNA forwards.  ‘Other’ 
contains two line items:  loans and commercial advances, and other accounts receivable/payable other 
than loans and commercial advances. 
27 These calculations have used data from Bureau Van Dijk’s Orbis database of company data.  This 
database allows for aggregate calculations of line items, with the restriction that only the prior decade 
of data are available.  In view of the limitations of this database, the analysis in chapter eight will 
pursue finer detail using the Economatica database. 
28 The number of publicly listed firms fluctuates over time.  Of the current number, approximately 110 
are non-financial corporations.  More detail on the composition of the Mexican stock exchange is 
provided in chapter eight. 
29 According to INEGI census data, the share of the largest non-financial corporations, defined as 
those with greater than 1000 employees, in total gross fixed capital formation has risen from 46 per 
cent in 1998 to 51 per cent in 2008.  I am not aware of any data on the share of total gross value-added 
of listed NFCs. 
30 The source is Orbis balance sheet data for industrials.  Financial assets is calculated as the sum of 
cash and short-term investment, investments and investment properties; both short-term and long-term 
receivables have been left out of the sum in order to facilitate interpretation.  Net property, plant and 
equipment is a single line item. 
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cent in the 2000s.  Beneath the aggregate picture is a differentiated sectoral story.  
The ratio has been stagnant in the manufacturing sector, volatile in the construction 
sector, but rising in the services sector31. 
 
 
Figure 6.16:  Listed Mexican NFC financial assets to net PPE (stocks) 
Source: Orbis, author’s calculation 
 
 
On the liability side of the balance sheet, NFC financialisation in high-
income countries has been associated with an increasing reliance on market-based 
financing.  Again, for reasons outlined above, at the sectoral level the picture is 
restricted to flows data.  Figure 6.17 shows that, compared to other emerging 
capitalist countries, Mexican firms appear to have little reliance on loans 32 , 
particularly in the last decade.  
 
                                                
31 Author’s calculation using the Orbis database. 
32 For detailed source notes see Appendix B. 
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Figure 6.17:  NFC net incurrence of loans (short- and long-term) to total liabilities 
 
 
Figure 6.18 disaggregates flows of Mexican NFC financial liabilities, 
providing further evidence that loans have not constituted a key source of financing 
during the period.  In the 1990s, equities and loans constitute the dominant, though 
declining, sources of external funds; at the same time, funds are being used to repay 
trade credit.  From 2001, equities start to grow once again as a source of funds, while 
trade credit turns from a use to a source.  Derivatives data only become available 
from 2005.  It is important to remember that this data only captures external 
financing.  Levy (2012), using System of National Accounts data, estimates that 
between 1997 and 2009 internally-generated funds account for nearly 80 per cent of 
gross fixed capital formation of the private non-financial sector.   
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Figure 6.18:  Mexican NFC disaggregated liability flows, as a share of GDP33  
Source:  INEGI SNA 
 
 
Restricting the analysis once again to only Mexican publicly listed firms, 
figure 6.19 shows that the stock of loans as a share of liabilities34 has been falling in 
the last decade, from approximately 30 per cent in the early part of the 2000s to dip 
below 20 per cent in 2009.  Once again, the sub-sector differences appear significant.  
While the importance of loans actually rose in the manufacturing sector between 
2000 and 2007, it fell in the services sector throughout35. 
 
                                                
33 Disaggregated information on derivatives is only available from 2005 SNA forwards.  ‘Other’ 
contains two line items:  loans and commercial advances, and other accounts receivable/payable other 
than loans and commercial advances. 
34 The source is Orbis balance sheet data for industrials.  Loans is calculated as the sum of loans 
(current liabilities) plus bank loans (long-term interest-bearing debt).   
35 Author’s calculation using the Orbis database. 
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Figure 6.19: Mexican listed NFC loans to total liabilities (stocks) 
Source:  Orbis, author’s calculation 
 
 
Is financialisation, characterised by reliance on market-based finance and an 
increase in treasury activities, a profitable strategy for Mexican firms?  On this 
count, one indicator which is available36 suggests that increasing financialisation has 
not led to increased financial income.  Figure 6.20 shows that, on a sectoral level, 
NFC financial income (made up of interest and dividends received plus payments 
from investment income) as a share of gross value added, has fallen from over ten 
per cent in 1994, at the time of the financial bubble related to bank re-privatisation 
and the negotiation of the NAFTA (see figure 6.03 for the related rise in stock 
market capitalisation), to less than two per cent in 2009.   
                                                
36 It would be heroic to assume that all financial income related to the treasury activities of Mexico’s 
major corporations is appearing on the main balance sheet, as opposed to through holding companies 
and special purpose vehicles (Shaxson, 2011). 
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Figure 6.20:  Mexican non-financial corporations’ financial income to gross value-
added 
Source:  INEGI SNA, II.1.2, author’s calculation 
 
 
The increasing financialisation of the balance sheet of Mexican firms, 
alongside declining financial income may be symptomatic of the subordinate nature 
of the financialisation process.  Important to this question is to determine the 
significance of foreign funds to firm financing strategies.  Figure 6.21 relates the 
growing claims of international banks on the Mexican non-bank private sector.  In 
the decade before the signing of the NAFTA in 1994, the non-bank private sector 
accounts for approximately a quarter of the claims of international banks; since that 
time, it accounts for an average of 60 per cent, rising to over 70 per cent after the 
global financial crisis in 2007. 
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Figure 6.21:  Total consolidated claims of international banks on Mexico  (mns 
USD) 
Source: Bank for International Settlements (BIS) table 9A: consolidated claims of 
reporting banks – immediate borrower basis 
 
 
National accounts data does not permit the examination of the sourcing of 
finance from abroad at the sectoral level.  Central bank data does however provide 
data on ‘external financing’ of the private non-financial sector (including 
households) in its picture of total financing of the private sector37.  Figure 6.22 
makes it clear that, while the role of development banks and debt securities has 
remained relatively less important, the role of external financing has been increasing 
in importance, nearly overtaking commercial bank lending in the period 2001 to 
200338.  It will become clear in the next section that much of the growth in 
commercial bank financing of the private non-financial sector since 2004 has been 
due to an increase in the financing of households and commercial real estate. 
 
                                                
37 State funds for housing (Infonavit and Fovisste) are excluded from the analysis here since it can be 
assumed that these funds went to households. 
38 Financing from non-bank financial institutions in figure 6.22 also grows at a much slower pace than 
that of external financing.  A considerable, though unspecifiable, portion of NBFI financing is for the 
household sector.  These data do not consider equity financing. 
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Figure 6.22: Financing of the private non-financial sector (bns of pesos) 
Source:  Bank of Mexico 
 
 
In sum, the absence of stocks data in sectoral national accounts renders cross-
country comparisons of the financialisation of the non-financial corporation difficult.  
From the information available, it appears that over the last decade Mexican firms’ 
turn away from bank loans as a source of external finance and towards investment in 
financial assets has been a relatively strong one.  The combination of balance sheet 
financialisation and falling financial income may be a symptom of subordinate 
financialisation.  Foreign financing has become increasingly important to Mexican 
firms, and the demands this has placed on the balance sheet in the form of 
derivatives’ use are of consequence to the particular nature of financialisation in a 
subordinate economy. 
 
6.3.3	  	  The	  banking	  sector	  
 
Within the financial sector the focus will be on commercial bank behaviour for two 
reasons.  First, as made clear in figure 6.22, commercial bank lending remains the 
most important external source of financing for the private sector.  Second, while the 
0	  
200	  
400	  
600	  
800	  
1,000	  
1,200	  
1,400	  
1,600	  
1,800	  
19
96
	  
19
97
	  
19
98
	  
19
99
	  
20
00
	  
20
01
	  
20
02
	  
20
03
	  
20
04
	  
20
05
	  
20
06
	  
20
07
	  
20
08
	  
20
09
	  
20
10
	  
External	   Commercial	  bank	   Dvlpmt	  banks	  
NBFIs	   Debt	  securipes	  
Chapter	  6	  	  Financialisation	  in	  emerging	  capitalist	  economies	  
 
176 
 
rise of non-bank financial institutions is a critical part of the financialisation story, 
the focus in this research is on the transformation of the bank-firm relationship.   
Beginning then on the liability side of the balance sheet, the last decade has 
witnessed a modest decline in the share of deposits in total liabilities39.  Differences 
in cross-country categorisation present great difficulties in any attempt to precisely 
disaggregate the nature of these deposits.  It appears that Mexican and Korean banks 
are less reliant on deposits than banks in the other countries. 
 
 
Figure 6.23: Banks’ deposits to total liabilities 
 
 
The Mexican bank regulatory agency (CNBV) provides a more detailed 
picture of the changing balance sheet of ‘multiple banks’40.  Figure 6.24 illustrates 
the increasing importance of operations with securities and derivatives, and a 
reversal in the relative importance of term deposits as against demand deposits. 
 
                                                
39 For source notes, see Appendix B. 
40 The term ‘multiple banks’ is used in Mexico to denote commercial banks which are allowed to 
carry out the multiple functions of retail, commercial, and investment banking.  This resulted from the 
merger of what had been separate deposit banks, financial companies and mortgage companies before 
the banking law was amended in 1976 (Turrent, n.d.). 
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Figure 6.24:  Multiple banks’ liabilities 
Source:  CNBV 
 
 
An indicator of the nature of the relationship to international capital in the 
banking sector is the balance between domestically and internationally-sourced 
funding.  However, interpreting this balance is by no means straightforward.  A 
country whose banks assume more local currency liabilities than they invest in local 
currency assets might be judged to be subordinate.  In other words, domestic 
resources are being invested abroad rather than at home.  On the other hand, equal 
consideration has to be given to the possibility that a country whose banks take on 
less local currency liabilities than they make local currency claims, and are therefore 
reliant on foreign funds, could be judged subordinate due to its increased 
vulnerability.  In the Mexican case, figure 6.25 reveals that, while local currency 
liabilities of BIS-reporting banks equaled claims throughout the 1980s and 1990s 
(not pictured in the graph), in the 2000s there has been a growing gap between local 
currency claims and liabilities, with the former outstripping the latter.  This suggests 
that as international banks have increased their presence in Mexico since the late 
1990s41, the country has become increasingly reliant on foreign funds.  
 
                                                
41 The entry and impact of foreign banks will be discussed at length in chapter seven. 
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Figure 6.25:  Local currency claims less local currency liabilities (mns USD) 
Source: BIS consolidated table 9A 
 
 
Turning to the asset side of banks’ balance sheets, the share of lending to 
non-financial corporations in total assets has been stagnating or falling, with the 
exception of Turkey42.  Limited time series availability makes an analysis of 
historical trends difficult.  The level of non-financial corporate lending, at 
approximately 25 per cent for all but Thailand, is higher than that seen for advanced 
capitalist economies in chapter four, where such lending has fallen to approximately 
ten per cent of total assets, with the exception of Japan. 
 
                                                
42 For source notes, see Appendix B. 
0	  
10000	  
20000	  
30000	  
40000	  
50000	  
60000	  
70000	  
20
00
	  
20
01
	  
20
02
	  
20
03
	  
20
04
	  
20
05
	  
20
06
	  
20
07
	  
20
08
	  
20
09
	  
20
10
	  
Chapter	  6	  	  Financialisation	  in	  emerging	  capitalist	  economies	  
 
179 
 
 
Figure 6.26: Banks’ loans to non-financial corporations to total assets 
 
 
The asset side of the Mexican multiple banks’ balance sheet has been fairly 
stable over the past decade.  Total loans has hovered at around 40 per cent of total 
assets, while investment securities rose from 30 to 35 per cent by mid-decade before 
returning to their previous share.  Cash, derivatives and other assets all hover at 
about ten per cent each of total liabilities.  This contrasts with the picture developed 
in chapter four of banks in advanced capitalist countries, where loans are becoming a 
less significant part of banks’ asset portfolios. 
More dramatic however are the transformations which have occurred in the 
make-up of banks’ loan portfolios (figure 6.27).  Lending to the government has 
fallen from 25 to less than five per cent of total assets.  The corresponding increases 
have come from lending to consumers and non-financial corporations.  Consumer 
loans rose from two per cent to top ten per cent in 2008 before falling back slightly 
in the face of the global financial crisis.  Lending to non-financial corporations had 
been hovering at around 12 per cent of total assets until the crisis saw it rise to 
approximately 17 per cent43.   
 
                                                
43 The difference in the level of lending to non-financial corporations between figures 6.26 and 6.27 is 
due to different institutional categories in use by the Bank of Mexico (commercial banks, which 
includes specialised banks) and CNBV (multiple banks).  Figure 6.27 also limits the analysis to the 
performing loan portfolio. 
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Figure 6.27:  Performing loans by recipient to total assets 
Source: CNBV 
 
 
While the shifting shares within the banks’ balance sheet are an important 
part of the banking story, it is equally important to have a picture of the changes in 
the magnitude of lending relative to the size of the economy.  Figure 6.28 reinforces 
earlier arguments about the under-financed character of the Mexican economy; it 
shows that, in real terms, the decline in lending to the private non-financial corporate 
(PNFC) sector has been dramatic, from over 20 per cent of GDP in the mid-1990s to 
below five per cent in 2006.  Lending for housing has started to recover from its 
lowest level in 2004, while consumer lending has risen sharply over the past decade, 
reaching nearly five per cent of GDP in 2007.  Loans to other financial corporations 
have remained a small part of the Mexican commercial bank portfolio.  
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Figure 6.28:  Commercial bank lending as a share of GDP 
Source:  Bank of Mexico CF29 and author’s calculation 
 
 
In figure 6.28, there appears to be a slight recovery in commercial bank 
lending to the private non-financial corporate (PNFC) sector from 2006.  Detailed 
examination of this increased activity in the last half-decade reveals that the growth 
has been in services and industry, but not agriculture44.  The growth in lending to 
industry has been partly due to increased lending for manufacturing, particularly 
‘food and beverages’ and ‘machinery and equipment’, but has been largely due to an 
increase in lending to the construction industry.  The latter has been particularly for 
the construction of non-residential buildings.  In the services sector, the biggest 
increases in the past five years have been witnessed in the commerce, social and real 
estate sub-sectors.  The significant presence of construction and real estate lending 
suggests caution before interpreting this recent increase in PNFC lending as a return 
to lending for production. 
During the last decade, interest income has fairly consistently made up 80 per 
cent of total income, with a rise in the share of fees and commissions from below ten 
to nearly 20 per cent, before falling back to 17 per cent45.  Within the figure for total 
interest income, the share from consumer lending has risen from less than ten per 
                                                
44 This analysis comes from Bank of Mexico table CF29, commercial bank credit by activity of 
borrower. 
45 This analysis comes from CNBV historical series on multiple banks. 
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cent at the start of the decade to over 50 per cent by 2007 (figure 6.29).  This is 
reminiscent of trends visited in high-income countries in chapter four.  During this 
time interest income from lending to government has fallen drastically, while that 
from lending to non-financial corporations has hovered around 30 per cent. 
 
 
Figure 6.29:  Share of total interest income 
Source:  CNBV multiple bank historical series 
 
 
Banks’ net interest margin, calculated as net interest revenue as a share of 
interest-bearing (total earning) assets in Mexico rose from five to ten per cent 
between 1997 and 2007 before falling in the face of the recent crisis (figure 6.30).  
The levels enjoyed by the Mexican banks are higher than those found in South 
Africa, Thailand and Korea, but less than those in Brazil and Turkey.   
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Figure 6.30:  Net interest margin 
Source: World Bank financial structure database, from Fitch’s Bankscope database 
 
 
It is not surprising then that bank profitability, measured in terms of return on 
equity, rose steadily from below 10 per cent in the late 1990s to peak at over 20 per 
cent in the years before the global financial crisis46.  Foreign-owned banks’ profit 
remittances – where these profits have been made increasingly through consumer 
lending – represent a transfer of workers’ wages abroad.  This has become an 
increasingly high-profile issue in Mexico, particularly in the run-up to the elections 
of 2012.  Between 2007 and 2011, bank regulator CNBV revealed that the five major 
foreign-owned banks in Mexico47 paid out dividends to their largely foreign-based 
shareholders equivalent to half the profits of the entire banking sector for the period 
(Amador, 2012b).   
As will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter, the risks of profit 
repatriation posed by the presence of foreign-owned banks have not escaped 
Mexican authorities.  Increasingly stringent restrictions on ‘related lending’ have 
been imposed, ostensibly to avoid the repatriation of capital in the form of loans 
made to the parent corporate group.  This has had the side effect, intended or not, of 
making it more difficult for smaller Mexican banks with higher ‘related’ loan 
                                                
46 CNBV multiple bank historical series. 
47 BBVA Bancomer, Banamex (Citigroup), Santander, HSBC and Scotiabank 
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portfolios to compete with the larger foreign-owned banks (Comision Federal de 
Competencia, 2007).  
Finally, the importance of the increase in the use of derivatives deserves 
further attention.  While the previously cited CNBV data on liabilities (figure 6.24) 
reflect net derivative positions, Banco de México offers data on gross positions.  By 
this measure, commercial bank holdings of derivatives have risen from 
insignificance in the late 1990s to exceed 15 trillion pesos in January 2008, or nearly 
eight times the level of outstanding loans.  The big growth has been in peso-
denominated futures, and foreign currency-denominated forwards and swaps (figures 
6.31 and 6.32).  It is safe to assume that the former is predominantly interest rate 
futures48; however it is more difficult by design to ascertain the nature and purpose 
of the over-the-counter instruments.   
 
 
Figure 6.31:  Commercial banks’ domestically-denominated derivatives, assets (bns 
pesos)  
Source:  Bank of Mexico CF124 
 
 
                                                
48 According to the August 2011 monthly statistical report of MexDer, some 78 per cent of futures by 
(accrued annual) value, and some 85 per cent by volume, were interest rate futures. 
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Figure 6.32:  Commercial banks’ foreign-currency derivatives, assets (bns pesos) 
Source:  Bank of Mexico CF124 
 
To summarise the position of Mexican banks, it is clear that they have 
become increasingly reliant on short-term and foreign funding.  Relative to banks in 
other emerging capitalist economies, Mexican banks appear more reliant on market-
based funding, and have a low-level of commitment to lending to non-financial 
corporate activities.  On the asset side, while loans have retained a constant share, 
they have shifted towards lending to households.  This has proven a profitable 
strategy for the banks.  González (2009) notes similar trends, highlighting the 
growing disconnect between financial activity and productive intermediation.  The 
subordinate nature of the financialisation of Mexican banks relates to sizeable profit 
remittances to foreign shareholders, increasing reliance on foreign funds, and the 
concomitant engagement with derivatives related to both hedging and to the 
speculative exploitation of currency and interest rate movements.   
 
6.4.4	  	  The	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  sector	  
 
In chapter four, it was shown that in advanced capitalist economies (with some 
important differences noted in Germany and Japan), financialisation has been 
characterised by rising levels of household indebtedness, and an increasing 
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engagement of households with market-based finance.  In chapter five, it was 
suggested that in states of the periphery, where average incomes are lower, 
household indebtedness would have a reduced reach and therefore accordingly 
smaller impact on a macroeconomic scale.  It was argued that a distinctive element 
marking a subordinate relationship to international capital would be an outflow, or 
volatile flows, of household savings across borders, both as bank deposits and 
market-based investments.  
First, in terms of household indebtedness relative to income, Mexico appears 
less financialised than its peer group.  Household liabilities as a share of household 
gross disposable income (figure 6.3349) fall from a level of over 20 per cent in the 
wake of the re-privatisation of the banking sector and its ensuing credit expansion, to 
reach their nadir of 12 per cent in 2000 as banks cut back lending in an effort to 
repair their balance sheets.  Since that time, with the sale of the commercial banking 
sector to foreign banks and the expansion of non-bank financial institutions, the 
figure has risen again to approach 20 per cent.  Nonetheless, even this level is lower 
than the rest of the sample of emerging market economies, especially Korea and 
South Africa, countries whose level of household indebtedness, at 140 and 80 per 
cent of GDP respectively, is approaching that of the more financialised advanced 
economies, Great Britain and the United States.    
 
Figure 6.33: Household indebtedness to gross disposable income 
                                                
49 For source notes, see Appendix B. 
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Since the incurrence of liabilities is by definition matched by the acquisition 
of assets, more insight on the risks of increased vulnerability posed by increased 
indebtedness should be sought from the household debt-servicing picture.  However, 
in the Mexican case, this is not straightforward.  From national accounts data, 
household interest expense as a share of household GDI peaks at 12 per cent in 1996 
then falls to hover between one and just over two per cent. While the higher level in 
1996 aligns with the expansion of lending which took place in the early 1990s 
following bank re-privatisation, the lower level in recent years contradicts other 
accounts of the rising burden of consumer debt.  For example, a report by Mexico’s 
largest commercial bank BBVA Bancomer finds that servicing of consumption and 
mortgage debt has risen from 6.7 per cent of salaries and wages in 2000 to a peak of 
18.8 per cent in 2008 (Amador, 2012a).   
In the Bank of Mexico’s 2011 annual report on the financial system (2010, p. 
99), household debt service is defined as payment of interest and commissions paid 
by households to commercial banks for consumer credit, and by households to 
commercial banks and state mortgage provider Infonavit for housing credit; this 
excludes the rapidly-expanding non-bank financial institutions, either single or multi-
purpose (so-called Sofoles and Sofomes will be discussed in chapter seven).  The 
result is that the debt service ratio is very low, below 2.5 per cent, in line with the 
national accounts data.  Yet previous years of this same report show the debt-service 
ratio rising from just over two per cent in 2002 to over five per cent in 2006, to over 
seven per cent in 2007.  Then the 2008 report states that “… inferences from the 
household survey point to an important increase in household debt service as a share 
of their income” (2008, p. 130). In the most recent reports, the figure for 2007 has 
dropped back down from over seven per cent in the 2007 report to just over two per 
cent50. 
The evidence presented of increasing indebtedness in the 2000s and rising 
debt-servicing ratios should be placed in the context of what has happened to the 
wage share.  Figure 6.34 shows that in the years since the signing of the NAFTA in 
1994, the share of the remuneration of salaried workers in net value added has fallen 
                                                
50 Requests for further explanation of this inconsistency with both personal contacts at Bank of 
Mexico as well as via its official information service have gone unanswered. 
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nearly 30 per cent; from 43 per cent in 1993 to 31 per cent in recent years51.  As 
documented by Lapavitsas (2013), this declining trend in the wage share is a feature 
common to the period of financialisation across many of the advanced capitalist 
economies. 
 
 
Figure 6.34:  Remuneration of Mexican salaried workers in net value added 
Source:  INEGI SNA 
 
 
While national accounts data on the stocks of household liabilities52 and 
assets are unavailable, insight can be gleaned from the net flows of sources and uses.  
On the sources side, it appears that households are becoming increasingly reliant on 
short-term relative to long-term loans53 (figure 6.35).  This resonates with the 
previously noted rise in banks’ consumer lending (figure 6.27).  However, loans are a 
less significant source of funding than other accounts payable54 (figure 6.36).  This 
                                                
51 Palma (2011), piecing together data over different SNA, contends that Mexican wages and salaries 
(without employers’ social contributions, which are included above) fell from a peak of just below 40 
per cent in 1976 to below 20 per cent by 2000.  While productivity rose during that period, real wages 
fell.  
52 The data on stocks of Mexican household liabilities used in figure 6.33 come from central bank data 
(CF297) on total financing to the private sector, disaggregated by sector (households’ total financing 
SF42790). 
53 The standard definitions of loan maturity apply here, namely short-term loans are for one year or 
less, while long-term loans are those granted for greater than one year. 
54 ‘Other accounts payable’ is made up of both commercial loans and advances and other items 
receivable or payable.  The second category is related to dividends, the purchase and sale of securities, 
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may reflect, first, family and micro-enterprises (which are captured in the household 
rather than the non-financial corporate sector) taking on trade credit, and, second, 
salary advances.  This figure has started to grow once again during the current crisis.   
 
 
Figure 6.35: Household short-term loans to total new loans55 
Source: INEGI SNA 
 
 
On the asset side, flows in to deposits are falling while those into market-
based assets are rising, suggesting increasing engagement with open financial 
markets.  While at first glance it might appear that households are becoming less 
financialised since flows in to equities are falling, this conclusion hinges on the 
portfolios of pension funds, which have risen from a negligible share of uses before 
2001 to between 40 and 50 per cent of uses between 2003 and 2008.  With the 
increasing liberalisation of pension fund contributions, starting with the switch to a 
private defined-contribution scheme in 1997, the composition of Mexican pension 
funds has shifted from government bonds to increasing shares of private bonds, 
equities and more recently commodities markets (V. Cardoso, 2013b). 
                                                                                                                                     
income, wages and salaries; it also includes non-capitalised interest and various reserves for labour 
obligations (INEGI, n.d.). 
55 During years when long-term loans are, in net terms, being repaid, the ratio of short-term loans to 
total new loans is one.  Conversely, during years where short-term loans are, in net terms, being 
repaid, the ratio of short-term loans to total new loans is zero. 
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Figure 6.36: Mexican household sources of funding (bns pesos) 
Source: INEGI SNA 
 
 
 Further insight into financial incomes and outlay can be extracted from 
analysis of household survey data which allows disaggregation by income decile56.  
This shows that for the bottom five deciles, ‘irregular money transfers coming from 
other households’, or remittances, represents approximately 40 per cent of financial 
incomes.  For the top five deciles, these transfers represent just 25 per cent of 
financial incomes, with greater shares coming from savings withdrawal, loans and 
other financial sources.  On the outlay side, for the bottom five deciles between ten 
and 70 per cent are accounted for by ‘losses in household business’.  For the upper 
five deciles, home business losses are less than ten per cent, with the bulk of their 
financial outlays accounted for by making deposits and other financial contributions, 
as well as by credit card servicing.  What this survey data illustrate is the limited 
access of the marginalised sections of Mexican society to the formal financial sector; 
what financialisation of the household is occurring is predominantly happening at the 
middle and upper ends of the income scale. 
Finally, balance of payments figures give some idea of the movement of 
household savings across borders, an indicator of subordinate financialisation 
                                                
56 Source is author’s analysis of the INEGI national household survey of income and expenditure 
2010. 
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discussed in chapter five.  Figure 6.13 captured both the volatility and the recent 
sharp increase in deposits held abroad over the last decade.  While it is impossible to 
disentangle deposits of the corporate sector from the household sector, it seems 
reasonable to assume that a significant portion of this flow represents household 
savings since deposits have become an insignificant asset flow for corporations (see 
figure 6.15). 
 In summary, from a macroeconomic perspective, the burden of household 
indebtedness does not appear to support the thesis of financialisation.  Nonetheless, 
there is evidence of tendencies which are common to financialisation in advanced 
countries, but transformed through the institutional specificities of the Mexican 
economy.  Indebtedness and debt-servicing appear to be rising significantly in the 
last decade.  This has happened in the context of a falling wage share.  Households 
are increasingly turning towards short-term debt, likely credit card debt, and are 
investing in open-market assets through their pension funds.  These phenomena 
appear to be concentrated in the middle and upper ranges of the income distribution.  
These transformations, which might be characterised as constituting subordinate 
financialisation, are accompanied by an increase in the cross-border flow of 
household savings. 
 
6.4	  	  CONCLUSION	  
 
Wrapping up this chapter, it was first established that Mexico is under-financed by 
standard measures.  Mexico’s ‘financial depth’, as well as levels of both bank-based 
‘productive’ lending and market-based finance, both equities and bonds, are under-
developed relative to its peer group.  On the surface, this undermines any assertions 
that the country is already financialised, or even that it is financialising.     
 The next task was to examine the evidence of financialisation at both the 
macro and sectoral levels, testing both the indicators of financialisation developed in 
relation to advanced capitalist economies in chapters three and four, which attempt to 
capture changes in the behaviour of and relationship between the central agents of a 
capitalist economy, and to operationalise measures which would reflect the 
understanding of subordinate financialisation elaborated in chapter five.   
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At the macro level, while Mexico exhibits a small financial sector ‘footprint’, 
its financial corporations account for a large and rapidly increasing share of after-tax 
profits. Domestic firms do not appear to be spending greater amounts on 
commissions and fees paid to foreign banks, though this may be mediated by the 
actions of foreign-owned domestic banks. Dividends paid abroad are growing, but 
are still outstripped by reinvested earnings, leaving open the question of overall 
impact. The volatility and nature of foreign capital inflows, and outflows of domestic 
savings clearly reflect Mexico’s subordinate position in the hierarchy of global 
finance.  
At the sectoral level, flows data suggest that Mexican non-financial 
corporations are acquiring financial assets at a pace which outstrips other countries in 
the survey over the past decade.  From the evidence of publicly-listed firms, financial 
assets are growing in relative importance as are market-based liabilities.  It was 
suggested that the lack of evidence that these changes in firm strategy have led to 
increasing financial incomes may be symptomatic of subordinate financialisation.  
Foreign financing has become increasingly important to Mexican firms, and this has 
been the catalyst for a rapid rise in the use of derivatives.  Relative to banks in other 
countries surveyed, Mexican banks appear more reliant on market-based funding, 
and have a low-level of commitment to lending to non-financial corporate activities.  
Lending has shifted to households, proving highly lucrative. Sizeable profit 
remittances to foreign shareholders, increasing reliance on foreign funds, and 
engagement with derivatives are indicative of the subordinate nature of the banks’ 
financialisation.  Finally, in the household sector, the picture reflected, however less 
strongly, those changes witnessed in advanced capitalist countries; namely increased 
borrowing (particularly of a short-term nature) and investment in market-based 
assets.  This change in behaviour is concentrated in the middle and upper income 
groups, and has occurred in the face of a declining wage share. 
Based on this evidence, I argue that Mexico represents a case of subordinate 
financialisation; that is, an uneven combination of the transformations which 
characterise inter-sectoral relations in a new epoch of capitalism, whose distinctive 
characteristics emerge from Mexico’s subordinate status in the hierarchy of the 
world market.  In the following chapter, in order to better understand the historical 
and institutional roots of these distinctive characteristics, I examine the political 
Chapter	  6	  	  Financialisation	  in	  emerging	  capitalist	  economies	  
 
193 
 
economy of Mexican bank-firm relations in the context of a subordinate relationship 
to international capital. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter	  7	  	  
	  Bank-­‐firm	  relations	  and	  subordinate	  
financialisation	  in	  Mexico	  
 
 
7.1	  	  INTRODUCTION	  	  
 
In the previous chapter, the sectoral transformations reflecting a subordinate form of 
financialisation in Mexico were documented.  It was argued that the fact that Mexico 
is under-financed by conventional measures should be viewed as consistent with this 
process, rather than in contradiction to it.  However, understanding why the process 
of subordinate financialisation has taken the particular form that it has in the 
Mexican context demands detailed historical class analysis.  Towards this objective, 
this chapter will focus on the post-war evolution of the relationship between Mexican 
banks and firms; a relationship of decisive importance to accumulation.   
Rather than characterising financial capitalists as a rentier class parasitic on 
the productive activities of industrial capital, I will establish that, depending on the 
social formation and opportunities for profit-making, fractions of the capitalist class 
have variously opposed, allied or merged into one another.  The boundaries of a 
fraction may change spatially, both within and across borders, or become porous as 
different institutional forms engage with different forms of capital.  All of these 
inter-relationships are reflected in the form and actions of the state, the primary 
location for the reproduction of social relations imprinted with its historical 
relationship to the world market.  During critical conjunctures, Mexican bank-firm 
relationships and behaviours became oriented in ways which, in the contemporary 
period, are facilitating the subordinate financialisation of the development trajectory.   
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In what follows, the evolution of bank-firm relations is divided into four 
periods1.  The first period to be examined, running from the late 1970s until the late 
1980s, marks the break-up of historic bank-firm relations that were established 
during the post-war era of state-led industrial policy.  Bank nationalisation, carried 
out by a state under increasing financial pressures, served to facilitate a shift into an 
accumulation regime based on the exploitation of public fictitious capital, rather than 
on the reinvigoration of private fixed investment.  Non-bank financial institutions 
seized the opportunity to capture pivotal positions in both private credit 
intermediation and public debt issuance.  These events were given impetus by 
Mexico’s increasing integration into the world market.  Export-oriented domestic 
capital, allied with foreign financial capital began to exert a dominant influence on 
state structures, policy and personnel.   
The second period, covering the lead-up to and fallout from bank re-
privatisation, marks a failed attempt to re-build bank-firm relations around arms-
length lending from the newly privatised banks.  This period saw Mexico’s formal 
integration into the world market, exhibited by aggressive financial liberalisation and 
the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  The regime of 
accumulation based on public fictitious capital in the previous period switched to one 
based on private fictitious capital, fed by high levels of foreign capital inflows and 
loose credit conditions.  The interdependence of the state and the new class of 
domestic financial capital was revealed by the extremely favourable terms of the 
bank bailout in 1994-5. 
After the peso crisis, banks returned to their previous role as backers of the 
public purse, only this time under private ownership.  Lending to the private 
corporate sector fell precipitously, though new institutions were introduced to 
maintain credit to households.  The turn of large firms to international sources of 
finance matched an increasing internationalisation of their revenue streams.  The 
resultant exchange rate and interest rate risk, a fact of Mexico’s subordinate place in 
the hierarchy of world money, required increasingly sophisticated hedging strategies.  
An internal capital market developed to facilitate access to credit for firms without 
                                                
1 This periodisation should not be understood in the sense of stages in the development of Mexican 
capitalism, but instead as denoting important conjunctural changes in bank-firm relationships, the lens 
through which the analysis is conducted in this chapter. 
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access to international capital markets.  The political elite of the Mexican state 
consolidated the process of world market integration through continued privatisation, 
and liberalisation of trade and finance.  Accumulation was now dependent on foreign 
capital-fuelled exports.    
The final period, covering the last decade, is distinguished by the 
‘extranjerización’ of the Mexican banking system, that is the purchase of Mexican 
banks by foreign capital, and an increasing orientation of firms towards market-based 
and foreign financing.  The business model of the banking sector has shifted towards 
household credit provision.  Trapped by the need to both maintain capital inflows 
and allow preferred conglomerates to meet their dollar liabilities, the Mexican state 
has defended an over-valued exchange rate through sterilisation operations and high 
real interest rates.  As a result, even as the central government’s primary deficit has 
been eliminated, debt issuance has continued to grow.  Large firms have become 
balance sheet managers, with an increasing focus on the contribution of treasury 
activities’ to the bottom line.  Banking on the state’s commitment to a stable 
exchange rate, a number of big firms engaged in increasingly speculative use of 
derivative instruments.  When the peso finally fell in the wake of the global financial 
crisis and the ensuing capital flight, state managers would once again be called upon 
to rescue those who were unable to cover their positions. 
While the focus of this chapter is on intra-class dynamics, the struggle 
between capital and labour provides the broader context.  After the post-war period 
of rising wages2, Mexico’s working and peasant classes have suffered a prolonged 
period of weakened influence.  Wage share has fallen significantly3, with real wages 
eroded by over 70 per cent between 1980 and 2000 (Watt & Zepeda, 2012, p. 163).  
This has contributed to rising informality4, out-migration5 and the growth of the 
                                                
2 Moreno-Brid and Ros (2009) describe the period from 1940 to 1970 in Mexico as the ‘Golden Era of 
Industrialisation’. 
3 System of national accounts records beginning in 1993, show the share of wages (including social 
contributions) falling as a share of net value-added from 43 per cent to 31 per cent in 2010 (see figure 
6.34, chapter six). 
4 Analysis of INEGI employment survey data (2010) suggests that over half of the working age 
population is excluded from the formal labour market, a figure which has been steadily rising since 
2000. 
5 Between 1970 and 2005, the number of migrants from Mexico to the US increased by over 700 per 
cent, surpassing ten per cent of Mexico’s population by 2005 (Hanson & McIntosh, 2010). 
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narco-economy6.  Organised discontent has thus far been successfully silenced.  The 
Zapatista uprising in 1994, in response to the abolishment of the ‘ejido’ (common) 
system of communal land tenure was violently crushed; organised labour has, for the 
most part, been co-opted into the power structures of the ruling party (Cockcroft, 
1998).  The weakness of the working class is a critical factor in the alignment of the 
Mexican state with the imperatives of international financial capital.  
 
7.2	  	  THE	  ROAD	  TO	  BANK	  NATIONALISATION	  
 
The post-revolutionary period7 witnessed the formation of financial-industrial groups 
in Mexico (Basave, 1996, 2001; Moreno-Brid & Ros, 2009; Vidal, 2000).  Distinct 
from the relationship that existed in Hilferding’s (1981) 19th century Germany, many 
banks were established by industrial firms to serve the financial needs of their group.  
Initially these groups were tightly restrained by the state, thereby ensuring that both 
the externally (internationally) and internally (domestically) -oriented financial 
circuits were under public control through the operations of the central bank and 
various state development banks.  The former had interests linked to foreign bank 
capital, while the latter served ‘hacendados’ (landowners), ‘latifundistas’ (large 
estate owners), and regional industrial, commercial and mining interests served by 
state banks (White, 1992, p. 21).  This first era of state-led capitalism supported the 
socialisation of the forces of production essential to overcoming belated 
development. 
Private finance capital of this era was divided into three factions: the export-
oriented financial faction based in Monterrey (the ‘Northern’ faction); the powerful 
‘Central’ faction which included the largest banks as well as the Association of 
Mexican Bankers, tightly enmeshed with the state apparatus itself; and the internally-
oriented group nurtured by the developmentalism initiated by the left-of-centre 
regime of Lázaro Cárdenas in the 1930s which became dominate in the subsequent 
                                                
6 Conservative estimates put the size of the wholesale drug market at $50 billion per year in 2008 
(Watt & Zepeda, 2012, p. 168). 
7 The Mexican revolution is generally dated from 1910 to approximately 1920; however, for the 
purposes here, the post-revolutionary period refers to the period after the end of outbreaks of warfare 
in the 1920s and the consolidation of power of the ‘Partido Revolucionario Institucional’, or PRI, in 
1929 (then the ‘Partido Nacional Revolucionario’). 
Chapter	  7	  	  Bank-­‐firm	  relations	  and	  subordinate	  financialisation	  
 
198 
 
decade (the ‘Forty’ faction) (White, 1992).  Foreign capital played a growing role, 
instrumental in establishing manufacturing industries, investment infrastructures, and 
state-owned heavy industry (Morton, 2011).  This represented a continuation of the 
prominent role of foreign capital in pre-revolutionary Mexico8. 
What Russell White (1992) describes as the ‘coincidence of interests’ 
between the state and these financial factions would necessarily prove short-lived.  
The growth of the Mexican economy through the ‘stabilising development’ of the 
1950s and 1960s brought with it the expansion of financial capital and the gradual 
privatisation of financial circuits.  The banking system became increasingly 
concentrated and dollarised (Vega Rodríguez, 1999, pp. 120–8).  In 1974, non-bank 
financial institutions (‘las financieras’) were authorised to accept dollar deposits 
(Vega Rodríguez, 1999, p. 134), and in 1976, banks were also allowed to open dollar 
accounts.  Interbank loans allowed the banks ever more room to evade regulations 
and boost liquidity and profitability (White, 1992, p. 65).  Private sector banks’ loan 
portfolios focused on the highly profitable commercial services sector, and levels of 
related lending remained high (White, 1992, p. 105).  Much of the riskier work of 
industrial development was left to the state banks.  In 1982, the public industrial 
development bank, NAFINSA, provided 37.5 per cent of all credit available to the 
manufacturing sector; by comparison, this had fallen to only 10.3 per cent by 1991 
(Cypher & Wise, 2010, p. 40).  
The ruling ‘Partido Revolucionario Institucional’ (PRI) sought to resolve the 
tension between the socialisation of the forces of production and the increasing 
private appropriation of the generated gains, in order to maintain its legitimacy with 
the rural peasantry and growing proletariat.  However it attempted to do so without 
confronting the ruling classes.  The PRI crushed organised political opposition in the 
1960s, culminating in the 1968 massacre of students at the ‘Plaza de las Tres 
Culturas’ in Tlatelolco.  Rural peasant movements were repressed with the 
mobilisation of large numbers of troops into rural areas in the 1970s by the 
administration of Luis Echeverría.  Recognising the danger such movements posed to 
the existing socio-economic order, Echeverría tried to shift moderate amounts of 
income to workers and peasants (Cypher & Wise, 2010, p. 32).  However, efforts to 
                                                
8 For excellent accounts of Mexico’s pre-revolutionary period, see Juan Carlos Moreno-Brid and 
Jaime Ros (2009) and Adam David Morton (2011). 
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match this increased spending with increased taxes on internationally-linked capital 
failed in the face of increased capital mobility (Morton, 2011, p. 115).  With 
expenditure rising, and unable (or unwilling) to increase the tax intake, the state 
became increasingly reliant on international loans, oil revenues (aided by rising 
prices and a major find in 1976), and direct financing instruments.  White (1992, p. 
83) argues that this was a deliberate strategy to increase state financial autonomy in 
relation to domestic financial capital. 
With hindsight, it can be seen that this marked the last major stand of the 
waning influence of domestically-oriented industrial capital (and the ideological 
influence of the structuralist school (Fitzgerald, 2010)) over the policy direction 
taken by the state as Mexico became increasingly integrated into the world market.   
State support for Mexican conglomerates in the 1970s and 1980s had led to the 
domination of about 30 industrial groups (Vidal, 2000, p. 122).  These firms had 
been the main recipients of public support via development banks, but had created 
indirect links to foreign capital through the creation of holding companies.  In 1975, 
the Business Coordinating Council (‘Consejo Coordinador Empresarial’, or CCE) 
was formed.  Based in Monterrey around export-oriented firms and firmly committed 
to a neoliberal outlook, the CCE’s influence rose as that of the domestic industry-
oriented National Chamber of Industry (‘Cámara Nacional de la Industria de 
Transformación’, or Canacintra) fell (Cypher & Wise, 2010, p. 15).  Increasing 
pressure on the state to attract capital in a competitive global economy, meant that 
historical links to a particular group of domestically-oriented capitalists began to 
appear as a hindrance. 
The state’s new funding strategy fell apart when, first, international interest 
rates spiked in the late 1970s triggered by the ‘Volcker shock’9, and then oil prices 
peaked and began to fall in the early 1980s.  This resulted in a dual balance of 
payments and fiscal crisis, with the deficit reaching 16 per cent of GDP in 1982.  
In the lead-up to the 1982 economic crisis, the left-of-centre administration of 
José López Portillo expressed increasing frustration with the behaviour of the private 
banks.  It accused them of engaging in speculation over exchange rate and related 
                                                
9 Paul Volcker, appointed chairman of the US Federal Reserve in 1979, raised the federal funds rate to 
a peak of 20 per cent in 1981, bringing US inflation down from its 1981 peak of 13.5 per cent to 3.2 
per cent in 1983 (Hutchinson, 2008). 
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capital movements, and of lending to non-productive sectors.  Characteristic of 
peripheral capitalism, private appropriation during times of crisis took the form of 
capital outflows.  Capital flight increased from $1.1 billion US in 1979 to 10.9 
billion in 1981.  Of the $60 billion in public debt accumulated up to that point, nearly 
half went to financing capital flight (Buffie, 1989, p. 155).  By 1981, bank profits 
from foreign currency operations had surpassed those from intermediation (Vega 
Rodríguez, 1999, p. 137).  At the same time, interest rate spreads, the gap between 
deposit and lending rates, had risen from 4.6 per cent in 1978 to 14.3 per cent in 
1981 (Vega Rodríguez, 1999, p. 131).  Members of López Portillo’s team talked 
ominously of banks’ ‘social obligations’ (White, 1992, p. 116). 
López Portillo brought in Carlos Tello as head of the central bank on the first 
of September, 1982, ushering in a period which would become known as the ‘ninety 
days’.  Tello, who had served as Secretary of Budget and Planning in the cabinet of 
López Portillo, was a Cambridge-educated economist trained in the structuralist 
tradition.  In the next three months, before handing power over to incoming president 
Miguel de la Madrid, the Mexican banks were nationalised.  Bankers were 
predictably outraged.  However, in truth, due to rising overseas interest rates and 
falling domestic revenues, both commercial and development banks were technically 
bankrupt.  Nationalisation served as a means to socialise the banks’ debts.  Vega 
Rodríguez (1999, p. 151) contends that international financial capital greeted the 
nationalisation favourably.  Happy to work with Mexican private financial capital 
during the preceding economic expansion, with the arrival of crisis, international 
capital’s primary interest lay in recouping its investments.  Nationalisation, and the 
socialisation of the bankers’ losses, represented their best chance of doing so.   
Manuel Espinosa Yglesias, scion of the family that owned Mexico’s largest 
commercial bank, Bancomer, would later remark that he had been surprised that big 
firms had not been more upset by bank nationalisation, since this had cut off their 
sources of related lending10.  However for big firms, the combination of rising 
interest rates, economic crisis and the legacy of unproductive investment meant that 
short-term debts contracted abroad or domestically in foreign currency had become 
                                                
10 Author’s discussion with Dr. Carlos Marichal, Research Professor of Latin American History at El 
Colegio de México, 2 May 2011. 
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unsustainable.  Their self-interest, like that of foreign financiers, was in getting 
bailed out.  
The bailout for the big firms came in 1983, when the Trusts for the Coverage 
of Exchange Rate Risk (‘Fideicomisos de Cobertura de Riesgos Cambiario’, or 
Ficorca) were created.  Under the programme, the Mexican state assumed the 
exchange rate risk both for the principal and interest of loans contracted by Mexican 
firms abroad, and offered new credit in domestic currency at a favourable exchange 
rate in its place (Vidal, 2000, p. 135).  The bailout resulted in a 3.8 billion peso 
financial subsidy, 80 per cent of which went to just 20 private groups.  This public 
subsidy of big capital in a period of crisis would lead to a subsequent boom in 
mergers and acquisitions, as big firms used their windfall to buy up smaller 
competitors (Basave, 2001, pp. 75–81).   
After his inauguration in 1982, president de la Madrid immediately undertook 
a broad programme of neoliberal restructuring known as the ‘Programa Inmediato 
de Reordenación Económica’, or Urgent Programme for Economic Restructuring 
(Teichman, 1992).  Amongst the range of measures taken was the replacement of key 
figures at the central bank and the ministry of finance with those more broadly 
sympathetic to the interests of the private financial sector11.  Expropriated bankers 
were paid in indemnity bonds based on a formula for calculating shareholders’ 
‘adjusted capital’ which was never made public (Vega Rodríguez, 1999, p. 156).  
This gave them a large capital base with which they would acquire brokerages and 
other firms, as well as minority shares in nationalised banks. 
After changes were made to allow formerly individual traders (‘agentes 
bursatiles’) to create brokerage firms, the number of brokerages rose from 31 to 204 
between 1982 and 1987, and the number of clients increased from 66,000 to over 
300,000 (Suárez Dávila, 2005).  These brokerages played a critical role in inflating 
and exploiting the market bubbles of 1984 and 1987.  Private financial capitalists 
tightened their grip on capital markets through their control of these brokerages, as 
                                                
11 This marked the beginning of the dominance of the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit (SHCP) 
and central bank.  Sylvia Maxfield (1990, p. 61) describes this as the rule of the ‘financial coalition’ 
(Ministry of Finance, Banco de Mexico and development banks) over the ‘developmentalist coalition’ 
(natural resource ministries and state-owned enterprises).  Jens Wissel (2011, p. 225) identifies central 
banks and finance ministries more generally as bases of a ‘transnationalised bloc’, from which they 
are able to gain political importance and escape democratic control. 
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well as the acquisition of insurance and leasing companies (and eventually privatised 
pension funds).  The latter so-called non-bank financial institutions, or NBFIs, had 
been quickly re-privatised in 1984.  With these acquisitions, private financial capital, 
with the sanction of the Mexican state "… began to compete for savings and create a 
parallel financial market beyond state control" (Maxfield, 1990, p. 44).  
The PRI exploited bank nationalisation to begin an ambitious project of 
concentration in the sector.  The poorest performers were first liquidated and closed, 
then the remaining banks merged into 18 core banks (Marois, 2012, p. 77).  Banks 
de-dollarised by converting dollar-denominated accounts into pesos (with the 
government absorbing the losses), and the worst excesses of bank profit-making 
were restrained (White, 1992, p. 130).  While reserve levels were lowered12, new 
mandates were put in place to guarantee minimum levels of support for state-owned 
enterprises and the federal government.  Profit from financing government would 
become the new basis of bank profitability.  
As a result of this change in bank orientation, non-financial companies faced 
restrictive credit conditions.  To meet their funding needs, firms turned to the 
brokerages for what became known as ‘operaciones extra-bursatiles’ (or, off-market 
operations)13.  To get around regulations which prohibited them from accepting 
deposits, brokerages simply found firms with surplus cash and directed them to those 
with a cash deficit, collecting fees for their troubles.  Private control over capital 
became more concentrated as these NBFIs "… became the preferred means of 
financing among large capitalists" (MacLeod, 2005, p. 46).   
In another signal of the increasingly important relationship between this 
fraction of financial capitalists and key economic ministries of the state, brokerages 
were given the monopoly over primary auctions and secondary trading of treasury 
certificates known as ‘Cetes’ (‘certificados tesoros’).  Soon the fraction was 
demanding increasingly higher interest rates in order to facilitate the placement of 
these securities in the private capital market (White, 1992, p. 142).  This was a very 
lucrative business.  Government securities made up 90 per cent of the Mexican 
                                                
12 Reserve requirements on domestically-denominated liabilities were removed in 1988; those on 
foreign-denominated liabilities in 1991. 
13 From author’s discussions with Luis Foncerrada, Director General of the ‘Centro de Estudios 
Económicos del Sector Privado’ (CEESP), or Private Sector’s Centre for Economic Studies, 28 April 
2011. 
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securities market at this time.  The rapid rise in issuances, related both to the costs of 
bank nationalisation and to the sums spent on reconstruction following the 
devastating earthquake of 1985 (Levy-Orlik, 2001), drove the Bolsa Mexicana de 
Valores (BMV), or Mexican Stock Exchange, from 676 points in 1982 to 47,101 
points in 1986.  
With the profits earned from off-market lending and securities’ placement, 
the brokerages were able to buy up large shares of Mexican firms.  In this way 
financial-industrial linkages were partially re-built.  Only this time the linkages were 
centred around the brokerages rather than the commercial banks.  The process 
indirectly contributed to the centralisation and concentration of capital by restricting 
the financial access of illiquid private firms.  White (1992, p. 142) describes the 
implications of this shift: “It distorted the productive circuits by creating an artificial 
credit crunch, therein promoting financial liquidity problems and mass bankruptcies.  
It also transformed the accumulation strategy of large firms.  In essence, the entire 
productive apparatus stagnated and the logic of accumulation shifted from 
entrepreneurial productive investments to speculative rentierism."  What became key 
to corporate profitability was no longer the difference between projected profits and 
the real interest rate, but the spread between the interest rate paid on liabilities and 
that earned on assets (Vidal, 2000, p. 137). 
To sum up, this period marked the end of a phase of accumulation which had 
pivoted on the private banks and domestic-oriented production.  Newly nationalised 
banks broke off their relationships with large firms, turning to invest in treasury 
paper in order to help the government ward off fiscal crisis and earn tidy risk-free 
profits in the process.  Old bank-firm relations were partially replaced by relations 
with the non-bank financial intermediaries of private financial capital.  However, 
these new relations, operating through the mechanism of so-called ‘operaciones 
extra-bursatiles’, were based on short-term financial profit rather than long-term 
productive investment relations.  Both financial and non-financial corporations came 
to hold an increasing share of financial assets (dominated by holdings of public 
securities), as accumulation became centred on the exploitation of public fictitious 
capital.  These changes were accompanied by a significant decline in both gross 
fixed capital formation (GFCF) and GDP growth.  GFCF fell from an average of 
nearly 22 per cent of GDP in the decade 1973-1982 to 18 per cent in the decade 
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1983-1992; GDP growth, which had averaged a robust 6.8 per cent per annum in the 
period from 1960 until 1981, fell to an average 1.4 per cent in the ‘lost decade’ from 
1982 to 1991 (see figure 7.01).  
 
 
Figure 7.01:  Growth rates of GDP (per cent, left axis) and Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation (per cent of GDP, right axis) 
Source:  World Bank WDI, series NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG and NE.GDI.FTOT.ZS 
 
 
It is important to observe the role of foreign, especially financial, capital in 
these changes.  US financial capital facilitated the realisation of profits through 
domestic capital flight in the years before the crisis.  Crucially, tight monetary policy 
in the US between 1979 and 1982 was what catalysed the debt crisis.  The Mexican 
state was forced to bail out both banks and non-financial corporations.  Real interest 
rates were driven higher as the state attempted to finance its external debts with a 
massive expansion in domestic securities issuance.  As a result, large liquid 
corporations began both to invest in government securities and borrowed in the US 
to exploit the cross-border interest rate spread.   By the mid-1980s, 42 per cent of 
interest payments by the Mexican state were made to Mexican residents holding 
funds outside the country (Garrido, 1988, p. 29).  All of this is indicative of Mexico’s 
subordinate status in the hierarchy of global finance. 
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7.3	  	  BANK	  RE-­‐PRIVATISATION	  AND	  ITS	  AFTERMATH	  
 
When it came to power in 1988, the administration of president Carlos Salinas 
sought the answer to Mexico’s anaemic growth in further liberalisation.  In the 
financial sector, a series of new laws and constitutional reforms were ushered in 
between 1989 and 1993.   Most importantly for this analysis, these changes saw the 
end of capital controls, the removal of restrictions over banks’ credit allocation, and 
a reduction and eventual elimination of reserve requirements and the liquidity 
coefficient.   
Re-privatisation of the nationalised banks was a stated priority.  The Bank 
Divestment Committee, one of several similar committees devoted to the 
privatisation of state-owned enterprises, was established in September 1990, made up 
of officials of the treasury, central bank and bank supervisory authority, as well as 
representatives of the banks themselves.  The committee also "… relied heavily on 
large, high-profile international consulting and accounting firms" (MacLeod, 2005, 
p. 51).   
In light of the ultimate sale of Mexican banks to foreign entities a decade 
later, it is important to note that, at this time, Salinas’ stated preference was for the 
maintenance of a strong, domestic bourgeoisie (Vidal, 2000).  One of the eight 
principles which were announced by finance minister Pedro Aspe to guide the re-
privatisation process was that the banks would continue to be controlled by Mexicans 
(Suárez Dávila, 2010, p. 61).   
However, the identity of the domestic financial bourgeoisie was to change.  
Salinas assured his party that the banks would not return to their former owners 
(Suárez Dávila, 2010, p. 59).  Ostensibly, this assurance was designed to quell the 
opposition of members of his own party who had supported nationalisation, 
preventing the re-formation of what were judged to be cosy bank-firm relations in 
the pre-nationalisation period, and replacing them with a ‘modern’ system of market-
based finance.  In practice, it gained the administration the support of the 
increasingly powerful private brokerages.  Changes were made to the ‘Ley de 
Instituciones de Crédito’ (Credit Institutions Law) in 1990 preventing individuals 
from owning any more than five per cent of any single bank’s stock (Maxfield, 1993, 
p. 255), and restricting related lending to 20 per cent of total loan portfolios 
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(Chavarín Rodríguez, 2010, p. 103).  This was intended to disadvantage the old 
banking elite. 
Non-bank financial capital was well-positioned to consolidate its growing 
dominance.  In the years since nationalisation, the brokerages’ earnings had grown 
substantially through off-market lending and public securities placement and trading.  
Brokerage house market capitalisation had increased from six to 30 billion pesos 
between 1982 and 1989 (OECD, 1992, p. 172). The 1990 Financial Groups Law 
removed restrictions on universal banking, allowing financial groups to be formed 
around banks, insurance firms or brokerages (Bank of Mexico, 1991, pp. 52–4). 
Despite publicly-voiced intentions to avoid a return to the mutual dependency 
of banks and the state during the period of nationalisation, the increasing 
concentration of the banking sector achieved through the privatisation process would 
consolidate an alliance between the new financial oligarchy and the economic elite.  
As argued by Osvaldo Santín Quiroz, “the already alarming concentration of 
economic power in a few groups was strengthened with the banks' privatisation, 
consolidating, in this way, the alliance of the economic elite with the financial 
coalition." (2001, p. 157) 
The bank re-privatisations were rapidly carried out over a thirteen-month 
period between June 1991 and July 1992.  Public auctions were held for six 
‘packets’, each consisting of several banks.  The Bank Divestment Committee 
assessed all of the bids for compliance with legal requirements, but importantly did 
not carry out assessments of whether potential buyers were ‘fit and proper’.  Thomas 
Marois (2012, p. 83) alleges that the process allowed PRI officials to “… keep a 
hand on both the sale process and the bidders accepted, while appearing to allow free 
market processes.”  Supporting this assertion is the fact that a number of bids would 
later be shown to be fraudulent.   
Sylvia Maxfield (1993, p. 256) recounts how there was virtually no 
opposition to bank re-privatisation – even from trade unions – other than that from a 
handful of left-wing congressional representatives and the architect of nationalisation 
himself, Carlos Tello.  Santín Quiroz (2001, p. 141) notes similarly that not a single 
public demonstration against privatisation was mounted.  Marois (2008) counters 
that surprise at the lack of opposition is misguided, based as it is on the incorrect 
assumption that state asset ownership is a fixed characteristic that determines firm 
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behaviour.  The nationalised banks underwent austerity measures, shedding workers 
in order to facilitate concentration and increase productivity.  Thus, when re-
privatisation came, bank workers felt little nostalgia for the period of national 
ownership.  For the banks’ corporate clients, during the years of nationalisation their 
interests had shifted towards the private brokerages and international capital.   
While the government’s objective in the sale had been ostensibly to increase 
the efficiency of financial intermediation, most observers agree that the overriding 
aim had been to maximise revenues.  The sale of 18 banks provided nearly 60 per 
cent of state privatisation revenues for 1991-2 (Moreno-Brid & Ros, 2009) pushing 
the fiscal balance into the black (net government borrowing fell from over 3 per cent 
of GDP in 1990 to essentially balanced for the next four years) and helping to reduce 
the net public debt burden from over 55 per cent of GDP in 1989 to 17 per cent of 
GDP at the close of 199314.  Inflation and interest rates were reined in to levels that 
had not been seen since the early 1970s.   
After the sale, brokerage firms directly controlled 62 per cent of the assets of 
the newly privatised banking system (Vega Rodríguez, 1999, p. 227).  They held 
further influence through both their financing of other buyers of the re-privatised 
banks and subsequent establishment of newly licensed banks.  Sixteen new banks 
would be created between 1993 and 1995, as well as hundreds of new credit unions 
and factoring and leasing agents (Suárez Dávila, 2010, p. 73).  To be sure however, 
the dominance of the new financial elite was not total.  Seven of the 18 re-privatised 
banks were sold to commercial industrial groups.    
A number of commentators	  (for example Haber, 2005; Suárez Dávila, 2005) 
stress the role that over-payment for the re-privatised banks during this period of 
euphoria played in their subsequent troubles during the crisis of 1994-5.  As a 
variation on this thesis, Gruben and McComb (2003) have described the two-year 
period following re-privatisation in 1991 to 1993 as one of ‘super-competition’:  
newly privatised banks – in an attempt to repay debts incurred for their purchase – 
competed for market share by extending increasingly questionable loans.  Marois 
takes issue with this line of analysis.  He argues that the buyers were buying into a 
                                                
14 Data for general government net borrowing/lending from IMF WEO series GGXCNL.  Data for net 
public debt stock from INEGI (monthly) figures.  Nominal GDP from IMF WEO series NGDP. 
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new strategy of accumulation backed by state authorities15, and as such the prices 
paid were “… more of a symptom of neoliberal competitive imperatives than a 
parsimonious causal explanation of the subsequent crisis” (2012, p. 91).   
What is certain is that, with new issues of public debt and their yields falling, 
banks saw greater profit in lending to the private sector.  Within limits set by the 
Bank of Mexico, the banks directly entered the carry trade, borrowing short-term 
funds from the US at low interest rates, and lending in local currency at much higher 
rates for longer terms.  This included loans to both corporations and households, the 
quality of which would soon be called into question.  Figure 7.02 shows the rapid 
growth in international banks’ claims on Mexican banks and corporations during the 
years 1990 to 1994.  In this period, the share of Mexico’s private corporations’ in 
cross-border borrowing rose from 34 to 61 per cent, establishing a trend that would 
continue until the present day.   
 
Figure 7.02: Total consolidated claims of reporting banks on Mexico ($ millions) 
Source: BIS table 9A: Consolidated claims - immediate borrower basis 
 
 
Two further mechanisms were used to evade central bank restrictions and 
increase banks’ access to dollar funds.  First, the banks took funds from the ‘second-
floor’ operations of state development banks, which were not subject to the same 
                                                
15 The PRI let it be known that the new buyers would be protected from foreign bank competition for 
up to four years.  Interest rate spreads increased as official interest rates fell between 1991 and 1993, 
and lending rates were allowed to rise (Ramírez, 1994, p. 666). 
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foreign liability restrictions and assumed the credit risk of the lending.  Second, was 
the creation of ‘synthetic dollars’ through the use of currency forwards (Vega 
Rodríguez, 1999, pp. 308–9). 
Commercial bank credit to the private non-financial sector rose from 10 per 
cent of GDP in 1988 to 44 per cent in 1994 (Suárez Dávila, 2010, p. 75).  In the same 
period, real terms lending for housing and consumption rose 250 per cent (Vega 
Rodríguez, 1999, p. 237).  Included in this expansion was the country’s first wave of 
consumer credit card issuance.  This expansion is argued by Basave (1996, p. 229) to 
have been part of the PRI electoral strategy in 1994, illustrating again the close 
linkages between political elites and financial capitalists. 
The growing use of international interbank markets supported increasingly 
complex liability management techniques, much of which occurred off-balance 
sheet.  Mexican banks had started their use of derivatives in the early 1990s, 
participating in foreign exchange swaps on Mexican government treasury bonds 
(‘tesobono’ swaps) (Soto Esquivel, 2010, p. 159).  In return for taking on exchange 
rate risks, the banks earned fees and were provided with short-term loans in US 
dollars, which could then be lent to Mexican firms.  Also in the early 1990s, markets 
for options, forwards and warrants were established.  These operations have been 
largely over-the-counter and dominated by the large Mexican banks.  
President Salinas’ combination of nationalism and commitment to liberalism 
took the form of ‘el gran acuerdo’ (the great accord). Salinas’ government embarked 
on a renewed policy of ‘Mexicanisation’, providing support to large conglomerates 
to take over newly privatised state-owned enterprises and buy out foreign stakes in 
existing private firms.  Barbara Hogenboom (2004, p. 215) argues that without 
popular support, the Salinas government’s “… dependency on the political (and 
financial) support of 'big business' made them turn their pro-market agenda into a 
pro-conglomerate program."  
Large non-financial corporations increased financing in international markets 
during this period.  Between 1993 and 2002, the Bank of New York and Citigroup 
developed 87 'American Depository Receipt' programmes (ADR) for Mexican 
enterprises (Garrido, 2005, p. 185).  ADRs had been created in the 1920s to allow 
foreign firms to capture funds from American investors without having to list in the 
US.  ADR use by Mexican firms in the 1990s was extremely concentrated; nearly 60 
Chapter	  7	  	  Bank-­‐firm	  relations	  and	  subordinate	  financialisation	  
 
210 
 
per cent was obtained by two companies, media conglomerate Televisa and the 
recently-privatised telecommunications giant Telmex.  
 
 
Figure 7.03:  Stock and bond market capitalisation (per cent of GDP) 
Source: World Bank financial structure database 
 
 
The influx of foreign funds in the early 1990s was catalysed by legislative 
changes which allowed greater freedom for both foreign direct investment and 
portfolio investment, and the privatisation of a string of state-owned enterprises.  
This fuelled a domestic stock market bubble.  Stock market capitalisation rose from 
below ten per cent of GDP in the late 1980s to over 40 per cent in 1993 (see figure 
7.03).  Despite the boom in both credit and share prices, levels of gross fixed capital 
formation grew only marginally, remaining below 20 per cent of GDP (figure 7.01).  
Most of the additional liquidity went in to the purchase of financial assets.  While 
SNA data only begin in 1993, the historically high level of deposits and other 
financial assets (loans and commercial advances) in this period can be detected (see 
figure 7.04)16.  
 
                                                
16 In the previous chapter, figure 6.14 shows that the ratio of the acquisition of financial assets to gross 
fixed capital formation for non-financial corporations exceeds parity in 1993-4.  The ratio falls with 
the onset of the peso crisis in 1994, and does not regain the 1993-4 levels until 2005. 
0	  
0.1	  
0.2	  
0.3	  
0.4	  
0.5	  
0.6	  
0.7	  
19
78
	  
19
80
	  
19
82
	  
19
84
	  
19
86
	  
19
88
	  
19
90
	  
19
92
	  
19
94
	  
19
96
	  
19
98
	  
20
00
	  
20
02
	  
20
04
	  
20
06
	  
20
08
	  
Stock	  market	   Private	  bonds	   Public	  bonds	  
Chapter	  7	  	  Bank-­‐firm	  relations	  and	  subordinate	  financialisation	  
 
211 
 
 
Figure 7.04:  Mexican NFC disaggregated asset flows as a share of GDP17 
Source: INEGI SNA 
 
By the time the Mexican government was forced to devalue the peso in 
December 1994, many financial and non-financial firms alike were technically 
bankrupt.  The fall in the value of the peso and concomitant rise in interest rates only 
served to make the fact inescapable.  Debate over the primary causes of the crisis has 
been vigorous.  The macroeconomic argument emphasises the dangers of 
maintaining a semi-fixed exchange rate while undergoing a rapid process of capital 
account liberalisation.  For supporters of liberalisation, blame is therefore placed on 
both the Salinas administration for its failure to liberalise the exchange rate regime 
earlier, and on the management of the eventual devaluation process by the incoming 
government of president Ernesto Zedillo. The so-called ‘error de deciembre’ (the 
December mistake) of foreshadowing the eventual devaluation in December 1994 
triggered unprecedented levels of capital flight (W. C. Marshall, 2011).   
The microeconomic argument places more stress on the vulnerabilities 
created by the process of bank re-privatisation.  The government’s objective of 
maximising revenue meant minimising regulation and assuaging expropriation fears 
by lowering the capital that buyers had to put at risk (Haber & Welna, 2010).  A tacit 
                                                
17 Disaggregated data on derivatives is only available from 2005 forward.  ‘Other’ contains two line 
items:  loans & commercial advances, and other accounts receivable/payable other than loans & 
commercial advances. 
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agreement was struck that high interest rate spreads would be tolerated to allow the 
investors to quickly recoup their investments.  The result, according to a number of 
analysts, was a banking system controlled by owners who had poor credit skills and 
inadequate information systems, in the context of a weak regulatory and legal system 
(Del Ángel-Mobarak, 2006; Mannsberger & McBride, 2007; Marichal, 1997).   
Resolving these debates is neither possible nor necessary for our purposes 
here.  But what is important to note, as argued by Suárez Dávila (2010), is that 
attempts to blame poor credit skills overlook the fact that there was little difference 
in the behaviour of banks between those which maintained the services of the old 
bankers and those which did not.  This suggests that in a newly liberalised 
environment attracting capital inflows, with weak bank-firm relations centred around 
non-bank financial intermediaries, the credit relationship was transformed from 
‘invest and retain’ to short-term financial gain.  This change in the lending 
imperative chimes with Marois’ (2012) earlier cited arguments against emphasising 
the role of the price paid for the banks in 1991-2. 
  New president Ernesto Zedillo entered office in December 1994 and moved 
quickly to bail out the banks.  Direct administrative intervention facilitated the 
liquidation, merger or sale of originally twelve, and ultimately sixteen, banks.  The 
Bank of Mexico provided a dollar liquidity window, and bought convertible 
subordinate debt from those banks whose capital adequacy ratios fell below 
acceptable levels under the ‘Programa de Capitalización Temporal de la Banca’ 
(Procapte), or Temporary Capitalisation Programme.   
The most controversial part of the bailout involved the actions of the ‘Fondo 
Bancario de Protección al Ahorro’ (Fobaproa), or Banking Fund for the Protection 
of Savings.  Operating under the central bank, the fund had originally been designed 
in 1990 as a preventative contingency for the then newly-created multiple banks.  
But in 1995, failed banks were allowed to exchange their non-performing assets for 
Fobaproa bonds.  For every peso that private shareholders injected in the banks, 
Foboproa bought twice the amount in bad debt.  A series of government agencies 
subsequently failed in their attempts to sell these assets.   
Until 1998, the bonds were legally backed by the assets within Foboproa.  
Fearing that uncertainty over the value of these assets could continue to undermine 
confidence in the banking system, president Zedillo moved in March 1998 to back 
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the bonds with the full revenue-generating capacity of the state.  Eventually $552 
billion pesos, or 15 per cent of GDP, would be passed to the direct public debt of the 
federal government.  Marois (2012, p. 133) aptly describes this as the ‘socialisation’ 
of the banks’ bad debts, mortgaging the costs of the financial rescue onto future 
generations of Mexican taxpayers.  This is illustrative of the willingness of the state 
to comply with the needs of the new financial oligarchy. 
Public anger mounted as it was revealed that in anticipation of the 
programme many bankers had made fresh loans to themselves (Haber & Welna, 
2010).  Of the 440,000 loans taken over by Fobaproa, only 550 loans, each above 50 
million pesos, represented 40 per cent of total liabilities (Suárez Dávila, 2010, p. 
135).  This anger would play a key role, as will be subsequently discussed, both in 
the PRI’s loss of power in the 2000 elections, and in the absence of public opposition 
to the second wave of foreign bank entry thereafter. 
Summing up this period, it can be seen that after a decade of almost 
exclusively serving the public sector, re-privatised banks emphatically returned to 
private sector lending.  While a handful of the newly privatised banks attempted to 
directly re-establish the bank-firm relations which pre-dated nationalisation, the 
majority continued with the arms length credit model which had grown out of the 
establishment of the non-bank parallel market.  Household lending flourished. 
The combination of a rapid expansion in credit and high levels of capital 
inflows resulted in increasing levels of household indebtedness and asset inflation.  
This was the first period of significant (though short-lived) growth in stock market 
capitalisation, rising from below ten per cent to above 40 per cent of GDP between 
1990 and 1993 (figure 7.03).  Large Mexican firms were able increasingly to directly 
access foreign capital markets.  Accumulation became based on the exploitation of 
private fictitious capital.  Fixed investment remained stubbornly low, averaging just 
18.8 per cent of GDP between 1990 and 1994, and while GDP growth was better 
than during the collapse of the 1980s, average annual growth of less than four per 
cent was still disappointing relative to the nearly seven per cent figure achieved from 
1960 to 1981 (figure 7.01).  
This period marked the beginning of an era of accelerated integration into the 
world market.  Financial and trade liberalisation processes were driven by US 
pressure expressed through the NAFTA negotiations, in line with the interests of the 
Chapter	  7	  	  Bank-­‐firm	  relations	  and	  subordinate	  financialisation	  
 
214 
 
domestic economic elite which had become increasingly aligned with that of 
financial capital.  The US economic downturn and low interest rates fed portfolio 
inflows, which exploited interest rate spreads, and stoked the credit and stock market 
bubbles. Opportunities in the carry trade opened up for Mexican corporations.  These 
inflows drove the development of an enormous capital account surplus and its mirror 
current account deficit.  The eventual reversal in US interest rates and subsequent 
capital outflows were a critical factor in the crisis which erupted at the end of 1994. 
 
7.4	  	  ACCELERATED	  LIBERALISATION	  AND	  THE	  INTERNATIONALISATION	  OF	  
FIRM	  FINANCE	  	  
 
After the immediate crisis abated, Mexico entered a five-year period (1996-2000) 
averaging an annual GDP growth rate slightly above five per cent, exceeding 
anything it had experienced since the 1970s (figure 7.01).  While exports grew to 
account for over 30 per cent of GDP, imports grew in lock-step.  Imports exceeded 
exports in 1997, initiating a trend which has continued for over a decade (figure 
7.05).  This export-driven accumulation was ensured by the subordination of 
monetary, exchange rate and fiscal policies to the needs of international creditors and 
investors. Central to this strategy were the declaration of central bank independence 
in 1994 with its new chief objective of price stabilisation (Levy-Orlik, 2009), and the 
floating of the Mexican peso18.  
 
                                                
18 The peso fell from its semi-fixed level at just over three pesos to the dollar during the first half of 
the decade to over ten pesos to the dollar by 1998. 
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Figure 7.05:  Aggregate demand analysis (share of GDP growth) 
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators 
 
The manner of Mexico’s export growth is important.  NAFTA encouraged 
the growth of ‘maquiladoras’, plants which imported largely US technology for 
assembly and re-export.  Basave (1996, p. 226) cites studies estimating that 25 per 
cent of these manufactured exports were made up of intra-firm trade.  While the 
share of manufacturing in GDP rose from 16 to 21 per cent and that of 
manufacturing employment from 15 to 20 per cent (both would fall back to their 
original level in the 2000s) 19, manufacturing wages fell by 20 per cent between 1994 
and 1997 (Watt & Zepeda, 2012, p. 123).  The growth in poor quality jobs in the 
‘maquilas’ failed to make up for the loss of manufacturing jobs in the toy, clothing 
and shoe sectors – which had traditionally made up some 65 per cent of formal 
employment (Basave, 1996, p. 237) – these had been decimated by the 1994-5 crisis 
and the increase in foreign competition after NAFTA. 
With the bailout from the 1994-5 crisis adding some 20 per cent of GDP to 
the public debt stock, the new, post-crisis banking model came to pivot on interest 
income from government securities and commissions (Garrido, 2005, p. 200).  
Commercial bank investment in securities (both public and private) rose from 
approximately ten per cent of total assets in 1993-4 to between 34 and 39 per cent for 
                                                
19 Source: INEGI SNA quarterly data on total manufacturing activity 
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the rest of this period.  This took advantage of the fact that Mexican treasury 
certificate rates reached nearly 80 per cent in 1995 (over 40 per cent in real terms), 
and then gradually declined through the period.  In 1998, with the failure to realise 
bad loans taken on through the Fobaproa bailout, the government was forced to 
recognise the programme costs as contingent public debt (Suárez Dávila, 2010, p. 
158).  This meant returning for financing to the same banks20 that had been bailed 
out only a few years earlier.  Ironically, the level of public sector holdings on bank 
balance sheets marked a return to the business model of the nationalised banks. 
Meanwhile, bank loans (both public and private) fell from a 1993 peak of 81 
per cent of total assets to below 20 per cent by the end of this period (T. S. L. 
González, 2009, p. 245).  Within the falling loan figures, lending to the private sector 
fell from 40 per cent of GDP in 1994 to 10 per cent by 2000 (Garrido & Garcia, 
2010).  Households and firms, especially small and medium enterprises, were left 
without access to bank credit.   The collapse in the credit market can only partially be 
blamed on demand-side factors; while real interest rates peaked at over 70 per cent in 
1995, they then hovered between zero and ten per cent until 1999 (see figure 7.06). 
 
Figure 7.06: MX real interest rate and MX-US real interest rate spread 21 
Source: IMF IFS monthly 
                                                
20 The government went to the banks under a new programme entitled the ‘iniciativa de Ley de 
Protección del Ahorro Bancario’, LPAB, or ‘Law for the Protection of Bank Savings’, introduced in 
May 1999. 
21 Mexican real interest rate is calculated as the lending rate (60P..ZF), the rate that banks charge on 
short and medium-term loans to the private sector, less the Consumer Price Index (CPI) per cent 
change (64..XZF).  For the real interest rate spread, Mexican and US treasury bill rates (60C..ZF) less 
the CPI per cent change are used as representative. 
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On the liability side of the banks’ balance sheet, a fall in traditional deposits 
from 71 per cent of total liabilities in 1992-3 to 33 per cent in 1995-6 was made up 
for by rising use of market-based liabilities (T. S. L. González, 2009, p. 244).  
Through this significant change in the bank business model, return on equity 
recovered from the crisis period to remain between six and ten per cent of GDP 
(Garrido, 2005, p. 200)  In addition to rising income from investments and 
commissions, interest rate spreads (see figure 7.07) widened, exceeding ten per cent 
in 1998-9.   
 
 
Figure 7.07:  Interest rate spread (lending – deposit rate, per cent per annum) 
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators series FR.INR.LNDP 
 
 
A number of authors (Chavarín Rodríguez, 2010; Guerrero & Villalpando, 
2009) have suggested that the maintenance of high profit levels throughout this 
period of balance sheet restructuring was owed to continued high levels of 
concentration in the banking sector; this despite its elimination being one of the 
stated objectives of the re-privatisation process.  The ‘Comisión Federal de 
Competencia’ (CFC), or Federal Competition Commission, was only established in 
1993.  It began publishing indices of the level of concentration in the banking sector.  
These indices showed that, while the levels of concentration in liabilities and assets 
had fallen during the run-up to privatisation, they then stagnated for the remainder of 
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the decade at levels considered to be above the threshold indicating adverse impacts 
on competition (Chavarín Rodríguez, 2010, pp. 156–68).   
However, while there is no argument over the continued concentrated nature 
of the Mexican banking sector, what is in dispute is the effectiveness of the orthodox 
remedy of increased competition.  In recognition of calls to address the lack of 
competition in the financial sector, and to comply with the requirements of NAFTA, 
the Salinas administration introduced ‘Sociedades Financieras de Objeto Limitado’ 
(Sofoles), or Limited Purpose Financial Institutions, in 1993.  These non-depository 
institutions channeled investment funds into specific financing operations, such as 
housing, automobile and consumer loans.  Many of the Sofoles were affiliated to the 
same financial groups as the multiple banks.  While the macroeconomic impact of 
the operations of these non-bank financial institutions had only just begun to register 
in the 1990s, their erosion of commercial banks’ role in consumer and housing 
finance can be appreciated:  Between 1994 and 1999, NBFIs share of consumer 
lending rose from five to 39 per cent, while their share of mortgage lending22 rose 
from 27 to 55 per cent (T. S. L. González, 2008, p. 133).  
The entry into effect of NAFTA locked in a profound structural 
transformation in the Mexican economy which had been building for a decade or 
more.  Import-dependent ‘maquila’ initially provided significant employment though 
low value-added.  Outside of the maquila sector, Mexican manufacturing firms faced 
increasingly stiff competition.  This fact, and the impact of liberalisation measures, 
resulted in an increasing number of foreign takeovers, reversing the process of 
‘Mexicanisation’ that had been orchestrated a decade earlier (Basave, 1996).  Both 
trends pushed Mexican economic groups towards strategic alliances with foreign 
capital.  The belief was that since Mexican exporters were internationalising their 
revenues, this would balance any internationalisation on the liability side. 
By the end of this period, domestic politics would confirm the dominance of 
internationally-oriented exporters.  Rising public resentment over two decades of 
instability, poor growth, and rising poverty, threatened the 50-year reign of the ruling 
                                                
22 González (2008) includes the state-backed Instituto del Fondo Nacional para la Vivienda de los 
Trabajadores (Infonavit), or Institute of the National Housing Fund for Workers, established in 1973, 
in her calculations of the NBFI share of mortgage lending.  The dominance of Infonavit is illustrated 
by the fact that it accounts for nearly half of the 55 per cent total mortgage market share of NBFIs in 
1999-2000. 
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party, the PRI.  The nominally anti-neoliberal Partido de la Revolución Democrática 
(PRD), or Party of the Democratic Revolution, threatened a return to state 
intervention.  To see off this possibility, Rodríguez Araujo (2010) argues that the 
neoliberal technocracy guaranteed its dominance by supporting both the PRI and the 
conservative Partido Acción Nacional (PAN), or National Action Party, in the 2000 
elections.  The PAN, with its power base in Monterrey, home to both industrial 
exporters and to externally-oriented finance capital, was declared the victor.  
Remnants of domestically-oriented finance capital could count their days numbered. 
During this period, the share of commercial banks in the total financing of the 
non-financial private sector fell from over 60 per cent to just over 30 per cent (see 
figure 7.08).  External financing rose from 20 per cent to over 30 per cent, nearly 
surpassing bank finance during the first years of the new millennium.  By 2002, 
nearly 50 per cent of corporate financing was from international sources (Garrido, 
2005, pp. 181–2).  
 
Figure 7.08:  Financing of the non-financial private sector (bns pesos) 
Source: Banco de México 
 
 
In a sample of 40 listed firms taken between 1995 and 2002, Celso Garrido 
(2005, p. 241) found that the ratio of total liabilities to equity remained at ‘normal’ 
levels, while fixed asset investment was low.  This, he suggests, raises the likelihood 
that new liabilities, the largest part of which were contracted in foreign currency, 
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were being used for financial rather than productive investment.  Firat Demir (2009a, 
p. 319), in econometric work linking gaps in the rate of return between fixed and 
financial investment with levels of financial assets, confirms this by showing that the 
level of listed firms’ financial assets (as a share of financial plus fixed assets) rose 
during the mid 1990s. These claims will be explored in more detail in the next 
chapter. 
This change in the balance sheet behaviour of large non-financial 
corporations introduced increasing levels of currency and maturity mismatch, 
embodied in exchange rate and interest rate risk.  These new realities led quite 
naturally to an increase in the use of derivatives to hedge risk, in the first instance.  It 
is difficult to estimate corporations’ use of derivatives since the trade was 
predominantly over-the-counter and off-balance sheet (Soto Esquivel, 2010, p. 176). 
MexDer, the organised market for derivatives, started operations in 1998, but its 
major growth would come in the subsequent decade. 
What emerges clearly during this period is a bifurcation in financing and 
broader corporate strategy.  As summarised by Moreno-Brid and Ros (2009, p. 187): 
“… a few very large firms, whose oligopolistic power in the domestic market and 
links with transnational corporations and access to foreign capital help[ed] them to 
successfully become relevant players in export markets, coexist[ed] with a vast 
number of medium and small firms without access to bank credit and technology."  
AAA exporting firms continued to enjoy a range of financing options including 
international and domestic bank loans, both domestically and internationally-issued 
debt securities, and equity.  For firms without access to finance, Gonzalo Castañeda 
(2005, 2007) argues that an internal capital market was established which allowed 
the economy to continue to function in the face of both a prolonged bank credit 
contraction, and negligible market-based financing options23.  Corporations with 
surplus liquidity made loans to their subsidiaries and suppliers.  Firms of all sizes 
increased their reliance on trade credit during these years, with the degree of reliance 
decreasing in larger firms (Garrido, 2005, pp. 224–5). 
                                                
23 Castañeda (2005, 2007) links the shallow development of market-based finance with limited 
property rights and legal enforcement.  This opens up a larger debate over the reasons for the failure to 
deepen financial markets during this period, and whether this should be viewed as a ‘failure’ at all. 
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Figure 7.09:  Gross fixed capital formation disaggregated by sector (share of GDP) 
Source: INEGI SNA, author’s calculation 
 
 
Summing up this period, the switch to export-driven accumulation and an 
emphasis on manufacturing begun in the previous period was completed.  This was 
the only period of both increasing fixed capital formation (driven by the private 
sector – see figure 7.09) and comparatively high GDP growth since the end of 
industrial policy (figure 7.01).  Foreign direct investment increased to nearly three 
per cent of GDP between 1995 and 1999, while portfolio flows were less significant 
and volatile (see figure 7.10).  Without reaching the levels attained in the run-up to 
the 1994 crisis, the twin capital account surplus and current account deficit once 
again grew to considerable proportions (see figure 7.11).  The current account deficit 
reflected the inelasticities generated by the new export model based on imported 
intermediate inputs (Mantey & Levy, 2006).  That is, powerful foreign 
monopsonistic buyers successfully held down the prices that Mexican suppliers were 
able to charge, while the Mexican firms were unable to exert similar pressure on to 
the suppliers of intermediate inputs.   This is indicative of Mexico’s subordinate 
place in global production. 
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Figure 7.10: FDI and portfolio flows 
Source: IMF BOPS, direct investment in Mexico [Code: 4555..] and portfolio 
investment [Code: 4600..] 
 
 
 
Figure 7.11:  Current and capital accounts (share of GDP) 
Source: IMF BOPS, net current account [4993..9] and capital and financial account 
[4996..] 
 
 
There were critical changes in both bank and firm behaviour and their inter-
relationship.  Post-crisis, banks repaired their balance sheets, replacing non-
performing (and, in some cases, fraudulent) loans to the private sector with holdings 
of government bailout bonds.  In response, large corporations turned increasingly to 
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various sources of international finance, both bank and non-bank.  This accelerated 
the bifurcation of the economy.  On the one hand, there was the small number of 
export-oriented internationally-competitive firms, with access to a range of financing 
options; and on the other hand, was the large number of firms with little or no access 
to external finance and low profit levels.  Between the two an internal capital market 
emerged. 
 
7.5	  ‘EXTRANJERIZACIÓN’	  
 
The model of growth based on Mexico’s explicit insertion into US-led global value 
chains was hit by the collapse of the dot-com bubble and the ensuing slowdown in 
the US economy in 2001.  Mexican GDP growth collapsed, and had barely edged its 
way back up to five per cent per annum by 2006-7 (figure 7.01) before the impacts of 
the global financial crisis sent it tumbling again.  Exports played a role in what 
recovery there was, however the dynamism of the previous period proved impossible 
to replicate.  Devaluation of the peso, which had played a role in the previous period 
of growth, was precluded by the new strategy of using the exchange rate as an 
inflation anchor in an era of liberalised exchange rates and capital flows.  Both FDI 
and portfolio inflows were reasonably stable but declining as a share of GDP (at least 
until the current crisis, figure 7.10).  Despite historically low real interest rates of less 
than ten per cent after 2001 (figure 7.06), gross fixed capital formation of the non-
financial corporate sector was stagnant at 12 per cent of GDP (see figure 7.09).  
What little growth in investment there was came instead from the household and 
public sectors.   
Effort had been made in NAFTA negotiations to provide for the continued 
protection of the domestic ownership of the banking system.  A ‘triple padlock’ 
included limits on foreign participation in any one bank, prohibition of foreign 
participation in the largest banks, and a ceiling on participation in the total banking 
system (Suárez Dávila, 2010, p. 154).  This was explicitly designed to ensure that 
control of the payments system remained in Mexican hands. 
In December 1996, only seven per cent of total bank assets were controlled 
by foreign banks, half of which reflected stakes held in investment banks.  With the 
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sale of failed banks through 1996-7 the level of foreign ownership reached the new 
ceiling of 25 per cent.  Then in April 1998 restrictions on foreign ownership of 
Mexico’s largest banks were removed.  After market leader Banamex’s bid to 
purchase number two Bancomer was rejected by the Zedillo administration on 
competition grounds, the signal to foreign banks was clear and a domino effect of 
competitive logic was set in motion.   
Of the big four Mexican banks, Serfín was sold to Spanish Santander in May 
2000; Bancomer was purchased by Spanish BBVA in August 2000; Banamex was 
purchased by American Citigroup in May 2001; and finally Bital was bought by 
British bank HSBC in November 2002 (Suárez Dávila, 2010, p. 169).  By 2004, 82 
per cent of assets in the Mexican banking system were in foreign hands (Haber & 
Musacchio, 2004).  This raises an important question that is little discussed in the 
literature on ‘extranjerización’.  Echoing the earlier discussion over the lack of 
controversy over re-privatisation, why was there so little opposition to the removal of 
restrictions on foreign ownership?  Suárez Dávila describes the legislative debate 
over the removal of the restrictions as having “passed in the night” (2010, p. 158).   
Many domestic finance capitalists, the owners of the smaller Mexican banks, 
were wiped out in a series of liquidations and mergers between September 1994 and 
March 1998.  This removed many of the banks that had been engaged in related 
lending with economic groups.  The remaining large banks, burdened by portfolios 
of non-performing loans, were dependent on the bailout, thus diminishing their 
power to lobby government or outwardly oppose state initiatives towards further 
liberalisation.  Moreover, a factor not to be overlooked was the immediate personal 
financial gain reaped by large shareholders in the big five Mexican banks through 
their sale to foreign owners. 
But why would the officials’ attitudes have changed so drastically in the 
years since the ‘triple padlock’ and the emphasis on the strategic importance of 
maintaining domestic control over the payments system?  This stance had been re-
emphasised during the initial NAFTA negotiations.  The official line is that there was 
not enough domestic equity to purchase the banks post-crisis.  Considering the 
knock-down prices at which they were sold this explanation seems difficult to 
accept.  Undoubtedly an ideological commitment to open markets played a role.  A 
generation of economists, schooled in neoliberal economics, had come to control the 
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central bank and treasury and enjoyed support for their ideas from international 
financial institutions24.    
However, over-emphasising this point risks overlooking the critical 
transformation that had occurred post-crisis in bank-firm and bank-household 
relationships.  Mexico’s largest firms had turned to international finance, both bank 
and market-based.  Smaller firms financed themselves through retained earnings, 
intra-corporate transfers and trade credit.  Irrespective of whether this model was 
successful for investment and growth in macroeconomic terms, it meant that at the 
firm level there was little appetite for fighting the corner of the remaining domestic 
banks.     
The growth area for banks since re-privatisation had been in lending to 
Mexican households.  However, skyrocketing interest rates charged on credit card 
debts had led to accusations that the bankers were acting as ‘tiburones’ (sharks)25.  
On top of this, bankers were increasingly blamed for first causing the crisis of 1994-
5 through reckless lending, and then profiting handsomely from the bailout.  
Mexican consumers looked enviously at rich-country banks which seemed to offer 
both greater stability and lower interest rate spreads.  Under these circumstances, 
foreign bank intervention was welcomed by the public, unopposed by industrial 
capital, and aligned with the ideological framework of powerful technocrats. 
The business model of the banking sector post-‘extranjerización’ was 
initially a perpetuation of the post-crisis domestic model.  On the asset side, credit as 
a share of GDP continued to fall, starting from 18.4 per cent of GDP in 2000 and 
reaching 10.7 per cent in 2005, before recovering to hover at around 15 per cent in 
the run-up to the global financial crisis of 2008.26   The mirror image of the trend in 
loans was provided by bank holdings of investment securities.  As a result, SMEs 
continued to be excluded from financial services markets due to the high cost of 
credit.  This fall in lending occurred despite several programmes and legal changes 
                                                
24 From the author’s discussions with Adalberto Palma Gómez, Director General of Unifim, the Union 
of Mexican Financial Institutions, 1 April 2011. 
25 From the author’s discussions with Professor Carlos Marichal, Professor of Latin American History, 
Colegio de México, 2 May 2011. 
26 The source is Bank of Mexico series SF208 commercial bank credit.  As a share of the multiple 
banks’ portfolio, this marked a fall from over 50 per cent to 35 per cent by June 2005, before 
recovering to hover at 40 per cent in the crisis run-up (Source: CNBV Banca Múltiple series 
históricas).   
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introduced by the PAN administration of Vicente Fox to increase access to credit, 
including: Pronafim (‘Programa Nacional de Financiamiento al Microempresario’, 
or National Programme for the Financing of Microenterprise); the ‘Ley de Ahorro y 
Crédito Popular’ (Savings and Credit Law); the ‘Ley Orgánica de la Sociedad 
Hipotecaria’ (Mortgage Society Law); and a law to restructure the development 
bank system.  
On the liability side, term deposits fell from 35 to 20 per cent of multiple 
banks’ liabilities between 2000 and 2007, replaced by the rise in the share of 
securities and derivative operations from 25 to 40 per cent.  During the same period 
of falling bank deposits, domestic savings increased from 41 to 57 per cent of GDP 
(Garrido & Garcia, 2010).  While still low even by internationally-low regional 
standards, the contrast between falling deposits in the big banks and rising overall 
savings levels illustrates the increasing importance of non-bank savings. 
 
 
Figure 7.12:  Multiple banks’ gross income (per cent of total) 
Source: CNBV multiple bank historical series 
 
 
This model proved to be very lucrative for the new foreign owners. Interest 
income has hovered at about 80 per cent of gross income throughout the 2000s (see 
figure 7.12), but this masks an important change in the source of that interest income.  
At the beginning of the period over 50 per cent of interest income was derived from 
lending to government, and only ten per cent from lending to households (see figure 
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7.13).  By 2007, as bailout bonds were repaid and the government budget deficit 
remained low27 , these percentages were reversed (with remaining government 
lending focused at the sub-national level).  With implicit, that is un-risk-weighted, 
interest rates on consumer loans being some 40 per cent higher than other types of 
lending, this translated in to rising profits.  Return on equity rose from below ten per 
cent at the start of the period to reach 25 per cent by 2007 (see figure 7.14).  More 
recently, profits from lending and securities have fallen, while those from derivatives 
trading have risen dramatically (Soto Esquivel, 2010, p. 191).   
 
 
Figure 7.13: Multiple banks’ interest income disaggregated (per cent of total) 
Source: CNBV multiple bank historical series 
 
 
                                                
27 According to the Mexican treasury, the budget deficit between 2000 and 2007 averaged 1.36 per 
cent of GDP.  While overall government debt continued to grow as a result of sterilisation operations, 
its share of GDP remained constant at approximately 20 per cent throughout this period.  The 
composition of government debt continued to shift from external to internal, with 25 per cent of it 
held internally in 2000, rising to over 80 per cent at the time of the global financial crisis (Source: 
Bank of Mexico, public finance, net public sector debt).  This is complicated by the fact that a rising 
percentage of ‘internally-held’ debt is actually in the hands of foreign investors (Amador, 2013b). 
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Figure 7.14: Multiple banks’ return on equity (per cent) 
Source: CNBV multiple bank historical series 
 
 
High levels of concentration have characterised the Mexican banking sector 
for much of its history.  Federal Competition Commission measurements indicating 
high levels of concentration in virtually all elements of the commercial bank balance 
sheet have been largely unaffected by foreign bank entry over the past decade 
(Chavarín Rodríguez, 2010).  As with President Carlos Salinas’ introduction of non-
bank financial intermediaries, so-called ‘Sofoles’, over a decade earlier, President 
Vicente Fox would seek the answer to the problem of concentration once again in 
increased market-based competition.  Predictably, the results would prove similarly 
disappointing.  As of April 2009, six banks controlled 82 per cent of all banking 
assets in Mexico.    
In July 2006, institutions known as Sofomes (‘Sociedades Financieras de 
Objeto Multiple’, or Multiple Purpose Financial Institutions) were created which 
could combine the different single-purpose credit activities of the earlier generation 
of Sofoles along with factoring and leasing activities. Sofomes’ were divided into 
those which were linked with regulated financial groups and would therefore be 
regulated themselves, and those which were not.  For the latter, credit-creation 
activities could be carried out without authorisation or special regulation, and their 
ownership structures were exempted from foreign ownership limits.  The new 
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lenders took advantage of their room to manoeuvre, leading explosive growth in 
securitised mortgage lending.  Non-bank financial institutions’ mortgage lending 
rose from 27 per cent of total mortgage lending in 1994 to 68 per cent in 2007 (T. S. 
L. González, 2008).  Nine new multiple banks were authorised in late 2006, 
including new retail-based lenders, Banco Walmart and Banco Azteca. New vehicles 
for institutional investment – mutual funds, insurers and private pension funds – 
were also developed during this period.  However, Teresa González (2009, p. 254) 
argues that "… only a small number of these funds assume an active role in the 
generation of risk capital by supporting the creation of new companies or plants", 
investing instead in fixed-income public securities.  
A number of other developments point to the increased alignment of the 
priorities of the Mexican state with the imperatives of international financial capital.  
The limit on related lending was lowered to a maximum of 75 per cent of net capital 
in 2001, with the added stipulation that any related loans over one per cent of basic 
capital had to be approved by the board (Chavarín Rodríguez, 2010, p. 107).  In 
February 2008, the maximum level was further reduced to 50 per cent of net capital.  
Ostensibly, this was done to prevent foreign-owned banks from lending to their 
parent, but, in practice, the new laws posed the greatest difficulties for the remaining 
smaller Mexican-owned banks with ties to industrial groups.  Mexico’s bank 
regulator, La Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores (CNBV), or National 
Commission on Banking and Securities, pushed for compliance with the Basel II 
banking principles, whose capital adequacy standards favour large banks with access 
to international funding.  The CNBV also entered into a series of agreements with 
foreign banking authorities with the goal of turning Mexico into a platform for 
international bank entry into the greater sub-region (Marois, 2012, p. 142). 
Previously established trends in the financing of the private non-financial 
corporate sector continued in to the new millennium:  namely, heavy reliance on 
internally-generated funds28, accompanied by large firms’ expansion of the use of 
international and market-based financing.  The bifurcation of the corporate sector 
                                                
28 Levy (2012), using System of National Accounts data, estimates that between 1997 and 2009 
internally-generated funds (net savings plus depreciation) account for nearly 80 per cent of gross fixed 
capital formation of the private non-financial sector.  This figure masks the differences in funding 
behaviour between the 95 per cent of firms (by number of units) which are classified as ‘micro’ and 
the largest firms. 
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continued apace.  While survey data should only be taken as indicative, they suggest 
that for small firms use of trade credit has risen from 50 to nearly 70 per cent of total 
financing, while for AAA29 firms it accounts for only 20 to 40 per cent of financing 
(see figures 7.15 and 7.16).  The onset of the global financial crisis marked at least a 
temporary return of Mexican firms to domestic bank loans, with the shutdown of the 
corporate asset-backed commercial paper market (Vidal, 2010, p. 86). 
 
Figure 7.15: Small firms’ financing (per cent of total financing) 
Source: Banco de México credit market surveys 
 
 
                                                
29 AAA is generally used to indicate the largest firms.  For Banco de México credit market surveys, 
the differentiation is made according to annual revenues: small (1-100 million pesos), medium (101-
500 million pesos), large (501-5000 million pesos), and AAA (over 5000 million pesos, or 
approximately 400 million US dollars). 
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Figure 7.16: AAA firms’ financing (per cent of total financing) 
Source:  Banco de México credit market surveys 
 
 
Antonio Mendoza Hernández (2010) captures the changes in AAA firm 
strategy in a case study of four of Mexico’s largest firms30.  He highlights four 
features which epitomise their business models: the turn to market-based finance; 
reduction of capital and an increase in leverage denoting a preference for liquidity 
over productive investment; aggressive expansion outside of Mexico through 
mergers and acquisition; and the increasing use of derivatives as an independent 
income source rather than a hedging technique. 
During this period, Gregorio Vidal et al. also highlight the "… incursion by 
the largest national corporations into the derivatives market as a part of the general 
strategy to increase earnings through financial speculation" (2011, p. 9).  By 2007, 
MexDer, the organised market for derivatives, had accumulated notional value of 
22.9 billion pesos, or 300 per cent of GDP, its growth having been given a significant 
boost since 2001 with the entry of foreign banks (Soto Esquivel, 2010, p. 174).  
Over-the-counter derivative markets exploited resources made available by the 
managers of the newly privatised pension funds, called Afores (‘Administradoras de 
Fondos para el Retiro’, or Administrators of Retirement Funds).  Trading in 
                                                
30 This included: building materials supplier and cement producer Cemex; glass manufacturer Vitro; 
corn flour and tortilla manufacturer Gruma; and bottler, brewer and retailer Femsa. 
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derivative contracts remained highly concentrated, with ten banks representing 98 
per cent of the total volume (Soto Esquivel, 2010, p. 178). 
By the time of the global financial crisis, a number of AAA corporations had 
been caught on the wrong side of their derivative operations, most notably brewer 
Grupo Modelo, retailer Comercial Mexicana and glass manufacturer Vitro (Vidal, 
2010, p. 83).  Unsurprisingly, the Mexican state stepped in to rescue them.  Public 
development banks Nafin and Bancomext extended a credit line of US$50 billion to 
guarantee the external debt payments of eight of Mexico's largest privately-owned 
companies (Vidal et al., 2011, p. 10).  This bailout of the non-financial corporations 
was matched by support given to the banks since 2009 to ensure the liquidation of 
derivative positions in foreign currency (Girón & Correa, 2010, p. 29).  A US 
Federal Reserve swap line and IMF line of credit were designed to ensure dollar 
liquidity for the banks.  
 Summing up this discussion of the most recent period, continued reliance on 
export-driven accumulation has failed to live up to its initial promise.  Investment 
has mirrored the ups and downs of the US economy over the past decade, and GDP 
growth has been lackluster (figure 7.01).  FDI and portfolio inflows have fallen as a 
share of GDP (figure 7.09).  It appears that accumulation has rested upon rising 
levels of private fictitious capital, marked by an increase in corporate holdings of 
derivatives and a large increase in stock market capitalisation from below 20 per cent 
of GDP in 2002 to over 60 per cent of GDP in 2006 (figure 7.03). 
The analysis of the sale of Mexican banks suggests that technocratic support 
for the move in the abstract was abetted in the concrete by a re-alignment of 
domestic interests.  Domestic financial capitalists were severely weakened.  Large 
industrial capital, having turned to international and market-based finance, was 
indifferent.  Populist support, or at least the lack of opposition, emanated from public 
anger over the banks’ perceived role in the peso crisis in 1994.   
The business model of the foreign-owned banks remained largely unchanged 
from when they had been Mexican-owned31 (at least until the financial crisis).  The 
turn away from term deposits and towards open market liabilities continued.  On the 
                                                
31 In this regard, it is important to remember that the process of ‘extranjerización’ in Mexico was one 
of conversion of existing domestic banks rather than foreign bank entry as new players.  This point is 
emphasised in a paper by the national banking regulator (J. González & Peña, 2012). 
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asset side, the loan portfolio continued to shrink relative to derivative holdings.  
Within the loan portfolio, lending to the public sector fell, loans to private non-
financial corporations stagnated (until the crisis), and there was growth in consumer 
loans.  This coincided with a steady rise in bank profitability. 
A large literature has grown up which attempts to understand why foreign 
bank entry has not lived up to promised improvements in credit depth and efficiency 
of intermediation.  The predominant strand points towards failures of market 
structure, an analysis which crosses political economy boundaries.  This is, for 
example, the view taken by the Mexican treasury itself (Hernández, 2010).  Most 
commonly highlighted herein is a continuing lack of competition (Haber, 2003; 
Levy-Orlik, 2009; Maudos & Solís, 2009; Palacios, 2009) or contestability (Avalos 
& Hernandez, 2006).  Within the market structure camp, other authors have 
underscored problems with over-specialisation (Blancas, 2009), and with drawbacks 
over foreign ownership itself (Beck & Martinez Peria, 2010; Haber & Musacchio, 
2004; Schulz, 2006), though it should be noted that some analysis argues that foreign 
ownership is beginning to address the limitations of the banking sector (Dages, 
Goldberg, & Kinney, 2000; Hernández-Murillo, 2007).   
The ‘good governance’ line of argument, emanating from a new 
institutionalist analysis, emphasises failings in corporate governance and the 
Mexican legal framework (Del Ángel-Mobarak, 2006; Haber, 2005; La Porta, 
López-De-Silanes, & Zamarripa, 2003; Maurer & Haber, 2007; Ochoa, 2009).  
Finally, structuralist authors question the ability of foreign bank entry to solve (or 
suggest they may in fact contribute to) underlying problems of finance and 
development, arguing the need for forms of financial restraint (Levy-Orlik, 2009; 
Moreno-Brid & Ros, 2009) and a more explicit role for state-run development banks 
(Cypher & Wise, 2010; Girón & Levy, 2005; Moreno-Brid & Ros, 2009). 
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to examine the various arguments in 
detail.  However, the analytical lens of bank-firm relations in an era of 
financialisation lends itself to a different interpretation.  The foundations for the 
financialisation of both bank and firm behavior were laid in an era of public 
ownership, continuing through re-privatisation and domestic private ownership.  
From this viewpoint it seems unlikely that foreign ownership will fundamentally 
alter this trajectory.  Rather than affecting the nature of bank-firm relations and 
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processes of accumulation, foreign bank entry may serve only to alter the 
geographical distribution of the gains from financial accumulation.  This is 
symptomatic of subordinate financialisation. 
Trends in firm behavior have been reinforced.  A small number of the largest 
firms have replicated corporate financialisation as witnessed in the advanced 
capitalist countries.  This equates to dependence on market-based finance, and high 
holdings of liquid financial assets, with the important difference that firms are 
dependent on international finance with the additional risk that entails.  Foreign-
owned domestic banks have undoubtedly played a role in the increasing 
sophistication of firms’ treasury activities, but this has been a reinforcement of an 
existing trend rather than a new development.  Small and medium enterprises, 
lacking dynamism due to the export-oriented nature of accumulation and the failure 
to catalyse domestic technological innovation, support their financing needs through 
the use of internal capital markets.   
Foreign-owned domestic banks have accelerated the adoption of consumer 
credit management techniques that have begun to yield early signs of the ‘mass 
financialisation’ (Becker et al., 2010) that has been so spectacularly evident in 
advanced economies (dos Santos, 2009b).  Bank lending to middle and low-middle-
income households has increased sharply (Garrido & Garcia, 2010).  In this regard, 
Vidal (2011, p. 119) highlights the penetration of financial capital into new spheres 
during the contemporary period: present and future family income, land rents, and 
small and medium producers working capital.  Consumer loans make up 20 per cent 
of commercial bank loan portfolios, but provide 54 per cent of revenues (Ochoa, 
2009).   
The impact of foreign bank entry on household financialisation should not be 
exaggerated for a number of reasons32.  First, households have historically been 
underserved by the Mexican banking system.  There is some suggestion that much of 
what comes under the heading of consumer credit today is in actual fact lending for 
micro and small enterprises.  Second, it must be remembered that the first wave of 
credit card loans for consumption preceded foreign bank entry by nearly a decade.  
Finally, in parallel with developments in the US, innovation in securitised mortgage 
                                                
32 Due to lower average income levels, household debts are less important on a macroeconomic scale 
than is the case in advanced capitalist countries. 
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lending is supported by a state-run housing development fund, not exclusively by 
private bank operations.  
Exchange rate and interest rate uncertainty, which catalyses Mexican 
corporations’ entry into derivatives markets, is a fact of Mexico’s subordinate place 
in the world market.   Vidal (2010, p. 91) argues that ties to the US distinguish the 
financialisation of the Mexican corporation:  "Policies are oriented towards avoiding 
a devaluation in the currency and relying on sufficient foreign exchange in a stable 
exchange rate regime, so that large corporations can meet their commitments in 
foreign currency, and banks and transnationals don't have problems to remit profits 
or financial resources abroad.”  
 
7.6	  	  CONCLUSION	  
 
Understanding the turn of the Mexican economy away from the financing of 
productive investment and towards the acquisition of financial assets and consumer 
debt-driven demand, requires a detailed historical understanding of the evolution of 
capital-labour and intra-capitalist relations and their articulation with the state and 
the world market.  Central to this re-orientation has been the role played by the 
Mexican state.  Through its management of crises in the 1980s and 1990s, it enabled 
a reliance of Mexican banks and NFCs on profits from non-productive accumulation.  
Trade and financial liberalisation policies were pushed ahead.  These moved the 
economy on to an import dependent path based on low wages.  Portfolio inflows 
covered up the ensuing current account deficits, but brought increased volatility and 
fragility.  Macroeconomic policies designed to attract foreign capital, meant high 
interest rates and an over-valued exchange rate, undermining the dynamism of the 
domestic market.   
Second, Mexico’s capitalist classes have failed to establish a system of 
developmental finance.  Bank-firm lending relationships have been dysfunctional 
since the era of industrial policy, through subsequent periods of bank nationalisation, 
re-privatisation and now ‘extranjerización’.  The result of this failure has been two-
fold.  The largest corporations, repeatedly favoured by the Mexican state and often 
enjoying cartel-like positions of dominance, have sought out international and 
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increasingly market-based finance.  The remaining firms are reliant on retained 
earnings and the internal capital market.  This structure denies the full growth 
potential of the endogenous credit cycle, distributes rather than expands existing 
domestic wealth, and surrenders a portion of the domestic surplus to foreign financial 
institutions.   
Finally, this last point draws attention to the subordinate nature of the re-
orientation of the Mexican economy.  This should not be crudely understood as an 
imposition of foreign financial capital, for as has been indicated this re-orientation 
was an outcome of the very particular decisions taken by Mexico’s capitalist classes.  
However, it is clear that the structural subordination of the Mexican economy helps 
to explain the 1980s debt crisis, accentuating the breakdown of bank-firm relations 
and increasing reliance on accumulation strategies based on fictitious capital. 
Financial globalisation, as embodied by US portfolio flows in the 1990s, inflated 
Mexican credit and stock market bubbles.  With trade liberalisation came the 
cementing of Mexico’s subordinate insertion in production chains led by US 
corporations; the resulting structural deficits funded by portfolio inflows.  In recent 
years, foreign-owned banks and firms have staked a major claim to Mexico’s 
domestic surplus.  
The financialisation of the Mexican economy should be understood then to 
contain within it distinctive elements which relate to the country’s status as an 
emerging capitalist economy.  While exhibiting many of the outward ‘symptoms’ of 
financialisation, the internal dynamics have been different.  Mexico has suffered a 
double blow.  While productive accumulation has disappointed, much of the 
financial benefit which has accrued, has done so outside its borders. 
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corporation	  
 
 
8.1	  	  INTRODUCTION	  
 
The analysis in chapters four and six drew attention to non-financial corporations’ 
increasing engagement with financial markets, to raise external funding and to 
provide outlets for investment.  These tendencies were documented in both advanced 
and emerging capitalist countries, including the case study country Mexico.  
Evidence was presented to suggest that this behaviour was particularly marked in 
large multinational corporations.  In this chapter, original analysis using data from 
listed Mexican firms’ financial statements is conducted in order to verify and better 
specify these transformations.   
What this analysis reveals confirms the trends analysed at the macroeconomic 
level, but also provides several new insights into the specific form which 
financialisation has taken in Mexico.  I find that in the 2000s, listed non-financial 
corporations have substituted long-term bond issuance for bank borrowing, to satisfy 
external financing requirements.  On the asset side, fixed investment has fallen, 
while holdings of highly liquid financial assets, derivatives and intangibles have 
increased substantially.  I will argue that these transformations should be related to 
the process of subordinate financialisation, and can be distinguished from an earlier 
period of financial expansion in the early 1990s when bank lending played a 
significant role for non-financial corporates and their fixed investment levels grew.   
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The case will be made, supported by a variety of indicators, that increased 
holdings of highly liquid assets in the current conjuncture reflect involvement in the 
carry trade.  Against orthodox accounts which blame speculative excesses on 
deficient corporate governance, this account suggests that firms have undertaken 
increased treasury activity in the wake of financial liberalisation.  This is now a sine 
qua non of operating in a global trading environment under a flexible exchange rate 
regime, as well as a result of competitive pressures in an era of financial innovation.  
In such an environment, the line between hedging and speculative strategies becomes 
increasingly difficult to discern. 
Critical to the specifically subordinate nature of financialisation in Mexico is 
the subordination of macroeconomic policy to the financial needs of these large 
domestic corporations and their foreign investors.  Dependency on foreign capital 
inflows has committed the Mexican state to a strong peso policy, and low inflation 
anchored by the domestic interest rate.  On the back of these commitments, large 
corporations have adopted profitable strategies to exploit the availability of cheaper 
international funding.  Foreign investors are participating in the financialisation of 
the Mexican firm.  A dramatic rise in the purchases of Mexican securities by US 
residents in the period between 2000 and 2011 coincides with an increase in financial 
rather than fixed investment by Mexican non-financial corporations.   
The chapter will proceed as follows.  In the next section, the data on listed 
non-financial corporations is first described.  This is followed by an analysis of the 
changes in firm funding and investment behaviour.  The differences between an 
earlier period of financial expansion and the present period of subordinate 
financialisation are then briefly discussed.  Finally, both orthodox and heterodox 
explanations for increased holdings of liquid assets will be assessed in light of the 
Mexican data.  The chapter then concludes. 
 
8.2	  	  EXPLORATORY	  DATA	  ANALYSIS	  
8.2.1	  	  The	  data	  
 
The data come from the financial statements of publicly-listed non-financial firms, as 
aggregated in the Economatica database.  The period available is from the fourth 
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quarter of 1989 until the present period.  Due to a major change in accounting 
methodology1, the data for 2011-12 have not been used2.  Quarterly data have been 
used in order to maximise the ability to capture the potentially volatile flows of 
financial assets, and to avoid year-end reporting biases3. 
The panel data are unbalanced.  As shown in figure 8.01, the total number of 
publicly-listed non-financial firms for which data is available in the Economatica 
database rises from under 20 firms in 1988 to peak at 140 firms in 2000 before 
falling back slightly in recent years4.  Initially the sample is made up almost entirely 
of manufacturing firms.  More rapid growth in the inclusion of firms from other 
sectors meant that by 2000 manufacturing firms made up less than 50 per cent of the 
total number of firms.  This proportion was roughly maintained throughout the 
following decade.  In other words, both the overall size (in terms of number of listed 
firms) and sectoral composition of the dataset stabilises towards the end of the 1990s.    
It is impossible to draw a representative sample from all Mexican non-
financial firms for which financial statement data are readily available.  Therefore, 
the sample of listed firms on which the subsequent analysis is based must be 
understood to provide an indicative, not statistically representative, picture of the 
behaviour of the broader population5.  This picture is biased towards a relatively 
small number of large, mostly Mexican-owned firms.  According to calculations by 
Cypher and Wise, the Mexican economy is dominated by large firms.  Some 3000 
large firms constitute only 0.3 per cent of companies, but own 74 per cent of 
business assets, pay 69 per cent of all wages, employ 52 per cent of the workforce 
and produce 74 per cent of all value-added.  Of these firms, 403 account for 75 per 
                                                
1 In 2011, all firms switched from the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles of Mexico (GAAP-
MEX) to the International Financial Reporting System (IFRS).  Some firms introduced some of the 
changes required by the switch prior to this date. 
2 Distinct from the recent change in accounting standards outlined in footnote one, there was also a 
change in reporting formats during the period.  Discrepancies in individual line items between the old 
reporting template for industrial firms (INDCOMMX) and its replacement (IND2MEXICO) were 
systematically reconciled, the details of which are subsequently outlined where relevant. 
3 Note that only annual statements are audited. 
4 The recent decline in the number of listed firms is due to mergers and acquisitions, de-listings and 
transfers to foreign exchanges. 
5 Within the literature there is no analysis that I am aware of which examines the composition of firms 
listed on the Bolsa Mexicana de Valores (BMV) relative to the entire non-financial corporate sector.  
Listed firms are usually larger firms, though many of the largest multinational corporations present in 
Mexico do not list on the BMV.  Much of the export-oriented ‘maquila’ industry, operating as 
subsidiaries of foreign parents, for example, is unlisted. 
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cent of Mexico's exports (2010, p. 3).  Census data  of the Instituto Nacional de 
Estadística y Geografía (INEGI) suggests that the largest firms, those with over 1000 
employees, contribute over 50 per cent of gross fixed capital formation (GFCF), with 
over 70 per cent of GFCF coming from these firms together with large firms of over 
250 employees6.  
 
 
Figure 8.01:  Number of non-financial firms with data available in Economatica 
 
 
In total there are 178 non-financial firms in the dataset, 113 of which are 
active in the most recent period7.  There are 10,324 individual observations in total8.  
Distribution of firm observations over time shows that five per cent of firms are 
observed for roughly three years or less; 50 per cent survive for over 15 years; and 
the oldest five per cent are observed for the entire period of 23 years. 
There are 16 different sectors (North American Industry Classification 
System, or NAICS, level one) represented in the dataset.  Of this, four sectors are 
more significant in terms of the number of firms represented (shown in bold in table 
8.01): manufacturing (38 per cent of firms, or 44 per cent of observations); retail (13 
                                                
6 Author’s calculations using INEGI census data, conducted every five years, for 1998, 2003 and 
2008. 
7 Multiple share classes have been treated as a single corporation. 
8 For the first-cut analysis, all observations for all firms are included.  For the finer analysis conducted 
in chapter nine, a number of data cleaning measures will be outlined. 
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per cent of firms, or 14 per cent of observations); construction and information (both 
with approximately 10 per cent of firms, or 9 per cent of observations). 
 
Sector	  	  
NAICS	  level	  1	  
Number	  of	  
observations	  
%	  of	  total	  
observations	  
Number	  of	  
firms	  
%	  of	  total	  
firms	  
Accommodation	  and	  
Food	  Services	  
528	   5.11	   8	   4.49	  
Administrative,	  Support	  
and	  Waste	  Mgmt	  
166	   1.61	   3	   1.69	  
Agriculture,	  Forestry,	  
Fishing	  and	  Hunting	  
218	   2.11	   4	   2.25	  
Arts,	  Entertainment,	  and	  
Recreation	  
104	   1.01	   3	   1.69	  
Construction	  
	  
884	   8.56	   19	   10.67	  
Health	  Care	  and	  Social	  
Assistance	  
78	   0.76	   1	   0.56	  
Information	  
	  
854	   8.27	   17	   9.55	  
Mgmt	  of	  Companies	  and	  
Enterprises	  
161	   1.56	   4	   2.25	  
Manufacturing	  
	  
4538	   43.96	   68	   38.20	  
Mining	  
	  
262	   2.54	   4	   2.25	  
Professional,	  Scientific,	  
and	  Technical	  
58	   0.56	   2	   1.12	  
Public	  Administration	  
	  
33	   0.32	   1	   0.56	  
Real	  Estate	  and	  Rental	  
and	  Leasing	   	  
126	   1.22	   3	   1.69	  
Retail	  Trade	  
	  
1487	   14.40	   24	   13.48	  
Transportation	  and	  
Warehousing	  
354	   3.43	   9	   5.06	  
Wholesale	  Trade	  
	  
473	   4.58	   8	   4.49	  
TOTAL	   10324	   100.00	   178	   100.00	  
 
Table 8.01: Number of observations and firms by sector 
 
Examining structural change in the composition of the sample by sector over 
time reveals that manufacturing firms make up a greater share of the sample in the 
earlier period (1989Q4 to 1999Q4) than in the later period, while construction and 
information firms account for a smaller share (trends for the four most significant 
sectors are included in table 8.02). 
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Sector	   Number	  of	  firms	  	  
(%	  of	  total)	  
	   1989Q4-­‐
2010Q4	  
1989Q4-­‐
1999Q4	  
2000Q1-­‐
2010Q4	  
Construction	   19	  (11)	   10	  (7)	   19	  (11)	  
Information	   17	  (10)	   11	  (8)	   17	  (10)	  
Manufacturing	   68	  (38)	   63	  (44)	   68	  (39)	  
Retail	  trade	   24	  (13	   22	  (15)	   22	  (13)	  
TOTAL	  
	  
128	  (72)	   106	  (74)	   126	  (73)	  
Table 8.02:  Sectoral composition over time 
 
Besides sector, firms have also been disaggregated by size.  Unlike sector, 
where firm characteristics do not vary9, firms may move between size categories.  
For this reason, and strictly for indicative purposes, the firms have been divided into 
the largest 25th percentile, the middle 50th percentile, and the smallest 25th percentile, 
by total assets10.  By definition therefore the largest 25th percentile contains one-
quarter of the individual observations; however it does not necessarily contain one-
quarter of firms.  As shown in table 8.03, the smallest and largest percentiles contain 
more than a quarter of the total number of firms11, both for the whole period, and for 
the two sub-periods.  The second and third columns of table 8.03 reveal that, in terms 
of size, the structural composition of the sample is consistent over time.  
 
Size	  	  	  
(total	  assets)	  
Number	  of	  firms	  	  
(%	  of	  total)	  
	   1989Q4-­‐
2010Q4	  
1989Q4-­‐
1999Q4	  
2000Q1-­‐
2010Q4	  
Bottom	  25th	  percentile	   88	  (29)	   66	  (30)	   70	  (28)	  
Middle	  50th	  percentile	   130	  (43)	   95	  (43)	   118	  (47)	  
Top	  25th	  percentile	   82	  (27)	   62	  (28)	   61	  (25)	  
TOTAL	  
	  
300	  (100)	   223	  (100)	   249	  (100)	  
Table 8.03:  Number of firms by size of total assets, change over time 
                                                
9 In theory it is possible that a firm could switch sector, but in practice it has been verified that they 
have not.  This does not preclude however that a firm in one sector merges with a firm in another 
sector.  In this case the series for the acquired firm ends. 
10 The stock of total assets was preferred to other possible measures.  This was to avoid the greater 
volatility associated with the use of the flow figure for revenues; data on the number of employees, a 
measure commonly used to differentiate firms by size, was unavailable. 
11 The total number of firms in each of the columns of table 8.03 exceeds the actual total number of 
firms due to the fact that firms may appear in more than one size category over time. 
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Finally, it would have been desirable to disaggregate the data by level of 
foreign revenue and ownership structure.  The former would have allowed assessing 
changes in balance sheet behaviour in relation to the degree of export orientation, 
while the latter would have permitted analysis of the importance of various forms of 
ownership to changes in funding and investment behaviour.  Unfortunately, the data 
are not available, leaving such analysis for future research. 
 
8.2.2	  	  Changes	  in	  firm	  financing	  
 
The most significant change in external firm financing in the contemporary period is 
the turn away from bank finance and towards bond issuance.  Figure 8.02 shows the 
trend for the aggregate data for all listed non-financial firms in the dataset.  In the 
1990s, bank loans (both short- and long-term, though the trend is similar for each 
taken separately) hover at between 40 and 50 per cent of total liabilities.  In the 
2000s, loan levels fall to below 20 per cent of the same.  This trend is uniform across 
firms by size (though led by the largest firms) and sector (with some exception in 
recent years in construction and wholesale trade).  The decline in bank loans can not 
be explained by rising interest rates; real interest rates have first stabilised and then 
fallen throughout the 2000s.  This points to the rising importance of the bond market. 
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Figure 8.02: Bank loans / total liabilities12 
 
 
What bank financing is available is increasingly monopolised by the largest 
firms.  Examination of nominal flows of bank financing from the cash flow statement 
shows nearly all new lending going to firms of the largest 25th percentile of firms by 
total assets (see figure 8.03). 
The near mirror flipside of this trend is the increase in long-term bonds as a 
share of total liabilities.  From 10 per cent through the 1990s, bonds increase to 
nearly 30 per cent of total liabilities in the most recent observations (figure 8.04).  
However, unlike the decline in bank lending, the increase in bond issuance is 
restricted to firms in the largest 25th percentile.  That is, the smaller firms are not 
participating in the bond market on a significant scale.  The increase in bond 
financing is fairly uniform across sectors, with the exceptions of both retail and 
wholesale trade.   
 
                                                
12 The source for all figures is Economatica unless otherwise stated.  Data analysed and output 
generated by the author using Stata. 
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Figure 8.03: Nominal cash flow from bank financing by size quartile 
 
 
Figure 8.04: Long-term bonds / total liabilities 
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This increase in bond financing reflects the rapid growth in private bond 
market capitalisation from the late 1990s (see figure 8.05).  However, this growth 
should be kept in perspective; as a share of GDP, Mexico’s private bond market 
capitalisation remains below that of countries such as Thailand and Brazil13, and 
significantly less than in advanced capitalist countries14. 
 
 
Figure 8.05: Mexican private bond market capitalisation / GDP 
Source: World Bank financial structure database 
 
 
Graphing the trends in bank and bond financing reveals an apparent break 
around 2000 (figure 8.06). Before that date, bank and bond financing tend to move 
together, that is, firms that obtain one form of financing also obtain the other15.  After 
2000, it is clear that bond financing becomes the substitute for bank financing. 
 
                                                
13 See figure 6.04, chapter six, private bond market capitalisation to GDP. 
14 See figure 4.04, chapter four, private bond market capitalisation to GDP. 
15 The natural logarithm and inverse of long-term debt to total liabilities is used to make the 
relationship with long-term bonds to total liabilities more clear on a single chart. 
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Figure 8.06: Logarithm of total liabilities/LT debt and LT bonds/total liabilities 
 
 
Trade finance is relatively stable across the entire period (see table 8.0416).  
Accounts payable account for some ten per cent of total liabilities, while accounts 
receivable hovers around eight per cent, suggesting that these listed firms are 
extracting better terms from their suppliers then they are granting to their buyers.  On 
both sides of the balance sheet, trade finance is more important to the smaller firms.  
A number of distinct sector-specific levels and patterns can be discerned.  
A significant change occurred in long-term deferred taxes as a share of 
liabilities.  From insignificant levels in the 1990s, deferred taxes regularly 
constituted six per cent of liabilities in the 2000s.  This trend was significant across 
firm size and sector, while the level showed larger firms less indebted to the state.   
  
                                                
16 The division in to these two periods is meant to be indicative and does not reflect any particular 
structural break.  Rather, from 2000 forwards represents a period of the ‘new normal’ for Mexican 
corporations, coming after both the fallout from the peso crisis of 1994 had settled and the 
implementation of a raft of trade and financial liberalisation measures (outlined in chapter seven).  
The year 2000 also marks an approximate break in the external financing strategies of firms as noted 
in figure 8.06. 
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Liability	  line	  item	   1989q4	  –	  	  
1999q4	  
2000q1	  –	  	  
2010q4	  
CURRENT	  LIABILITES	   	   	  
	  	  Debt	  	   18.0	   7.0	  
	  	  Debentures	  	   4.5	   3.0	  
	  	  Other	  credits	  with	  ST	  costs	   0.0	   1.2	  
	  	  Accounts	  payable	   10.5	   9.6	  
	  	  Taxes	  due	   2.5	   3.3	  
	  	  Other	  ST	  liabilities17	   12.0	   18.8	  
	  	  	  	  	  Derivatives	   *	   	  	  	  0.5	  
	  	  	  	  	  Employee	  benefits	   *	   	  	  	  	  14.5	  
Total	  current	  liabilities	   47.5	   42.9	  
	   	   	  
LONG-­‐TERM	  LIABILITIES	   	   	  
	  	  Debt	   28.1	   20.1	  
	  	  Bonds	   10.3	   18.7	  
	  	  Miscellaneous	  payables	   5.8	   2.2	  
	  	  Deferred	  taxes18	   0.6	   6.2	  
	  	  Other	  obligations19	   0.1	   0.8	  
Total	  long-­‐term	  liabilities	   44.9	   48.0	  
TOTAL	  LIABILITIES	   92.4	   90.9	  
 
Table 8.04: Changes in firms’ liability structure20 
 
 
The other possible source of external finance is, of course, equity finance.  
However, as a proportion, equity has fallen from a level nearly twice that of total 
liabilities to consistently hover at around 50 per cent of total liabilities over the last 
decade.  This pattern is consistent across firms, though led by large firms.   
                                                
17 Other short-term liabilities is composed of interest payable, derivatives, advance and custom 
deposits, other current deferred revenue, employee benefits, discontinued operations and other.  Due 
to changes in reporting requirements the individual line items are not significant for the earlier period. 
18 While not studied herein, the dramatic rise in the level of deferred taxes poses an interesting 
question for future research.  Shaxson argues that deferred taxes are a “… crucial element of the 
offshore system.  Corporations hold their profits offshore, indefinitely, and only when they bring it 
back home to pay out dividends to shareholders does it get taxed." (2011, p. 129) 
19 Other obligations is composed of derivatives, advance and custom deposits, other current deferred 
revenue, employee benefits, provisions, discontinued operations and other.  In practice, the entirety of 
the category is made up by employee benefits, discontinued operations and other. 
20 The construction of this table, and its counterpart for the asset side of the balance sheet, reflects a 
considerable investment of time in forensic accounting.  As earlier alluded to, there was a change in 
the financial reporting format in the middle of the period of analysis.  Due to this switch, and 
sometimes for other unrelated reasons, line items have switched names and/or changed the structure 
of disaggregation over time.  This has resulted in the reporting of misleading sub-aggregate lines such 
as ‘other’ which have had to be corrected.  These have been reconciled as much as possible, but 
despite these efforts the sum of individual line items remains short of 100 per cent.  Economatica staff 
were unable to account for the discrepancy. 
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Finally, Mexican financial statement reporting requirements include a 
division of liabilities into those denominated in foreign currency.  This line item does 
not disaggregate loans and securities, but does give a broad picture of the currency in 
which firms are financing themselves.  Across the entire group, long-term foreign 
liabilities rise from 60 to over 80 per cent of total liabilities in the 1990s, falling back 
to 60 per cent in recent quarters.  The trend is replicated across firms of varying size, 
however the levels vary considerably: foreign liabilities of the smallest firms rise 
from 0 to 50 per cent before falling back to half that level; the largest firms rise from 
50 to over 90 per cent before falling back to about 75 per cent of total liabilities.  The 
trend is broadly reflected across sectors.   
How does this picture compare with the aggregate picture of non-financial 
corporations that was examined in chapter six?  A caveat is required here over the 
difficulty in comparing the part with the whole.  System of National Accounts (SNA) 
data for Mexico is only available in flows, and obviously includes a great number of 
unlisted firms which are for the most part smaller and possibly distinctive in their 
behaviour.  Having said this, the role of bank loans at the aggregate level reflects 
what has been revealed for listed firms, namely a source of financing of diminishing 
importance.  Bank loans as a share of total financing at the aggregate level is even 
lower than for listed firms, reflecting the observation that what bank lending does 
occur goes predominantly to the largest firms.  Equity, which had been the most 
important source of finance at the aggregate level has fallen in importance.  This 
echoes the finding that the level of shareholders’ equity has fallen markedly 
compared to the level of total liabilities, with the admitted difficulty of disentangling 
new flows from capital market inflation.  Trade finance, which was stable and a 
relatively small source of financing for listed firms, emerges as the most important 
source of financing over the past decade at the aggregate level.  This suggests that 
small, domestically-oriented firms have witnessed a significant increase in their use 
of trade finance.  Finally, securities poses somewhat of a mystery.  Aggregate SNA 
data suggest that, except for 2002-3, securities have been an unimportant source of 
finance.  However, listed firm data would suggest that it is a critical and increasingly 
important source of finance.  The latter view is confirmed by a report from the Banco 
de México that the issuance of securities outside of Mexico was the principal source 
of financing for private corporations in 2011 (Zúñiga, 2012).  Finally, shifts in 
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external funding should be placed within the context of an overwhelming reliance on 
internal funds for investment.  As discussed in chapter six, Levy-Orlik’s (2012, p. 
250) work examining the net flow of funds for the non-financial sector between 1993 
and 2009, maintains that internal funds contribute more than 60 per cent of the 
financing of gross capital formation, or 80 per cent of gross fixed capital formation.  
 
8.2.3	  	  Changes	  in	  firm	  investment	  
 
The most important transformation on the asset side of the balance sheet has been the 
declining share of fixed assets accompanied by a rising share of financial assets.  Net 
property, plant and equipment as a share of total assets fell from 60 to 55 per cent in 
the 1990s, but then fell even more rapidly in the 2000s from 55 to 45 per cent of total 
assets (see figure 8.07).   
 
 
Figure 8.07:  Net property, plant & equipment / total assets 
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By firm size, this fall has been most dramatic not in the largest or smallest 
quartiles, but in the middle two quartiles.  The decline is seen across most sectors 
with manufacturing and mining as two key sectors where there has been little change 
in the ratio.  The decline in firm investment in property, plant and equipment (and 
inventories) is reflected in dynamics at the aggregate level.  After a post-NAFTA 
boost from 1995 to 2000 where gross fixed capital formation of non-financial 
corporations rose from ten to 15 per cent of GDP, it has since stagnated at around 12 
per cent. 
Certainly part of this change might be explained by structural transformations 
which reduce the fixed-capital intensity of business operations.  This is likely the 
explanation for the decline in inventory levels (as distinct from PPE) from over 8 per 
cent of total assets in the 1990s to fluctuate between 6.5 and 8.5 per cent in the 2000s 
(see table 8.05).  However, this argument seems unlikely to be able to account for the 
entirety of the decline in fixed investment and its uniformity across firms of different 
sizes and from different sectors.  In an emerging capitalist economy, particularly one 
suffering from chronically low growth rates, low productivity and high levels of 
informality, the need to maintain high private fixed investment levels is broadly 
acknowledged (Moreno-Brid & Ros, 2009). 
Financial assets is calculated as the sum of receivables, cash and cash 
equivalents (maturities less than 90 days), short-term investments (maturities 
between 90 days and one year), long-term notes receivable (maturities greater than 
one year), investments in subsidiaries and other permanent investments, and both 
short- and long-term derivatives.  Breaking this down, the increase in current 
financial assets emanates predominantly from increased holdings of cash and cash 
equivalents21, and more recently in derivatives.  The increase in long-term financial 
assets can be found in the increased value of intangibles. 
 
 
 
                                                
21 Cash is measured at nominal value and consists of non-interest bearing bank deposits and restricted 
cash. Cash equivalents consisting principally of short-term bank deposits and fixed-rate investments 
with original maturities of three months or less are recorded at its acquisition cost plus accrued 
interest income not yet received, which is similar to listed market prices. 
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Asset	  line	  item	   1989q4	  –	  	  
1999q4	  
2000q1	  –	  	  
2010q4	  
FIXED	  ASSETS	   	   	  
	  	  Property,	  plant	  &	  equipment	  (LT)	   56.4	   50.8	  
	  	  Inventories	  (ST)	   8.0	   7.3	  
Total	  fixed	  assets	   64.4	   58.1	  
	   	   	  
FINANCIAL	  ASSETS	   	   	  
Current	  financial	  assets	   	   	  
	  	  Accounts	  receivable	   8.2	   8.1	  
	  	  Other	  receivables	   3.0	   3.5	  
	  	  Cash	  &	  cash	  equivalents	   1.2	   2.8	  
	  	  Investments	  	   6.9	   6.4	  
	  	  Other	  assets22	  	   1.2	   1.9	  
	  	  	  	  	  Derivatives	  	   	  	  	  	  	  0.0	   	  	  	  	  	  0.4	  
Total	  current	  financial	  assets	   20.5	   22.7	  
	   	   	  
Long-­‐term	  financial	  assets	   	   	  
	  	  Notes	  receivable	  	   1.1	   0.6	  
	  	  Investments	   5.9	   3.3	  
	  	  	  	  	  Other	  investments	   	  	  	  2.5	   	  	  	  1.2	  
	  	  	  	  	  Investments	  in	  subsidiaries	   	  	  	  3.4	   	  	  	  2.1	  
	  	  Net	  intangibles	   4.0	   8.5	  
	  	  	  	  	  Commercial	  credits23	   	  	  3.6	   	  	  4.7	  
	  	  	  	  	  Other24	   	  	  0.4	   	  	  3.8	  
	  	  Deferred	  taxes	   0.0	   0.6	  
	  	  Other	  non-­‐current	  assets25	   2.0	   2.7	  
	  	  	  	  	  Derivatives	   	  	  	  0.0	   	  	  	  0.1	  
Total	  long-­‐term	  financial	  assets	   13.0	   15.7	  
Total	  financial	  assets	   33.5	   38.4	  
	   	   	  
TOTAL	  ASSETS	   97.9	   96.5	  
 
Table 8.05: Changes in firms’ asset structure 
 
 
 
                                                
22 Other short-term assets includes prepaid expenses, derivative instruments, available-for-sale assets, 
discontinued operations, rights and permissions, and other. 
23 Economatica staff report that this category includes what is typically known as ‘goodwill’. 
24 Other intangibles includes brands, rights and permissions, consignments and other.  ‘Other’ 
accounts for almost the entirety of the change between periods. 
25 Other non-current assets includes financial derivatives, employee benefits, discontinued operations, 
deferred charges, and other. 
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Cash has increased steadily from less than one per cent of total assets at the 
beginning of the period to over five per cent in recent quarters26 (figure 8.08).  The 
trend is most dramatic in the largest firms, while in the smallest firms there has been 
little change in the levels of cash holdings.  The trend is uniform across all of the 
significant sectors.  Theories which attempt to account for the increased share of cash 
and cash equivalents will be discussed in detail in section four. 
 
 
Figure 8.08: Cash and cash equivalents / total assets 
 
 
The increase in derivatives has occurred since 2005, almost exclusively 
amongst the largest firms, rising from nothing to reach nearly two per cent of total 
assets27.  It is important to note that derivatives are off-balance sheet except where 
                                                
26 A common metric of cash holdings in the business literature is cash and cash equivalents as a share 
of current liabilities, the so-called ‘coverage ratio’.  For the dataset analysed here, the coverage ratio is 
a stable five per cent throughout the 1990s; it then rises sharply throughout the 2000s surpassing 25 
per cent.  As with cash as a share of total assets, the trend is strongest in the largest firms and is 
present across all significant sectors.  
27 Mexican authorities only began to require more detailed accounting for derivatives in non-financial 
corporate financial statements in 2005.  Inspection of bank holdings of derivatives (see figures 6.31 
and 6.32, chapter six), assuming that large non-financial corporations are counterparty to a non-trivial 
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their fair value is measured as a net positive fair value (asset) or net negative fair 
value (liability).  Therefore, what appears on the balance sheet is a small reflection of 
the risk being assumed through these transactions.  The trend is strongest in the 
information and retail sectors, led by a handful of firms. 
Finally, there is a significant increase in long-term intangible assets, 
accounted for largely by an increase in ‘other intangibles’.  This jump is driven by 
the behaviour of the largest firms, though the trend is present across firms of all 
sizes.  In terms of sector, the trend can be found in all significant sectors with the 
exception of the mining sector.  A number of authors have attempted to theorise the 
increasing role played by intangibles within the broader context of financialisation 
(Palan, 2013; Serfati, 2011; Willmott, 2010); while this issue is not pursued herein, it 
offers interesting material for future research.  
 
8.3	  	  LARGE	  FIRM	  FINANCIALISATION	  TAKE	  1	  AND	  2?	  
 
Large Mexican firms appear to exhibit behaviour which might be termed 
‘financialisation’ in both the beginning of the period under examination and in more 
recent years.  However, there are decisive differences between the two periods which 
demand careful analysis. The behaviour in the first period is better understood in the 
context of the bubble induced by financial liberalisation and re-privatisation of the 
banking sector, while that of the second period more properly marks subordinate 
financialisation, that is, representing a profound change in the operational strategies 
of firms, banks and households, and the relationship between them. 
In the early 1990s, large firms were able to access external financing from 
two primary sources.  First, bank loans were easily obtainable, as newly re-privatised 
banks returned aggressively to private sector lending following the end of 
nationalisation.  Bank loans make up over 50 per cent of liabilities during the period.  
Second, financial liberalisation led to large inflows of both FDI and portfolio 
investment.  Between 1989 and 1994 this resulted in a four-fold increase in the size 
                                                                                                                                     
portion, suggests that the growth in non-financial corporate holdings of derivatives actually began in 
the late 1990s. 
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of the Mexican stock exchange relative to GDP.  For listed firms, capital stock was 
some 150 per cent of total liabilities in the period. 
Much of these funds found their way in to corporate holdings of financial 
instruments.  Short-term investments, those with maturities between three months 
and one year, began the period at over ten per cent of total assets.  Gradually there 
was a shift out of these short-term investments and into longer-term government 
paper, with the line item ‘long-term notes receivable’ peaking at over two per cent of 
assets in 1995.  Investment in subsidiaries was also at a comparatively high four per 
cent of assets during the early 1990s.  Derivative use was not yet a significant 
phenomenon. 
It is worth noting however, that investment in fixed capital during this period 
was higher than it had previously been or would be thereafter.  For listed non-
financial firms, net property, plant and equipment levels stood at over 55 per cent of 
assets throughout the 1990s.  From the aggregate vantage point, gross fixed capital 
formation rose from below ten to 15 per cent of GDP in this period. Expansion in the 
run-up to the signing of the NAFTA may account for part of this increase.  Certainly 
both the object and the quality of these investments can be called in to question, but 
the point remains that this period is a classic one of financial market ‘exuberance’; 
that is trade and financial liberalisation driving flows of easy money in to 
investments both financial and real. 
The last decade should be distinguished from this earlier period.  Bond 
issuance takes over from bank loans as the primary source of external funding for 
listed firms.  Rather than medium- and long-term instruments, the funds are held as 
cash and cash equivalents. Derivatives come to play a central role in firms’ strategies 
to integrate into the world market.  Also distinct from the earlier bubble period, 
investment in property, plant and equipment falls throughout.  As discussed in 
chapter six, Mexican banks’ profits in the most recent period have come from 
investment banking and lending to households.  I maintain that these characteristics, 
related to the changing nature of Mexico’s insertion into the world market, 
distinguish the contemporary period of financialisation from earlier experiences of 
financial expansion. 
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8.4	  	  ‘CASH	  EQUIVALENTS’	  AND	  THE	  CARRY	  TRADE	  
 
Holdings of cash and cash equivalents (CCE), in absolute terms, are, unsurprisingly, 
dominated by some of Mexico’s largest firms.  These include:  mining 
conglomerates Grupo Mexico and Industrias Peñoles; state oil and gas giant Pemex; 
the world’s largest cement producer Cemex; América móvil, the fourth largest mobile 
network operator globally, and formerly the mobile arm of Telmex; and white goods 
retailer and consumer credit agency Elektra.   
In relative terms, those firms with the largest holdings of CCE to total assets 
are still dominated by the largest firms, but represent a more diverse cross-section 
outside of purely AAA firms.  Of firms with a CCE-to-total assets ratio of five per 
cent or higher in the period 2000-2011, those in the construction, information and 
mining sectors play a much greater role than their share of the total sample of firms 
would suggest.  Construction firms, for example, which account for under nine per 
cent of the total sample, make up 22 per cent of firms with high cash ratios.  These 
include the Geo Corporation, Hogar Consorcio, ICA, Sare and Urbi Desarollos28.  
In the information sector, Cablevision, a cable network and programme distributor, 
and radio and television broadcaster Grupo Televisa, have high CCE holdings for 
prolonged periods of time.   
While there are undoubtedly sector-specific and firm-specific reasons for the 
rise in this ratio, its presence across a number of key sectors, especially amongst the 
largest firms, suggests that there are also more generalised dynamics at work.  In 
what follows, I will look first at orthodox accounts of changes in cash holdings, 
followed by more heterodox theories. 
I begin by examining the literature on corporate finance which argues that 
changes in the cash flow sensitivity of cash are due to market imperfections or 
underdevelopment.  The cash flow sensitivity of cash is a measure of the marginal 
propensity to save cash out of current cash flows in order to fund more profitable 
investments.  First, Almeida et al. (2004) provide evidence that the cash flow 
sensitivity of cash is positive for financially constrained firms.  In empirical testing, 
                                                
28 Housing developers have entered a period of crisis in 2013.  Falling demand for housing brought on 
by the crisis of 2009 has persisted with a shift of consumer tastes away from new housing 
developments.  Leverage ratios for three of the biggest housing developers, Homex, Geo and Urbi, 
rose from 1.5 times in 2007 to 4.7 times in 2012 (Amador, 2013c). 
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firm size is used as a proxy of financial constraint.  Without reliable access to 
external sources of finance, this theory posits that small firms are more likely to 
hoard cash when retained earnings are high in anticipation of future investment 
opportunities. While this hypothesis might account for differences in the cash flow 
sensitivity of cash between small and large firms in Mexico, it does not account for 
the rising level of cash held by large firms during a period in which they have 
become progressively less financially constrained. 
Khurana et al. (2006) use cross-country econometric testing to support their 
argument that the cash flow sensitivity of cash is negatively related to the degree of 
financial development.  In other words, as a country develops deeper capital and 
credit markets, firms will feel less need to hoard cash during times of plenty.  Again, 
while this sounds intuitive, it does not account for the increasing CCE holdings of 
listed Mexican firms during a period of financial development.  Private bond and 
stock markets, and loan and deposit markets all grew in relation to GDP during this 
period, if admittedly from a low base. 
Kusnadi and Wei (2011) provide cross-country evidence to suggest that the 
level of financial development is a secondary consideration to the first-order driver 
of the cash flow sensitivity of cash which they argue to be the degree of legal 
protection of investors.  This is consistent with the notion that effective legal systems 
ease firms’ access to external capital markets.  While this may have been a plausible 
account for Mexico in the period in which they conducted their empirical analysis 
(1995 to 2004), for the more recent period it fails to stand up.  The World Bank’s 
protecting investors index improved from a score of 3.7 in 2004 to 6.0 in 2012 (the 
OECD average is 6.1).  Clearly, Mexico’s legal protection of investors has improved 
and is of an international standard; nonetheless, the cash flow sensitivity of cash has 
increased. 
Additional hypotheses, of a more heterodox nature, can be broadly organised 
under three headings: operations, hedging and speculative motivations.  The 
operations motive might include the need to hold higher levels of foreign-currency 
denominated cash for inputs as business activities expand internationally.  
Unfortunately, without a reliable dataset of the share of firm sales which transpire 
internationally, this hypothesis is difficult to prove empirically.  Another reason 
might be an increase in the general expectation of dividend payouts.  Figure 8.09 
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shows that there has indeed been an increase in dividend payouts since the crisis 
period of 1994-5.  However, having steadied at approximately ten per cent of 
earnings before interest and tax (EBIT), at best this can account for some of the 
increased level of CCE holdings, but not the decade-long increasing trend. 
 
 
Figure 8.09: Dividends / earnings before interest and taxes 
 
 
The hedging motive refers to management efforts to undertake precautionary 
measures in the face of uncertainty.  Where there is macroeconomic instability, such 
as most recently experienced in 2007-9, firms may hold cash rather than risk losing 
out on planned fixed investment.  Particularly at times of low interest rates, the 
opportunity costs associated with such a decision may be relatively low.  Facing an 
uncertain financing picture, management might similarly decide to hold more cash to 
avoid shortages or delays to desired investment, or to avoid external financing costs.  
However, this account loses its explanatory power in view of the fact that the 
increase in cash holdings occurred during a relatively favourable period of 
macroeconomic conditions and availability of firm financing, certainly for the largest 
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firms.  Neither was there a debt restructuring bringing an increase in current 
liabilities relative to long-term liabilities for which greater cash needed to be kept on 
hand.   As shown in figure 8.10, current liabilities have declined as a share of total 
liabilities.  This has resulted in a sharp increase in coverage ratios (cash / current 
liabilities).  This suggests that, all else being equal, the need to hold cash for these 
reasons has diminished, not increased.   
 
 
Figure 8.10: Current liabilities / total liabilities 
 
 
While this undermines the linkage between increased CCE holdings and 
macroeconomic volatility, there may still be a role for microeconomic volatility.  
Even in periods of benign macroeconomic conditions, certain sub-sets of firms may 
experience increased operating volatility.  To test this latter hypothesis, figure 8.11 
plots a measure of micro-economic volatility (the three-year moving average of the 
standard deviation of EBIT by quartile29) against the share of CCE in total assets.  
Until 2005, there appears to be no relation between the experience of volatility and 
                                                
29 The first quartile indicates the lowest standard deviation of EBIT, the fourth quartile the highest. 
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CCE holdings.  Between 2005 and 2008, there is the suggestion that the biggest 
increase in CCE holdings occurred in firms experiencing the greatest volatility in 
EBIT.  However, this relationship breaks down after 2008. 
 
Figure 8.11:  Three-year moving average of the standard deviation of earnings 
before interest and tax (by quartiles shown as different lines) against the share of 
CCE to total assets (left axis, per cent) 
 
 
Finally, there may be a number of reasons for increased CCE holdings which 
can be categorised as speculative in nature.  First, unknown and likely unknowable is 
the relationship between cash holdings and money laundering of the illegal drug 
economy.  It is estimated that Mexican drug cartels send between 19 and 29 billion 
dollars annually from the US to Mexico, equal to nearly three per cent of GDP 
(Realuyo, 2012).  In a paper for Chatham House, Ferragut argues that it is becoming 
increasingly difficult to launder these funds through financial institutions, so “… 
dirty money is being laundered within the formal economy in businesses that accept 
cash as tender…” (2012, p. 8).  He believes this includes many of the top firms in 
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Second, cash-on-hand may allow firms to take advantage of market 
movements to buy back shares when prices fall, thereby boosting earnings per share.  
In the shareholder value literature, this has been found to be the case particularly 
where executive compensation is linked to profit performance (Froud, Haslam, Johal, 
& Williams, 2000; Lazonick & O’Sullivan, 2000; Lazonick, 2008, 2012).  Haw et al. 
argue that corporate insiders in a weak investor protection environment are likely to 
employ repurchases “… as a tool to mislead investors or extract private control 
benefits rather than to genuinely disgorge excess cash balances to shareholders” 
(2011, p. 153) as posited by the free cash flow theory.  Figure 8.12, showing a 
marked increase in the nominal values of repurchased shares on the balance sheet, 
and figure 8.13 showing nominal cash flows spent on share re-purchases from the 
income statement30, suggest that this may be part of the story in Mexico. 
Third, Toporowski (2010c) has argued that in an era of both financial 
liberalisation and capital market inflation, ‘financially enhanced transnationals’ 
which enjoy easy access to capital and credit markets grow by international mergers 
and acquisitions rather than by expansion of production.  Certainly for Mexico this 
account fits well with, for example, the aggressive global expansion of Cemex 
starting in the mid 1990s (Mendoza Hernández, 2010).  This might account for the 
need to hold liquid assets in order to conduct share purchases, though such 
acquisitions can also be conducted via share swaps or leveraged buyouts.  This might 
suggest future work to examine the relationship between CCE holdings and mergers 
and acquisitions activity. 
 
                                                
30 Haw et al. (2011) argue that the dollar amount spent on repurchases in the cash flow statement is 
likely to yield the least biased estimate of the actual dollar amount spent on repurchases.  However, 
cash flow statement data on share re-purchases is only populated from 2007Q4 in the Economatica 
database suggesting that there may have been an accounting change prior to which share re-purchases 
were not separately accounted for in financial statements. 
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Figure 8.12: Nominal value of repurchased shares, balance sheet 
 
 
 
Figure 8.13:  Nominal value of share repurchases, income statement 
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The last strand in the speculative account is the hypothesis that the increased 
holdings of CCE may be concealing carry trade operations.  The carry trade can 
exploit spreads in either or both of the exchange rate and the interest rate.  Looking 
first at the exchange rate, figure 8.14 shows that, except for a brief period in 2002-3, 
Mexico’s real effective exchange rate appreciated between 1995 and 2008.  More 
relevant for practical purposes is likely to be the bilateral nominal exchange rate 
between the peso and the US dollar.  Figure 8.15 indicates that, after a period of 
significant depreciation between 1994 and 1998, that the value of the peso was 
stabilised against the dollar for a period of nearly a decade.   
 
 
Figure 8.14: Mexican real effective exchange rate index (2005 = 100) 
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics (..RECZF) 
 
 
0	  
20	  
40	  
60	  
80	  
100	  
120	  
140	  
19
89
	  
19
90
	  
19
91
	  
19
92
	  
19
93
	  
19
94
	  
19
95
	  
19
96
	  
19
97
	  
19
98
	  
19
99
	  
20
00
	  
20
01
	  
20
02
	  
20
03
	  
20
04
	  
20
05
	  
20
06
	  
20
07
	  
20
08
	  
20
09
	  
20
10
	  
20
11
	  
Chapter	  8	  	  Financialisation	  of	  the	  Mexican	  non-­‐financial	  corporation	  
 
264 
 
 
Figure 8.15: Nominal Mexican peso – US dollar exchange rate 
Source: Banco de México 
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estimated, shown in figure 8.16, that while funding rates in the early part of the 
2000s were near ten per cent, they fell to below six per cent by 2004, where they 
hovered until the Lehman Brothers crisis in late 2008.   
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Figure 8.16:  Estimate of AAA corporate funding rates (per cent per annum) 
Source: Author’s calculations summing yields on 10-year US government bonds 
with the EMBI estimate of Mexican sovereign risk 
 
 
On the asset side, figure 8.17, indicates that from mid-2005 there was an 
upward change in the trend of the deposits of private non-financial corporations in 
both commercial banks and non-bank depository corporations.  This suggests that the 
increased CCE holdings were finding their way into fixed short-term lending to 
banks, and to vehicles such as money market mutual funds run by investment funds.  
The latter becomes the more significant vehicle from late 2005.   
It is worth noting that in national accounts for the private non-financial 
sector, deposits are not enjoying the upward trend that could be expected given the 
analysis so far (see figure 6.15, chapter six).  What is increasing during this period is 
the broad category of ‘securities’ on the asset side, suggesting that what is called 
‘cash equivalents’ on firms’ financial statements is accounted for as securities by the 
authorities.  Overall, this recommends that, again as a conservative proxy, rates on 
short-term fixed deposits can be used to estimate the return that non-financial 
corporations are earning on ‘cash equivalents’. 
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Figure 8.17: Nominal stocks of private non-financial corporate deposits with banks 
and non-banks (bn pesos) 
Source: Bank of Mexico SF40413 PNFC term deposits with depository non-bank corporations; 
SF99039 demand deposits of PNFCs with commercial banks; SF 99045 time deposits of PNFCs with 
commercial banks 
 
 
Figure 8.18 gives a rough approximation of the profitability of a 
straightforward carry trade operation in the 2000s, that is, borrowing in US dollars 
and investing in Mexican pesos.  It depicts the spread between the proxy for 
corporate funding costs, namely the ten-year US government bond plus EMBI 
spread, and the proxy for returns, the one-day fixed term deposit rate.  The spread is 
positive for most of the decade, and is uninterrupted from August 2004 until March 
2009.   
The assertion that this period fits well with the carry trade hypothesis is 
backed up by Bloomberg analysis of the carry trade (see figure 8.19), which shows 
that for the period from February 2004 until June 2007, returns on the carry trade in 
the Mexican peso were the fourth most lucrative after those conducted with the 
Brazilian real, the Korean won and the New Zealand dollar.  
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Figure 8.18: Spread between the proxy for corporate funding rates and 1-day fixed 
term deposit rate (per cent per annum) 
Source: Author’s calculation based on EMBI data and Banco de México SF3239 
one-day fixed term deposits, weighted average rate before tax 
 
Figure 8.19:  Bloomberg carry trade (long: MXP; short: USD), Jan 2004 – June 
2007 
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The straight-forward carry trade, as illustrated above, can be conducted 
without the use of derivatives.  However, their use can either mitigate or amplify 
both potential gains and downside risk.  Once again, it is worth remembering that 
derivatives are off-balance sheet except where their fair value is measured as a net 
positive fair value asset or net negative fair value liability.  Therefore, what appears 
on the balance sheet is a small reflection of the risk being assumed through these 
transactions, let alone through off-balance sheet operations31.  Figure 8.20 illustrates 
the dramatic rise in the value of short- and long-term derivatives as a share of the 
total assets of listed non-financial firms, rising from near zero in late 2004 to nearly 
two per cent of total assets in late 2007.  As earlier discussed, these figures are likely 
to significantly underestimate the value of derivatives. 
 
 
Figure 8.20: Short- and long-term derivatives / total assets 
 
                                                
31 As a result of significant losses related to derivatives’ use, the national regulator (CNBV) mandated 
greater disclosure of derivatives positions starting in 2009 (Whittall, 2009). 
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The sharp depreciation of the Mexican peso against the US dollar by nearly 
20 per cent in October 2008 led to sizeable derivatives losses for a number of 
Mexican firms, revealing the speculative carry trade strategies which they had been 
pursuing.  According to the financial press, one of the more common structures 
utilised was called a ‘target redemption forward’, or TRF (R. Davidson, 2008).  This 
product involves a series (or ‘strip’) of forward contracts, each with a coupon that 
has an individual payout equal to the underlying price (the price of the underlying 
asset at maturity, in this case US dollars) minus the delivery price (the price agreed 
upon in the forward contract).  Once the total payout from multiple coupons exceeds 
a target level, the contract ‘knocks out’, that is, it ceases to exist.   
The TRF allowed the Mexican corporate buyer to sell US dollars for pesos, at 
a rate that was typically better than the spot rate, on a set expiry schedule until the 
pre-determined profit level had been reached.  For companies with US dollar 
receivables, TRFs acted as a hedge against a fall in the value of the dollar, a reality 
faced by Mexican exporters for over four years before the onset of the financial 
crisis.  If the corporate buyer anticipated a strengthening peso, this appeared to be a 
low-risk profitable strategy. 
However, the TRFs were structured so that the buyer had to sell double the 
notional value of the contracts if the exchange rate moved against them, that is, if the 
peso fell.  Importantly, whereas upside gains were limited, downside losses were not.  
Furthermore, evidence has emerged to suggest that some Mexican corporates were 
leveraging their participation in these structures, or entering into TRFs with multiple 
banks (Whittall, 2009).  In such instances, what may have originally been a hedging 
strategy had become a speculative one.  Jan Kregel (2011) and Randall Dodd (2009) 
have provided evidence of the use of such strategies using a variety of exotic 
derivative instruments by non-financial corporates across Latin America in the years 
leading up to the financial crisis in 2008. 
In concluding this section, there are two important points of a methodological 
nature that must be highlighted.  First, it is impossible to equate ex-post outcomes of 
macroeconomic prices with ex-ante expectations of the same.  I have suggested that 
Mexican government policy, and the stated policy objective of the central bank, sent 
a signal to the managers of large Mexican firms about their intentions as regarded a 
strong exchange rate and the use of the domestic interest rate as an inflation anchor. 
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However, these signals and the subsequent policy interventions were mediated by a 
host of dynamic factors, both domestic and international.  This means that their 
efforts may or may not have yielded the outcomes they sought.  Second, and building 
upon this first point, it is impossible, at the aggregate level, to equate ex-post 
evidence of involvement in the carry trade with the ex-ante intentions of corporate 
mangers. Between intention and outcome lies dynamic change and fundamental 
uncertainty related to the passage of time.   
 
8.5	  	  CONCLUSION	  
 
The analysis in chapters four and six highlighted the importance of the 
transformation in the funding and investment behaviour of large non-financial 
corporations.  In this chapter, I have exploited the greater level of detail afforded by 
listed firms’ financial statements as an indicative sample, in order to probe these 
transformations.   
This has helped to clarify the important changes in corporate behaviour in 
Mexico in the 2000s and revealed a number of new findings.  For external finance, 
large non-financial firms have turned away from bank borrowing, substituting long-
term bond issuance.  On the asset side, fixed investment has fallen, while holdings of 
highly liquid financial assets, derivatives and intangibles have increased 
substantially.  I have argued that these transformations reflect the tendencies of 
contemporary financialisation witnessed in advanced capitalist economies, 
particularly as seen in the large corporation.  This was distinguished from an earlier 
period of financial expansion in the early 1990s when trade and financial 
liberalisation drove portfolio inflows.  Unlike the current period, bank lending to 
non-financial corporations played a significant role, and fixed investment levels 
grew.   
A range of theories which have attempted to explain non-financial 
corporations’ increasing holdings of liquid assets were examined.  I argued that 
orthodox theories which link increased cash flow sensitivity of cash to imperfections 
or underdevelopment of the financial system do not hold up to scrutiny in the 
contemporary Mexican context.  While the recent period until the crisis of 2007-8 
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has been one of relative macroeconomic stability, analysis was provided contending 
that microeconomic volatility may explain some of the increase in cash holdings.  A 
number of heterodox theories were considered including the demands of 
international expansion, expectations of higher dividend payouts, laundering of the 
illegal drug economy, share buybacks, and merger and acquisition activity.  Finally, 
detailed statistical evidence at the aggregate level and anecdotal evidence at the firm 
level was presented to suggest that carry trade operations, whether or not they were 
carried out as part of a conscious strategy, are likely an important part of this 
transformation.  Undoubtedly, a full account requires more than a simple single 
causal explanation.   
It is important to emphasise the systemic nature of this transformation.  
Against orthodox accounts which celebrate financial market deepening, whilst 
blaming unsuccessful speculative excesses on deficient risk management practices, 
this account suggests that firms have undertaken increased treasury activity in the 
wake of financial liberalisation.  This is now a sine qua non of both operating in a 
global trading environment under a flexible exchange rate regime as well as a result 
of competitive pressures from other firms whose profitability has been augmented 
through financial innovation.   
Critical to the subordinate nature of financialisation in Mexico is the 
subordination of macroeconomic policy to the financial needs of foreign investors 
and large domestic corporates.  Dependency on foreign capital inflows has 
committed the Mexican state to a policy of stable, if not appreciating exchange rates, 
and low inflation kept in check by the domestic interest rate.  Large corporations, 
both financial and non-financial (though the analysis here has focused on the latter) 
have taken advantage of this commitment by seeking funds abroad.  Some of these 
funds, whether by intention or accident, have entered the carry trade. 
Foreign, largely US, investors have played an important role in the changed 
behaviour of Mexican non-financial corporations. Figures for real portfolio flows, 
such as those made available in the IMF IFS, are limited by what amounts to triple-
netting.  That is, netting between purchases and sales, netting over the period of 
calculation (monthly), and netting flows driven by, respectively, American and 
Mexican investors.  In contrast, the US Treasury International Capital Reporting 
System provides data which can act as an estimate of gross portfolio flows.  This 
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gives gross sales by Mexicans to US residents of Mexican securities (bonds and 
stocks).  Figure 8.21 illustrates that, in real terms, there has been a dramatic rise in 
gross purchases of Mexican securities by US residents, in the period between 2000 
and 2011.  This coincides, not with an increase in fixed investment, but a rise in 
financial investment by listed Mexican non-financial corporates, or, as illustrated in 
the figure, a significant rise in the ratio of financial assets to net property, plant and 
equipment.  Determining whether these flows are catalytic or opportunistic, that is 
whether they are leading or following the changes in the investment patterns of 
Mexican corporations, would require a number of heroic assumptions (for example, 
UST ICRS figures include purchases of securities of non-listed firms).  It is enough 
for now to note that flows made available by foreign investors are participating in the 
financialisation of the Mexican firm. 
 
 
Figure 8.21:  Financial-to-fixed assets and cross-border securities activity 
Source:  Economatica; US Treasury International Capital Reporting System 
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 In the next chapter, I will use innovative econometric techniques to take this 
analysis a step further.  This will involve testing a key hypothesis concerning the 
financialisation of the non-financial corporation; against orthodox theory which 
stipulates that changes in firms’ operating characteristics determine alterations in 
their capital structure, I will argue that, in the era of financialisation, changes in the 
availability of international capital are driving the financialised investment behaviour 
of Mexican corporations.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter	  9	  	  
Capital	  structure	  and	  liquid	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  management	  in	  
the	  Mexican	  non-­‐financial	  corporation	  
 
 
9.1	  	  INTRODUCTION	  
 
In the previous chapter, detailed original analysis of the balance sheets of Mexican 
publicly-listed non-financial corporations revealed significant behavioural 
transformations, particularly over the last decade.  These changes were consistent 
with the sectoral picture of Mexican non-financial corporations developed in chapter 
six, and reveal similar tendencies to those seen in the financialised corporation of 
advanced capitalist economies in chapter four.  On the liability side, there is 
increasing reliance on internal funds while external financing needs are being met by 
long-term bond issuance at a time when bank borrowing has stagnated.  On the asset 
side, fixed investment has fallen as a share of total assets, while investment in highly 
liquid financial assets, and the value of derivatives and intangibles have increased 
substantially.   
The question of why there has been a secular increase in industrial firms’ 
cash holdings across a range of countries has preoccupied both the international 
financial media (Waters, 2013) and academics studying corporate finance (Bates, 
Kahle, & Stulz, 2009; Iskandar-Datta & Jia, 2012; Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, & 
Williamson, 1999).  A number of theories which attempt to explain the increased 
holdings of cash and cash equivalents by industrial firms were examined in chapter 
eight in light of the Mexican evidence.  Orthodox theories which link increased cash 
holdings to firm-specific financial constraints (Almeida et al., 2004) or to 
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underdevelopment of the financial or legal system (Khurana et al., 2006; Kusnadi & 
Wei, 2011) do not hold up to scrutiny in the Mexican case.  The micro-economic 
relationship between cash holdings and the volatility of operating revenues was 
analysed, finding that increased volatility may be playing a role but does not explain 
the phenomenon in its entirety.  It was similarly shown that heterodox theories (Haw 
et al., 2011; Levy-Orlik, 2012; Toporowski, 2010c) linking cash holdings to the 
demands of international expansion, the requirement to pay higher dividend levels, 
merger and acquisition activity or share buybacks may explain part but not all of the 
increase.  Finally, statistical evidence at the aggregate level and anecdotal evidence 
at the firm level suggests that carry trade operations, whether or not they are 
conducted as part of a conscious strategy, are likely an important explanatory factor. 
Having addressed the question of Mexican firms’ possible motivations for 
increasing their cash holdings, this chapter will empirically investigate a critical 
connected issue which is central to testing the theory of financialisation advanced in 
this research:  are the increased cash holdings related to the firms’ capital structure?  
To put a finer point on it, is access to cheaper funding from international investors on 
bond markets inducing Mexican firms’ investment in liquid assets?  Against 
orthodox theory which posits that operating characteristics cause changes in firms’ 
capital structure, it will be argued that the reverse may also be true, that is that capital 
structure may cause changes in operating characteristics.  This is a key assertion of 
the theory of financialisation presented in this thesis, namely that transformations in 
firms’ funding opportunities have altered their investment behaviour.   
It was argued in the previous chapter that while the engagement of non-
financial corporations in the carry trade may be broadly symptomatic of 
financialisation, the dynamics of such activities for enterprises from emerging 
capitalist economies has a specifically subordinate nature.  The rise in cash holdings 
and carry trade operations of Mexican firms coincides with a sharp increase in US 
investors’ purchases of Mexican private securities (figure 8.21, chapter eight).  In 
turn, Mexican macroeconomic policy has been designed to protect these profit-
making strategies of large Mexican firms and their investors, both domestic and 
foreign; this has resulted in an overvalued exchange rate and increasing levels of 
international reserves needed to maintain it, as well as high domestic interest rates 
which threaten investment and employment. 
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 The results of the econometric analysis described in this chapter, of the 
aggregate relationship between capital structure and liquid asset holdings, suggests 
that increases in the ratio of financing received from long-term bonds is more 
influential on the cash holdings ratio than the availability of internal funds.  The 
evidence on cointegration of the three series is inconclusive.  Granger causality tests 
suggest that bond financing Granger causes liquid asset holdings, while no such link 
exists with internally-generated funds.  However, analysis at the aggregate level 
suffers from a number of drawbacks.  Simple ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimation requires that the variables be independent and stationary, whereas 
evidence is presented that they are not.  Cointegration refers to a linear combination 
of non-stationary variables, but it may be that the relationship is non-linear.  More 
importantly for interpretation of estimation results, aggregation excludes 
consideration of unobserved variables with heterogeneous effects across firms.   
Consequently, new techniques of mean group estimation for panel time series 
were drawn upon, allowing for both time varying heterogeneity across firms and 
cross-section dependence.  I find that the relationship between levels of bond 
financing and holdings of highly liquid assets is both positive and significant, 
whereas that between internal funds and cash holdings is negative and statistically 
less robust.  The relationship between bond financing and cash holdings gets stronger 
in the period after 2000, especially in the largest firms.  At the sectoral level, the 
relationship is strongest in the construction and information sectors across the period 
of analysis, only appearing in the manufacturing sector after 2000.   
 The chapter proceeds as follows.  It begins with a brief review of corporate 
finance theory and a survey of the empirical literature on corporate cash holdings 
that is built upon these original frameworks.  In the subsequent section, the Mexican 
dataset is described and summary statistics for key variables are provided.  The 
analysis section begins by examining the aggregate relationship between capital 
structure and cash holdings, moving on to panel time series analysis of the 
relationship at the individual firm level.  The chapter then concludes.  
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9.2	  	  CORPORATE	  FINANCE	  THEORY	  AND	  LIQUIDITY	  MANAGEMENT	  
 
One of the key pillars of the theory of modern corporate finance is the Modigliani-
Miller (1958) capital irrelevance proposition, according to which individual investors 
in a perfect market can create their desired level of leverage through portfolio 
decisions, thereby rendering the capital structure decision of an individual firm 
irrelevant for its market value.  In recognition of the fact that no such perfect market 
exists in practice, Modigliani and Miller (1963) subsequently amended the 
proposition to stress the role played by income tax provisions on debt.  By shielding 
earnings from taxes, such provisions render debt relatively more attractive than 
equity.  
To avoid the corollary of this latter proposition that all firms would use 100 
per cent debt financing, a large body of literature was spawned which attempted to 
determine the offsetting costs associated with debt financing.  So-called ‘trade-off 
theory’ initially focused on the static trade-off between the tax benefits and 
bankruptcy risks of debt financing (Kraus & Litzenberger, 1973; Myers, 1984).  
Since that time, the theory has come to encompass a wide range of theories which 
posit that firms dynamically weigh off the marginal costs of their capital structure 
against its marginal benefits, all the time moving towards an optimal position.  
Dynamic trade-off theory introduces uncertainty, expectations and transaction costs 
(Fischer, Heinkel, & Zechner, 1989; Hennessy & Whited, 2005; Kane, Marcus, & 
McDonald, 1984; Strebulaev, 2007; Titman & Tsyplakov, 2007).  In terms of cash 
holdings, the marginal cost is usually conceived as the difference between interest 
earned on cash holdings and interest that would have to be paid on additional 
external financing.  The marginal benefit is judged in terms of the ability of cash 
holdings to minimise a range of information asymmetries and transaction costs. 
The most important competing hypothesis to trade-off theory is ‘pecking 
order theory’ (Myers & Majluf, 1984; Myers, 1984), according to which adverse 
selection ensures that internal financing is monotonically preferred to external 
financing, and that where external financing is required, debt is preferred to equity.  
The theory is analytically based on information asymmetries between owners and 
outside investors, which make external financing more expensive, meaning that firms 
will forego positive net-present value projects to avoid overpaying.  Unlike trade-off 
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theory, there is no presumption that firms are targeting an optimal capital structure.  
Against empirical evidence that the pecking order does not always hold in practice, 
Jensen (1986) has argued that debt financing may be more prominent than the 
pecking order theory predicts since it commits managers to pay out future cash 
flows.  This reduces the agency costs to shareholders of ‘free cash’ that is available 
for spending at the discretion of managers.  More recently, Anderson and Carverhill 
(2012) have created a model in which firms’ optimal cash level is adjusted 
dynamically according to expected earnings; this is consistent with a ‘pecking order’ 
of funds, but as a function of business conditions, not as a universally-applicable 
heuristic.  
A large literature drawing upon these theoretical foundations empirically 
investigates the determinants of corporate cash holdings.  A range of variables 
relating to information asymmetry and transaction costs have been tested, with 
inconsistent and sometimes contradictory results.  A number of studies, for example, 
link firm size (Al-Najjar, 2013; Almeida et al., 2004; Iskandar-Datta & Jia, 2012) 
and maturity (Bigelli & Sanchez-Vidal, 2012; Dittmar & Duchin, 2011) with the 
degree of financial constraint, with constrained firms thought to hold larger cash 
hoards.  Another group of cross-country studies focuses on firms’ operating context, 
arguing that firms will hold more cash where the financial system is underdeveloped 
(Khurana et al., 2006), or more specifically where legal protection of investors is 
weak (Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, & Servaes, 2003; Kusnadi & Wei, 2011).  All of these 
arguments face an empirical challenge in the Mexican case. They fail to explain a 
secular increase in cash holdings across firms of varying sizes and sectors in a single 
country context over a period of improving investment climate and a broadly 
optimistic economic outlook. 
At a deeper analytical level, most of these studies reflect two flawed 
assumptions.  The first is that causality flows from changes in corporate operating 
characteristics to changes in capital structure.  As argued by Guo and Suliman 
(2010), there are actually four possible relationships between corporate operating 
characteristics and capital structure:  first, corporate operating characteristics cause 
changes in capital structure; second, capital structure causes changes in corporate 
operating characteristics; third, corporate operating characteristics and capital 
structure are mutually causal; and, fourth, the two are causally independent.  The 
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theory of financialisation central to this thesis is premised upon the notion that 
material changes in the world market which have afforded new financing 
opportunities to corporations are affecting their investment behaviour.  This suggests 
that capital structure and operating characteristics are likely to be mutually causal. 
Second, these studies are based on the presumption that cash is an internal 
source of funds which will ultimately be used to finance productive investment.  This 
can be contrasted with heterodox theories which view the firm as a balance sheet 
manager, with no presumption that funds will be invested in directly productive 
activities (Minsky, 1976, 2008; Toporowski, 1993, 2008).  Accordingly cash and 
cash equivalents may themselves be seen as an investment.  The latter view of the 
firm informs much of the literature on financialisation, as reviewed in chapter three, 
permeating both post-Keynesian (for example Lazonick & O’Sullivan, 2000; 
Orhangazi, 2007; Stockhammer & Grafl, 2010) and Marxian (for example Foster, 
2010a; Lapavitsas, 2013; Sweezy & Magdoff, 1987) approaches.  
 
9.3	  	  DATASET	  AND	  SAMPLE	  STATISTICS	  
 
The data are the same as those analysed in chapter eight.  They come from the 
financial statements of publicly-listed Mexican non-financial firms, as aggregated in 
the Economatica database.  The period available is from the fourth quarter of 1989 
until the present period.  Due to a major change in accounting methodology (from 
GAAP-MEX to IFRS1), the data for 2011-12 have not been used.  Quarterly data has 
been used in order to maximise the ability to capture the potentially volatile flows of 
financial assets, and to avoid year-end reporting biases2.  According to International 
Accounting Standard 29 on "Hyperinflationary Economies", the last 
hyperinflationary period for the Mexican peso was in 1998. The use of ratios 
partially mitigates this problem since both numerator and denominator are likely to 
be affected, and where there are identical effects upon the denominator in both 
                                                
1 In 2011, all firms switched from the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles of Mexico (GAAP-
MEX) to the International Financial Reporting System (IFRS).  Some firms introduced some of the 
changes required by the switch prior to this date. 
2 Note that only year-end statements are audited.    
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independent and dependent variables.  Nonetheless, results prior to 1998 should be 
treated with caution, and the main argument is built on trends post-2000.  
The panel data are unbalanced.  As shown in figure 8.01 in the previous 
chapter, the total number of active publicly-listed non-financial firms included in the 
Economatica database rises from under 20 firms in 1988 to peak at 140 firms in 2000 
before falling back slightly in recent years3.  In total over the whole period, there are 
178 non-financial firms in the dataset, 113 of which are active in the most recent 
period.  There are 10,324 individual observations in total.  Distribution of firm 
observations over time shows that five per cent of firms are observed for roughly 
three years or less; 50 per cent survive for over 15 years; and the oldest five per cent 
are observed for the entire period of 23 years. 
 There are firms from 16 different sectors4 included in the dataset.  Of this, 
four sectors are more significant in terms of the number of firms represented (see 
table 8.01, chapter eight): manufacturing (38 per cent of firms, or 44 per cent of 
observations); retail (13 per cent of firms, or 14 per cent of observations); 
construction and information (both with approximately 10 per cent of firms, or 9 per 
cent of observations).  Initially the sample is made up almost entirely of 
manufacturing firms.  In the earlier period (1989Q4 to 1999Q4), manufacturing firms 
account for 44 per cent of firms, but only 39 per cent in the later period (2000Q1 to 
2010Q4); construction and information firms account for a rising share over time.  
The proportion of manufacturing firms to non-manufacturing firms was roughly 
maintained throughout the later period.   
Unlike sector, where firm characteristics do not vary5, a firm’s size may 
change over time in both absolute and relative terms.  For this reason, and strictly for 
indicative purposes, the firms have been divided into the largest 25th percentile, the 
middle 50th percentile, and the smallest 25th percentile, by total assets6.  By definition 
therefore the largest 25th percentile contains one-quarter of the individual 
observations; however it does not necessarily contain one-quarter of firms.  Analysis 
                                                
3 Multiple share classes have been treated as a single corporation. 
4 North American Industry Classification System (NAICS), level one. 
5 It is possible that a firm could switch sector, but in practice it was verified that they have not. 
6 The stock of total assets was preferred to other possible measures of firm size.  This was to avoid the 
greater volatility associated with the use of the flow figure for revenues; data on the number of 
employees, a measure commonly used to differentiate firms by size, was unavailable. 
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in the previous chapter shows that, in terms of size, the structural composition of the 
sample is consistent over time7. 
The analysis in chapter eight found that there had been a significant increase 
in firm holdings of cash and cash equivalents8, therefore the dependent variable of 
interest is the level of cash and cash equivalents as a share of total assets (CSH_TA)9.  
Ratios are used throughout to normalise the data.  Changes in the holdings of these 
highly liquid assets are assessed against changes in capital structure: long-term bonds 
as a share of total liabilities10 (BNDSLT_TL); debt as a share of total liabilities11 
(DBT_TL); and available internal funds, as approximated by earnings before interest 
and tax as a share of net operating revenues (EBIT_REV).  Data from the balance 
sheet and income statement were preferred to those from the cash flow statement due 
to the more complete coverage of the former12.   The use of earnings before interest 
and tax13 has the advantage of capturing internal funds available before decisions are 
made about whether to make financial investments (or repayments), and before 
taxes, where accounting techniques used to manipulate tax payments and changes in 
tax regulations over time introduce additional complications.  The use of retained 
earnings would suffer from the same complications (reflecting the accumulation of 
net income/losses over time) and additional ones related to adjustments for items 
such as accruals from non-monetary assets, changes in the fair value of financial 
instruments and other assets, and equity valuations for mergers and acquisitions.   
                                                
7 It would have been desirable to disaggregate the data by level of foreign revenue and ownership 
structure.  The former would have allowed assessing changes in the capital structure – liquid asset 
relationship in relation to the degree of export orientation, while the latter would have allowed 
analysis of the importance of various forms of ownership.  Unfortunately, the data are not available, 
leaving such analysis for a future date. 
8 Cash is measured at nominal value and consists of non-interest bearing bank deposits and restricted 
cash. Cash equivalents consisting principally of short-term bank deposits and fixed-rate investments 
with original maturities of three months or less are recorded at acquisition cost plus accrued interest 
income not yet received, which is similar to listed market prices. 
9 For the older accounting template for industrial firms (IND&COMMX), cash and cash equivalents is 
a separate line item from short-term investments.  For the newer template (IND2MEXICO), short-
term investments needed to be subtracted from cash and short-term investments to arrive at the same. 
10 Long-term bonds was selected over either short-term bonds or the sum of long- and short-term 
bonds due to the parallel trajectory of long-term bonds with cash holdings uncovered in chapter eight. 
11 This is the sum of both short- (less than one year) and long-term (greater than one year) debt. 
12 Moreover, while the cash flow statement does offer cash from operating activities, it does not 
disaggregate the figure for cash from financing activities between debt, securities and equity. 
13 EBIT is equal to net operating revenues less the cost of goods sold and operating expenses.  For the 
older accounting template for industrial firms (IND&COMMX), EBIT is used.  For the newer 
template (IND2MEXICO), both EBIT and its Spanish equivalent ‘utilidades (perdidas) antes otros 
ingresos/gastos’ are variously used and had to be manually reconciled. 
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Two other candidate independent variables were considered.  Foreign 
liabilities as a share of total liabilities could reveal any impact that increased reliance 
on foreign funding has on cash management. Derivatives as a share of total assets 
could provide a test of the relationship between anticipated volatility and cash 
holdings.  However, in both cases, the limited availability of data precluded this 
further analysis14. 
 
9.4	  	  ANALYSIS	  I:	  	  WHOLE	  SAMPLE	  AGGREGATE	  RELATIONSHIP	  
 
As a first step, the aggregate relationship, that is the relationship across the whole 
sample of listed firms as opposed to individual firms, was examined between capital 
structure and cash management.  Bank debt as a correlate of increased cash holdings 
was ruled out as an independent variable at the aggregate level due to the pronounced 
downward trend in bank debt as a share of liabilities during the period in question15.  
Equity was ruled out for similar reasons.  Therefore, it was left to examine whether 
increases in cash holdings are more closely associated with increased bond financing, 
or with increased profitability16.   
From descriptive statistics (table 9.01), it is clear that CSH_TA is skewed to 
the right, as might be expected for a ratio variable with most observations near zero.   
BNDSLT_TL is also skewed right, though less severely so. EBIT_REV is the most 
platykurtic, and appears to be bimodal with peaks around 15 and 27 per cent.  For the 
sake of completeness, the bank debt ratio was also examined.  DBT_TL is skewed 
left, though inspection of the histogram suggests this may be a multimodal variable 
perhaps reflecting structural composition effects in the sample.  On balance, this 
suggests that the variables of interest are non-normal. 
                                                
14 Disaggregated data on derivatives holdings is only available from 2005, and then only for a limited 
sub-set of firms. 
15 It is possible that increased cash holdings are correlated with decreased bank loans if the former 
reflects decreased access to bank loans which firms are compensating for by holding increased cash.  
However this hypothesis is not tested here. 
16 An alternative measure is cash from operating activities as a share of net operating revenues 
(CSHOP_REV).  This has the advantage of excluding non-cash profits generated from depreciation, 
intangibles, etc..  EBIT_REV has been preferred in the analysis since there are more observations 
available (more firms make income statement data available over cash flow data), and because 
preliminary visual inspection suggests an upward trend in EBIT_REV from 2000, whereas 
CSHOP_REV is flat.   
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   CSH_TA	   BNDSLT_TL	   EBIT_REV	   DBT_TL	  
Mean	   0.017625	   0.133575	   0.196294	   0.372477	  
Median	   0.013884	   0.114125	   0.161116	   0.390262	  
Maximum	   0.051466	   0.244426	   0.312014	   0.506049	  
Minimum	   0.003799	   0.048224	   0.069682	   0.195124	  
Std.	  Dev.	   0.010923	   0.056190	   0.059824	   0.097990	  
Skewness	   1.440882	   0.562476	   0.433410	   -­‐0.319361	  
Kurtosis	   4.405156	   2.030259	   1.698422	   1.772474	  
Jarque-­‐Bera	   36.40490	   7.812621	   8.661078	   6.781530	  
Probability	   0.000000	   0.020115	   0.013160	   0.033683	  
Sum	   1.498133	   11.35386	   16.68495	   31.66055	  
Sum	  Sq.	  Dev.	   0.010022	   0.265211	   0.300631	   0.806575	  
	   	   	   	   	  
Observations	   85	   85	   85	   85	  
 
Table 9.01: Descriptive statistics for aggregate variables of interest 
 
 
Three methods were subsequently used to examine the relationship between 
the variables: basic OLS estimation, cointegration testing, and Granger causality 
testing.  First, results of the simple OLS regression of bond financing on cash 
holdings give the impression that there may be a relationship.  The coefficient of 
bond financing is significant17 at 0.16, suggesting that the cash holdings ratio is 
approximately 16 per cent (or about one-sixth) of the bond financing ratio.  R-
squared is 0.6517.  A scatter plot of the two-way data points of cash holdings and 
bond financing, along with the fitted values from the regression is shown in figure 
9.01, which gives the appearance of a linear relationship.  However, the Durbin-
Watson statistic, at significantly less than two, indicates positive serial correlation, 
and therefore hypothesis tests may be invalid.   
 
                                                
17 Testing is conducted at the five per cent significance level unless otherwise noted. 
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Figure 9.01: Scatter plot of bond financing and cash holdings (aggregated for all 
firms) and fitted values 
 
Regressing EBIT_REV on CSH_TA yields a significant coefficient of 0.12 but 
an R-squared value of only 0.364518. This suggests that bond financing has more 
power in explaining levels of cash holdings than internally generated funds. 
However, it is possible at this stage that the relationships are under- or mis-specified, 
as indicated by the low Durbin-Watson statistic.  An additional check of the 
robustness of these relationships is to examine the relationship between first 
differences of the variables.  The results of the scatter plot of first differences of 
CSH_TA and BNDSLT_TL, in figure 9.02, show no clear relation, reflecting the 
intuition gained through inspection of the descriptive statistics, and suggesting that 
the apparent relationship shown previously in aggregate levels may be a spurious 
one19.   
                                                
18 Regressing CSHOP_REV, that is cash from operating activities as a share of net operating revenues, 
on CSH_TA yields a significant coefficient of 0.08 but an R-squared value of only 0.0674.  It was 
argued in chapter eight that CSH_TA is a better proxy for the availability of internal funds than 
CSHOP_REV. 
19 Other possible explanations for the absence of a clear relationship are discussed in the section on 
firm-level relations below. 
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Figure 9.02: Scatter plot of first differences of bond financing and cash holdings 
(aggregated for all firms) 
 
It seems likely that the most powerful predictor of the CSH_TA ratio in any 
given period would be its value in the previous period.  OLS regression was 
conducted regressing the lagged value of CSH_TA, as well as BNDSLT_TL and 
EBIT_REV on CSH_TA.  The coefficient of bond financing is once again significant, 
though at a more modest level (0.05); the coefficient of profitability is insignificant 
and near zero.  As expected, the coefficient for the lagged value of CSH_TA is large 
(0.70) and significant.  The overall R-squared value is 0.811420.  Durbin-Watson 
statistics are ineffective in the presence of lagged dependent variables, however 
Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation testing rejects the null of no serial correlation for 
the equation with one lag. 
With doubts over the robustness of basic OLS estimation, the next step is to 
examine whether or not the aggregate time series are cointegrated.  Using the 
augmented Dickey-Fuller test, for both CSH_TA and BNDSLT_TL the null 
                                                
20 Nearly identical results are obtained if CSHOP_REV is used as the ratio for internally-generated 
cash rather than EBIT_REV. 
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hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected with zero lags and trend included; however, 
for all other lag lengths, both trended and non-trended, the null hypothesis of a unit 
root can not be rejected.  For EBIT_REV, the null with zero lags, trended and non-
trended can not be rejected; nor can the null for all greater lag lengths21.  The 
modified Dickey-Fuller t test (known as the DF-GLS test) is an augmented DF test 
with the time series transformed via a Generalised Least Squares (GLS) regression 
before performing the test.  The null hypothesis of a unit root can not be rejected for 
all lag lengths at all significance levels for variables CSH_TA and BNDSLT_TL.  For 
EBIT_REV the null hypothesis can be rejected for one lag; for all greater lags the null 
can not be rejected22.  Finally, the Phillips-Perron unit root test can be viewed as 
Dickey–Fuller statistics that have been made robust to serial correlation by using the 
Newey–West heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent covariance matrix 
estimator.  The Phillips-Perron test can not reject the null hypothesis of a unit root 
for CSH_TA,  BNDSLT_TL and EBIT_REV, with a Newey-West lag length of 
three23. 
On the balance of evidence presented, it appears that CSH_TA, BNDSLT_TL 
and EBIT_REV all contain a unit root (while CSHOP_REV does not), allowing the 
next step of cointegration testing.  First, for the Engle-Granger residuals-based 
approach the cointegrating regression is performed; if the variables are not 
cointegrated, the residuals will be I(1); if they are cointegrated, the residuals will be 
I(0).  To test this, a Cointegrating Regression Augmented Dickey-Fuller (CRADF) 
test is conducted.  For CSH_TA and BNDSLT_TL the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration can not be rejected24.  The same was true for the reverse cointegrating 
regression.  Conducting the CRADF test of CSH_TA and EBIT_REV also does not 
allow the rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration in either direction.  A 
second test of cointegration is the Error Correction Model (ECM) t-test.  If the 
variables are cointegrated, then the coefficient on the disequilibrium error should be 
negative and significant. For CSH_TA and BNDSLT_TL, the null hypothesis that the 
                                                
21 For CSHOP_REV, for all relevant lag lengths, with and without the inclusion of a trend, the null 
hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected. 
22 The null hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected for the variable CSHOP_REV for all lags less than 
or equal to five. 
23 The null hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected for the variable CSHOP_REV at the default lag 
length. 
24 This is true both with and without a constant, and at all lag lengths. 
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two variables are not cointegrated can be rejected; however the null can not be 
rejected for the reverse relationship.  The ECM t-test of CSH_TA and EBIT_REV 
allows rejection of the null hypothesis that the variables are not cointegrated for the 
reverse cointegration only.  Finally, where the previous approaches are of low power, 
cointegration testing using the Johansen (1991) system-based reduced rank 
regression approach is preferred. According to this test, there are no cointegrating 
relations under all five trend assumptions25 for either CSH_TA and BNDSLT_TL, or 
for CSH_TA and EBIT_REV.  However, Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001) have argued 
that the critical values differ depending on whether or not dependent and independent 
variables are I(0) or I(1).  Using their table of asymptotic critical value bounds of the 
F-statistic for I(1) variables, there is a cointegrating relation under the assumption of 
a restricted intercept and no trend for the variables CSH_TA and BNDSLT_TL.  In 
sum, the evidence suggests that while the three variables of interest are I(1), the 
evidence over cointegration is inconclusive. 
Finally, Granger causality testing attempts to establish precedence in time.  If 
event A occurs before event B, then A is said to have Granger caused B.  If the 
prediction of the current value of y is improved by using past values of x, then x is 
said to Granger cause y.  By transposing x and y, it is possible to test whether y 
Granger causes x.  BNDSLT_TL Granger causes CSH_TA for lags of one and two 
quarters, but not for lags of three quarters and greater; CSH_TA Granger causes 
BNDSLT_TL for lags of one quarter only.  This suggests that there is a degree of 
mutual Granger causality between the two variables.  Carrying out the test for 
variables CSH_TA and EBIT_REV does not suggest any Granger causality at any lag 
length.  
Concluding the analysis of the aggregate relationship, basic OLS estimation 
suggests a significant relationship between BNDSLT_TL and CSH_TA, but not 
between EBIT_REV and CSH_TA.  However, inspection of descriptive statistics, 
histograms and examination of the relationship of first differences gives reason to 
question the robustness of OLS estimation in these circumstances.  While the 
variables of interest appear to all have a unit root, the evidence on cointegration is 
                                                
25 No intercept, no trend; restricted intercept and no trend; unrestricted intercept and no trend; 
unrestricted intercept and restricted trend; unrestricted intercept and unrestricted trend. 
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inconclusive.  Finally, there is some evidence that BNDSLT_TL Granger causes 
CSH_TA, where no such link exists between EBIT_REV and CSH_TA. 
 
9.5	  	  ANALYSIS	  II:	  	  FIRM-­‐LEVEL	  RELATIONSHIP	  USING	  PANEL	  TIME	  SERIES	  
ANALYSIS	  
 
I begin with descriptive statistics for the variables of interest at the firm level: 
CSH_TA (cash / total assets); BNDSLT_TL (long-term bonds / total liabilities); 
DBT_TL (total debt / total liabilities)26; and EBIT_REV (earnings before interest and 
tax / net operating revenue).  This shows that three of the four variables (CSH_TA, 
BNDSLT_TL, and DBT_TL) are skewed to the right, as would be expected for ratio 
variables where most observations are expected to be above zero (see table 9.02).  
The left skewness of EBIT_REV appears to be caused by an outlier(s).  All four 
variables are leptokurtic, suggesting the need both to eliminate observations of zero 
and signaling the presence of outliers. 
 
Variable	   Mean	   Std	  
Dev	  
Min	   Max	   Skew
-­‐ness	  
Kurt-­‐
osis	  
Obs27	  
CSH_TA	   overall	   .0187	   .0309	   -­‐.2112	   .4624	   4.55	   36.88	   10100	  
	   between	   	   .0196	   .0002	   .1618	   	   	   178	  
	   within	   	   .0249	   -­‐.1964	   .4322	   	   	   57	  
BNDSLT_TL	   overall	   .0805	   .1531	   0	   .9989	   2.46	   10.18	   10095	  
	   between	   	   .1300	   0	   .8603	   	   	   178	  
	   within	   	   .1058	   -­‐.7798	   .7662	   	   	   57	  
EBIT_REV	   overall	   -­‐1.0624	   80.8791	   -­‐7815	   5.9394	   -­‐94.39	   9101.74	   9576	  
	   between	   	   18.2671	   -­‐240.323	   .5877	   	   	   177	  
	   within	   	   79.5618	   -­‐7575.74	   239.3176	   	   	   54	  
DBT_TL	   overall	   .3459	   .2774	   -­‐1.419	   10.6231	   5.23	   188.55	   10092	  
	   between	   	   .1894	   0	   .7785	   	   	   178	  
	   within	   	   .2111	   -­‐1.7574	   10.3022	   	   	   57	  
 
Table 9.02: Descriptive statistics for firm-level variables 
 
                                                
26 While bank debt could be ruled out at the aggregate level due to its declining trend over the period 
of the dataset, it is included here since it may be relevant at the firm level for specific sectors, size of 
firm, or time periods. 
27 The default for Stata is to include observations of zero in the observation count.  Observations of 
zero will be removed in subsequent analysis. 
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Next scatterplots are examined of the independent variables against the 
dependent variable CSH_TA (for observations which are non-empty for both 
variables). Table 9.03 summarises the relationships for: the whole sample; the largest 
quartile of firms (by asset size); and by sector. 
 
Independent	  
variable	  
Whole	  	  
sample	  
Largest	  	  
firms	  
Sectoral	  detail	  
BNDSLT_TL	   Positive	   Accentuated	   +	  info	  
-­‐	  retail	  
EBIT_REV	   Not	  significant	   Slight	  positive	   +	  mining	  
n/a	  all	  else	  
DBT_TL	   Negative	   Accentuated	   -­‐	  cnstrn,	  info,	  mining,	  retail	  
n/a	  all	  else	  
Table 9.03: Summary of visual inspection of scatterplots 
 
 
For example, the relationship between CSH_TA and BNDSLT_TL is positive 
for the whole sample.  That is, as cash as a share of total assets rises, so too do long-
term bonds as a share of total liabilities.  The positive relationship is strengthened 
where the scatterplot is limited only to the largest quartile of firms by asset size.  
When plots are disaggregated by sector, the strongest positive relationship appears to 
be in the information sector, while the retail sector stands out as having a negative 
relationship between the variables.  Figure 9.03 provides an example of the 
scatterplot of CSH_TA and BNDSLT_TL limited to observations of the largest firms. 
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Figure 9.03: Scatter plot of bond financing on cash holdings (individual firm 
observations) and fitted values 
 
9.5.1	  	  Mean	  group	  estimation	  	  
 
In the prior section, the analysis of aggregated time-series for the whole sample 
suffers from a number of weaknesses.  Simple OLS estimation requires that the 
variables be stationary, whereas evidence has been presented to suggest that they are 
stochastic nonstationary.  Cointegration refers to a linear combination of non-
stationary variables.  It may be that the relationship is non-linear.  Most importantly, 
aggregation excludes consideration of unobserved variables.  These unobserved 
variables may be time constant (‘unobserved effects’).  When the unit of observation 
is the firm, time constant unobserved effects capture characteristics such as 
managerial quality or firm structure.  First generation panel time series methods 
designed to capture these unobserved effects assumed that panel members were 
cross-sectionally independent.  These gave way to methods which address 
correlation across panel members.  Such correlation is likely to be common amongst 
firms in the same economy or even more so in the same sector. 
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Recent advances in the analysis of panel data where both the cross-section 
(N) and the time series (T) are large have introduced techniques to allow for time 
varying heterogeneity and cross-section dependence (the following draws upon the 
work of Eberhardt, 2012).  These estimators are based on the following general 
model: 
 !!" =   !!!!" +   !!"                                                     (9.1) 
where  !!" =   !!! +   !!!! +   !!"                        (9.2) !!" =   !!! +   !!!! +   !!!! +   !!"                                     (9.3) 
 
βi is the firm-specific slope on the observable regressor (equation 9.1), while !!" 
contains the unobservable variables and the error terms.  The unobservables 
(equation 9.2) are composed of fixed effects !!!  capturing time invariant 
heterogeneity across groups, such as managerial quality; and an unobserved common 
factor !!  with heterogeneous factor loadings !!  which can capture time varying 
heterogeneity and cross-section dependence, capturing such issues as 
macroeconomic or sectoral factors.  Factors !! and !! can be non-linear and non-
stationary (equation 9.3).   
All mean group (MG) type estimators estimate N firm-specific OLS 
regressions, and then average the estimated coefficients across groups.  The original 
Pesaran and Smith (1995) MG estimator models unobservables with a linear trend.  
Equation (9.1) is estimated for each firm, with an intercept to capture fixed effects 
and a linear trend to capture time varying unobservables.  Estimated coefficients are 
averaged across firms.   
The Pesaran (2006) common correlated effects mean group estimator 
(CCEMG) allows for non-linear unobservable variables.  Apart from the regressors !!" and an intercept, the firm-specific regression equation includes the cross-section 
averages of the dependent and independent variables (using data from the entire 
panel) as additional regressors.  The estimated coefficients are then averaged across 
panel members.28   
                                                
28  A third MG estimator, the augmented mean group estimator (AMG), was dropped due to 
conformability errors in estimation. The developer of the AMG estimator, Professor Markus 
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Results for the implementation of the MG and CCEMG (both with and 
without a firm-specific trend) estimators on the relationship between CSH_TA and 
BNDSLT_TL, and between CSH_TA and EBIT_REV, reporting unweighted 
coefficient averages, are given in the tables below.  Also reported are the coefficient 
for the independent variable and the intercept using a basic fixed effects regression 
of the form: 
 !!" −   !! = !!" −   !! ! + (!!" −   !!)                                          (9.4) 
 
Unlike the mean group estimations, the basic fixed effects regression does not 
estimate N firm-specific regressions averaging coefficients across these groups, but 
calculates a single regression which attempts to account for firm specific effects.  If β 
is random and independent of x, then fixed effects is unbiased.  However, with 
lagged dependent variables (LDV) and/or heterogeneous coefficients on the LDV 
and the independent variable, fixed effects is inconsistent.  The two sources of this 
inconsistency with LDV come from fixed-T downward Nickell bias (1981), which 
does not go away as N gets large but does as T gets large, and the heterogeneity 
upward bias which remains as T gets large. 
Typically within the literature on firm behavior (for example Haw et al., 
2011; Kusnadi & Wei, 2011) a number of data cleaning steps may be considered 
depending on the objective of the analysis.  This might include, for example, the 
elimination of:   
 -­‐ firms with fewer than a minimum number of observations;  -­‐ sectors which exhibit distinctive behaviour or those with less than a minimum 
number of firms;  -­‐ firms with negative book value;  -­‐ firms exhibiting extreme growth or contraction;  -­‐ firms with less than a certain level of assets (for example, book value of 
assets less than US$10 million); and -­‐ extreme values of variables/ratios of interest at the 1st and 99th percentiles 
through winsorisation. 
 
                                                                                                                                     
Eberhardt, was unable to locate and resolve the problem, advising the author to use the CCEMG 
estimator. 
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For the analysis here, the sample was restricted to observations where 
variables of interest were non-negative (and non-empty).  This first restriction 
limited the sample to 3301 observations over 115 firms, compared to 10324 
observations over 178 firms for the unrestricted sample.  Following standard practice 
enumerated above for analysis of firm panel time series, a number of measures were 
taken to improve data robustness with due consideration of the risks of introducing 
sample bias.  First, firms were eliminated which did not have a minimum of 20 
observations (five years) for the variables of interest.  Second, firms from anomalous 
sectors (public administration and real estate29) were eliminated.  Third, observations 
were eliminated where the firm was in a situation of negative book value30.  Finally, 
observations above the 99th percentile for the variables of interest were removed31.  
After these additional measures, the restricted sample had 2788 observations over 72 
firms.  The restricted sample was consistent with the whole sample in sectoral 
distribution, though showed a bias towards larger firms.  This is expected, since 
larger firms are more likely to issue securities; it does not however pose a problem 
for the analysis since it is the behaviour of these securities-issuing firms which is of 
interest.  
Estimations were made of the relationship between the dependent variable, 
CSH_TA, and the independent variables (first BNDSLT_TL, then EBIT_REV), using 
fixed effects, mean group, and common correlated effects mean group estimators.  
The estimations were carried out for the whole (restricted) sample (table 9.04) and 
four sub-sample groupings: first, restricted to the largest quartile of firms by asset 
size (table 9.05); second, restricted to the period after 2000 when the growth of the 
aggregated ratios CSH_TA and BNDSLT_TL increases markedly (see figures 8.08 
and 8.04 in previous chapter) (table 9.06); third, combinations of the previous two 
sub-groupings (table 9.07); and, finally, restricted to the four most significant sectors 
(manufacturing, construction, information and retail; results described below). 
                                                
29 There was a single firm in the sector of public administration which displayed outlying behaviour 
for both variables of interest.  The real estate sector was dropped since it is considered to operate 
according to distinctive funding and investment norms from other non-financial firms. 
30 Negative book value is a situation where total assets minus total liabilities is less than zero.  It is 
expected that firms in this position are at or near bankruptcy, and therefore their funding and 
investment behaviour will be erratic. 
31 Observations in the first percentile were not removed since the variables are expressed in ratio form, 
and negative observations had already been eliminated. 
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Table 9.04: Whole sample FE and MG estimation of BNDSLT_TL on CSH_TA 
 
	   [1]	   [2]	   [3]	   [4]	   [5]	  
	   FE	   MG	   MG	   CCEMG	   CCEMG	  
	   CSH_TA	   CSH_TA	   CSH_TA	   CSH_TA	   CSH_TA	  
Number	  of	  obs	   2788	   2788	   2788	   2788	   2788	  
Number	  of	  groups	   72	   72	   72	   72	   72	  
BNDSLT_TL	   0.0085	   0.0465	   0.0556	   0.0285	   -­‐0.1124	  
	   [2.86]**	   [1.37]^	   [1.45]^	   [1.26]^	   [-­‐0.88]	  
Firm	  trend	   n/a	   n/a	   0.0003	   n/a	   -­‐0.0013	  
	   	   	   [2.22]**	   	   [-­‐1.07]	  
Intercept	   0.0176	   0.0133	   -­‐0.0011	   -­‐0.0017	   0.0200	  
	   [23.86]**	   [3.36]**	   [-­‐0.14]	   [-­‐0.32]	   [1.03]	  
No.	  significant	  trends	   n/a	   n/a	   40	   n/a	   21	  
RMSE	   n/a	   0.0155	   0.0135	   0.0127	   0.0116	  
Notes:	  t/z	  statistics	  are	  reported	  in	  square	  brackets.	  Statistical	  significance	  at	  the	  20%,	  10%	  and	  5%	  	  
level	  is	  indicated	  with	  ^,	  *	  and	  **,	  respectively.	  
 
Table 9.05: Large firm FE and MG estimation of BNDSLT_TL on CSH_TA 
 
	   [1]	   [2]	   [3]	   [4]	   [5]	  
	   FE	   MG	   MG	   CCEMG	   CCEMG	  
	   CSH_TA	   CSH_TA	   CSH_TA	   CSH_TA	   CSH_TA	  
Number	  of	  obs	   1279	   1277	   1277	   1277	   1277	  
Number	  of	  groups	   41	   39	   39	   39	   39	  
BNDSLT_TL	   0.0158	   0.0322	   -­‐0.0056	   0.0240	   -­‐0.0837	  
	   [3.37]**	   [1.03]	   [-­‐0.06]	   [0.62]	   [-­‐0.49]	  
Firm	  trend	   n/a	   n/a	   0.0021	   n/a	   0.0034	  
	   	   	   [0.80]	   	   [0.71]	  
Intercept	   0.0155	   0.0175	   -­‐0.2400	   0.0084	   -­‐0.3536	  
	   [15.04]**	   [2.52]**	   [-­‐0.99]	   [0.38]	   [-­‐0.80]	  
No.	  significant	  trends	   n/a	   n/a	   19	   n/a	   16	  
RMSE	   n/a	   0.0139	   0.0117	   0.0114	   0.0103	  
Notes:	  t/z	  statistics	  are	  reported	  in	  square	  brackets.	  Statistical	  significance	  at	  the	  20%,	  10%	  and	  5%	  	  
level	  is	  indicated	  with	  ^,	  *	  and	  **,	  respectively.	  
 
Table 9.06: Post-2000 FE and MG estimation of BNDSLT_TL on CSH_TA 
 
	   [1]	   [2]	   [3]	   [4]	   [5]	  
	   FE	   MG	   MG	   CCEMG	   CCEMG	  
	   CSH_TA	   CSH_TA	   CSH_TA	   CSH_TA	   CSH_TA	  
Number	  of	  obs	   1673	   1671	   1662	   1671	   1662	  
Number	  of	  groups	   62	   61	   58	   61	   58	  
BNDSLT_TL	   0.0145	   0.0806	   0.0403	   0.0722	   0.0270	  
	   [2.94]**	   [1.04]	   [3.18]**	   [0.94]	   [1.92]**	  
Firm	  trend	   n/a	   n/a	   0.0002	   n/a	   -­‐0.0003	  
	   	   	   [1.48]	   	   [-­‐1.16]	  
Intercept	   0.0207	   0.0062	   -­‐0.0042	   0.0102	   0.0079	  
	   [16.32]**	   [0.62]	   [-­‐0.42]	   [0.93]	   [0.69]	  
No.	  significant	  trends	   n/a	   n/a	   27	   n/a	   20	  
RMSE	   n/a	   0.0163	   0.0147	   0.0135	   0.0122	  
Notes:	  t/z	  statistics	  are	  reported	  in	  square	  brackets.	  Statistical	  significance	  at	  the	  20%,	  10%	  and	  5%	  	  
level	  is	  indicated	  with	  ^,	  *	  and	  **,	  respectively.	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Table 9.07: Post-2000 large firm FE and MG estimation of BNDSLT_TL on CSH_TA 
 
	   [1]	   [2]	   [3]	   [4]	   [5]	  
	   FE	   MG	   MG	   CCEMG	   CCEMG	  
	   CSH_TA	   CSH_TA	   CSH_TA	   CSH_TA	   CSH_TA	  
Number	  of	  obs	   761	   755	   752	   755	   752	  
Number	  of	  groups	   34	   30	   29	   30	   29	  
BNDSLT_TL	   0.0185	   -­‐0.0279	   0.0929	   0.0406	   0.1432	  
	   [2.40]**	   [-­‐0.46]	   [1.57]*	   [2.10]**	   [1.25]^	  
Firm	  trend	   n/a	   n/a	   0.0040	   n/a	   0.0063	  
	   	   	   [1.20]	   	   [1.01]	  
Intercept	   0.0198	   0.0177	   -­‐0.3658	   -­‐0.0076	   -­‐0.5903	  
	   [11.28]**	   [2.11]**	   [-­‐1.13]	   [-­‐0.62]	   [-­‐1.01]	  
No.	  significant	  trends	   n/a	   n/a	   12	   n/a	   8	  
RMSE	   n/a	   0.0150	   0.0126	   0.0123	   0.0111	  
Notes:	  t/z	  statistics	  are	  reported	  in	  square	  brackets.	  Statistical	  significance	  at	  the	  20%,	  10%	  and	  5%	  	  
level	  is	  indicated	  with	  ^,	  *	  and	  **,	  respectively.	  
 
For the whole sample, the relationship between CSH_TA and BNDSLT_TL is 
significant for the fixed effects estimation though the coefficient is near-zero; the 
coefficient is positive between 0.03 and 0.06 for the other significant estimations.   
For large firms over the whole period, the results are not significant, with the 
exception of the fixed effects estimation, and the signs of the estimations are not 
consistent.  For the period after 2000, all coefficients are positive between 0.02 and 
0.04, three of which are significant at the five per cent level.  For large firms after 
2000, all the significant estimations are positive and ranging between 0.02 and 0.14.  
This suggests that the relationship between BNDSLT_TL and CSH_TA is positive and 
gets stronger in the period after 2000, especially in larger firms. 
Drilling down to the sectoral level32, for manufacturing firms, there are no 
significant coefficients and the sign of the relationship is inconsistent over the whole 
period.  However, the coefficients are universally positive after 2000, with the MG 
estimation with trend yielding a coefficient of 0.02.  For firms in the construction 
sector, all estimations are positive and significant for the whole period, ranging 
between 0.04 and 0.10.  After 2000, the relationship becomes stronger, ranging 
between 0.07 and 0.11 for the significant estimations.  For firms in the information 
sector, the coefficient for BNDSLT_TL is positive between 0.03 and 0.07 for all 
estimations (though only the fixed effects estimation is significant at the 20 per cent 
                                                
32 Caution should be taken in the interpretation of these results, as outside of the manufacturing sector, 
the number of firms under analysis is small, reducing the power of the mean group estimations. 
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level or better), both for the whole period, and for the period after 2000.  Finally, 
retail firms exhibit decidedly different behaviour.  The universally significant 
relationship is negative, ranging from -0.02 to -0.05 for the whole period; after 2000 
the sign is inconsistent and the coefficients insignificant.   
To compare the relative influence of bond financing on liquid asset holdings 
with that of internal funds on liquid assets, the sample was additionally restricted to 
those observations which satisfied the previous criteria with the additional condition 
that EBIT_REV was non-negative and non-empty.  This reduced the sample to 2386 
observations over 62 firms. 
 
Table 9.08: Whole sample FE and MG estimation of EBIT_REV on CSH_TA 
  
	   [1]	   [2]	   [3]	   [4]	   [5]	  
	   FE	   MG	   MG	   CCEMG	   CCEMG	  
	   CSH_TA	   CSH_TA	   CSH_TA	   CSH_TA	   CSH_TA	  
Number	  of	  obs	   2386	   2386	   2386	   2386	   2386	  
Number	  of	  groups	   62	   62	   62	   62	   62	  
EBIT_REV	   -­‐0.0095	   -­‐0.0310	   0.0183	   0.0161	   0.0088	  
	   [-­‐1.31]	   [-­‐0.95]	   [0.28]	   [0.47]	   [0.27]	  
Firm	  trend	   n/a	   n/a	   0.0003	   n/a	   -­‐0.0004	  
	   	   	   [1.98]**	   	   [-­‐1.80]*	  
Intercept	   0.0216	   0.0224	   -­‐0.0011	   0.0069	   0.0453	  
	   [19.22]**	   [4.78]**	   [-­‐0.11]	   [0.55]	   [1.76]*	  
No.	  significant	  trends	   n/a	   n/a	   30	   n/a	   20	  
RMSE	   n/a	   0.0161	   0.0136	   0.0127	   0.0118	  
Notes:	  t/z	  statistics	  are	  reported	  in	  square	  brackets.	  Statistical	  significance	  at	  the	  20%,	  10%	  and	  5%	  	  
level	  is	  indicated	  with	  ^,	  *	  and	  **,	  respectively.	  
 
 
Table 9.09: Large firm FE and MG estimation of EBIT_REV on CSH_TA 
 
	   [1]	   [2]	   [3]	   [4]	   [5]	  
	   FE	   MG	   MG	   CCEMG	   CCEMG	  
	   CSH_TA	   CSH_TA	   CSH_TA	   CSH_TA	   CSH_TA	  
Number	  of	  obs	   1129	   1125	   1125	   1125	   1125	  
Number	  of	  groups	   37	   34	   34	   34	   34	  
EBIT_REV	   -­‐0.0137	   -­‐0.0824	   -­‐0.0300	   0.0154	   0.0088	  
	   [-­‐1.47]	   [-­‐1.68]*	   [-­‐0.91]	   [0.38]	   [0.20]	  
Firm	  trend	   n/a	   n/a	   0.0004	   n/a	   0.0001	  
	   	   	   [1.22]	   	   [0.18]	  
Intercept	   0.0210	   0.0305	   -­‐0.0191	   0.0132	   -­‐0.0078	  
	   [12.87]**	   [3.55]**	   [-­‐0.68]	   [0.87]	   [-­‐0.30]	  
No.	  significant	  trends	   n/a	   n/a	   15	   n/a	   8	  
RMSE	   n/a	   0.0150	   0.0119	   0.0116	   0.0107	  
Notes:	  t/z	  statistics	  are	  reported	  in	  square	  brackets.	  Statistical	  significance	  at	  the	  20%,	  10%	  and	  5%	  	  
level	  is	  indicated	  with	  ^,	  *	  and	  **,	  respectively. 
 
Chapter	  9	  	  Capital	  structure	  and	  liquid	  asset	  management	  
 
297 
 
Table 9.10: Post-2000 FE and MG estimation of EBIT_REV on CSH_TA 
 
	   [1]	   [2]	   [3]	   [4]	   [5]	  
	   FE	   MG	   MG	   CCEMG	   CCEMG	  
	   CSH_TA	   CSH_TA	   CSH_TA	   CSH_TA	   CSH_TA	  
Number	  of	  obs	   1509	   1509	   1506	   1509	   1506	  
Number	  of	  groups	   51	   51	   50	   51	   50	  
EBIT_REV	   0.0020	   -­‐0.0641	   -­‐0.0420	   -­‐0.0440	   -­‐0.0288	  
	   [0.16]	   [-­‐1.20]	   [-­‐0.64]	   [-­‐0.61]	   [-­‐0.49]	  
Firm	  trend	   n/a	   n/a	   0.0005	   n/a	   -­‐0.0005	  
	   	   	   [3.35]**	   	   [-­‐1.92]*	  
Intercept	   0.0241	   0.0288	   -­‐0.0092	   0.0514	   0.0791	  
	   [12.48]**	   [3.94]**	   [-­‐0.66]	   [1.71]*	   [2.26]**	  
No.	  significant	  trends	   n/a	   n/a	   21	   n/a	   11	  
RMSE	   n/a	   0.0170	   0.0141	   0.0128	   0.0118	  
Notes:	  t/z	  statistics	  are	  reported	  in	  square	  brackets.	  Statistical	  significance	  at	  the	  20%,	  10%	  and	  5%	  	  
level	  is	  indicated	  with	  ^,	  *	  and	  **,	  respectively. 
 
 
Table 9.11: Post-2000 large firm FE and MG estimation of EBIT_REV on CSH_TA 
 
	   [1]	   [2]	   [3]	   [4]	   [5]	  
	   FE	   MG	   MG	   CCEMG	   CCEMG	  
	   CSH_TA	   CSH_TA	   CSH_TA	   CSH_TA	   CSH_TA	  
Number	  of	  obs	   705	   703	   703	   703	   703	  
Number	  of	  groups	   29	   27	   27	   27	   27	  
EBIT_REV	   -­‐0.0111	   -­‐0.1278	   -­‐0.0532	   0.0030	   -­‐0.0003	  
	   [-­‐0.62]	   [-­‐2.12]**	   [-­‐1.17]	   [0.06]	   [-­‐0.00]	  
Firm	  trend	   n/a	   n/a	   0.0010	   n/a	   0.0007	  
	   	   	   [2.47]**	   	   [1.32]	  
Intercept	   [0.0254]	   0.0382	   -­‐0.0432	   0.0311	   -­‐0.0213	  
	   [8.44]**	   [3.50]**	   [-­‐1.27]	   [2.02]**	   [-­‐0.67]	  
No.	  significant	  trends	   n/a	   n/a	   11	   n/a	   5	  
RMSE	   n/a	   0.0167	   0.0124	   0.0125	   0.0114	  
Notes:	  t/z	  statistics	  are	  reported	  in	  square	  brackets.	  Statistical	  significance	  at	  the	  20%,	  10%	  and	  5%	  	  
level	  is	  indicated	  with	  ^,	  *	  and	  **,	  respectively.	  
  
Results are presented in tables 9.08 through 9.11.  For the whole sample, 
none of the tests yield significant results, and coefficients range from -0.03 to 0.02.  
In large firms, the basic mean group estimation shows up a coefficient of -0.08, 
significant at the ten per cent level.  Coefficients range between -0.08 and 0.02.  For 
post-2000 observations, there are no significant tests with coefficients varying 
between -0.06 and zero.  Finally, in large firms after 2000, the mean group 
estimation is significant at the five per cent level generating a coefficient of -0.13, 
with coefficients of different tests extending from -0.13 to zero.  On balance, though 
statistical significance is limited, the evidence suggests that the relationship between 
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EBIT_REV and CSH_TA is a negative one.  That is, firms which generate higher 
levels of internal funds hold relatively lower levels of liquid assets. 
Finally, it should be noted that the possibility exists to conduct unit root and 
cointegration tests at the firm level.  First generation panel unit root tests, pioneered 
by Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) assume idiosyncratic errors are cross-sectionally 
independent.  For this reason they are inadequate to the demands of the dataset of 
Mexican firms.  Second generation tests allow for cross-section dependence in the 
form of a single unobserved factor (Pesaran (2007) CIPS33 test) , or multiple factors 
(Pesaran et al. (2013) CIPSM34 test).  The problem with both generations of tests is 
that they are based on the null hypothesis that all groups in the panel have a unit root.  
In the dataset of Mexican firms it would be trivial to reject the null hypothesis; 
clearly, for specific variables, some firms’ series will have a unit root and some will 
not35.  For this reason, it would be necessary to individually assess the 178 firms and 
analyse the compositional effects of those series which contained a unit root.  This 
has been left for future work.     
 
9.6	  	  CONCLUSION	  
 
In the analysis of firm decision-making over capital structure, orthodox financial 
theory makes two critical assumptions.  First, that operating characteristics, mainly 
investment needs, drive the decision around whether or not to seek external funds 
and in what quantity.  Second, that both internally-generated and externally-raised 
funds are channeled towards investment in non-financial assets.  In this chapter, in 
line with heterodox understandings of the firm, I have posited that capital structure 
may in fact drive operating characteristics, and remained agnostic about whether 
firms invest in financial or non-financial assets.  This is consistent with the theory of 
the financialised corporation developed in this thesis. 
This hypothesis was tested for the listed non-financial corporation in Mexico.  
At the aggregate level, basic OLS estimation suggests a significant relationship 
                                                
33 Cross-sectionally augmented Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS) test (2003). 
34 Cross-sectionally augmented IPS test in the presence of a multifactor error structure. 
35 Pesaran (2012) highlights the identification of stationary as against non-stationary series as an area 
of emerging research.  One suggestion is to apply a panel unit root test sequentially on progressively 
smaller fractions of the dataset, dropping those series for which there is evidence of stationarity. 
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between availability of bond financing and holdings of highly liquid assets, but not 
between the availability of internally-generated funds and holdings of highly liquid 
assets.  However, this relationship does not appear statistically robust.  The evidence 
on cointegration is inconclusive, and Granger causality tests suggest that while bond 
financing Granger causes liquid asset holdings, no such link exists with internally-
generated funds. At the firm level, employing new techniques of mean group 
estimation, I find that the relationship between levels of bond financing and holdings 
of cash is both positive and significant, whereas that between internal funds and cash 
holdings is negative and less robust.  The relationship between bond financing and 
cash holdings gets stronger in the period after 2000, especially in the largest firms.  
At the sectoral level, I find that the relationship between bond financing and cash 
holdings is strongest in the construction and information sectors, and only appears in 
the manufacturing sector after 2000. 
In sum, this analysis provides original evidence of the financialisation of the 
Mexican non-financial corporation.  Listed enterprises, particularly the largest in the 
period after 2000, are turning to bond markets for external financing; these 
enterprises are leading the trend of investment in highly liquid financial assets.  It 
appears that the change in the availability of funding opportunities has permitted 
firms to increasingly act as balance sheet managers, in line with heterodox 
understandings.   
The analysis has highlighted a number of promising areas for further 
research.  Within the framework established here, the analysis could be extended 
through the introduction of lag structures into the variables of interest36, as well as by 
assessing the influence of other independent variables.  A similar exercise could be 
performed with other balance sheet items which have undergone significant changes 
in levels over recent years, such as intangibles and derivatives.  Finally, additional 
examination of compositional effects could be afforded if data were to be made 
available on firm characteristics such as levels of foreign revenue or firm ownership 
structure. 
                                                
36 Chudik and Pesaran (2013) argue that the CCEMG estimator continues to be valid in heterogeneous 
panel data models with lagged dependent variables and/or weakly exogenous regressors. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter	  10	  	  	  
Conclusion	  
 
 
10.1	  	  KEY	  FINDINGS	  AND	  CONTRIBUTIONS	  
 
I began this thesis with a concern for financialisation as a problem for development.  
This concern had grown out of an appreciation of finance – understood both as a set 
of institutions and as forms of capital – as something which is at once creative and 
predatory, supportive of and in tension with production.  Investigating 
financialisation as a development issue required that I first come to grips with how 
the phenomenon had been understood theoretically and documented empirically in 
advanced capitalist economies.  What this investigation revealed was the presence of 
a number of similar tendencies characteristic of financialisation across a range of 
institutionally diverse settings.  This regimented against an understanding of 
financialisation restricted to a single country or type of countries; it also suggested 
that causal explanations focused on a particular policy matrix driven by a rentier 
class might be incomplete, if not misleading.      
 One of the theoretical contributions of this thesis has been to locate 
financialisation within the contemporary characteristics of the world market.  The 
overcoming of capitalist crisis through the increasing liberalisation of trade and 
finance has been dialectically related to the maturation of this market.  In its mature 
form, this has been distinguished by the deepening of the internationalisation of the 
circuits of commodity and money capital, and the unprecedented internationalisation 
of the circuit of productive capital; this period has also been notable for the role 
played by the US dollar as quasi-world money.  These changes have brought new 
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funding and investment opportunities and placed new, especially financial, demands 
on the fundamental agents of capitalism. 
 A consequent empirical contribution of the work has been to document the 
resulting behavioural shifts – the tendencies of financialisation – in enterprises, 
banks and households across both advanced and emerging capitalist economies.  This 
has confirmed the turn of the non-financial corporation to retained earnings and 
market-based finance, and its engagement in financial investment; banks have 
become reliant on market-based funding, with profits coming increasingly from 
investment banking activities and household lending; household reproduction has 
itself become increasingly enmeshed with financial intermediation, resulting in both 
greater indebtedness, but also the assumption of greater market risk in the 
accompanying asset portfolio. 
 This empirical analysis made clear however that these epochal 
transformations in the relations between the agents of capitalism are by no means 
homogenous.  The tendencies of financialisation are being experienced through the 
complex prism of institutional hysteresis.  That is, the forms of financialisation are 
institutionally specific.  It matters whether an economy has historically been reliant 
on bank-based or market-based financial systems, even though both are coming 
under increasing pressure from financialisation.  While German and Japanese 
policies in regard to industrial finance, housing and pensions set them apart, their 
largest enterprises and banks are exhibiting similar behaviour to their counterparts in 
the UK and the US.  This supports the thesis of divergence within convergence, as 
against that of straightforward divergence which characterises the varieties of 
capitalism literature.  This is financialisation varied, not varieties of financialisation.   
 A second theoretical advance made in this thesis has been to establish how 
financialisation, as a global process related to the maturation of the world market, 
will not only be exhibited in some form in the periphery, but that this form must 
necessarily be shaped by imperial relations.  To better theorise these dynamics, I 
returned to the literature on imperialism.  I resolved upon an understanding of 
imperialism as a collection of practices, reflecting differential power in the hierarchy 
of states, which are characteristic of the uneven process of capitalist development.  
The specific manifestations of imperialism in any single period reflect the 
characteristics of the world market.  In the contemporary era of deep trade, finance 
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and production linkages, the forces and relations of production in the periphery 
respond to the imperatives of the capitalist classes of the core in complex, multi-
faceted ways.  Positioning within the hierarchy of states is neither pre-determined 
nor static; instead it is affected by the inter-relationship between the state, its 
constituent social relations and external forces.  In this, finance has a pivotal role to 
play, be it ‘autocentric’ or ‘extraverted’, and constantly in dialectical tension 
between its role in both coordination and predation.     
I have argued that in the context of imperial relations, the behavioural 
transformations characteristic of financialisation will take a subordinate form in the 
periphery.  As is the case in advanced capitalist economies, there is both a shared 
essence to the process of financialisation in the periphery and a specificity arising out 
of institutional realities.  At the macroeconomic level, subordinate financialisation is 
not reducible to any simple measure of capital flows, but is reflected in the 
subjugation of domestic monetary policies to the imperatives of international capital 
and the relationship of the domestic currency with world money.  The turn of the 
large non-financial corporation towards market-based finance means a turn towards 
international capital, introducing market risk and making possible the extraction of 
domestically-generated surplus, as well as ushering in pressures for engagement with 
hedging and speculative financial instruments.  Banks’ increasing reliance on 
international capital markets, and disengagement from productive lending threatens 
the growth of developmental finance.  Finally, as household reproduction strategies 
become ensnared by financial intermediation, their increased indebtedness will be 
matched by rising holdings of financial assets.  The distinctive class structure of 
emerging capitalist economies may circumscribe what temporary growth potential 
debt-financed household consumption has afforded in advanced capitalist economies.  
An emerging elite will desire to hold their assets either denominated in world money 
or physically located in the core.   
 The primary empirical contribution of the thesis has been to document and 
analyse the subordinate financialisation of the Mexican economy and, above all, that 
of the Mexican non-financial corporation.  Historical analysis of inter- and intra-class 
relations brought to light the particularity of the form of financialisation in Mexico, 
the foundations for which stem from the actions taken by the Mexican state in 
response to crises of the 1980s and 1990s, and the failure of Mexico’s capitalist 
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classes to establish a system of developmental finance.  Bank-firm relations in 
Mexico have been dysfunctional in terms of domestically-oriented development 
through successive periods of nationalisation, privatisation and ‘extranjerización’; 
therefore an account of financialisation in Mexico which focused primarily on the 
role of banks or their purchase by foreign capital would be limiting.  This conclusion, 
and the importance in Marxist theory of the capitalist firm to the process of 
accumulation, compelled a deeper study of the transformation of Mexican non-
financial corporations.  The financialisation of the Mexican corporation has consisted 
of a turn to foreign bondholders and increasing engagement with financial assets, 
particularly highly liquid ones.  Evidence was provided that, in part, this reflects 
involvement in the carry trade.  Against orthodox theories of the firm which argue 
that investment behaviour determines the choice of finance, this finding makes clear 
that the availability of different forms of financing influences firms’ investment 
behaviour.   
At least two features account for the specifically subordinate nature of the 
financialisation of the Mexican firm.  First, foreign capitalists who hold Mexican 
private securities extract profits regardless of whether or not the new financialised 
strategy is a successful one for Mexican firms.  US investors’ purchases of private 
Mexican securities have increased sharply in the last decade.  Second, orienting 
domestic policy towards the defence of such strategies of financial accumulation 
poses two major disadvantages.  Maintenance of a strong peso exchange rate has 
required that the Banco de México hold increasing levels of international reserves1.  
As figure 10.01 illustrates, international reserves have risen from the rule-of-thumb 
of three months-worth of imports after the peso crisis in 1995, rising to nearly 20 
months by the end of 2011.  These are funds earning little or no interest, and 
therefore coming with a heavy opportunity cost (Painceira, 2009; Rodrik, 2006).  
This opportunity cost is being borne by the Mexican taxpayer in the form of reduced 
government spending on public services. 
 
                                                
1 Petroleum exports from state-owned oil multinational Pemex account for nearly 90 per cent of 
Mexico’s international reserves (Rodríguez, 2013). 
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Figure 10.01: Central bank reserves (bn USD left axis; share of imports right axis) 
Source: IMF IFS	  
 
Second, high domestic interest rates associated with the inflation-targeting policy 
serve the requirements of both international financial capital and domestic capital 
which holds its liabilities denominated in world money.  This has resulted in a 
bifurcated domestic funding market, with large corporates able to tap cheaper 
international sources of financing, while domestic SMEs are left reliant on retained 
earnings to fund their investment, shut out of expensive credit markets and unable to 
enter capital markets.  With smaller domestic suppliers lacking the funds to invest, 
large firms turn increasingly to international suppliers, finding that local rivals are 
unable to compete.   
The implications of these changes for real economic variables have not been 
the focus of this research.  This has been precluded by the need to first establish the 
theoretical basis for the phenomenon of subordinate financialisation, and to 
document its empirical manifestations.  Nonetheless, the implications which are 
suggested by the analysis pose substantial challenges for development.  Subordinate 
financialisation plays a significant part in explaining deficient levels of fixed capital 
formation and consequently disappointing rates of GDP growth in Mexico.  Large 
transnational firms invest increasingly in financial assets while small and medium 
firms are unable to secure sufficient funds for investment. This low-investment, low-
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growth trajectory has exacerbated the pressures on workers, who have not only seen 
their share of output fall2, but who have endured falling real wages and high levels of 
informality and underemployment 3 .  The combination of accelerated financial 
accumulation with a stagnant wage share plays a role in Mexico’s high levels of 
inequality4.  
 
10.2	  	  FURTHER	  ISSUES	  ARISING	  	  
 
At the level of general theory, my framework has pivoted on the transformations in 
the relations between enterprises, banks and households.  This choice was a strategic 
one, but it is obviously not exhaustive.  Within the financial sector, the focus on 
banks reflected the critical role which they continue to play in emerging capitalist 
economies.  The focus on the non-financial corporation reflected both a theoretical 
commitment to the important linkages between changes in the sphere of production 
and those of the financial system, and the empirical realities of financial sector 
under-development in Mexico.  This is not to say that other researchers should not 
theorise and empirically investigate the tendencies of financialisation in the 
government sector and in non-bank financial intermediaries.  In all sectors, there is a 
need for both quantitative and qualitative microeconomic research into the 
motivations and incentives as understood by the actors themselves.  
                                                
2 INEGI system of national accounts records beginning in 1993, show the share of wages (including 
social contributions) falling as a share of net value-added from 43 per cent to 31 per cent in 2010 
(figure 6.34, chapter six). 
3 Correa et al. (2012, p. 271), using Banco de México statistics on employment and consumer price 
inflation, reveal that the real minimum wage has fallen from nearly 120 pesos per day in 1980 to 40 
pesos per day in 2000, at which level it has stagnated for the last decade.  Today, some 58 per cent of 
the labour force earns less than the equivalent of three times the minimum wage.   
   Analysis of INEGI employment survey data (2010) suggests that over half of the working age 
population is excluded from the formal labour market, a figure which has been steadily rising since 
2000.  This huge number of informal workers and workers who are available but considered inactive 
explains the persistently low levels of official unemployment reported in Mexico. 
4 According to the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, since 1992 the share of income held 
by the highest ten per cent in Mexico has hovered at around 40 per cent.  This compares favourably 
only with the outlying nations in terms of inequality such as South Africa and Brazil (though the latter 
has been improving over the past decade).  Even these data hide the concentration occurring at the 
very top in terms of accumulated wealth.  Correa et al. (2012, p. 270) point out that fifteen Mexicans 
on the Forbes list of billionaires were worth $25.6 billion in 1996, while by 2008 nine people had 
amassed $96.2 billion.  
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 In relation to financialisation in emerging capitalist economies, the 
boundaries of analysis in this thesis were circumscribed by the quality and 
availability of the data. If increased or improved data were to become available, this 
would open further avenues for investigation.  A number of countries, including 
Mexico for example, are working on making national accounts data available in 
stocks.  This would allow more meaningful cross-country comparison of sectoral 
transformations, particularly in the non-financial corporate sector.  Short of this, 
analysis of listed firms’ financial statements data, replicating the analysis conducted 
for Mexico herein, is already possible.   
On the question of subordinate financialisation in Mexico, while I have 
concentrated on the non-financial corporation for the reasons already discussed, 
future research should probe similar questions in relation to the financial, household 
and state sectors.  Within the non-financial sector, if national accounts data do 
become available in levels, it would be possible to better assess how much the 
picture of listed firms developed herein is representative of the sector as a whole.  
Akin to this, it may be possible to investigate the comparative financialisation of 
foreign transnational corporations which operate in Mexico, but do not list in 
Mexico.  This would require analysis of country-disaggregated financial statements 
as they are made available by firms in their respective countries of origin/listing or, 
at least, detailed case study analysis5.  For the analysis of listed Mexican firms, as 
noted in chapters eight and nine, if data were made available on export revenues and 
ownership structures, additional insight might be drawn about the dynamics of 
financialisation.  Are exporting firms or firms majority-owned by foreign capital 
more or less likely to engage in financialised behaviour?  Are their strategies 
distinctive from those of domestic capitalists, and are they more or less successful?  
Finally, within the strictures of what data were available for this thesis, future 
research might push the boundaries of the econometric analysis by, for example, 
introducing lag structures, assessing the influence of other independent variables, or 
conducting cointegration tests in panels.  In a similar vein, the types of analysis 
                                                
5 The number of multinational firms which make available detailed financial statements disaggregated 
by individual country is severely limited since the rules of the International Accounting Standards 
Board do not require it (Shaxson, 2011, p. 251). 
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applied in chapter nine could be applied to understanding marked changes which 
were observed in firms’ levels of intangibles, derivatives and deferred taxes. 
 
10.3	  	  WHAT	  IS	  TO	  BE	  DONE?	  	  
 
Throughout this thesis, I have emphasised the global, systemic and structural 
character of financialisation.  This is in contrast to those accounts of financialisation 
which treat it as an Anglo-Saxon error in judgment, a cyclical trend, or a straight-
forward policy outcome.  This is not to deny that the Anglo-Saxon countries and 
their policies are, in some sense, leading the transformation; or that a certain amount 
of cyclical de-financialisation is inevitable in the wake of the excesses committed in 
the run-up to the ‘Great Recession’.  However, while the predatory outgrowths of 
financial expansion can be periodically reined in, epochal changes in the size and 
form of finance are immanent in the transformed needs of global production and 
exchange, and respond to opportunities for financial accumulation which have 
accompanied the internationalisation of the world market.     
 For this reason, it is not surprising that attempts to re-regulate finance in the 
wake of the crisis which began in 2007 have been, so far, disappointing (Calomiris, 
2013; Helleiner et al., 2011; Kalinowski, 2013).  As discussed by Costas Lapavitsas 
(2013), market-negating regulations which controlled prices, quantities and the 
functions of financial institutions in the post-war period have been dismantled.  Such 
regulations were based on an analysis which held that liberalised financial markets 
could inhibit productive accumulation.  Those market-negating regulations which 
remain, such as the lender-of-last-resort function and deposit insurance guarantees, 
serve perversely to increase financial profits while socialising associated costs.  The 
principal form of regulation during the contemporary period has been not market-
negating but market-conforming.  These regulations, largely institution-specific in 
application rather than system-wide, have been designed to overcome market 
failures.  They are based in the belief that optimal investment and accumulation can 
only occur in the presence of properly-functioning liberalised financial markets.  
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 While the financial crisis has laid bare the weaknesses of market-conforming 
regulation and even led to efforts towards improved ‘macroprudential’ oversight6, 
there has been little progress in establishing new forms of market-negating 
regulation.  Beyond the obvious fact that such initiatives are opposed by the sizable 
political influence wielded by international financial institutions, the analysis which 
underlies this thesis suggests that there is an additional, structural reason for their 
failure.  The transformation of the world market, involving the deepening of the 
internationalisation of circuits of commodity and money capital, and the 
internationalisation of production, has rendered industrial capital dependent on and 
complicit with the liberalised financial market agenda.  Moreover, without a form of 
world money which can stabilise exchange rates, capital accumulation remains 
dependent on growing financial markets.  In a similar fashion, household 
reproduction strategies are increasingly ‘locked in’ to rising capital and housing 
markets (Engelen, 2003; Langley, 2004; Toporowski, 2010b), creating a constant 
demand for new asset classes.  Not surprisingly this sets up a powerful political 
constituency which backs continued financialisation (Watson, 2008). 
 Does this suggest that the ever-increasing financialisation of the global 
economy is inexorable? The implications of financialisation were not the focus of 
this thesis for the reasons previously outlined, however the prospects of continued 
financialisation for investment and employment, as well as for inequality and 
environmental sustainability are, in my opinion, ominous.  Further exploration of 
these implications, and the transmission channels through which they operate, is 
urgently needed.  This would be greatly aided by increased transparency in the form 
of country-disaggregated financial reporting for multinational enterprises and banks.   
However, in the absence of such information, the age-old question must be 
asked – what is to be done?  As discussed above, one central element of a 
progressive agenda for de-financialisation must be the establishment of a form of 
world money which can act to stabilise international exchange rates.  If accompanied 
by an internationally-agreed framework for the implementation of capital controls, 
                                                
6 This has led to a flurry of initiatives including the upgrading of the Financial Stability Forum of the 
Bank for International Settlements to a Financial Stability Board, and the creation of the Financial 
Stability Oversight Council in the US, the European Systemic Risk Board, and the Financial Policy 
Committee of the Bank of England. 
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this would serve to harness the international circuit of money capital for the needs of 
productive accumulation.  Combined with public intervention to ensure the provision 
of developmental finance, this could serve to break industrial capital’s dependency 
on and alignment with liberalised financial markets.  This would have the indirect 
benefit of rendering needed accompanying regulatory reforms more politically 
viable. 
 Of course, the difficulties of procuring international agreement for such an 
agenda can not be overstated.  A large literature has sprung up around questions of 
financial regulation and the failure of ‘global governance’ to address them7.  This 
should bring into focus the limitations of purely policy-based change.  In recognition 
of this, citizens, workers and social movements must build pressure for larger 
structural change through national struggles for the disengagement of social 
reproduction from financial intermediation.  This involves campaigns not only 
against the privatisation of pensions, housing and social services, but advocacy in 
support of new forms of democratic, public provision of the same.  Essential to any 
such agenda will be the need to assert democratically-accountable, public control 
over the process of credit provision.  Public banks can be used to advance a 
democratically-decided social agenda including long-term large-scale investment in 
confronting the challenges of natural resource depletion (Lapavitsas, 2009d).   
 An even greater challenge is faced by citizens of those nations undergoing 
subordinate financialisation.  They face similar problems with fewer resources and 
from a position of relative geopolitical weakness.  However, this is not to suggest 
that subordinate financialisation is a mechanically-determined fate which awaits all 
emerging capitalist economies.  There are numerous examples of countries which 
have taken measures to harness finance, rejecting the characterisation of such steps 
as ‘financial repression’8.  Once again, it is up to citizens, workers and social 
movements to create political coalitions which will take full advantage of improved 
opportunities for the use of capital controls (Grabel, 2011); support the establishment 
                                                
7 See, for example, the special issue of the Review of International Political Economy on governing 
global finance and banking with an introduction by Randall Germain (2012).  
8 The list of countries which have used capital controls in recent years includes Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, China, Czech Republic, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, 
the Russian Federation, Thailand and the Ukraine (IMF, 2011; Reinhart, 2012).  Public development 
banks are large players in their banking systems in a number of countries including Turkey, Rwanda, 
Fiji, Brazil and the Philippines (de Luna-Martínez & Leonardo Vicente, 2012). 
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or expansion of public development banks (Girón et al., 2010); and oppose the 
privatisation of pensions, housing and social services.   
 In Mexico, the government of President Enrique Peña Nieto has introduced a 
sweeping set of financial sector reforms (SHCP 2013).  While much of the 
discussion for public consumption has been on the strengthening of development 
bank lending in ‘priority areas for national development’, ostensibly a market-
negating reform, the underlying ethos reinforces the prevailing view of the 
importance of financial market liberalisation and deregulation.  Market-conforming 
reforms include: increasing ‘financial inclusion’; facilitating medium-sized 
enterprises’ access to market-based finance; increasing financial institutions’ lending 
through improvements to the legal framework9; and the removal of limits on foreign 
investment in ratings agencies, insurance agencies and multiple-purpose financial 
institutions (Sofomes).  In the wake of the global financial crisis, the establishment 
of a permanent Council for Financial System Stability reflects a familiar gesture 
towards the need for greater macroprudential oversight of the economy.  While the 
actual implementation and therefore the implications of these initiatives will not be 
clear for some time, it appears that business-as-usual is the most likely outcome.    
 Reversing subordinate financialisation in Mexico will require a radical policy 
agenda.  A clear framework for the implementation of capital controls is required, in 
order that monetary policy may be oriented towards domestic developmental 
objectives rather than the needs of volatile international capital and its domestic 
partners.  This will require a re-alignment of the central bank away from its current 
obsession with inflation and towards domestic growth and employment objectives.  
A massive increase in the provision of developmental finance should support the 
introduction of long-term plans for industrial upgrading and improvements in 
workers’ skills.  This would involve differential pricing of credit for priority sectors, 
and restrictions on credit for consumption.  Expansion of the public realm in the 
provision of social services is required to prevent the further ensnarement of 
Mexican workers in costly layers of financial intermediation.   
 A brief sketch of the contours of such a radical policy agenda belies the 
revolution in social relations which must occur for it to be implemented.  Nothing 
                                                
9 A highlight of which is a strengthening of the ability of creditors to seize debtors’ assets. 
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short of a complete re-drawing of the social contract is required to:  achieve the 
prerequisite tax and land reforms; see an end to corporatist structures in the 
workplace; and first reverse, then dramatically increase workers’ share in economic 
gains.  Such changes fly in the face of the neoliberal state project, and the interests 
and ideologies of Mexico’s political classes and their international allies.  To date, 
there is scant evidence that the parties of the left are up to the challenge of uprooting 
this neoliberal hegemony (Rodríguez Araujo, 2010).  
Returning to a global perspective, the path taken by reform efforts to date is 
indicative of the continued dominance of the ‘financial deepening’ view of 
development (Gurley & Shaw, 1967; McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973).   In a classic 
piece written over thirty years ago, Cuban-born economist Carlos Díaz-Alejandro 
(1985) cautioned against extensive financial liberalisation, believing that it would not 
only fail to generate long-term investment, but that it would provoke financial 
instability.   He has since been proven prophetic.  What he could not have foreseen 
was the way that changes in the world market would mutually reinforce this 
neoliberal agenda, ushering in a structural transformation in the relationship between 
enterprises, banks and workers.  Putting the financialisation genie back in the bottle 
will not be easy.  But it must begin with a reconsideration of the role of finance in 
development. 
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Figure 4.01:  Financial sector total financial assets as a share of GDP 
 
For the USA, Z1 flow of funds data has been used.  Financial sector assets equals 
total finance total financial assets (FL794090005.A) less monetary authority total 
financial assets (FL714090005.A). Note that in the USA, bonds are evaluated on a 
face value basis while they are evaluated on a market value basis in other countries. 
Financial auxiliaries (such as the Stock Exchange and Clearing House) are not 
included in financial institutions.  Offshore accounts are classified as ‘overseas’ 
whereas in the other countries, they are included in ‘domestic financial institutions’.  
This suggests that the values for the total assets of the financial sector will be 
understated.  GDP figures come from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) 
National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) Table 1.1.5 GDP annual (NSA). 
 
For the UK, using Office of National Statistics (ONS) UK Economic Accounts 
(UKEA) X23 (Financial balance sheet: Financial Corporations), financial sector 
assets is calculated by subtracting monetary authority total financial assets from 
financial corporations’ total financial assets (NLIZ).  Figures for GDP come from 
ONS BKTL: GDP at market prices, current prices, not seasonally adjusted. 
 
For Japan, data comes from the Bank of Japan, Flow of Funds (1993 SNA), assets 
and liabilities. Financial sector assets is calculated as the sum of depository 
corporations’ total financial assets (FFYS120A900), insurance and pension funds 
(FFYS130A900), other financial intermediaries (FFYS150A900), and financial 
auxiliaries (FFYS300A900).  IMF WEO figures for GDP were used (NGDP, current 
prices, national currency), as Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) and 
OECD GDP data are only available from 1994 forward.  Note that deposits within 
the sector are shown on an unconsolidated basis in Japan, therefore the asset levels 
will tend to be comparatively larger than in other countries (Research and Statistics 
Department, 2000, p. 2). 
 
For Germany, data comes from the Bundesbank financial accounts. Financial sector 
assets has been calculated as the sum of MFI total financial assets (CEB0Q3), other 
financial institutions total financial assets (CEB00X), and insurance corporations 
total financial assets (CEB0QB).  While the 1993 SNA guide advises that, as a rule, 
Appendices	  
 
313 
 
entries in the System are not consolidated, there is some evidence to suggest that 
there may be partial consolidation in the German data resulting in an under-reporting 
of the size of the financial sector.  Source for GDP data is the OECD. 
 
Finally, for France, data comes from the National Institute of Statistics and 
Economic Studies (INSEE).  Financial sector assets is simply financial institutions’ 
total financial assets (001523402).  This data was used, even though it does not allow 
for the subtraction of the assets of the central monetary authority, due to the 
availability of a longer time series.  Comparison of the Banque de France data for the 
more narrowly defined S122 (total financial institutions’ assets less central monetary 
authority assets), available only from 1994 forward, suggests that the use of the 
aggregate INSEE data leads to an overestimation of the size of the financial sector by 
between two and five per cent.  OECD data were used for GDP. 
 
 
Figure 4.02:  Banks’ total financial assets as a share of GDP 
 
Unless otherwise stated, sources are the same as for figure 4.01.  For the USA, 
figures are for commercial banks’ total financial assets (FL764090005.A).  For the 
UK, data is UK banks’ financial assets (NHTZ).  For Japan, the data is domestically 
licenced commercial banks’ total financial assets (FF'FOF_FFYS122A900).  For 
Germany, commercial banks’ total assets is calculated as the sum of lending to banks 
(OU0779), lending to non-banks (OU0784), securities (OUB077) and participating 
interests (OU0793), from the Bundesbank statistical supplement banking statistics no. 
3.  For France, data has been used for ‘Etablissements de crédit et assimilés’, series 
code (MU.A.A.122AE0.980000.980000.A.E.F.A); note that the total assets is only 
available from 1994 forward, so previous years’ figures are the sum of individual 
asset line items. 
 
 
Figure 4.05: Loans as a share of total liabilities of non-financial enterprises  
 
For the USA, Z1 data has been taken from the non-farm non-financial corporate 
business sector.  Total loans, the sum of bank loans not elsewhere classified 
(Z1/FL103168005.A), other loans and advances (Z1/FL103169255.A), and total 
mortgages (Z1/FL103165005.A), has been divided by total financial liabilities, the 
sum of financial liabilities (Z1/FL104190005.A) and equities liabilities 
(Z1/FL103164003.A).  For the UK and the other countries, the sector examined is 
the non-financial corporate sector.  Using ONS UKEA data, total loans (NOPI) has 
been divided by total financial liabilities (NONT).  Bank of Japan data for total loans 
(FFYS410L200) has been divided by total liabilities (FFYS410L900) minus the 
difference between financial assets and liabilities (FFYS410L700) (the former is 
adjusted by the latter to equal financial assets).  Bundesbank data for total loans 
(CEB41Q) has been divided by total financial liabilities (including equity) 
(CEB01Q).  INSEE data for total loans (001523262) was divided by total financial 
liabilities (including equity) (001523400). 
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Figure 4.06: Financial assets relative to total fixed assets of non-financial 
enterprises 
 
It would have been desirable to include only what might be termed ‘portfolio’ assets 
in the numerator, but this is impossible due to data limitations. The use of ‘total 
financial assets’ has the merit of not missing any important dimensions because of 
different classification systems.  The use of ‘fixed assets’ avoids volatility in both 
land prices (included in tangible assets) and cyclical inventory stocks (included in 
produced assets).  Sources and sectoral classifications are the same as previous, 
except where specifically mentioned.  For the USA, total financial assets 
(Z1/FL104090005.A) have been divided by the current cost net stock of private fixed 
assets for the corporate nonfinancial sector from BEA table 6.1.  (Z1 figures for 
tangible assets of non-farm nonfinancial corporate business include land).  For the 
UK, total financial assets (NNZB) has been divided by total tangible assets (CGVA) 
– inventories (CGUZ), from ONS UKEA.  For Japan, total financial assets 
(FFYS410A900) have been divided by fixed assets for the non-financial corporate 
sector from the ESRI national accounts.  For Germany, total financial assets 
(CEB0Q1) have been divided by the net stock of fixed assets from the integrated 
sectoral and overall balance sheets of the German Statistical Office for 1991 to 2005.  
Figures for 2005 to 2008 were sent to the author by the German Statistical Office 
taken from a national accounts working document, fixed assets by sector.  For France, 
INSEE data for total financial assets (001523398) has been divided by total fixed 
assets (001525706). 
 
 
Figure 4.07:  Loans to total liabilities (stocks) of French non-financial 
corporations 
 
BACH non-consolidated data for French companies is available from 1999 onward. 
The data source is the Central Balance Sheet data office of the Banque de France.  
France has an exhaustive survey allowing the provision of figures which can be 
considered “genuine variable samples” (DG ECFIN, 2006, p. 16). 
 
The data used includes companies in categories A to N, minus  K (real estate), 
according to the Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community 
(NACE rev 2).  Items on the balance sheet in BACH are given as a percentage of the 
balance sheet total.  The sum of amounts owed to credit institutions payable within 
one year (F.2) and payable after more than one year (I.2), has been divided by total 
liabilities (FL) which includes capital and reserves. 
 
 
Figure 4.08:  Financial to total income (flows) of French non-financial 
corporations 
 
In BACH, items on the ‘Profit and Loss Account’ account are given as a percentage 
of turnover.  Sectoral composition is the same as figure 4.07 above.  Financial 
income (9/11) has been divided by total operating income (S). 
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Figures 4.09 & 4.10:  Financial assets to tangible fixed assets (flows); financial 
assets to tangible fixed assets (stocks) of French non-financial corporations 
 
Information on investment flows is given in BACH as a percentage of the turnover.  
Figure 4.09 gives data for the same set of companies as previously defined in figure 
4.07, with ‘acquisition of financial assets’ (line 271) divided by ‘acquisition of 
tangible fixed assets’ (line 261).  Figure 4.10 uses data from the balance sheet, with 
‘fixed financial assets’ (C.3) divided by ‘tangible fixed assets’ (C.2).  ‘Fixed 
financial assets’ includes holdings of stocks and bonds, but does not include ‘current 
financial assets’ of trade credit and cash in hand. ‘Tangible fixed assets’ includes 
land and buildings, plant and machinery, other fixtures, and assets in construction, 
but does not include inventory.  The inclusion of land is mandated by data limitations. 
 
 
Figure 4.11:  Deposits to total liabilities of the banking sector 
 
For the USA, the source is the H8 tables of assets and liabilities of commercial banks.  
Deposits (B1058NCBDM) has been divided by total liabilities (B1152NCBDM).  
For the UK, data comes from the ONS UKEA A.58 Financial Balance Sheet of 
Banks.  Deposits is equal to the sum of sterling deposits with UK banks (NHVX) and 
foreign currency deposits with UK banks (NHVY).  Total financial liabilities is item 
NHXD.  (Note that using the Bank of England’s ‘Other Banks’ balance sheet, 
sterling deposits (RPATBFW) as a share of total financial liabilities (RPATBGV) 
match very closely to the ONS figures above.  However, data is broken between two 
time series.)  For Japan, data is for domestically licensed banks from the Bank of 
Japan.  Domestically licensed banks’ currency and deposits (FF'FOF_FFYS122L100) 
has been divided by total liabilities (FF'FOF_FFYS122L900) less the difference 
between financial assets and liabilities (FF'FOF_FFYS122L700).  For Germany, the 
source is the Bundesbank’s assets and liabilities of Monetary Financial Institutions 
(MFIs).  Deposits of banks and non-banks (in MFIs) (OU0001 + OU0191) has been 
divided by the summation of individual liability items (deposits of banks and non-
banks (OU0001 + OU0191), repos (OUA179), bearer debt securities (OU0370), 
capital (OU0322), other liabilities (OUA008)).  For France, the longer time series of 
INSEE for S12A (Financial Institutions) has been cross-referenced with the shorter 
Banque de France time series of S122 (Other MFIs excluding the central bank).  
INSEE S12A currency and deposits (001523496), has been divided by total liabilities 
(001523412). 
 
 
Figure 4.12:  Non-FIRE lending to total financial assets of the banking sector 
 
For the USA, data on the sector ‘commercial banks’ comes from the federal H8 
tables. Commercial and industrial loans (B1023NCBDM) have been divided by total 
assets (B1151NCBDM).  For the UK, data on the sector ‘UK resident banks’ comes 
from the Bank of England.  For the period 1977 to 1996, non-FIRE loans equals total 
net lending (RPAAFTA) minus that to ‘Financial Intermediaries’ (RPAVAHM), 
‘Individuals’ (RPAB842) and ‘Property Companies’ (RPAAFUJ).  For the period 
1997–2008, total net lending (RPQTBSA) minus lending to finance (RPQTBTI, 
RPQTBTT, RPQTBTU, RPQTBTV), individuals (RPQTBTW) and real estate 
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(RPQTBSY) has been used.  These sums were divided by the figure for total 
financial assets for the relevant period (RPAATFU and RPMTBJF respectively). 
(Note that 1997 was the year that building societies converted to commercial banks, 
accounting for the break in the data sets.)  For Japan, data for ‘domestically licensed 
banks’ comes from the Bank of Japan loan market data.  Non-FIRE loans equals total 
loans (DL'DLLILKG90_DLLI5DS2T) minus loans to finance and insurance 
(DL'DLLILKG49_DLLI5DS2TFI), real estate (DL'DLLILKG50_DLLI5DS2TFX), 
local governments (DL'DLLILKG61_DLLI5DS2TRO), individuals 
(DL'DLLILKG62_DLLI5DS2TPN) and ‘Overseas Yen Loans’ 
(DL'DLLILKG63_DLLI5DS2TFL).  This sum has been divided by total assets 
(FF'FOF_FFYS122A900).  For Germany, data comes from the Bundesbank’s assets 
and liabilities of MFIs.  Non-FIRE loans equals lending to all non-FIRE sectors 
(PQ3020, 3021, 3023, 3024, 3025) plus services less real estate (PQ3027 – PQ8076) 
(note that real estate is only uniquely identified from 1989-07).  This has been 
divided by total financial assets (OUA006 + OU0081 + OU0083 + OUA0087 + 
OU0089 + OU0310 + OUA007).  For France, data for MFIs comes from the Banque 
de France.  ‘Loans to domestic private non-financial institutions’ 
(MG.Q.R.A20.A.1.U6.2240.Z01.T.E.B.X) has been divided by ‘Total financial 
assets’ ( MI.M.FR.N.A.T00.A.1.Z5.0000.Z01.M.E.B.X). 
 
 
Figure 4.13:  Banks’ loans to households as a share of total loans 
 
For the USA, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) historical statistics on 
banking have been used.  Loans to individuals (table CB13) plus loans for residential 
properties (table CB12), has been divided by gross loans (table CB11).  For the UK, 
data on UK residential banks has been drawn from the Bank of England.  Loans to 
individuals (RPAB842 / RPQTBTW) has been divided by total loans (RPAAFTA / 
RPQTBSA).  Note that the break in the data (and in the categories) marks the 
inclusion of building societies in the category of residential banks from 1997.  From 
the Bank of Japan comes data on loans to households by domestically licenced banks 
(DL'DLLILKG62_DLLI5DS2TPN) divided by total loans 
(DL'DLLILKG90_DLLI5DS2T).  For Germany, data come from the Bundesbank; 
lending to domestic employees and other individuals by commercial banks (PQ0805) 
divided by loans to banks (OU0784) plus loans to non-banks (OU0778).  For France, 
Banque de France provides household lending by credit institutions 
(MH.M.EC.CREDIT.3.R.1D.TO.T.M.X.B.X) divided by total loans 
(MI.M.FR.N.A.A20.A.1.U6.0000.Z01.M.E.B.X). 
 
 
Figure 4.14:  UK banks’ sterling and foreign currency reverse repos 
 
Bank of England data on other banks’ assets and liabilities: reverse sterling repos 
with UK banks (RPMTBHO); reverse sterling repos with private sector 
(RPMTBHR); reverse sterling repos with non-residents (RPMTBHS); reverse 
foreign currency repos with UK banks (RPMTBIO); reverse foreign currency repos 
with private sector (RPMTBIR); and reverse foreign currency repos with non-
residents (RPMTBIS). 
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Figure 4.15:  Non-bank loans as a share of total bank assets by bank type 
 
For the category ‘big banks’ this equals ‘lending to non-banks (non-MFIs)’ (OU0833) 
divided by total assets.  The equivalent ratio for the category ‘landesbanken’ is 
(OU1033) divided by total assets, and (OU1083) divided by total assets for the 
category ‘savings banks’.  Source: Bundesbank. 
 
 
Figure 4.16:  Total financial liabilities to gross disposable income of households  
 
For reasons of data availability the ratio refers to households and non-profit private 
institutions serving households (NPISH).  For the USA, total financial liabilities for 
households and non-profit organisations (FL154190005.A) comes from the Z1 data, 
while gross disposable personal income (FA156012005.A) from the NIPA tables. 
For the UK, total financial liabilities of households and NPISH comes from UKEA 
table A.64 (NNPP), while gross disposable income is from UKEA table A.38 
(QWND).  For Japan, Bank of Japan data for total financial liabilities equals 
‘Household Total Financial Liabilities’ (FFYS430L900) minus ‘Difference between 
Financial Assets and Liabilities’ (FFYS430L700) plus the same for non-profit 
institutions (FFYS440L900 - FFYS440L700).  OECD figures have been used for 
gross disposable income.  For Germany, Bundesbank data provides private 
household (including NPISH) total financial liabilities (CEB410), while OECD 
figures have been used for gross disposable income.  For France, INSEE data has 
been used.  Total financial liabilities equals that of households including individual 
enterprises (001523424) plus NPISH (001523428).  Gross disposable income comes 
from OECD figures. 
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APPENDIX	  B:	  Chapter	  6	  source	  notes	  
 
Figure 6.06: Financial sector total financial assets to GDP 
 
For Korea, Bank of Korea flow of funds data gives financial sector total financial 
total assets.  Note that data until 2001 is based on SNA 1968, while data from 2002 
forward is based on SNA 1993.  For Mexico, OECD national accounts data (volume 
IIIb) gives total assets of financial corporations (S12).  For South Africa, South 
African Reserve Bank data allow the calculation of financial sector total assets from 
the sum of: total assets of the monetary sector (KBP1358J), total assets of long-term 
insurers (KBP2242J), total assets of short-term insurers (KBP2282J), and total assets 
of Public Investment Corporation (KBP2339J). For Thailand, Bank of Thailand data 
allow the calculation of financial sector total assets from the sum of: financial assets 
of commercial banks (EC_MB_012), financial assets of depository specialised 
financial institutions (EC_MB_013), and finance companies (XLS_MB_028).  Note 
that earlier data are available for commercial banks’ assets only.  For the period from 
2002 forward the previous data is re-categorised as ‘other depository corporations’ to 
which has been added new data on the assets of securities companies from the 
Securities and Exchange Comission Thailand (table 47, assets and liabilities of 
securities companies), and the assets of insurance companies from the Office of 
Insurance Commission.  For Turkey, financial sector total assets is calculated from 
data of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey: assets of deposit money banks 
(TP.PB.K40), development and investment banks (TP.PB.T40) and participation 
banks (TP.PB.BLV34).  All GDP figures come from the IMF World Economic 
Outlook. 
 
 
Figure 6.07:  FIRE share of GDP 
 
For Korea, Mexico, Turkey and South Africa, OECD data are used for the gross 
value added at basic prices for financial intermediation, real estate, renting and 
business activities (B1GJ_K).  GDP data are those of the OECD (B1_GA).  Note that 
values are estimated for Mexico between 1970 and 2002, and for Turkey between 
1970 and 1997.  More disaggregated data for financial and insurance activities 
(B1GVK) are only available for Korea.  For Thailand, data are drawn from the 
Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) national 
income accounts tables 30 and 32, items ‘GDP originating from financial 
intermediation’ and ‘GDP originating from real estate, renting and business 
activities’.  Data are available back to 1980, however, there is a structural break in 
the classification system, with the previous single category of ‘banking, insurance 
and real estate’ ending in 2001, while the two categories previously mentioned begin 
in 1993.  NESDB data for GDP have been used and cross-checked with that of the 
IMF WEO.    
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Figure 6.14:  Non-financial corporations’ net acquisition of financial assets to 
gross fixed capital formation 
 
For Korea, figures for net acquisition of financial assets (NAFA) come from UN data 
table 4.3 S11 for 1980 to 2002 (note that series 100 is used for 1980 to 1992, series 
200 for 1993 to 2002), and OECD dataset 620 (financial accounts non-consolidated).  
Gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) comes from UN data table 4.3 S11, series 300.  
(Note that these figures have been corroborated with flow of funds figures of the 
Bank of Korea.)  For Mexico, data for both NAFA and GFCF come from INEGI 
system of national accounts.  For South Africa, both NAFA and GFCF data come 
from OECD (respectively, dataset 62.0 – financial accounts non-consolidated, and 
dataset 14A – non-financial accounts by sector).  For Thailand, all data come from 
NESDB flow of funds data. 
 
 
Figure 6.17:  Non-financial corporations’ net incurrence of loans to total 
liabilities 
 
For Korea, data for loans comes from UNstat.org, table III.2 financial account, loans, 
series 100 (1980 to 2002), series 200 (2003 to 2004); and from OECD F4LINC from 
2005 forward.  The same sources were used for total liabilities. The series was 
reconciled with data from the Bank of Korea (for which recent years were as yet 
unavailable).  For Mexico, data for loans and total liabilities comes from INEGI 
system of national accounts data for the private non-financial corporate sector.  UN 
and OECD data, similar to those used for Korea, are erratic, moving from 
significantly negative amounts to greater than parity.  For South Africa, OECD data 
on loans (F4LINC) and total liabilities (FLINC) were used.  For Thailand, data come 
from the NESDB’s flow of funds figures for the private non-financial corporate 
sector.   
 
 
Figure 6.23: Banks’ deposits to total liabilities  
 
For Korea, data come from the Bank of Korea’s flow of funds tables for depository 
corporations.  These data match those of the OECD non-consolidated financial 
balance sheet for other depository corporations (S122) (consolidated data 
unavailable).  A similar trend, but lower level, is attained if Bank of Korea banking 
data are used for the category ‘commercial and specialised banks’, and the 
instruments are limited to demand, time and savings deposits.  A similar trend with a 
higher level results, if the latter data are expanded to include certificates of deposit, 
repos and debentures.  Prior to 2002, deposit data is only available for the financial 
sector as a whole.  For Mexico, data used come from CNBV Multiple Bank historical 
series.  Deposits includes term and demand deposits.  A similar, though not identical 
result, both in terms of level and trend, results from the use of OECD consolidated 
financial balance sheet data for other depository corporations (S122) (similar trend 
but lower level results from the use of non-consolidated data).  For South Africa, 
South African Reserve Bank data has been employed for banking institutions, with 
total deposits (KBP1077) divided by total liabilities (KBP1085).  (The time series is 
available back to 1986 but has not been shown here for consistency with other 
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countries where consistent longer time series are unavailable.)  For Thailand, Bank 
of Thailand banking data have been used.  Commercial banks’ total deposits is series 
EC_MB_012 for the period 1970 to 2006, switching to series EC_MB_012_S2 after 
2002.  For Turkey, data have been drawn from the the Banks’ Association of Turkey 
monthly statistical reports (end-December figures have been used).  Total deposits 
(both Turkish and foreign currency) have been divided by total liabilities.  Note that 
there is a significant discrepancy with the level (though not the trend) attained 
through the use of the central bank’s (CBRT) data on the total deposits (TP.PB.S01) 
of ‘deposit money banks’ as a share of total liabilities.  Trend and level of both of 
these series are not consistent with OECD financial balance sheet data for other 
depository corporations (S122) (either consolidated or non-consolidated). 
 
 
Figure 6.26:  Banks’ loans to non-financial corporations to total assets 
 
For Korea, data come from the Bank of Korea’s banking data.  Loans and discounts 
for all industries has been adjusted for those to finance and insurance.  For Mexico, 
Banco de México table CF29 offers credit to farming, forestry and agriculture 
(SF210), manufacturing (SF211) and services (SF213).  Commercial banks’ total 
assets (SF98924) comes from table CF445.  Using CNBV data for multiple banks’ 
loans to private non-financial business yields a similar trend, though the level is 
approximately ten per cent lower.  For South Africa, SARB banking data on loans to 
the non-financial corporate sector have been summed (lines 124, 132, 138, 142, 147, 
152, 156, 161, 163, 168, 178, 183, and 190). Note that BD900 data convert historical 
DI900 to BA900 format.  Nonetheless, while the time series extends back to 1993, 
there is a structural break in 2001; before this, ‘overdrafts, loans and advances to 
PNFCs’ (line 183) and ‘other loans and advances to PNFCs’ (line 190), which 
account for a significant share of lending post-2001 are not available.  Bank of 
Thailand data for loans are series BoT FI_CB_021 & 021_S2 & 021_S3 (before- and 
after-2002).  Total lending was adjusted for lending to banking and finance, real 
estate and personal consumption.  Total assets comes from series EC_MB_012 for 
the period 1970 to 2006, switching to series EC_MB_012_S2 after 2002.  Turkish 
data comes from the BRSA statistical query system.  Banking sector consumer loans 
has been subtracted from total non-financial loans.  Total assets comes from BRSA 
financial markets report 2011, table 4.1-2. 
 
 
Figure 6.33:  Household indebtedness to gross disposable income 
 
For Brazil, data are only available for the combined sectors of households (HH) and 
non-profit institutions serving households (NPISH).  Data on financial liabilities 
come from OECD financial balance sheets (non-consolidated, consolidated not 
available).  Data on gross disposable income for HH+NPISH (S14+S15) come from 
UNstat table 4.9.  For Korea, data for household liabilities come from the Bank of 
Korea’s flow of funds figures.  For the period 1975-2001, ‘individual sector’ total 
liabilities employ SNA68; for the period 2002-2009 SNA 93 is employed.  Data on 
the GDI of the ‘individual sector’ comes from Bank of Korea national accounts 
tables.  Note that the Korean data matches that obtainable from OECD/UN sources, 
with the latter available after the change from SNA68 to SNA93 in 2002.  For 
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Mexico, Bank of Mexico’s series CF297, household total financing (SF42790) has 
been used to approximate household liabilities.  Household GDI comes from INEGI 
SNCM national accounts data.  Figures for 1993-2002 are net (gross figures are 
unavailable), while those from 2003 forward are gross.  Note that this ratio possibly 
overstates the level of Mexican household indebtedness.  If figures for HH 
indebtedness are used from the Bank of Mexico’s data on bank lending to 
households, or from OECD data on S14 liabilities, the level of indebtedness hovers 
at around ten per cent of GDI.  For South Africa, South African Reserve Bank series 
KBP 6525J, HH debt to disposable income of HH, has been used.  The resulting ratio 
is similar in terms of trend and approximately five to ten per cent lower than that 
resulting from the use of OECD financial balance sheet data.  For Thailand, Bank of 
Thailand data on HH loans from commercial banks (FI_CB_015, 1990-2000); S2 
(2001-3); S3 (2004 forward) has been used to approximate HH indebtedness.  GDI of 
households comes from NESDB national income report 2008.   For Turkey, figures 
for both HH indebtedness and HH GDI come from CBRT FSRs 2007, 2008, 2010 
and 2011.  Household debt consists of gross consumer credit and credit card balances 
extended by banks and consumer finance companies. The data for the period after 
2008 also include liabilities related to TOKI’s (Housing Development 
Administration) housing sales.   
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